SOJOBI, AKPEVWE JOYCE v. MS WONG WING SZE (THE PRINCIPAL, YAUMATI KAIFONG ASSOCIATION SCHOOL) AND OTHERS

DCCJ 5329/2025

[2026] HKDC 650

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO 5329 OF 2025

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DECISION

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GENERAL BACKGROUND

1.  This is the Plaintiff (“P”)’s appeal against Master Minnie Wong’s order dated 22 January 2026 (“the Order”). By the Order, the learned Master dismissed P’s summons issued on 23 December 2025 (“the Summons”) and ordered P to bear the costs of the 1^st, 2^nd and 3^rd Defendants (respectively “D1”, “D2” and “D3” and collectively “Ds”). Such costs were summarily assessed at HK$700 payable to D1 and D2 (which have been represented by the same firm of solicitors) and HK$700 payable to D3.

2.  P and her husband have children, including two sons. She alleges that one of her sons was subject to cruel and discriminatory treatment at D2, the primary school this son used to attend. This son, described by P as her elder son, is a minor born in 2015 and was a primary 4 student as matters stood in around February 2025 (“Elder Son”).

3.  In her Statement of Claim dated 25 September 2025 (“SoC”), P pleaded that the Elder Son had special education need, D1/D2 did not handle the need properly and D1/D2 have arbitrarily denied his entry to D2’s school premises and access to education since around 18 February 2025. D3, a Government department, was said to have failed to provide adequate support to D2 such that it should also be responsible for the losses of P and her family.

4.  Provisions of the Education Ordinance (Cap. 279) (“EO”) and Disability Discrimination Ordinance (Cap. 487) (“DDO”) were prayed in aid of P’s cause of action in the SoC. P also relied on the torts of breach of statutory duty, negligence and “misconduct in public office” (which I believe should be “misfeasance in public office” in the context of a civil claim), and referred to Article 27 of the Basic Law and Article 28 of the Convention on the Rights of Child.   

5.  Although DDO has been relied on, P, acting without legal representation, did not commence this action by filing a notice of claim (Form 1) under the District Court Equal Opportunities Rules (Cap. 336G) (“DCEO Rules”). Instead, she issued a Writ of Summons indorsed with the SoC to commence a general civil action. This is not a matter directly affecting my decision on P’s appeal against the Order. However, it may affect the further conduct of this action. The present decision is interlocutory and will not finally resolve this action one way or the other.

6.  P’s claim was triggered by what P considered to be a wrong done to the Elder Son. There is a legitimate concern on whether P should sue in her own capacity or as a next friend of the Elder Son. The latter case would necessitate the procedural requirements under Order 80 of the Rules of the District Court (Cap. 336H) (“RDC”). However, as some of P’s assertions in the SoC are about her own alleged suffering on top of the Elder Son’s, and Ds have not taken issue on this procedural matter in relation to the handling of the Summons and this appeal, I proceed on the basis that this is P’s own action. I notice, however, that this question of locus standi may be argued in the striking-out applications, which will be mentioned hereinbelow and are not handled by this Court.  

7.  D2 is a school; it does not have legal personality as such. Normally, when a plaintiff wants to pursue civil remedies against a school in Hong Kong, s/he will either sue its incorporated management committee, sponsoring body or other statutory/corporate entities related to the school, depending on the nature of the school.

8.  Likewise, civil actions (leaving aside applications for judicial review in the High Court) against Government departments should normally be proceeded against the Secretary for Justice under the Crown Proceedings Ordinance (Cap. 300).  

9.  As D2 and D3 are respectively represented by solicitors and the Department of Justice (“DoJ”), with no issue being taken on such technicality, I see no point dwelling on it. Overall speaking, the way the parties have been named does not affect the disposal of the Summons and this appeal.   

10.  Shortly after service of the Writ of Summons, in November 2025, D1/D2 and D3 took out summonses seeking to strike out the SoC and dismiss the present action. The progress of those striking-out applications was impeded by P’s application for legal aid made in the same month and the relevant statutory stay of proceedings. This Court understands that a substantive hearing for the striking out summonses will be held on 6 July 2026 before a master, with 1 day reserved.

