CHONG KAI MAN (person appointed by Order dated 21st April 2022 to substitute FOO TAK CHING, the Manager of ‘WAH YAN MO FAN HEUNG’) v. YU HON CHIU and YU PUI LAM, the Managers of ‘YU LUK SHUN TONG’ AND OTHERS

HCMP 724/2017

[2026] HKCFI 4297

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 724 OF 2017

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DECISION ON COSTS

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A. INTRODUCTION

1.  On 4 December 2025, I handed down the main judgment in these proceedings (“the Judgment”)[1], in which I ruled on the criteria for membership of the Heung and gave directions for the calling and holding of a meeting of the members of the Heung for the purpose of determining the managers of the Heung (“the First Meeting”). At [130] of the Judgment, I directed that costs of the proceedings be reserved.  After discussion, the Applicant (“A”) and the 1^st Respondents (“R1”) could not reach an agreement on costs, and hence the issue of costs would need to be resolved by this Court.  I have directed that the issue of costs be resolved on paper, and both A and R1 have lodged their respective written submissions with the Court.  The 2^nd Respondent (“R2”) is neutral on the issue of costs and has not lodged any written submissions.  For ease of reference, unless otherwise specified, the abbreviations used in the Judgment are adopted herein.

2.  On the issue of costs, A’s written submissions are prepared by Mr Anthony Neoh SC, leading Mr Alvin Chong.  R1’s written submissions are prepared by Ms Audrey Eu SC, leading Mr Nelson Miu.

3.  As a background information, after this Court handing down the Judgment, the First Meeting was convened on 2 April 2026.  In that meeting, the Heung members confirmed the resolution passed on 23 August 2014 for removal of MK Tang as a manager of the Heung, confirmed the resolution passed on the same date for appointing Pat Wong as a manager of the Heung, and appointed Daydes Ng as a new manager of the Heung.  All the decisions made in the First Meeting were made by resolutions passed by a majority, with 50 votes in favour of the proposed resolutions and 3 votes against.  All the votes against the proposed resolutions were casted by A in his personal capacity.

B.     THE PARTIES’ RESPECTIVE STANCES ON COSTS

4.  A’s stance on costs is that the nature of these proceedings falls within Category 1 in Re Buckton[2]. Applying the principles in Re Buckton and the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”), Order 62 rule 6(2), A is entitled to his costs of and incidental to these proceedings, whether before or after his formal appointment as the representative of the Heung in these proceedings, be paid out of the Heung’s funds on a solicitor-own-client basis, with a certificate for two counsel. There is no basis to deprive A of his costs.  Regarding the costs of R1, A has no objection that R1 can have reimbursement from the Heung’s funds.

5.  R1’s stance on costs is as follows:

(1)     A should not be entitled to any costs of and occasioned by these proceedings incurred by him after his appointment as substituted applicant.  If A is to be paid any costs at all, it should be limited to the costs of senior counsel, to be taxed if not agreed by R1 and/or R2, on a common fund basis, to be paid out of the Heung’s funds;

(2)     R1 should be entitled to the costs of and occasioned by these proceedings, to be taxed if not agreed by A and/or R2, on a trustee basis, with certificate for two counsel, to be paid out of the Heung’s funds;

(3)     R2 should be entitled to the costs of and occasioned by these proceedings, to be taxed if not agreed by A and/or R1, on a common fund basis, to be paid out of the Heung’s funds;

(4)     There should be no order for costs relating to MK Tang, who has been removed as a party after his death in 2025 in respect of the Order dated 21 Apr 2022 where costs were reserved;

(5)     No order for costs is necessary for TC Foo, the original applicant who had passed away in June 2020, as his solicitors have already been paid from rentals of the Heung and the time for taxation has long passed.

6.  Regarding R1’s positions as set in [5(2)] to [5(5)] above, A does not have any objection.  As to R1’s position as set out in [5(1)] above, A takes issue with R1.

7.  By the Order dated 21 April 2022, KM Chong was substituted as A in these proceedings, representing the interest of the Heung and its members for the sole purpose of these proceedings.  At [14] of A’s written submissions dated 15 June 2026, A says that prior to his appointment in April 2022, A made multiple payments on behalf of TC Foo to enable the continuation of these proceedings. Thus, A is seeking a costs order that the costs incurred by him, whether before or after his formal appointment, be paid by the Heung on a solicitor-own-client basis.  However, at [3] of A’s written reply submissions dated 29 June 2026, A has expressed agreement to some proposals made by R1, including the one set out in [5(5)] above.  In view of this development, costs claimed by A, if allowed, would be costs incurred by him in seeking the Order dated 21 April 2022 and thereafter.

