QBE HONGKONG & SHANGHAI INSURANCE LTD v. WONG MAN HIN MAX

DCCJ 1628/2023

[2026] HKDC 577

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION CASE NO 1628 OF 2023

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J U D G M E N T

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INTRODUCTION

1.  This is the claim by the Plaintiff (“QBE”)  against the Defendant (“D”)  for indemnity under the motor insurance policy number 1-V9340371-MVA (“the Policy”).

2.  D, acting in person, is absent at the trial.  He was represented by his former solicitors at the PTR hearing on 16 January 2026 and started acting in person on 19 January 2026.  According to the affirmation of service filed on 9 March 2026, the trial bundles and QBE’s opening submissions were served on D on 26 February 2026 and 4 March 2026 respectively by leaving the same outside the gate of his residence at Tai Koo Shing.

3.  I am satisfied that D has notice of the trial and consider that it is expedient to proceed in his absence pursuant to Order 32 rule 5(1) of the Rules of the District Court (Cap. 336H).

BACKGROUND

4.  D was the registered owner of a private vehicle bearing registration number MX23 and QBE was the motor insurer of D under the Policy. 

5.  According to the Insuring Clause of the Policy, compliance with the terms and conditions relating to anything to be done or not to be done, or to be complied with by D, shall be a condition precedent to QBE’s liability to provide cover for D.  In particular, clause (b)  of the “General Conditions” of the Policy provided that:-

“In the event of any occurrence which may give rise to a claim under this Policy the Insured shall immediately give notice thereof to the Company with full particulars. Every letter claim writ summons and process shall be notified or forwarded to the Company immediately on receipt by the Insured. Notice shall also be given in writing to the Company immediately the Insured or any person claiming to be indemnified shall have knowledge of any impending prosecution inquest or fatal inquiry in respect of any occurrence which may give rise to a claim under this Policy ...”

6.  On 9 February 2018, D drove MX23 along Austin Road West and ran into the rear of a taxi bearing registration no. KX6893 which was driven by a Mr Law (“Accident”).

7.  There is a dispute on whether D notified QBE of the Accident in accordance with clause (b).  QBE’s case is that D had failed to do so whereas D’s case is that he had done so by sending a claim form to QBE by ordinary post in February or early March 2018.

8.  As a result of the Accident, D was charged with careless driving and was convicted accordingly on 6 September 2018.  

9.  It is QBE’s case that D also failed to inform it of the prosecution in accordance with clause (b).  In the Defence, D denies QBE’s allegation but has not pleaded any positive case of notification.

10.  Following Practice Direction 18.1, Messrs. John W. Wong & Co. (“JWW”), representing Mr Law, sent a pre-action letter dated 10 December 2018 to QBE.  According to QBE, it only became aware of the Accident, the prosecution of D, and Mr Law’s intended claim when it received the said pre-action letter on 13 December 2018.

11.  On 7 May 2019, Mr Law issued proceedings against D under HCPI 156/2019 for damages caused by the Accident (“PI Action”).

12.  D instructed Messrs. Kent Tam & Co to act for him in the PI Action and an Acknowledgment of Service was filed on 25 June 2019.

13.  On 17 September 2019, interlocutory judgment was entered against D in the PI Action with damages to be assessed.

14.  It is QBE’s case that D had breached the condition precedent of the Policy by reason of his failure to (a)  notify QBE of the occurrence of the Accident; (b)  notify QBE of the prosecution and conviction of careless driving; and (c)  notify QBE of the commencement of the PI Action and to pass the documents relating to the PI Action to QBE.  Therefore, QBE refused to take over the conduct of D’s defence in the PI Action.

15.  By the letter dated 12 November 2019, QBE informed JWW that QBE could not handle Mr Law’s claim for damages as D had breached the Policy’s condition. 

16.  Thereafter, QBE and D engaged in negotiations on the issue of policy coverage.  The negotiations failed and no agreement was reached.

17.  By the letter dated 30 September 2020, QBE formally repudiated the Policy by reason of D’s breaches.

18.  Despite the repudiation, QBE, being the motor insurance of D, was obliged to pay any sum payable in connection with any third-party liability covered under the Policy pursuant to section 10(1)  of the Motor Vehicles (Third Party Risks)  Ordinance, Cap. 272.  To protect its interest, QBE applied and obtained leave in November 2020 to join the PI Action as the 2^nd defendant.