THE SUMMONS AND THE ORDER

11.  Notwithstanding the legal aid stay, P filed the Summons on 23 December 2025 seeking to obtain the following orders:

“1. Due to the fact that the 1^st Defendant drove the “Student” from school arbitrarily, my domestic helper left due to excess workload beyond terms of agreement and my husband started taking care of the children full time plus me, a situation which placed my family in deep poverty.

2. I pray the Court to transfer the “Student” to his younger brother’s school based on effectiveness, safety and peace and to avoid conflicts of interest.

3. As a student, I pray the Court to expediate the case to avoid it affecting my studies too much.”

12.  One can see that the substance of the order sought was at sub-paragraph (2) above, viz., a transfer of the Elder Son (i.e., the “Student” of concern in the present action in P’s choice of word) to his younger brother’s school. In the Affidavit sworn and filed the same day, P said the Elder Son had resumed schooling at Jordan Road Government Primary School (“Jordan Road School”) on 3 November 2025, but she was not satisfied with the services provided by that school. She requested the Elder Son be transferred to his younger brother’s school, viz., Hong Kong Taoist Association Wun Tsuen School (“the Taoist School”) in Kwun Tong District (“the Transfer Request”).

13.  In private law, the Transfer Request may be understood as an interim mandatory injunction. As the order sought seemingly requires the exercise of a power with public law character, it is also akin to a mandamus seen in judicial review proceedings.

14.  In the separate statutory regime under the DDO, the District Court has wide powers to grant different types of remedies when a claim of discrimination/harassment under its Part 3 or Part 4 is established, see for example its sections 72(3), 72(4) and 72(4A). As the DDO binds the Government (see for example its sections 21 and 36), it is apparent that the District Court has some powers to grant remedies of an injunctive nature against a Government department when the underlying claim is premised on DDO.    

15.  The Summons was placed before Master Wong for a 3-minute hearing on 22 January 2026. As P filed a Writ of Summons as opposed to a statutory form under the DCEO Rules to initiate this action, and the terms of the order sought as stated in the Summons were not entirely clear, it was natural that the Summons was placed before a master, not a judge, for a first hearing.    

16.  Having heard from P and the legal representatives for D1/D2 and D3, the learned Master dismissed the Summons and made the Order. As mentioned in D3’s written submissions prepared for this appeal, the reason (or perhaps one of the reasons) given by the learned Master was that she had no power to order a transfer of the Elder Son to another school. No transcript of the hearing before Master Wong is available to me.  

17.  In my view, the learned Master’s reasoning must be correct. A District Court master’s jurisdiction is derived from Order 32, rule 16 of RDC. Rule 16(1)(d) specifically provides that the grant of an injunction or other order under Part I of Order 29 is not within a master’s jurisdiction. The order sought by P carries an injunctive nature similar to that of an order sought under Part I of Order 29.

18.  The DCEO Rules do not confer extra jurisdiction on a District Court master. I have reviewed the Practice Directions and noted no suggestion that a District Court master can exercise the wide powers under the DDO abovementioned. To the contrary, interlocutory applications of claims commenced under the DCEO Rules are usually handled by District Court judges.

19.  While the learned Master might adjourn the Summons for a judge, in my view it was open to her to dismiss the Summons right away, especially when the papers filed by P are, with respect, not quite organized and easy to follow. Having heard from P in the appeal hearing, I find that it does take time to ascertain what P actually wants and why, in view of the long history of the Elder Son’s educational needs and, understandably, the strong emotion involved when addressing the relevant issues. I have considerable sympathy with the learned Master’s position as a master would normally have multiple 3-minute hearings scheduled for the same day and probably could not afford the same amount of time I used in the appeal hearing to explore the precise basis of an application from a litigant in person.    

20.  The dismissal of the Summons was probably the reason why the learned Master ordered P to pay costs, summarily assessed at HK$700 for each defendant camp.  

THE NOTICE OF APPEAL

21.  P filed a Notice of Appeal against the Order on 3 February 2026 (“the NoA”). The NoA specifically targeted at the requirement for her to pay HK$700 to each defendant camp.