8.  The Heung’s funds are the money now in a stakeholder’s account (“the account”) kept by LCC.  The balance in that account is now around HK$19 million.  In 2014, TC Foo and Pat Wong appointed Bonus Investments Ltd (“Bonus”) as the Heung’s letting agent.  Bonus regularly collects rentals from the tenants (“Bonus tenants”) and pays the same into the account.  The Heung’s funds in the account are the rental incomes from Bonus tenants.

C.     DISCUSSION

C1.    The principles

9.  The principles set out by Kekewich J in Re Buckton were explained by Lord Scott of Foscote NPJ in Cheng Pui Yuen v Worldcup Investments Inc^[3]. In Cheung Pui Yuen, Lord Scott of Foscote NPJ said:

“56. The case on costs …… is based on the principle that where proceedings have been properly instituted for the benefit of a trust fund, or a deceased’s estate, the court may, in an appropriate case, make an order for the costs of the proceedings to be borne by the fund or estate, as the case may be. The principle was explained by Kekewich J in Re Buckton [1907] 2 Ch 406 at pp.414/415. He referred, first, to cases in which trustees ask the court to determine some question which has arisen in the administration of the trust. In such cases, said Kekewich J, the general rule would be that the costs of all necessary parties would be taxed as between solicitor and client and paid out of the estate. He then referred to a second class of case in which the question for determination by the court is raised not by the trustees but by some of the beneficiaries. In such a case, if the question raised would have justified an application by the trustees but for some reason or other the application has been made by beneficiaries, the same costs consequences, he said, should follow:

‘The application is necessary for the administration of the trust, and the costs of all parties are necessarily incurred for the benefit of the estate as a whole.’ (p.415)

Kekewich J distinguished, however, the first and second classes of case from the third class, a class where the application to the court is made by a beneficiary but is, in substance although not in form, an adverse claim made in hostile litigation. In such a case, said the judge, the rule applicable to hostile litigation should be applied and the unsuccessful party ordered to pay the costs.

……

58. There is, moreover, a further principle regarding litigation to resolve questions arising in the administration of a deceased’s estate that needs to be borne in mind. If it is the deceased who is responsible for the creation of the doubts that have necessitated an application to the court for the doubts to be resolved, it is the deceased’s estate on which the costs of the application should fall. The principle is a well known one: “where the difficulty is occasioned by the … conduct of the testator … the costs are costs of administration” ……

59. But these principles do not constitute rules. They provide a guide as to how, in probate or administration proceedings, judicial discretion regarding the costs of litigation should be exercised. The answer to that may depend not only on the principles referred to but also upon the particular circumstances in which the litigation has been commenced and prosecuted. ……” (Emphasis added)

10.  In the context of Wui, Tso or Tong, the Re Buckton principles also apply.[4]

11.  RHC, Order 62 rule 6(2) provides:

“Where a person is or has been a party to any proceedings in the capacity of trustee, personal representative or mortgagee, he shall, unless the Court otherwise orders, be entitled to the costs of those proceedings, in so far as they are not recovered from or paid by any other person, out of the fund held by the trustee or personal representative or the mortgaged property, as the case may be; and the Court may otherwise order only on the ground that the trustee, personal representative or mortgagee has acted unreasonably or, in the case of a trustee or personal representative, has in substance acted for his own benefit rather than for the benefit of the fund.”

12.  In considering the issue of costs, the Court may take into account the conduct of all the parties.[5] This may extend to any matter relating to the litigation and the parties’ conduct in it, and also to the circumstances leading to the litigation, but no further.[6]

C2.    Dispute between A and R1

13.  As mentioned in the above, the dispute between A and R1 is whether A should be entitled to get costs of these proceedings from the Heung’s funds, and if yes, to what extent.

14.  R1 submits that A should not be regarded as a trustee.  TC Foo was a registered manager of the Heung and had commenced these proceedings in the capacity of a trustee.  However, A was never a manager of the Heung.   Further, A has acted unreasonably and against the interests of the Heung in these proceedings.  In the premises, A should not be regarded as a trustee of the Heung in considering the issue of costs.