19.  At the mediation on 23 September 2021, QBE reached a settlement with Mr Law at the sum of $1.8 million with costs. The settlement was embodied in a consent order dated 4 November 2021.  After further negotiation, Mr Law’s costs were agreed at $445,815.60.  According to QBE, it incurred a sum of $359,026 as the legal costs in handling the PI Action.

20.  In April 2023, QBE commenced the present action against D for recovery of those sums.

ISSUES IN DISPUTE

21.  According to the Joint Statement of Issues, the issues for determination are as follows:-

(a)  Whether D breached the conditions precedent in the Policy by failing to notify QBE of (i)  the occurrence of the Accident; (ii)  the prosecution against him for careless driving arising out of the Accident; and (iii)  Mr Law’s claim in the PI Action?

(b)  If D breached the Policy, whether QBE waived the breach by only repudiating the Policy only on 30 September 2020?

(c)  Whether QBE was entitled to disclaim liability under the Policy?

(d)  If D breached the Policy, what ought to be the damages awarded to QBE?  Whether, and if so to what extent, is D entitled to challenge (i)  the settlement sum; (ii)  the costs paid to Mr Law, and (iii)  QBE’s own costs in the PI Action.

THE WITNESS

22.  QBE calls one witness, Mr David Yip Po Ming, a motor claims officer, to give evidence.  It is Mr Yip’s evidence that:-

(a)  Upon receipt of a hardcopy claim form, QBE’s scanning team would scan it and upload a softcopy to QBE’s internal computer system for a claims officer to view; 

(b)  After receiving a claim, QBE’s claims officer would issue a written acknowledgement to the insured and if necessary, ask for further documents;

(c)  Upon receiving documents relating to a claim, QBE’s scanning team would scan documents relating to a claim and upload softcopies to the internal computer system for a claims officer to view; 

(d)  He checked QBE’s internal computer system, and could not find any record of the Accident.  Also, no written acknowledgment was issued by any claims officer to D;

(e)  The first document received by QBE in relation to the Accident was the letter before action dated 10 December 2018 from JWW.  Thus, QBE only became aware of the Accident, the prosecution, and Mr Law’s intended personal injuries claim, 10 months after the Accident;

(f)  On 14 May 2019, QBE received the court documents of the PI Action from JWW.  Prior to that, QBE had never received any of the said court documents from D directly;

(g)  On 12 November 2019, QBE sent a letter to JWW stating that QBE could not handle Mr Law’s claim for damages as D had breached the Policy’s condition; and

(h)  Thereafter, QBE and D engaged in negotiations on the issue of policy coverage.  The negotiations failed and no agreement was reached.  By the letter dated 30 September 2020, QBE formally repudiated the Policy by reason of D’s breaches.

23.  As D is absent at the trial, his witness statement is excluded as evidence.

ISSUE 1: BREACH OF THE POLICY

24.  I find Mr Yip to be a reliable witness. His evidence is clear and supported by documentary evidence.  There is no basis for me to doubt his evidence and I accept it without hesitation.

25.  On the other hand, as D is absent at the trial, his witness statement is excluded from evidence.  D has not produced any documentary evidence to support his case that he had informed QBE by sending the claim form by post.

26.  In addition, I accept the submissions of Mr Tsang, Counsel for QBE, that D’s conduct does not sit well with his case on notification.  If he really did notify QBE of the Accident in February or early March 2018 as alleged, D most certainly would have expected QBE to take over the defence in the driving offence proceedings and the PI Action.  However, there is no evidence that D had approached QBE in relation to the driving offence proceedings.  For the PI Action, D even instructed his own lawyers to handle it. 

27.  Apart from the failure to notify the Accident, QBE also relies on D’s failure to notify it of the prosecution and conviction, as well as of the commencement of the PI Action for breach.  On these alleged breaches, D has not pleaded any positive case or adduced any evidence to rebut the allegations.

28.  Having considered the evidence, I make the finding of fact that D failed to notify QBE of the Accident, the prosecution and conviction, and the commencement of the PI Action, and was thereby in breach of the Policy.

ISSUE 2: WAIVER

29.  It is D’s case that, even if there is any breach of the Policy on his part, QBE had knowledge of his breach when it received JWW’s pre-action letter dated 10 December 2018 in mid-December 2018. Furthermore, QBE received the Notice to Insurer together with the Writ of Summons and other documents from JWW on 7 May 2019.  However, QBE did not repudiate the Policy until 30 September 2020 which is more than 21 months after it became aware of the alleged breach.

