Case Details
AA (a minor) by Z, her next friend v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5278 · HCAL 2127/2020
Court of First Instance
HCAL 2127/2020
[2026] HKCFI 5278
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2127 OF 2020
BETWEEN
| |AA (a minor) |Applicant |
| |by Z, her next friend | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by counsel for the |
| |applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. Leave granted to the applicant to apply for judicial review in respect
of the Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision dated 25 August 2020.
2. The applicant is directed to issue an originating summons for the
intended judicial review on or before 30 September 2026 pursuant to
Order 53, rule 5(5) of the Rules of the High Court.
Observations for the applicants:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 23 October
2020, the applicant applied for leave to apply for
judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect
of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board
(“the Board”) dated 25 August 2020 (“the Board’s
Decision”).
2. The applicant is a minor born in Hong Kong in
January 2016 and was just four years old when her
case was assessed by the Board. The applicant was
not legally represented and was only represented by
her mother (“the Mother”) before the Board.
Likewise, when the Leave Application was filed, the
applicant was only represented by the Mother.
3. On 25 March 2026, the Director of Legal Aid issued a
Legal Aid Certificate to the Mother acting for the
applicant in these proceedings. Since then, the
applicant was legally represented before this court.
4. By way of a letter dated 26 August 2026 from the
applicant’s solicitors to this court, the applicant
made an ex parte application to apply for an
anonymity order, which was granted by this court on
31 August 2026. Thus, the applicant is referred to
as “AA” and the Mother is referred to as “Z” in
these proceedings.
5. By way of a summons dated 1 September 2026, the
applicant applied for leave to amend Form 86. This
court granted leave to the applicant at the oral
hearing of the Leave Application on 10 September
2026 to amend Form 86 as per the draft submitted at
the hearing. The Amended Form 86 was filed on 11
September 2026.
6. The Board found that the Mother had failed to
establish that the applicant was entitled to non-
refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the
applicable grounds under the Unified Screening
Mechanism (“the USM”). Accordingly, the Board
dismissed the applicant’s appeal/petition against
the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the
Director”) dated 25 September 2019 and confirmed the
same, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement
claim.
The applicant’s case
7. The Mother was a domestic helper in Hong Kong who
came from country I (the name of the country is not
mentioned due to the anonymity order). The Mother
met the applicant’s father (“the Father”) in Hong
Kong. The Father is of a different nationality from
the Mother. Although the Father and the Mother are
of the same religion, they are from different
branches.
8. In May 2010, the Mother and the Father went through
a religious marriage in Hong Kong. However, their
religious marriage was not a legal marriage in the
Mother’s country and was not registered with the
government of country I, nor in Hong Kong.
9. The Mother quitted her employment as a foreign
domestic helper in October 2011.
10. After the marriage, the Mother gave birth to the
applicant’s elder sister and the applicant in 2011
and 2016 respectively in Hong Kong.
11. The Mother and the applicant’s elder sister had
lodged their non-refoulement claims separately from
the applicant. Their non-refoulement claims were
rejected by the Director on 12 November 2015, and,
on appeal/petition, by the Board on 15 March 2017.
12. The applicant’s application for non-refoulement
protection, as presented by the Mother, was based on
the identical facts upon which the Mother and the
applicant’s elder sister’s claims were based.
13. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement
protection because if returned to country I, she
together with the Mother and her elder sister would
be killed or otherwise seriously harmed by either
the Mother’s ex-husband, or by two of the Mother’s
brothers, or by the religious people in the Mother’s
home village.
14. The Mother claimed that her ex-husband, whom she
claimed to have come from a brutal tribe, was
furious upon hearing her decision to divorce him in
2010, and threatened that he would find the Mother
and kill her when he was released from prison.
Subsequently, their divorce was gone through by
consent in 2010.
15. The Mother also claimed that her family, in
particular her own father and two of her brothers,
were angry with her as they considered that the
Mother had brought shame to the family by marrying a
foreigner without her father’s consent. The
Mother’s father subsequently passed away. However,
when the Mother informed her younger brother, with
whom she had remained on friendly terms, in a
telephone call of the applicant’s birth, the younger
brother told her that two of their brothers were
still angry with her for having brought shame upon
her family in Indonesia, for which they would never
forgive her. They forbade her to go back to their
family home, and threatened that if she ever did so,
they would kill her and her two daughters.
16. With regards to the fear from religious people in
the Mother’s home village, the Mother claimed that
she was informed by her younger brother that when
the religious leader in their village heard that she
had married a foreigner who belonged to a different
branch of their religion, the leader visited their
family home and expelled the Mother from the
village, and said that the members of the religious
group would throw stones at her if she returned to
the village.
17. The Mother was also told by the younger brother’s
wife that since she was not validly married to her
present husband, she was regarded by the religious
people in her home village as living in an extra-
marital affair, for which they would punish her if
she returned to the village with her daughters.
Oral hearing
18. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the
Leave Application and her case was heard on 10
September 2026.
19. As aforesaid, the applicant was granted legal aid
on 25 March 2026. She was represented by counsel at
the hearing.