15.  In my view, by the Order dated 21 April 2022, A is authorised as the representative of the Heung and its members in these proceedings.  Thus, for the purpose of these proceedings, A should be considered as a trustee of the Heung.  The purpose of these proceedings is to ascertain the membership of the Heung and to enable the Heung to appoint its own managers.  These proceedings are necessary for the administration of the Heung.  Hence, I am of the view that this case is within Re Buckton Category 1.  Even if I were wrong on this issue, bearing in mind that A is a member of the Heung and is a beneficiary of the Heung, this case would fall within Re Buckton Category 2 in any event.  In other words, no matter what, the nature of these proceedings would fall within either Re Buckton Category 1 or Re Buckton Category 2.  Accordingly, unless there is some reason depriving A’s entitlement to costs, A’s costs in these proceedings should be borne by the Heung.

16.  In my judgment, the real issue is whether there is a valid reason for depriving A’s entitlement to costs.

17.  R1 submits that A should not be allowed to get costs of these proceedings from the Heung by reason of A’s conduct and stance. R1 is relying upon the following in support of their contentions:

(1)     Circumstances leading to the setting up of the account

(a)     At one time, TC Foo and MK Tang were the two registered managers of the Heung.  TC Foo discovered the fraud and/or mismanagement by MK Tang and called a Heung meeting on 26 October 2013 to remove MK Tang as manager and to elect Pat Wong in his place.  On 23 August 2014, another Heung meeting was called to confirm the resolutions passed in 2013 removing MK Tang and appointing Pat Wong.  However, MK Tang wrote to the District Office to object to these resolutions on the basis that membership of the Heung was unresolved.  This led to the District Office shelving the appointment of Pat Wong, and MK Tang remaining as a registered manager.

(b)     In 2014, Pat Wong and TC Foo appointed Bonus as the Heung’s letting agent to collect rent from tenants and to pay the same into the account.  In ordering costs to be paid out of the funds in the account, it is important to know who has been responsible for gathering such funds and who has been trying to obstruct the same.

(c)     TC Foo passed away in June 2020, before the proceedings against MK Tang or the proceedings on membership could be resolved.  In May 2021, MK Tang, purporting to be the sole surviving registered manager and despite his removal in 2013 and confirmed in 2014 as aforesaid, signed a 10-year lease (“Tinting Lease”) with Tinting Development Ltd (“Tinting”), a company with a HK$100 paid up capital incorporated 2 months earlier, letting all the Heung’s land to Tinting at a gross undervalue. Although A had challenged the status of MK Tang, calling him “the disgraced and ousted manager”, A nonetheless supported the Tinting Lease by signing on it as a witness.   Yet later when MK Tang competed against A to substitute TC Foo as the applicant in these proceedings, A challenged MK Tang’s assertion that MK Tang was the “surviving manager”.  MK Tang withdrew his application at the last minute, A was substituted and costs in respect of their competing summons to be appointed was reserved by the order dated 21 April 2022.

(d)     A claimed that he supported Tinting Lease as the lease was of benefit to the Heung.  This puts Tinting against the interest of the Bonus tenants.  Yet A clearly knew that the man behind Tinting was TK Tang, who closely associated with MK Tang.  Tinting has been harassing the Bonus tenants on the basis that Tinting is the only legitimate and authorized occupier holding through MK Tang and/or the Tinting Lease.  This has led to numerous litigations including HCA 1242/2023 and HCA 1245-1247/2023.  Further A’s solicitors, Messrs Samuel Chow Solicitors (“SCS”), have been acting for Tinting since March 2025.

(e)     Since MK Tang remained the only registered manager of the Heung, members such as Daydes Ng had to take proceedings to protect the Bonus tenants from Tinting and MK Tang.  Yet both MK Tang and Tinting have been challenging the locus of Daydes Ng to represent the Heung.  This has led to numerous interlocutory proceedings including the injunction application in HCMP 1439/2021 whereby Daydes Ng acting on behalf of other members of the Heung obtained an injunction against Tinting from blocking the access of the Bonus tenants. Although the injunction was granted, A’s solicitors, SCS, are currently acting for Tinting in its application for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.  One of the grounds of appeal continues to challenge the status of Daydes Ng. Tinting is clearly an adversary of the Heung and the Bonus tenants (who are paying rent to the Heung).  There is clear conflict in SCS acting for Tinting and SCS could not have done so without the knowledge and consent of A.