30.  The applicable law on waiver can be found in the Court of Appeal’s judgement in The Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co Ltd v Cheuk Ma Yee [1981] HKLR 41 at 51E-51H as follows:-

“... Clause 2 of the policy entitles the company to take over the proceedings in the name of the insured "for its own benefit". In any case covered by such a clause where it appears that the solicitors acting both for the company and for the insured have done as much as they might reasonably be expected to do in order to apprise the insured of their intentions I would not think it reasonable to hold that they must abandon the attempt to defend the case even as to damages simply because the insured has, through crass indifference or obdurate silence, placed them in a position of considerable difficulty.

For waiver to operate there must be a representation, whether by conduct or otherwise, sufficient to induce the other party to the contract to act to his own detriment. In the present case it has not been suggested that the letters directed to the insured in July and December of 1976 were not received by him. I do not see why I should assume that they were not. Those letters contain a fair and clear warning of what will happen if the insured does not co-operate. Confronted with that the insured could not conceivably any longer imagine that if the defence were permitted to proceed under the tutelage of his insurance company he would nevertheless be indemnified should the action against him succeed. Where silence and inactivity are the only response to such a warning it is difficult to see how it can be said that the insured was led in any way to damage his own interests through a belief that they were in good hands.”

31.  According to the Joint List of Undisputed Facts, after the commencement of the PI Action, QBE and D engaged in negotiations on the issue of policy coverage, but the negotiations failed and no agreement was reached.

32.  In the Defence, D has not pleaded any representation by QBE, whether by words or conduct during the negotiations, which was capable of inducing him to act to his detriment, let alone any alteration of his position in reliance on the representation.

33.  In light of the above, D clearly fails to show that his breaches of the Policy were waived by QBE.

ISSUE 3: QBE’S RIGHT TO INDEMNITY AGAINST D

34.  In Chan Yiu Sun v Yip Kim Cheung [1990] 2 HKC 524, at 529E-I, Ryan J referred to the Court of Appeal’s decision in Anglo Starlite Insurance Co Ltd v Wong Ping Fai, CACV 162/1983, 14 February 1984, and held that, where there was a breach of a condition precedent in an insurance policy, the insurer was, in the absence of waiver, entitled to succeed against the defaulting insured.

35.  Upon a breach of the policy, an insurer can seek an indemnity from the insured for all payments made to an injured person and its own costs; see Australian & Eastern Insurance Co Ltd v Luen Fat Hong (a firm) HCA 1201/1972, 10 October 1973. 

36.  I agree with Mr Tsang that, given the lack of waiver as found above, QBE should be entitled to seek an indemnity against D for all the payments it made to Mr Law and its own costs in defending Mr Law’s claim, subject to the test of reasonableness which I will address below.

ISSUE 4: REASONABLENESS OF THE SUM CLAIMED

37.  Mr Tsang submits that, in assessing the amount of indemnity, the Court will consider, on a broad-brush approach, the reasonableness of the settlement amount reached between the insurer and the victim of the Accident, and the reasonableness of the costs incurred by the insurer in reaching such settlement: see e.g. Liberty International Insurance Ltd v Yeung Kai Chung Stanley, DCCJ 2775/2015, 21 August 2017; Liberty International Insurance Ltd v Yeung Chi Kong, DCCJ 3385/2008, 14 August 2009.

38.  Mr Tsang refers to Lam Ping Kit v Zung Fu Co Ltd [2025] HKCFI 1388 where, in the context of third-party proceedings, in deciding whether the settlement reached between the plaintiff and defendant was reasonable, the court did not go into any detail regarding the merits of the victim’s claim on quantum.  Instead, the Court simply accepted that the settlement reached between the plaintiff and the defendant was bona fide, given that it was commercially sensible for the defendant to agree to pay $200,000 on top of the employees’ compensation to settle the plaintiff’s claim, which was pitched at nearly $7 million: see §§39-41.  Mr Tsang invites the Court to take the same approach in the present case.

39.  I note that, in both Yeung Kai Chung Stanley and Yeung Chi Kong, the settlement sum paid by the insurer was only $50,000.  Even so, in the latter case, Master R Lai still went through the medical records and evidence in the case before concluding that the settlement sum was reasonable. 

