Case Details
Listing:
BAUTISTA PRECILLA NORCIO AND ANOTHER v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE
BAUTISTA PRECILLA NORCIO AND ANOTHER v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE
[2026] HKCA 1596 · CACV 458/2025
Court of Appeal
CACV 458/2025, [2026] HKCA 1596
On Appeal From [2025] HKCFI 2541
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL APPEAL NO 458 OF 2025
(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1221 OF 2021)
BETWEEN
| |BAUTISTA PRECILLA NORCIO |1st Applicant |
| |GARCIA PRECIOUS KATE ATHENA |2nd Applicant |
| |and | |
| |TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD/ |Putative |
| |NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE |Respondent |
| |and | |
| |DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION |Putative |
| | |Interested Party |
_____________________
Before: Hon Au and Chow JJA in Court
Date of Written Submissions: 24 March 2026
Date of Judgment: 14 September 2026
JUDGMENT
Hon Chow JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):
1. This is the Applicants’ appeal against the order of Deputy High Court
Judge To (“the Judge”) dated 17 June 2025 (“the Order”) refusing to
grant leave to the Applicants to apply for judicial review of the
decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims
Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 25 June 2021, whereby the Board
dismissed the 2nd Applicant’s appeal against the decision of the
Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 21 September 2020.
BRIEF BACKGROUND
2. The 1st and 2nd Applicants are mother and daughter, and are nationals
of the Philippines. The 1st Applicant is a party to the present
proceedings merely as the representative of the 2nd Applicant.
3. The 1st Applicant last entered Hong Kong to work as a foreign domestic
helper on 16 October 2014. After the termination of her employment
contract, she did not depart and had overstayed since 17 October 2017.
In the meantime, on 16 October 2016, she gave birth to her first
daughter (“the Elder Daughter”) out of wedlock in Hong Kong[1]. On 24
October 2017, the 1st Applicant surrendered herself together with the
Elder Daughter to the Immigration Department. On 7 November 2017, the
1st Applicant lodged non-refoulement claims for herself and on behalf
of the Elder Daughter[2], which were rejected by the Director on 20
June 2018. Their subsequent appeal against the Director’s decision
was dismissed by the Board on 4 January 2019[3].
4. On 18 February 2020, the 1st Applicant gave birth to the 2nd Applicant
out of wedlock in Hong Kong[4]. On 21 April 2020, the 1st Applicant
lodged a non-refoulement claim on behalf of the 2nd Applicant[5].
5. Both the 1st Applicant’s claim and the 2nd Applicants’ claims were
made on the basis that, if refouled, they would be harmed or killed by
the 1st Applicant’s husband (Emmanuel Bautista) in the Philippines
because the 1st Applicant gave birth to the Elder Daughter and the
2nd Applicant with another man in Hong Kong. Details of the claims
have been summarised by the Judge at §§4-8 of the CALL-1 Form.
6. By a Notice of Decision dated 21 September 2020 (“the Director’s
Decision”), the Director dismissed the 2nd Applicant’s non-refoulement
claim on all applicable grounds: the risk of torture[6], persecution
risk[7], BOR 3 risk[8], and BOR 2 risk[9].
7. The 1st Applicant on behalf of the 2nd Applicant appealed the
Director’s Decision to the Board. On 25 June 2021, the Board
dismissed the appeal, and confirmed the Director’s Decision (“the
Board’s Decision”). The Board’s reasons for its decision were
summarised by the Judge at §§9-11 of the CALL-1 Form, as follows:
“[9] The Board considered 1st Applicant evasive when she
testified before the Board on 30 November 2020. She took
time to consider before answering the Board’s question.
She was not frank with details and timing of the threats
throughout the screening process including the completion
of the [non-refoulement claim forms] and attending the
screening interview. She admitted she was aware of the
availability of non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong,
but could not explain why she did not seek assistance until
a year after she had been threatened by her husband. She
claimed her husband threatened her through messages in
Facebook, but could not produce any message claiming that
she had deleted them because she did not want them to be
seen by those living with her. While accepting that she
might not be aware of the evidential value of those
messages before she applied for protection, the Board could
not accept that she would have erased them when she should
have known of their evidential value after the screening
interview in October 2018.
[10] At the hearing on 24 May 2021, the Board reminded the 1st
Applicant to give more information about the 2nd
Applicant’s specific risk, if any. Despite that, she gave
no further evidence or any evidence relating to the 2nd
Applicant’s child-specific risk of harm or her child’s
appreciation of factors that may amount to persecution.