(f)     Not only has A never taken any step towards helping any of the Bonus tenants or preserving the account in all these years since 2014, his solicitors is acting for Tinting to challenge Daydes Ng’s locus and seeking leave to appeal against the injunction to restrain Tinting from blocking/harassing the Bonus tenants.  It is wrong in principle to allow A to share in the proceeds of such rentals by being paid costs from such funds.  Tinting is supposed to pay rental of HK$300,000 per month to the Heung under the Tinting Lease, but there is evidence that Tinting, with whom A sided, has not paid any rental at least since January 2023, and the arrears in rental has by now exceeded HK$10 million.  There is a receipt clause in the Tinting Lease witnessed by A but no evidence of such deposit has been provided. 

(2)     A’s conduct in these proceedings:

(a)     A claims to have taken the role of a trustee in these proceedings.  However, he acted more like an adversary than a trustee.  Further, he acted at a leisurely pace despite knowing the importance of the membership issue to resolution of the dispute with MK Tang, and as between the Bonus tenants and Tinting.

(b)     A had adopted a very laid-back attitude after his appointment and had failed to diligently prepare these proceedings for the substantive hearing.  At times, he had even obstructed R1’s effort to properly prepare the proceedings for trial:

(i)     K Yeung J in April 2022 directed that the experts on Chinese customary law should, after filing their own reports, meet and discuss and prepare and file a Joint Statement within 56 days thereafter.  R1’s expert, Dr Hase, filed his expert report on 29 November 2022.  On 31 January 2023, R1’s solicitors wrote to A’s then solicitors asking for contact details of Professor Palmer, so that Dr Hase could contact Professor Palmer.  This simple request was ignored for 3 weeks.  Later, it was R1 (rather than A) who also prepared a draft Joint Statement for the experts to comment and agree.

(ii)     In April 2023, A’s then solicitors proposed to seek directions from the Court, suggesting that 1 to 2 days be allowed for the substantive hearing.   R1’s solicitors pointed out that this would be insufficient as K Yeung J had in April 2022 directed that all deponents of affirmations must attend Court to be cross-examined.  There were then 6 factual witnesses and 2 experts.  R1’s solicitors further advised A’s then solicitors that R1 intended to seek declarations regarding management of the Heung by way of counterclaim, and that R1 intended to file further affidavit evidence (R1 was then in the course of preparing the Study) and asked A’s then solicitors to wait for another 4-6 weeks, but A’s then solicitors opposed, though K Yeung J did grant the extension requested by R1’s solicitors.  It was the counterclaim that paved the way for directions to hold the First Meeting and elect the new managers.  It was the Study which analysed the historical documents and the land search records that assisted the Court in coming to the determination on membership.  A did not help in these aspects at all.

(iii)     After MK Tang (ie R3) passed away on 18 November 2024, A did not make any application under RHC, Order 15 rule 7 for two months, despite prompting by R1, and despite the impending substantive hearing dates.  Finally, it was R1 who took out a summons under O15 rules 7&9 on 24 January 2025.   Due to A’s request to give more time to MK Tang’s family to respond, this resulted in 3 interlocutory hearings.  MK Tang was finally removed as a party and the Court also gave fresh directions for the substantive hearing, including a direction that parties should file an agreed (or disagreed) list of issues by 9 September 2025.

(iv)     A did not coordinate the filing of an agreed list of issues.  It was R1 who sent out a draft Joint Memorandum on 11 August 2025 and invited A and R2 to respond within 14 days.  R2 responded on 19 August 2025, but A only responded on 12 September 2025 (after the deadline), and further raised a totally new issue, requiring all assignees or successors of HLs to be registered in the Lands Registry before their entitlement to membership would be recognized.  A also adopted a new stance on Category 3 ownership, which was contrary to his own stance in 2017 and 1989.

(v)     A also failed to prepare the trial bundles for the substantive hearing.  These were prepared by R1.

(c)     R1 had assumed the role of, and become the de facto applicant soon after it was clear that A could not be depended on to properly prepare the case for the substantive hearing.  R1 had co-ordinated the filing of the Joint Statement of Experts, instructed LCC to prepare “A Study of the Heung” to show how the ownership of the HLs had devolved and the status of the current owners and caused the same to be lodged with the Court.  R1 also made a counterclaim seeking directions for the holding of the First Meeting so as to implement the Court’s judgement.  Further, R1 took out the Order 15 rules 7 & 9 summons to deal with the passing away of MK Tang, coordinated the filing of a Joint Memorandum setting out the parties’ stances on the various categories of membership and list of issues (as directed by the Court), and prepared the hearing bundles for the substantive hearing. These are tasks which a trustee applicant should have been expected to carry out in proceedings but A did not.  R1 therefore submits that A should not be entitled to have his costs to be taxed on a trustee basis, to be paid out of the stakeholder’s funds.   It is R1 who should be so entitled.

