|
HCAL 46/2023
[2026] HKCFI 2924
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 46 of 2023
|
BETWEEN
|
| |
Ragil Lusiani |
Applicant |
| |
and |
|
| |
Torture Claims Appeal Board/ |
Putative |
| |
Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office |
Respondent |
| |
and |
|
| |
Director of Immigration |
Putative |
| |
|
Interested Party |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Connie Lee:
1. Form 86 be amended, naming only the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office as the Putative Respondent and the Director of Immigration as the Putative Interested Party.
2. The application herein for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observation for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By Form 86 filed on 12 January 2023, the Applicant seeks leave to apply for judicial review (the “Leave Application”) of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 28 November 2022 (the “Board’s Decision”). By that decision, the Board confirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 14 July 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”), which had rejected her non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”).
2. The Applicant’s background, the basis of her claim and the arguments she advanced had been set out in detail in the Board’s Decision. It is not necessary for me to repeat the same here. Unless otherwise specified, the abbreviations and descriptions used in the Board’s Decision, the hyperlink[1] to which is included below, are also adopted herein.
3. The Applicant did not attend the oral hearing. I have considered the merits of the Leave Application based on the materials available before me.[2]
Discussion
4. Judicial review does not operate as a further avenue of appeal. The Leave Application operates as a “filtering” process and there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision.[3] In seeking to challenge the Board’s Decision, the Applicant ought to have clearly and precisely identified the grounds relied upon in the Form 86 and in her supporting affirmation. As matter stands, the Applicant has failed to identify any valid or effective public law grounds.[4]
5. In view of the seriousness of the issues involved, I have reminded myself of the enhanced standard required by law. Despite the Applicant did not advance any valid ground for the intended judicial review, I have scrutinized the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality.
6. I am not satisfied that the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review of the Board’s Decision is reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success. [5]
7. First, the primary decision makers are the Director of Immigration and the Board and the Court should not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence, country of origin information (COI) materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director of Immigration).[6]
8. The Board was acutely aware of the Applicant’s claim that she was in fear of being harmed or killed by her creditor i.e. Margono if she was returned to Indonesia. The Board had assessed the material facts and evidence of the Applicant’s claim including the COI materials and found that (1) there was no factual basis on which to find any of the applicable grounds to be established; (2) even taking her account at its highest, there was no real risk that she would be subjected to serious harm on her return; (3) state protection would be available to her on her return and (4) internal relocation would be a viable option.
9. Second, there is simply nothing to indicate the Board had failed to take into account any relevant matters. The Board was quite simply entitled to come to the conclusions it did.
10. Third, in all circumstances, I can discern no error of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality on the part of the Board in the assessment and rejection of the Applicant’s claim.
Conclusion
11. Accordingly, I dismiss the Leave Application.
Dated the 29th day of May 2026
| |
(Klein Tse)
for Registrar, High Court
|
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicants:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
|
|
|
|
|
a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
|
|
Sent to the Applicant
on 29 May 2026
Ragil Lusiani
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil. |
|
Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 29 May 2026
Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 18357
Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C 1018/21 (formerly RBCZ/10740/21)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
|