22.  Order 23 of the Rules of the High Court (which is taken to mean RDC in the present context) and section 905 of the Companies Ordinance were referred to for protection of P’s position. Plainly, those provisions are about seeking security for costs (i.e., requiring a plaintiff/corporate litigant to pay a sum of money into court before the proceedings initiated by him/her/it can be further pursued), and thus irrelevant to the present purpose (i.e., the making of an order requiring a litigant to pay the legal costs incurred by another litigant). P also referred to the objectives of the rules of courts under Order 1A, and repeated her references to EO and DDO etc claiming substantive remedies.

23.  P stated the predicaments of her family in the documents she filed together with the NoA, e.g., that her husband could not work because he had to stay home taking care of the Elder Son who had been, allegedly, denied education.

24.  However, one important matter was glaringly missing from the NoA – whether P still pursues the Transfer Request for the Elder Son, who used to be a student of D2 but later a student of Jordan Road School, in this appeal.

25.  The Transfer Request was the essence of the Summons. Dismissal of the Summons was the main part of the Order. The costs part of the Order was consequential to the main part of the Order. It would certainly be more difficult for P to justify a reversal of the learned Master’s costs order if she in fact no longer pursues the Transfer Request in our court system, and her abandonment of that pursuit was not caused by any change of circumstances outside her control.

NATURE OF APPEAL

26.  As Mr Adrian Lau, Government Counsel for D3, characterized it in his written submissions, in view of the way the NoA was formulated, this appeal is essentially a costs-only appeal. As set out in Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026, para 58/1/6, a judge in chambers will not allow a costs-only appeal from a master unless the master’s costs order is unreasonable or the master has erred in law.  

27.  However, given P is acting in person and has set out various points which go beyond a costs-only appeal in the papers she filed, I find it necessary to depart from an overly technical approach in trying to understand the scope of the NoA and the nature of this appeal. I should ascertain directly from her, at least, whether the Transfer Request to the Taoist School, the original subject of the Summons being dismissed, is a matter she seeks to appeal from Master Wong.

28.  Moreover, as a deputy judge, my jurisdiction is different from that of the learned Master. I appreciate that P did not use a form under the DCEO Rules to commence these proceedings, and the DCEO Rules made it mandatory for that form to be used (see rule 7(1) thereof). However, that is after all a matter about form, not substance. P has already pleaded DDO in the SoC. If the Summons had been placed before me directly, I believe I would have to look at the merits of the application instead of resting my decision on lack of jurisdiction. Different from the learned Master’s position, I am not constrained by Order 32, rule 16(1)(d) of RDC.

ORAL HEARING OF THIS APPEAL

29.  Thus, at the outset of the appeal hearing before me, I asked P what she wanted to achieve through this appeal. P said, first, the reversal of the costs order is still one purpose. In addition, she wants to have D1 (the Principal of D2) and D3’s officers arrested, the DoJ signing an undertaking not to further send individuals to her home to “pose threat” and the Police properly investigating into the issue bothering P and her family.

30.  When I specifically asked P if the Transfer Request remains to be a matter for this appeal, she said it is not. In passing, she mentioned she had already applied for leave to commence judicial review proceedings at the High Court in relation to the lack of education to the Elder Son.

31.  Mr Lau, having been assigned by the DoJ to handle the same judicial review application, informed me that the relevant Form 86 was filed on 12 March 2026 and Coleman, J has given directions for initial response from the putative respondent and reply from P to be lodged. Copies of relevant directions were submitted to me but not kept. I have no reason to doubt that P has chosen to commence a separate public law route in search for legal remedies.

32.  In these circumstances, P unequivocally confirmed to me that the Transfer Request, the original subject matter of the Summons, is no longer a matter for any interlocutory application before this Court.

33.  P carried on to explain the difficulties her family has faced since February 2025 (when the Elder Son was allegedly expelled from D2), including financial difficulty, and the different means she had explored to resolve the problem.

34.  One difficulty P specifically mentioned was that after the Elder Son’s admission to Jordan Road School, he felt sick after a few weeks and stopped attending that school from 1 December 2025. P also mentioned as the curriculum at Jordan Road School was “purely” Chinese (which I understand she meant the school is predominately based on Chinese medium of instruction), the Elder Son could not follow. It was said Jordan Road School does not have the resources to tackle the Elder Son’s educational need. On the bright side, P mentioned she would take the Elder Son to attend an interview at another school very soon.