(d)     During the trial, A was represented by senior counsel, who is independent of the Heung.  However junior counsel is in fact A’s son and hence an interested party to these proceedings.

(3)     A’s conduct after the Judgment in these proceedings

(a)     Around one month after the handing down of the Judgment, on 13 January 2026, SCS (as solicitors for Tinting) wrote to LCC (as solicitors for Daydes Ng, the plaintiff in HCMP 1439/2021), stating that this Court had by its judgment held that Daydes Ng was not a member of the Heung, and hence HCMP 1439/2021 was liable to be struck out.  On 26 January 2026, SCS took out an Order 18 rule 19 summons seeking to strike out Daydes Ng’s claim in HCMP 1439/2021 on the ground that he was not a member of the Heung at the time when the action was commenced.  The summons came before the Court on 25 March 2026, and was adjourned until after the First Meeting.  All this was to assist Tinting and against the interest of the rent-paying Bonus tenants without whom there would be no funds from which costs can be paid.

(b)     Looking back, the raising of the new issue by A in September 2025, that all assignees and transferees of HLs must prove their ownership of the HLs by registration in the Lands Registry, appears to be specifically tailored to enable Tinting to make the allegation (which it made in January 2026) that Daydes Ng was not yet a member of the Heung.  That issue had not been touched upon by the two experts in the first round of expert reports and the joint expert statement, and could only affect Daydes Ng whose problems with getting his title registered was disclosed in these proceedings.   This knowledge had been exploited by A to benefit Tinting.  SCS recently wrote to LCC to claim that part of R1’s costs should be deducted because LCC has also been acting for Daydes Ng.

(c)     Mr Chow of SCS was the solicitor who wrote the letter dated 13 January 2026 on behalf of Tinting.  He was also the solicitor who had attended the substantive hearing herein on behalf of A.  He has been wearing two hats: as solicitor for A, and as solicitor for Tinting.  To allow A’s costs in full would mean that the Heung would have to pay for the costs of someone who is also acting for its adversary.  This cannot be just.

(d)     SCS had on 23 March 2026 sent a letter to LCC requesting Mr Choi, the convenor of the First Meeting, to circulate a letter written by A dated 21 March 2026 to members of the Heung who would be attending the First Meeting.  The letter urged members to vote against the first two resolutions, suggesting that they were unnecessary because MK Tang had already died, and further alleged that DHCJ Kent Yee had ruled that the 2013 and the 2014 resolutions were invalid.  A’s objection to the retrospective confirmation of the 2013 and the 2014 resolutions that removed MK Tang could only be to help the Tinting Lease.  On the 3^rd resolution (election of new manager), A insinuated that Daydes Ng was lacking in honesty.  This was answered by Daydes Ng in a reply circular letter dated 25 March 2026.  At the First Meeting, all votes other than the 3 votes of A were in favour of retrospective confirmation of MK Tang’s removal and Pat Wong’s appointment in 2013 and 2014, as well as and the election of Daydes Ng as the new manager. Hence if there is a winning or losing party and costs do follow the event, that is an additional reason A should be deprived of his costs.

(e)     These manoeuvres by A after the Judgment demonstrated that he was not merely putting the issues before the Court and abiding by the Court’s determination.  His manoeuvres were calculated to benefit Tinting and/or put Daydes Ng in a disadvantageous position.  He is not a disinterested, neutral participant in these proceedings.  For those reasons, the Heung should not be required to reimburse his costs, at least not in full.

18.  With respect, I am unable to agree with R1.

19.  First, I do not regard R1’s complaints concerning the Tinting Lease constitute a valid reason for depriving A’s entitlement to costs in these proceedings. Those complaints are the subject matters in other proceedings which have not yet been adjudicated.  The validity and propriety of the Tinting Lease, including whether the rental provided therein was grossly under market value at the material time, are matters pending resolution by the Court in other proceedings.  At present, R1’s allegations concerning the Tinting Lease cannot be treated as established facts.  This Court has no reason to deprive A’s entitlement to costs in these proceedings by reason of those complaints, which have not yet been proved and are pending for resolution by the Court in other proceedings.

