AMIR HOSSAIN v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HCAL 552/2026

[2026] HKCFI 4118

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 552 OF 2026

Application for leave to apply for judicial review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only; or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant in open court;

1.  On this court’s own motion, “Department of Justice” is deleted as the putative interested party.

2.  The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the applicant:

The Leave Application

1.  By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 11 March 2026, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 2 March 2026 (“the Director’s 2026 Decision”), which refused the applicant’s request for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection (“the Request”). The Request was made by way of a letter dated 26 August 2025.

Amendment

2.  In Form 86, the applicant named “Department of Justice” as the putative interested party when naming the said department as an interested party is not necessary.

3.  This court therefore makes an order on its own motion to delete “Department of Justice” as the putative interested party.

Procedural history of the applicant’s previous non-refoulement claim

4.  The applicant is a male Bangladeshi and claimed that he illegally sneaked into Hong Kong on 10 September 2012. He was arrested by the police on 23 September 2012. He lodged a torture claim on 25 September 2012 and was released on recognizance on 27 October 2012. His torture claim was treated as withdrawn by the Director upon his failure to return a completed Torture Claim Form within the specified time. He then sought for non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong by a written signification dated 19 August 2013.

5.  The Director rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim on all the applicable grounds of Torture Risk[1], BOR 2 Risk[2], BOR 3 Risk[3] and Persecution Risk[4] under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”) on 9 August 2018 (“the Director’s 2018 Decision”). The applicant’s appeal/petition against the Director’s 2018 Decision was dismissed by the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) on 11 December 2019 (“the Board’s Decision”).

6.  Subsequently, on 10 January 2020, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review against the Board’s Decision (“the Previous Leave Application”). This court dismissed the Previous Leave Application on 16 May 2025 (“the CFI’s 2025 Decision”).

The applicant’s subsequent claim

7.  On 26 August 2025, which was just less than 4 months after the CFI’s 2025 Decision, the applicant made the Request.

8.  By way of a letter dated 5 September 2025, the Director informed the applicant that he had previously made a non-refoulement claim which had been finally determined. In the same letter, the applicant was also informed of his right to seek legal representation for the Request and the availability of publicly-funded legal assistance for the Request.

9.  On 11 September 2025, the applicant’s case was referred to the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”) for their consideration. DLS informed the Director on 25 September 2025 that they would not represent the applicant in relation to the Request.

10.  On 26 September 2025, the Director informed the applicant of DLS’s refusal and that he might consider instructing a private lawyer at his own expense. The applicant was further reminded of the requirement of making a subsequent claim and requested to provide further evidence, if any, on or before 10 October 2025, and if the evidence/supporting document(s) were not readily available, he should fully specify in writing (1) the nature of the evidence/supporting document(s) he intended to submit in support of the Request; and (2) the relevancy to the Request.

11.  On 9 October 2025, the Director received the applicant’s letter enclosing some supporting documents in support of the Request.

12.  After consideration of the applicant’s previous non-refoulement claim, the Request, the further information and evidence submitted by the applicant in support of the Request, the Director refused the Request by way of the Director’s 2026 Decision.

The applicant’s case and the Director’s decision

13.  In his first claim for non-refoulement protection, the applicant claimed that if refouled to Bangladesh, he would be killed by the people of Awami League (“AL”) due to his association with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”) and its leaders. He was also worried that he would be arrested because of a false case filed against him and his family members by AL members.

14.  In the Request, the applicant made multiple claims of threats as summarised by the Director in paragraph 9 of the Director’s 2026 Decision, including threats from: (1) members of National Citizen Party (“NCP”) and Islamic Party like Jamaat-e-Islami (“JI”) due to political reasons; (2) moneylenders; (3) relatives who frequently threatened to kill him because they were scared that he would talk about their secret to the police or other department; and (4) the general situation in Bangladesh.

15.  In the applicant’s letter dated 9 October 2025, the applicant enclosed some documents, namely 3 pieces of online articles in respect of Bangladesh.

16.  With regards to the applicant’s threats from NCP and JI due to political reasons, the Director considered that the applicant’s assertion that he would be personally targeted by NCP or JI after the AL regime came to an end was merely speculative without substantial information, and regardless of the present ruling party of his country, the applicant’s bare assertion that NCP or JI were targeting or threatening him was similarly stemmed from his political divergence with them at most. This same purported source of fear had been fully considered and rejected in his previous non-refoulement claim due to credibility issue.