40.  Further, I am doubtful whether the discussion in Lam Ping Kit is applicable to the present case.  In that case, the defendant’s claim against the 2^nd third party was made under section 3 of Civil Liability (Contribution)  Ordinance, Cap. 377 (“CLCO”)  and one of the requirements of the claim is that the payment, settlement or compromise of any claim should be bona fide.  It was under such statutory framework that the Court in Lam Ping Kit considered whether the defendant’s payment of an additional $200,000 on top of the $955,680 employees’ compensation received by the plaintiff to settle the claim was bona fide or not. 

41.  In the present case, QBE’s claim against D is made under the Policy, rather than under CLCO.  Therefore, the consideration is whether the settlement sum of $1.8 million (“Settlement Sum”)  is reasonable in the circumstances of the PI Action and Mr Tsang accepts that the burden of proof rests on QBE.  

42.  There is no evidence on how the Settlement Sum was arrived at during negotiation.  Based on Mr Tsang’s calculation, the reasonable damages were $1,403,700.

43.  Mr Tsang submits that the settlement sum of $1.8 million is reasonable, given that Mr Law’s claim was pitched at over $5 million.  Further, as the liability of the case was not disputed, the additional costs leading to the trial would be borne by QBE in any event.  He submits that the additional sum of about $400,000 is a reasonable trade-off for avoiding further sunk costs, and any vicissitude of litigation leading to the court awarding substantial damages to Mr Law.

Mr Law’s claim and QBE’s answer

44.  In the PI Action, the stances of Mr Law and QBE respectively set out in the Revised Statement of Damages (“RSOD”)  and the Answer are as follows:-

	Mr Law	QBE
PSLA	$700,000	$300,000
Pre-trial loss of earnings	$1,239,200	$340,000
Future loss of earnings	$2,831,400	$0
Loss of earning capacity	$150,000	$80,000
Future medical expenses	$168,000	$5,000
Special damages	$12,000	$10,000
Total	$5,100,200	$753,000

PSLA

45.  Mr Law was born on 3 August 1976. He was 41 at the time of the Accident.  He was 45 when he reached settlement with QBE in November 2021.

46.  The orthopaedic specialists, namely Dr Peter Tio (appointed by Mr Law)  and Dr Arthur Chiang (appointed by QBE), generally agreed that Mr Law sustained soft tissue injuries to his neck and back as a result of the Accident.  The MRI did not suggest any definite neurological deficit that could account for the lower limb complaints lodged by Mr Law.  Dr Tio opined that the Plaintiff would continue to suffer from residual pain, whereas Dr Chiang opined that the Accident brought forward the onset of symptoms from Mr Law’s pre-existing degeneration in his lumbar spine for 2-5 years.

47.  The psychiatry specialists, namely Dr Jimmy Dong (appointed by Mr Law)  and Dr Gabriel Hung (appointed by QBE), agreed that Mr Law suffered from Major Depressive Disorder, Single Episode, with Psychotic Features.

48.  Mr Tsang submits that the following cases are comparable to the injuries sustained by Mr Law:-

(a)  In Chung Lai Ha v Ching Mei Yee, DCPI 2755/2012, 20 January 2014, the plaintiff, a manager of a post office, was assaulted by her colleague, the defendant, because of a work dispute.  The plaintiff had multiple contusions and abrasion, bruise and soft tissue injury on her face, neck and chest wall.  She developed psychiatric symptoms since the incident.  She became insomniac and tense, developed startle response, had problems concentrating and kept ruminating on the incident.  She was diagnosed to have suffered PTSD with moderate intensity and was expected to suffer the symptoms indefinitely.  She was prevented from continuing with or advancing further at her career to which she had devoted to for more than 30 years. Damages for PSLA were assessed at $300,000; and

(b)  In Yu Wai Kan v Law Cho Tai, HCPI 62/2010, 11 May 2011, the plaintiff was injured in a traffic accident.  Expert evidence was in agreement that he recovered from soft tissue whiplash injuries.  The plaintiff had pre-existing bipolar disorder, and he developed PTSD after the accident, and the court accepted that the accident turned the bipolar disorder into a major chronic one.  The court thought $320,000.00 would be reasonable damages for PSLA, after giving minor reduction to reflect for the propensity of the pre-existing bipolar disorder to recur even without the accident.

49.  Having considered Mr Law’s injury and the fact that the above cases were decided in 2010s, I agree with Mr Tsang that QBE’s concession of $300,000 in the Answer is reasonable.

