YENI ANDRIANI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 1929/2020

[2026] HKCFI 1257

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 1929 OF 2020

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 22 December 2025 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 30 September 2025, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 10 September 2020.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 30 September 2025, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 14 October 2025. The time for appealing against my order has therefore expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In the Summons, the applicant did not give any ground for the intended appeal nor any reason for her lateness in making the application to appeal against my order. She merely said that the decision “was unsatisfied [sic] and was totally unfair”, her life was still in danger in her country Indonesia and she could not go back. She also mentioned that she was in detention while the judicial review was still running and it was unfair to her.

8.  Likewise, in her supporting affidavit/affirmation (undated but filed on 22 December 2025), the applicant merely alleged that she could not go back to her country Indonesia because it was still “risk” [sic] for her to return, but she did not give any ground for the intended appeal nor any reason for her lateness in making the application.

9.  The Summons was fixed for an oral hearing on 12 March 2026. However, on 9 February 2026, the Director of Immigration informed this court that the applicant was removed on 4 February 2026. As the applicant had been removed out of Hong Kong, it would not serve any practical purpose to continue with the oral hearing fixed on 12 March 2026. Thus, on 9 February 2026, I ordered that the hearing fixed on 12 March 2026 be vacated, and I proceeded to deal with the Summons by way of paper disposal.

10.  It is clear that the applicant offered no satisfactory explanation for her lateness in making the intended appeal. Her detention would not have prevented her from making the appeal within time as she could seek assistance from the Director of Immigration to lodge the appeal just like what she did in filing the Summons while in detention.

11.  In any event, the applicant failed to advance any ground for the intended appeal in the Summons and her supporting affidavit/affirmation. The applicant’s allegation that her life would still be in danger if she returns to her country Indonesia cannot be a ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review. Her allegation that my decision was unsatisfactory and unfair was just a bare accusation without any particulars. It cannot amount to any valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review either.

12.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

13.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above, and hence there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

14.  In the circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review and I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

15.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.