17.  The Director also noted that the applicant’s numerous claimed threats from moneylenders and relatives were submitted without any new and sufficient evidence or explanations in support.

18.  The Director was of the view that the documents submitted by the applicant in his letter dated 9 October 2025 only showed some general news of Bangladesh, none of which were related to the applicant personally, nor could they show, whether directly or indirectly, that the applicant would be subjected to any risk of harm as asserted.

19.  More importantly, the Director had taken the recent situation of Bangladesh into consideration and found from updated country of origin information that the situation in Bangladesh had been stable since the interim government took charge in early August 2024. The Director found that the applicant had adduced no evidence regarding the current situation in Bangladesh and the Bangladeshi government policy was not good for its citizens which amounted to any risk of harm to the applicant personally upon his return to the country. There was insufficient evidence suggesting that the applicant would be refrained from getting state protection and internal relocation.

20.  Thus, having considered all aspects of the Request, the Director decided that the applicant’s claimed risks in his intended subsequent claim could not amount to a significant change of circumstances and had no realistic prospects of success.

Oral hearing

21.  The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application and his case was heard on 2 July 2026.

22.  At the hearing, the applicant confirmed that he had previously made an application for leave to apply for judicial review against the Board’s Decision and the application was refused. However, the applicant did not appeal against the CFI’s 2025 Decision. Instead, he made an application to the Director for filing a subsequent claim.

23.  When this court asked the applicant why he did so, he simply said that he had new problems in his country.

24.  When this court asked the applicant to elaborate on the grounds of his intended judicial review, which were contained in his supporting affirmation filed on 11 March 2026 under the heading “GROUNDS FOR LEAVE JUDICIAL REVIEW FOR MY SUBSEQUENT CLAIM”, the applicant confirmed that he would rely on those grounds, but said that his friend wrote them for him and he could not remember what were written there.

25.  This court then asked the interpreter to interpret the said document to the applicant. Nevertheless, even after being read the said document, the applicant could only say that he had lots of problems in his country, the problems were severe, and people could be killed easily. He asked to be granted some more time to stay in Hong Kong because he would be arrested in the airport and be killed if he returned.

26.  As the applicant was making a second leave application, this court warned him that a Restricted Proceedings Order might be made against him and asked if he would make any submission in that regard. The applicant answered in the negative.

Grounds for judicial review

27.  The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).

28.  In the applicant’s supporting affirmation filed on 11 March 2026, he mentioned a number of grounds for the intended judicial review, which are summarised as follows:-

(1)  His claims were fresh and different from his previous claim;

(2)  There was procedural impropriety or irrationality in that the Director failed to: (a) properly apply paragraph 2 of the UN Committee against Torture General Comment No.2; (b) conduct sufficient inquiry into the relevant country of origin conditions; (c) conduct any screening interview for his new fresh case; (d) consider his fear and that he could not relocate because his enemies could easily trace him wherever he hid in his country; and (e) assess his claim genuinely;

(3)  There was error/misdirection in law in that the Director failed to: (a) consider the new fact he had provided in the Request; and (b) consider the supporting documents he submitted;

(4)  There was no sufficient basis for the Director to conclude that he and his family members would not be at risk of torture and/or CIDTP[5] upon refoulement; and

(5)  The Director failed to consider his fear for his life and danger upon return to his country.

29.  As aforesaid, the applicant did not elaborate on any of the above grounds at the oral hearing before this court. He only mentioned that he had lots of problems in his country, the problems were severe, people could be killed easily, and he would be arrested at the airport and be killed.

Discussion

30.  First of all, the applicant’s alleged danger in his home country, including the danger arising from his new enemies and due to the new reasons, as well as the documents submitted by the applicant, had all been duly considered by the Director when dealing with the Request.

31.  The Director had laid out in the Director’s 2026 Decision its detailed consideration of all the alleged new threats and had given full reasons for its finding that the applicant’s claimed risks in his intended subsequent claim could not amount to a significant change of circumstances and had no realistic prospects of success.

32.  Thus, Grounds (1), (3), (4) and (5) are not arguable.

33.  As to his general allegations that were summarised in Ground (2) above, the Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that general assertions without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial review (see Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA 578; and Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626). Further, as held by the Court of Appeal in Re Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020] HKCA 244, “general assertions or propositions of law cannot assist an appellant when he fails to condescend to the requisite particulars related to the facts of his case”. Thus, the applicant’s general allegations as aforesaid cannot help the applicant at all.