Pre-trial loss of earnings

50.  Mr Law claimed to work as a taxi driver and earn around $26,000.00 per month at the time of the Accident.  In ASOC, Mr Law claimed a full loss of earnings during sick leave period from 10 February 2018 to 3 October 2019 (i.e. 20 months)  and thereafter a partial loss of earning based on the alleged post-accident income of $1,200 per month up to February 2022.

51.  In the Answer, QBE did not agree to Mr Law’s alleged pre-accident income and proposed that $20,000 was more than reasonable.  For sick period, QBE accepted 17 months and QBE averred that Mr Law should have returned to work after the expiry of sick leave. 

52.  For sick leave, Mr Law’s experts considered that the sick leave granted was reasonable (i.e. 20 months).  On the other hand, Dr Chiang opined that sick leave should end by end November 2018 (i.e. 8 months)  and Dr Hung suggested that a period of 12 months from the 1^st psychiatric appointment on 12 July 2018.  Combining the opinions of Dr Chiang and Dr Hung, the reasonable sick leave was from February 2018 to July 2019 (i.e. 17 months).

53.  As to Mr Law’s ability to return to work as taxi driver, Dr Tio and Dr Chiang agreed that Mr Law was able to do so subject to a reduction in work efficiency.  Dr Hung said that Mr Law could resume driving by about November 2019 whereas Dr Dong opined that Mr Law could return to his pre-accident job only after the recommended 2-year treatments.

54.  Having considered the experts’ opinion, I am of the view that it is reasonable to allow 20 months for sick leave for the purpose of settlement.

55.  Insofar as Mr Law’s pre-accident income is concerned, given that Mr Law had failed to provide satisfactory proof, I am of the view that the concession should not be more than $23,000 (being the average of the parties’ positions).  Thus, for the purpose of settlement, the reasonable sum to be allowed for pre-trial loss of earnings should be $460,000 ($23,000 x 20 months).

Loss of earning capacity

56.  Dr Tio took the view that Mr Law was expected to have reduced work efficiency on prolonged driving, and he was advised to take regular breaks of 5 to 10 minutes from work every 1 to 2 hours.  Dr Chiang opined that Mr Law would suffer a slight decrease in efficiency but he did not “quantify” the reduction. 

57.  Insofar as the psychiatric experts are concerned, Dr Hung considered that Mr Law’s psychiatric condition had minimal impact on his working ability.  Dr Dong however was of the view that due to his likely residual symptoms, Mr Law’s efficiency would be reduced.

58.  In light of the experts’ opinions, I accept that it was reasonable for QBE to allow Mr Law’s claim for loss of earning capacity. 

59.  Mr Tsang submits that, since Mr Law was 43 at the time of the expiry of the reasonable sick leave, an award equal to around 17 months of his notional income would accord with the formula of 1 month for each remaining working year, discounted for accelerated receipt, as adopted in Ying Ka Chun v JV Fitness Ltd [2021] HKCFI 3349. 

60.  Mr Tsang draws the Court’s attention to the fact that Mr Law also claimed future loss of earnings in the sum of over $2.8 million.  He submits that, in cases where the Court refuses to award damages for future loss of earnings, the Court retains the discretion to award damages for loss of earning capacity over and above those pleaded by the plaintiff: Rai Surya Prakash v Pacific Crown Security Services Ltd [2020] HKCFI 917, §§77-78.  Mr Tsang therefore contends that the concession of 17 months was reasonable even though the award would be more than the amount claimed by Mr Law in RSOD for this head of loss.

61.  I agree with Mr Tsang. Considering that no award would be allowed for future loss of earnings, I accept that the concession of 17 months was reasonable and, based on $23,000 per month, the sum allowed should be $391,000 ($23,000 x 17 months).

Future medical expenses

62.  It was Dr Hung’s opinion that Mr Law required psychiatric follow-up every 3 to 4 months for 2 more years, which should be done in the Hospital Authority clinic for continuity of care.

63.  Dr Dong agreed that Mr Law should receive further psychiatric and psychological treatment for at least 2 years. He strongly advised Mr Law to switch to private sector because he considered that the service in the public sector had failed to recognize the importance of formal psychological treatment and Mr Law’s failure to respond satisfactorily after an extended period of treatment.  Dr Dong’s estimated cost of treatment was $168,000 which was Mr Law’s claim.

64.  In my view, for the purpose of settlement, the reasonable amount to be allowed was $86,500 (being the average of the parties’ position).  

Special damages

65.  Mr Law’s claim of $12,000 was relatively insignificant.  I agree that it was reasonable for QBE to allow the claim in full when considering the amount for settlement.