20.  Second, R1 is in fact suggesting that since A is represented by SCS in these proceedings and Tinting is represented by SCS in other proceedings, there is some collusion between A and Tinting, and A should be responsible for all Tinting has done.  With respect, this proposition is not supported by any authority.  I refuse to accept this proposition.

21.  Third, I do not consider that A was acting unreasonably or had any ulterior motive in raising the issue whether assignees/transferees of HLs would need to satisfy the Registration Requirement in order to be a member of the Heung.  Professor Palmer and Dr Hase gave different opinions on this issue.  In my view, the issue is a genuine issue which has to be resolved by the Court in order to determine the membership of the Heung.  At the end, this Court accepted Professor Palmer’s opinion and answered the issue in the affirmative.[7]

22.  Fourth, I do not consider that there are substantial delays caused by A in prosecuting these proceedings, nor there is something seriously wrong done by A in these proceedings.  I acknowledge that by proposing directions concerning the First Meeting of the Heung in the counterclaim, by preparing the Study, by taking the lead to take care of some procedural matters in these proceedings, and by preparing the trial bundles for the substantive hearing, R1 has given valuable assistance to the Court.  For all these valuable works done by R1, R1 would get back the costs from the Heung.  Ideally, all these matters should be taken care of by A.  However, in my view, the fact that A could do more in preparing the case for the substantive hearing is not a sufficient factor for depriving A’s entitlement to costs.  After all, A is serious in bringing these proceedings to a conclusion.  A has engaged Professor Palmer as an expert witness and has adduced Professor Palmer’s opinion as expert evidence in the substantive hearing.  A has also engaged senior and junior counsel to represent the Heung in the substantive hearing.  By doing all these, A has also provided valuable assistance to the Court.

23.  Fifth, A’s personal stance in relation to the matters in the First Meeting is entirely not relevant to the issue of costs in these proceedings. In relation to the resolutions proposed in the First Meeting, A is acting in his own personal capacity.  As to those proposed resolutions, A is entitled to have his own view, no matter whether that view is objectively correct and/or whether that view is shared by any other member of the Heung .  A is entitled to communicate with the other members of the Heung and try to persuade the other members to agree with him.  He is also entitled to cast the votes in his hands in the First Meeting in accordance with his own conscience.  These entitlements are A’s personal entitlements by reason of the fact that he is a member of the Heung.  A should not be deprived of any costs in these proceedings because he has exercised his personal entitlements in relation to the proposed resolutions in the First Meeting.

24.  Sixth, R1 is saying that A should not be allowed to get back the costs of the junior counsel representing A in the substantive hearing, because that junior counsel is A’s son.  With respect, this submission is not supported by any authority.  I am unable to accept this submission.

25.  In my view, applying the Re Buckton principles, A is entitled to get back the costs incurred by him in these proceedings from the Heung on a solicitor-own-client basis.  I would also allow a certificate for two counsel.

C3.    Other matters

26.  Regarding R1, these proceedings should be within Re Buckton Category 2.  In my view, R1 is entitled to get back their costs from the Heung on a solicitor-own-client basis, with a certificate for two counsel.

27.  I am of the view that the same treatment should apply to R2.  I would allow R2 to get back her costs from the Heung on a solicitor-own-client basis.

28.  Regarding R1’s proposals as set out in [5(4)] and [5(5)] above, I agree with those proposals.

D.     DISPOSITION

29.  For the reasons above, I make the following order:

(1)     A’s costs incurred in seeking the Order dated 21 April 2022 and thereafter in these proceedings (including costs reserved and costs relating to the arguments on costs) be paid by the Heung on a solicitor-own-client basis, with a certificate for two counsel, to be taxed if not agreed by R1 and/or R2;

(2)     R1’s costs in these proceedings (including costs reserved and costs relating to the arguments on costs) be paid by the Heung on a solicitor-own-client basis, with a certificate for two counsel, to be taxed if not agreed by A and/or R2;

(3)     R2’s costs in these proceedings (including costs reserved) be paid by the Heung on a solicitor-own-client basis, to be taxed if not agreed by A and/or R1;

(4)     As to the costs incurred by MK Tang in these proceedings, there be no order as to costs; and

(5)     As to the costs incurred by TC Foo in these proceedings, there be no order as to costs.

30.  Lastly, I must thank all counsel for the helpful submissions provided to the Court.