[11] In conclusion, the Board found the Applicants’ case vague
and unbelievable. It considered the nature of the
inconsistencies and suspicious allegations are sufficiently
serious as to undermine the reliability of her evidence.
It had reservation about the allegation that the 1st
Applicant’s husband was not happy about her affairs and her
giving birth to her two daughters. Even if he was not
happy, the Board considered it could not have reasonably
given rise to the alleged threats to kill the 1st Applicant
and her two daughters. It could find no evidence of any
child-specific risk of harm to the 2nd Applicant. The
Board considered the 1st Applicant’s fear for the 2nd
Applicant is based on her bare assertion instead of real
personal experience. It considered the underlying basis of
the Applicants’ claim is a personal and private dispute
without involving the state. There was no claim that the
police or the state would not intervene against the
husband’s threat. It did not consider the 1st Applicant’s
husband so powerful as could locate her and her daughters
anywhere in the Philippines. The 1st Applicant resiled
from that position and admitted that her husband did not
have influence all over the Philippines. Applying the law
applicable to non-refoulement protection, the Board found
the Applicants had failed to establish the factual basis to
support the 2nd Applicant’s claim for protection under the
[unified screening mechanism (‘USM’)]. Hence, it dismissed
the Applicants’ appeal.”
THE JUDGE’S DECISION
8. On 31 August 2021, the Applicants filed a Form 86 to apply for leave
to apply for judicial review of the Board’s Decision. No ground for
seeking relief was given in the Form 86. In the 1st Applicant’s
supporting affirmation of the same date, she complained generally that
the Board disregarded their dangerous situation.
9. On 17 June 2025, the Judge refused to grant leave to the Applicants to
apply for judicial review. The Judge held that the 1st Applicant was
only a nominal applicant in the leave application, and was not
entitled to any relief. The Judge further considered that there was
no arguable or specific ground of judicial review raised by the
Applicants to challenge the Board’s Decision. At §§14-16 of the CALL-
1 Form, the Judge gave his overall conclusion as follows:
“[14] Having rigorously examined the Decision, the papers and
the evidence with anxious scrutiny, the Court is satisfied
that the Board had correctly set out the law and key legal
principles applicable to non-refoulement protection under
the USM; the burden of proof and standard of proof;
correctly identified the issues and observed a very high
standard of fairness. The claims of both the 1st and 2nd
Applicants are rested on the same factual basis, ie the 1st
Applicant’s extra-marital relationship and birth of the 2nd
Applicant out of wedlock and that both of them are facing
the same harm and risk of harm from the 1st Applicant’s
husband. The 2nd Applicant’s claim is hinged on the
1st Applicant’s. Her claim stands or falls together with
the 1st Applicant’s. Despite the 1st Applicant’s own claim
had been finally determined and dismissed, the Board
reconsidered her evidence afresh, although for the same
reasons rejected it as incredible and unreliable.
[15] The Court is satisfied that the Board had analysed the
evidence carefully, tested it against common sense,
inherent probability and against authoritative and credible
[country of origin information (‘COI’)]. It seemingly
accepted that the 1st Applicant’s husband had learned about
the news of her affairs and the birth of her elder
daughter; but had reservation about the allegation that
[the husband] was not happy about her affairs and the birth
of her two daughters. It found even if he was not happy,
that could not have reasonably given rise to the alleged
threats to kill the 1st Applicant and her two daughters.
These are finding of facts solely for the Board. The Board
gave full reasons for its finding. The Board was also
mindful of the possibility that the 2nd Applicant might
have child-specific risks. It reminded the 1st Applicant
of such possibility and invited her to provide information
in support of such risks, but she did not give any. It
therefore found there was no evidence that the 2nd
Applicant would face any child-specific risk, if returned
to the Philippines.
[16] It was on that basis that the Board found the Applicants
had failed to establish the factual basis to support their
claim for non-refoulement protection under any of the
applicable grounds under the USM. These are mixed findings
of fact and of the law. Insofar as they are finding of the
law, they are absolutely correct. Insofar as they are
findings of fact, they are exclusively within the realm of
the Board, which the Court on a judicial review will not
interfere save when such finding was made as result of
error of law or procedural unfairness or that the Decision
is irrational. The Court could detect no error of law or
procedural unfairness in the Decision. The Decision does
satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test. It is not Wednesbury
unreasonable or irrational. Basically, the Applicant
failed to discharge his burden of proving his fears and
risks. The Decision is utterly without fault. The
proposed judicial review has no realistic prospect of
success.”
THIS APPEAL
10. In the Applicants’ Notice of Appeal filed on 30 June 2025, the
Applicants merely state that they would like to “reject and review”
the Judge’s decision, and complain that the Judge disregarded their
dangerous situation.