Reasonableness of the Settlement Sum

66.  Adding the interest up to November 2021[1] (which was $85,800), the reasonable sum to be allowed for settlement should be $1,335,300 (“Sum Assessed”).  In other words, the Settlement Sum is $464,700 more than the Sum Assessed.

67.  Whilst I agree that an extra sum should be added to the Sum Assessed as a buffer, I take the view that the Settlement Sum is on the high side by reason of the following:-

(a)  The extra sum of $464,700 is 34.8% of the Sum Assessed (which is, in my view, the result of a very generous assessment);

(b)  The fact that Mr Law pitched his claim as much as $5.1 million is not, by itself, a reason to justify adding a larger than necessary buffer to the Sum Assessed.  The amount of buffer to be added should depend on the likelihood that Mr Law could get an award higher than the Sum Assessed and by how much;

(c)  It is important to note that, of Mr Law’s claim of $5.1 million, $2,831,400 (i.e. more than half)  was for future loss of earnings.  The claim of this item is not supported by expert evidence. Even adopting Dr Dong’s opinion (which is the most favourable to Mr Law), Mr Law could return to his pre-accident job after 2 years’ treatment;  

(d)  It is also important to note that a higher sum for loss of earning capacity has been allowed on the ground that Mr Law’s claim for future loss of earnings is to be disallowed;

(e)  If the claim for future loss of earnings is excluded, Mr Law’s claim would be reduced to $2,268,600 and the Sum Assessed is about 60% of it;

(f)  The only items which Mr Law might have a chance to get an award higher than the assessment above are PSLA and future medical expenses.  For PSLA, it is unlikely that the award would be more than $350,000, the difference being $50,000.  For future medical expenses, the most Mr Law could get is $168,000, the difference being $81,500.  Even adding those two sums to the Sum Assessed, the amount is only $1,466,800 and the buffer was still more than $330,000;

(g)  In Lai Ki v B+B Construction [2003] 3 HKC 322, it was held that where a claim commenced in the High Court was settled or adjudicated upon in a sum which was within the jurisdiction of the District Court, the usual order on scale of costs would be that costs be on the District Court scale unless the High Court was, in the exercise of its discretion, persuaded that there was a reasonable prospect that the plaintiff would obtain an award in excess of the District Court jurisdiction.  In my view, there was no reasonable prospect that Mr Law could obtain an award in excess of $3 million in the PI Action.  In fact, pursuant to the Order dated 4 November 2021 approving the settlement, Mr Law’s costs were to be taxed at District Court Scale;

(h)  As to Mr Tsang’s submissions that, as the liability had been admitted, the additional costs leading to the trial would be borne by QBE in any event, I am of the view that QBE could have protected its costs position by way of sanctioned payment.  In fact, prior to the mediation, QBE had already made sanctioned payments in a total sum of $1 million into Court.

68.  By reason of the aforesaid, I am of the view that, even taking further into account the remote chance that Mr Law might get a better outcome in pre-trial income and sick leave, the reasonable settlement sum should be no more than $1,600,000.

Mr Law’s costs and QBE’s costs

69.  As shown by the extensive correspondence between QBE’s solicitors and JWW, Mr Law’s costs were finally agreed at $445,815.60, down from the initial claim of $601,962.25 plus interest.  Out of the agreed costs, $305,000 were the profit cost of JWW, and $140,815 were the disbursements (including $60,000 as counsel’s fees, and $64,200 for engaging the experts).

70.  As to QBE’s costs, it incurred a total sum of $359,026, which included (i)  a sum of $99,750 paid to the experts and the mediator; (ii)  $240,000 as profit costs of QBE’s solicitors; and (iii)  $19,276 as other disbursements.

71.  I agree with Mr Tsang that both the agreed costs of Mr Law in the PI Action and the costs incurred by QBE in handling the PI Action are reasonable.  I would allow these sums in full.

CONCLUSION

72.  By reason of the aforesaid, I enter judgment against D in favour of QBE in the sum of $2,404,841.60 ($1,600,000 + $445,815.60 + $359,026). 

73.  Costs should follow the event.  I therefore order on a nisi basis that D do pay QBE’s costs of this action, including any costs reserved, to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for counsel.  This costs order nisi shall become absolute unless an application to vary is made within 14 days from the date of this Judgment.

74.  Lastly, I am grateful to Mr Tsang for his helpful submissions to the Court.