20. Counsel for the applicant confirmed at the hearing
that the applicant would rely on the grounds as
stated in the Amended Form 86 for her intended
judicial review, namely:-
Ground (1): the Board failed to assess the applicant’s claim as a
separate claim;
Ground (2): the Board failed to examine the applicant’s personal
circumstances or consider child-specific risks;
Ground (3): the Board failed to consider child-specific country of
origin information (“COI”); and
Ground (4): the Board erred in finding that there were no proscribed
grounds of persecution despite the applicant being of
mixed race and being a child born out of wedlock.
21. Counsel submitted at the hearing that the first 3
Grounds were interconnected and were related to the
Board’s failure to assess the applicant’s risk
arising from her own circumstances, namely that she
was a child born out of wedlock and of mixed race.
Grounds for judicial review
22. The applicant is required to identify clearly the
grounds for the intended judicial review (see Ho Loy
& Another v Director of Environmental Protection,
HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
23. The applicant did not advance any ground in the
original Form 86, nor in the Mother’s supporting
affirmation dated 23 October 2020 submitted on
behalf of the applicant.
24. In the Amended Form 86 under the heading “Grounds on
which relief is sought”, counsel for the applicant
advanced the grounds as stated above to challenge
the Board’s Decision.
25. As aforesaid, counsel submitted at the oral hearing
that the first 3 Grounds were interconnected and
were related to the Board’s failure to assess the
applicant’s risks arising from her own
circumstances, namely that she was a child born out
of wedlock and of mixed race.
Discussion
26. The applicant was only about 4 years old when her
case was heard by the Board on 24 March 2020. She
was not legally represented at the Board’s hearing
and was only represented by the Mother. Thus, with
the lack of legal representation, it was possible
that the applicant’s case might not have been
properly presented to the Board for its
consideration.
27. As confirmed by counsel for the applicant at the
oral hearing before this court, the applicant relied
on the grounds as stated in the Amended Form 86 as
summarised above.
28. Although counsel submitted that only Grounds (1) to
(3) are interconnected, this court is of the view
that all 4 Grounds are in fact interconnected.
Indeed, if the Board had considered the child-
specific risks of the applicant, it would have found
that the applicant’s own personal circumstances
could have given rise to a risk of persecution.
29. This court notes from the Board’s Decision that the
Board had indeed only focused on dealing with the
applicant’s risk based on the Mother’s claims.
30. The Board was plainly aware of the applicant’s
personal circumstances as a minor of tender age, she
was a child of mixed race and was considered as born
out of wedlock, as the Mother’s religious marriage
in Hong Kong was not recognised and was not
registered in country I or Hong Kong.
31. Although the Board had addressed the applicant’s
risks arising from the Mother’s situation, the Board
did not separately consider the difficulties the
applicant might face upon refoulement, such as
whether she would face discrimination as a child of
mixed race and a child born out of wedlock, and
whether she would be ill-treated by any other
persons upon refoulement.
32. As held in Re Shahul Hameed Beer Mohamed and
Others, 08/04/2026, CACV 77/2024, [2026] HKCA 632
and Re Bantigue Susan Banes and Another, 29/09/2025,
CACV 234/2024, [2025] HKCA 853, the Board should
have considered the applicant’s unique situation as
a child of mixed race, which might be a cause for
discrimination.
33. The Board has clearly committed an error of law when
it failed to follow the Fabio[1] principles to give
adequate and separate consideration to the
applicant’s claim and her personal circumstances in
the Board’s Decision.
34. This error alone is sufficient enough for the
applicant’s intended judicial review to be
reasonably arguable.
35. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan
v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, the court
should grant leave to apply for judicial review when
the claim is a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the
view of this court that there are realistic
prospects of success for the applicant’s intended
judicial review in respect of the Board’s Decision
and hence leave is granted to the applicant to
proceed with the intended judicial review.
Conclusion
36. For reasons aforesaid, leave is granted for the
applicant to apply for judicial review in respect of
the Board’s Decision and the applicant is directed
to issue an originating summons for the intended
judicial review on or before 30 September 2026
pursuant to Order 53, rule 5(5) of the Rules of the
High Court.
Dated the 16th day of September 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or his solicitors | | |
|must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s |the putative |
|may be directed by the|solicitors |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order |on: 16/09/2026 |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any| |interested parties as |
|directions given | |may be directed by the |
|within 14 days after |Applicant’s ref. no: |Court / the putative |
|the leave was granted |AL715212/CNT |interested parties’ |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |16/09/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/ Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and| |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance| |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 16362/19/10/11/I1764|
| | | |
|c) supply to every | | |
|other party copies of | |Director of Immigration |
|every affidavit which | |Putative interested |
|the Applicant proposes| |party’s ref. no.: |
|to use at the hearing,| |QA T/C 580/19 (Formerly |
|including the | |RBCZ 10393/19) |
|affidavit in support | | |
|of the application for| |Department of Justice, |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Senior Assistant Law |
|6(5)). | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
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[1] Fabio Arlyn Timogan and Ors v Evan Ruth and Anor [2020] HKCA 971