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HCAL 3587/2019
[2025] HKCFI 1151
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 3587 of 2019
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BETWEEN
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Rehena Mst Zinnat |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board/
Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office |
Putative
Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative |
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Interested Party |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Teresa Wu:
The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By Form 86 (“Form 86”) filed on 3 December 2019, the Applicant applies for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/ Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 29 November 2019 (“the Board’s Decision”) confirming the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 23 November 2018 (“the Director’s Decision”), which rejected her non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds (“the Grounds”) under the Unified Screening Mechanism (USM).
Background
2. The Applicant’s personal background, the incidents alleged to show her fear of being harmed or killed in Bangladesh by the people of Awami League, and the immigration and procedural history, etc. were set out in the Board’s Decision. I do not see it necessary to restate them here. For completeness’ sake, reference can be made to the Board’s Decision, the hyperlink to which is included below[1]. Unless otherwise indicated, the Board’s abbreviations and descriptions are adopted below.
Discussion
3. I am not satisfied that the Applicant’s intended challenge of the Board’s Decision is reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success: see Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung & Another (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, and have therefore refused leave. I am not required or expected to give elaborate reasons for my decision in leave application: see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at §23.
4. To begin with, the Applicant is unable to state her grounds for the intended judicial review: see Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015 (22 December 2016) at §142. She is also in breach of her duty to make full and frank disclosure of both the material facts and the potential legal answers to her claims: see Re Leung Kwok Hung, HCAL 83/2012 (28 September 2012), at §35. In the supporting affirmation, she merely asserts that “…I have life and death question in my country. My enemy [sic] are too powerful and influential. Police and other law enforcing agencies listen [sic] my enemy. So it is impossible for me to return”.
5. I have reminded myself that the Board’s Decision should be rigorously examined and anxiously scrutinized. I should also ensure that the procedure adopted by the Board as the primary decision maker had met the high standard of fairness. The Board’s discussion and consideration of the different grounds under the USM, its assessment of evidence and COI materials and risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation, etc. were set out in the Board’s Decision. These matters were primarily within the province of the Board. It is not the Applicant’s complaint that there were errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. I am satisfied that the Board had made the findings of fact based on the available evidence, applying the relevant law and legal principles.
6. As the materials provided by the Applicant do not demonstrate any basis or ground to challenge the legality, rationality or fairness of the process below, it is not for the Court to usurp the role of the primary decision maker or intervene by way of judicial review: see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14; Re Qadir Sher [2018] HKCA 160; Hounkpedji Messanh v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2018] HKCA 152; Re Rizwan alias Rizwan Gulistan [2018] HKCA 162; Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246 and Re Masoom Parvez [2018] HKCA 163.
Conclusion
7. For these reasons, I make an order that the Leave Application be dismissed.
Dated the 9th day of April 2025
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( Allen LEE )
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent to the Applicant
on 9/4/2025
Rehena Mst Zinnat
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil |
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Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 9/4/2025
Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 14686/18/12/43/B1742
Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
QA T/C 4505/18 (formerly: RBCZ 11556/17) (PSO)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
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