35.  Three points mentioned by Ds’ legal representatives in reply are worth recording:

(a)  D1/D2’s solicitor, Ms Lo, submitted that the Transfer Request (from Jordan Road School to the Taoist School) has nothing to do with D1/D2. The need for the request arose months after the Elder Son ceased attending D2. P should not have drawn D1/D2 into the application and serve the Summons on her side;

(b)  The orders of arrest etc. mentioned in the oral hearing were not stated in the Summons or the NoA. A purely oral application for such orders should not be entertained;

(c)  Mr Lau for D3 said the way the Government has handled the Elder Son’s situation is a matter for the striking-out application, which will be substantively heard in July 2026. While the focus of this oral hearing before me is costs, by reason of the press attention to this case, he has found it necessary to state for record that many factual claims made by P in the SoC and orally in court (which include, I understand, assertions that the Elder Son had been expelled from D2 and P’s family was not supported in providing education to the Elder Son) are not accepted by D3. D3’s factual positions are different, and issues about what actually happened will be explored in the striking-out hearing.         

MY DECISION

36.  In the light of P’s changed position regarding the Transfer Request, the appeal before me has become straightforward.

37.  In my view, there is no basis to interfere with the learned Master’s discretion on costs. Her costs order was plainly reasonable and she had not erred in law. She did not have jurisdiction to entertain the Transfer Request. It was P’s choice to issue the Summons to make the Transfer Request and bring Ds to Court for this interlocutory application. Ds incurred legal costs by sending legal representatives to attend the hearing of the Summons. The application was dismissed. Costs generally follow the event; the same principle applies to litigants in person.

38.  There is no basis to complain about the costs order. The amount ordered was also modest and commensurate with the time and effort spared by the legal representatives. Although the hearing before the learned Master was reserved for 3 minutes, according to record and Mr Lau’s submission, it actually took longer time.

39.  Even if the learned Master decided to adjourn the Summons for a Judge, and let’s assume she reserved the costs of the hearing before her in the cause of the Summons, the same result on costs would have come out.

40.  It is P’s choice to stop pursuing the Transfer Request in the District Court after the judicial review leave application is filed. The materials filed were also plainly insufficient for Master Wong, or this Court, to hold that the Transfer Request should be ordered. In other words, even if the learned Master had adjourned the Summons and it had been placed before me for direct handling, I would have still dismissed the Summons. In that scenario, the legal costs of the hearing before the learned Master would become part of the costs of the Summons and would still have to be paid by P upon my dismissal of the Summons. In my judgment, there is every reason for P to be required to pay Ds’ costs in handling the Summons.     

41.  P should understand that in our litigation system, initiating a legal claim or application comes with a price. When the claim/application is unsuccessful, the norm, subject to some recognized exceptions and a judicial discretion, is for the successful party to be able to recover legal costs from the unsuccessful party. This is different from, e.g., a complaint to the Equal Opportunities Commission, which P mentioned in the papers and in court. I agree with solicitor for D1/D2 that it was particularly unnecessary for her clients to be drawn to the argument about the Summons. It is common ground that the Elder Son had, rightly or wrongly, ceased attending D2 and been admitted to Jordan Road School when the Summons was issued. The Transfer Request did not concern D1/D2, and D1/D2 could do nothing to enable a transfer of the Elder Son from Jordan Road School to the Taoist School.

42.  As to the claims for the arrest of D1 and D3’s officer etc., they were plainly not the subjects of the Summons/NoA and should not be entertained. Leaving aside procedural requirements, based on the materials disclosed and the development of the case thus far, it is impossible for the Court to grant any such order.

43.  I dismiss P’s appeal against the Order by way of the NoA. Ds seek costs of this appeal and have provided copies of statements of costs for summary assessment to this Court and P. At the end of the hearing before me, I reserved my decision but asked P in case the appeal is dismissed, what she wants to say in relation to the liability and quantum for the costs of this appeal. P only said she would not seek costs if she wins, and she is not going to pay costs anyway because of her financial difficulty. She has no comment on the amount of costs stated in the statements of costs of Ds.

44.  I order that P should pay Ds the costs of this appeal (on top of the HK$700 she was ordered to pay each defendant camp by Master Wong). D1/D2’s costs are summarily assessed at HK$7,000, whereas D3’s costs are summarily assessed at HK$6,000.