34.  With regards to the applicant’s complaint that the Director rejected his claim without conducting any screening interview for his new claim, there is no statutory provision that requires a screening interview to be conducted prior to the making of the decision on intended subsequent claims. Thus, the arrangement of screening interviews is not a must.

35.  As aforesaid, after DLS refused the applicant’s application for free legal assistance, the Director had invited the applicant to provide evidence/supporting document(s) in support of his claims and he in fact did so. The applicant was not deprived of his right to provide any evidence or documents to substantiate the Request.

36.  What the applicant said at the oral hearing, namely that he had new problems, the problems were severe, he would be arrested at the airport and be killed, were just reiteration of his claims and cannot amount to any valid grounds for judicial review either.

37.  Thus, none of the assertions made by the applicant, whether by way of his affirmation or his oral submission at the hearing before this court, constitutes a valid ground for challenging the Director’s 2026 Decision.

38.  The making of a subsequent claim is stipulated by Section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115, which reads as follows:-

“Limitation on subsequent claim

(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a person who has previously made a torture claim must not subsequently make another torture claim.

(2) A person may make a subsequent claim if the person provides sufficient evidence in writing to satisfy an immigration officer that –

(a) there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined or withdrawn; and

(b) the change, when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of the previous claim, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

(3) In deciding whether or not a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), an immigration officer may take into account any finding of credibility or fact made by an immigration officer or the Appeal Board in relation to a torture claim previously made by the person.

(4) If an immigration officer decides that a person may make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision.

(5) If an immigration officer decides that a person may not make a subsequent claim under subsection (2), the immigration officer must give the person written notice of the decision, and the notice must also include the reasons for the decision.”

39.  It is clear that the Director had fully complied with the above provisions when considering the Request.

40.  The Director found that the applicant’s new claims arising from political reasons were his mere speculation. His claimed threats from moneylenders and relatives were advanced without information and evidence in support. Further, even though the applicant had submitted articles showing the general conditions in his country, the Director considered that none of them were related to the applicant personally, nor could they show that the applicant would be subjected to any risk of harm as asserted.

41.  Moreover, there was insufficient evidence to suggest that the applicant would be refrained from getting state protection and internal relocation.

42.  Thus, the Director considered that the applicant had failed to satisfy an immigration officer that there had been any significant change of circumstances or those changes when taken together with the material previously submitted in support of his previous claim would give his subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

43.  These were findings of facts within the exclusive ambit of the Director, and this court in a judicial review will not interfere with them save when such findings involved errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality.

44.  Having considered the Request, and having rigorously examined the Director’s 2026 Decision with anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Director had correctly set out the law and key legal principles relating to the making of a subsequent claim under section 37ZO, correctly identified the issues, and analyzed the evidence with due care. The Director observed a very high standard of fairness. This court finds no errors of law in the Director’s 2026 Decision or procedural unfairness in the making of that decision. The Director’s 2026 Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational.

45.  As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave must be refused.

Restricted Proceedings Order

46.  It seems that the applicant might have abused the judicial process by making the Leave Application, as the applicant’s non-refoulement claim had already been determined by the Director’s 2018 Decision, the Board’s Decision and this court’s decision in the Previous Leave Application.

47.  The court has inherent jurisdiction to prevent an applicant from abusing its process by making an extended order against such applicant (see Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Ltd and Another [2005] 1 HKLRD 473).

48.  Restricted Proceedings Order (“RPO”) is an appropriate measure to prevent abuses of the court’s process by non-refoulement claimants (see Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991).

49.  However, this court has to exercise its discretion by reference to the circumstances of the case and the principle of proportionality. A RPO is in substance an injunction and this court has the power to grant an injunction to safeguard the proper administration of justice. At the same time, the exercise of such power has to be balanced against a litigant’s right of access to the court (see The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa [2006] 1 HKLRD 679).

50.  Generally, such order is called for when a vexatious litigant has already involved the appellate process unsuccessfully but persisted by re-litigating his wholly unmeritorious case all over again (see Siti Khotimah v Director of Immigration [2022] HKCA 327 and Indah v Director of Immigration [2022] HKCA 564).

51.  This court has called upon the applicant to show cause why a RPO should not be made against him, but the applicant did not make any submission in respect of the same. Nevertheless, as the applicant has not gone through any appellate proceedings in respect of the Previous Leave Application, this court does not think that it is right to restrict the applicant from exercising any right of appeal at this stage.

Conclusion

52.  For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed and no RPO is made.

Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1