11. On 30 June 2025, the Applicants consented to their appeal being
disposed of on paper by the Court without an oral hearing.
12. In their written submissions lodged on 24 March 2026, the Applicants
contend that their claims ought to be considered with reference to BOR
2 risk because they face a foreseeable risk of harm from the 1st
Applicant’s husband in the Philippines, which is a conservative
country that does not allow divorce[10]. They explain that the 1st
Applicant’s arguments and responses were found to be evasive because
she had difficulties in recalling events that happened a long time
ago, and she was not a legal professional and was testifying through
an interpreter when she was scared and anxious[11]. They also allege
that internal relocation is not a viable option open to them, and
state protection will not be available to them[12].
DISCUSSION
13. As rightly held by the Judge, the 1st Applicant is only a nominal
party in this case. She is plainly not entitled to any relief in her
own right.
14. Insofar as the 2nd Applicant is concerned, she a minor. The Court’s
approach in considering a minor’s claim for non-refoulement protection
is well established, and has been set out in Fabio Arlyn Timogan
[2020] HKCA 971 and Re Jasvir Singh [2021] HKCA 53. It is not
necessary to repeat the same in this judgment.
15. The 2nd Applicant’s claim in the present case was premised
fundamentally on the factual basis relied upon by the 1st Applicant
for her own claim, namely, a risk of harm from the 1st Applicant’s
husband in the Philippines to both herself and her two children born
in Hong Kong. The 2nd Applicant was legally represented before the
Board, and the 1st Applicant gave oral evidence at the hearing before
the Board on behalf of the 2nd Applicant. The Board, after
considering the evidence from the 1st Applicant, found that the 1st
Applicant was evasive to the questions put to her, and she was not a
reliable witness (see §33 of the Board’s Decision). The Board held
that the 1st Applicant was not telling the truth and there was no
reasonable ground to believe that the 1st Applicant or her children
would face any real risk of harm from the 1st Applicant’s husband upon
refoulement (see §39 of the Board’s Decision). Once the 1st
Applicant’s evidence was rejected, there was no factual basis which
could support the 2nd Applicant’s claim which was considered by the
Board with reference to BOR 2 risk and other applicable risks.
16. The allegation that the Philippines is a country that does not allow
divorce is a bare assertion without any evidence in support. In any
event, the Board considered the relevant COI and concluded that state
protection would be available to both the 1st and 2nd Applicants in
the Philippines against, amongst other matters, domestic violence (see
§§45-48 of the Board’s Decision). The Board also considered that the
question of internal relocation did not arise in the present case (see
§62 of the Board’s Decision). It is well-established that the
assessment of evidence, COI, risk of harm, state protection and
viability of internal relocation are matters primarily within the
province of the Board and the Director. The court will not intervene
by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural
unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board: Re Kartini
[2019] HKCA 1022. No such error of law or procedural unfairness or
irrationality in the decision of the Board is shown in the present
case.
17. The Judge was satisfied that there was no evidence to show the 2nd
Applicant would face any child specific risk upon refoulement. No
child specific issue has been raised in this appeal, and we are unable
to see any such issue arising on the materials before us.
18. In all, the Applicants’ appeal has no merit, and is dismissed.
19. For the avoidance of doubt, we shall treat the non-compliance with
Order 80, Rule 2 of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, in these
proceedings as a mere irregularity without rendering the 2nd
Applicant’s appeal a nullity.
|(Thomas Au) |(Anderson Chow) |
|Justice of Appeal |Justice of Appeal |
The 1st and 2nd Applicants, acting in person
-----------------------
[1] See §11 of the Director’s decision dated 20 June 2018.
[2] See §12 of the Director’s decision dated 20 June 2018.
[3] See §28 of the Board’s Decision.
[4] See §9.1 of the Director’s decision dated 21 September 2020.
[5] See §10 of the Director’s decision dated 21 September 2020.
[6] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the
Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.
[7] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-
refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to
the Status of Refugees.
[8] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment under Article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong
Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.
[9] This refers to the risk of being arbitrarily deprived of her life
under Article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance,
Cap 383.
[10] See §1 of the Applicants’ Written Submissions.
[11] See §3 of the Applicants’ Written Submissions.
[12] See §§2 and 4 of the Applicants’ Written Submissions.
-----------------------
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
V
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
VCitation
Court
Procedural posture
Issues
Holdings
Legal principles
Disposition
Appeal history
BAUTISTA PRECILLA NORCIO AND ANOTHER v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE
CA · [2026] HKCA 1596
This judgment