RE SUPIATI

CACV 319/2022

[2023] HKCA 304

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 319 OF 2022

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 22 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 16 December 2022, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this Court’s judgment of 8 December 2022 (“the Judgment”)  ([2022] HKCA 1837). In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the Deputy Judge”)  dated 5 August 2022, by which the Deputy Judge refused to grant extension of time and dismissed her application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2022] HKCFI 2421).

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this Court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.  Section 22(1)(b)  of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484 (“the HKCFAO”)  provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this Court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.  In her Notice of Motion, the applicant stated:

“1. Failure to consider the fact I had raised in my claim that the TCAB and the Director did not properly assessed in my claim that I would definitely face risk upon refoulement.

2. Failure to consider the country of origin information that the Authority of my country would not able to protect me from my enemies my risk is genuine and I would face real risk upon refoulement.

3. In my Appeal Judgement, the Honourable Judge only confirm the decision from the TCAB and the Director but not assess that why I would not face risk upon refoulement.” (sic)

5.  Pursuant to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant lodged her written submissions on 28 December 2022.  In those submissions, she mainly repeated the matters as stated in her Notice of Motion.  She further stated that the Board and the Director failed to take into account or give proper weight to relevant considerations and materials which they should have which in turn rendered their decisions illegal.  She also disagreed that her claim was a private and personal matter and alleged that the decision makers did not observe her fear properly.

6.  In our view, her intended appeal is clearly without substance. At the outset, the allegations made in her Notice of Motion and written submissions are all bare and vague allegations unsupported by any evidence.  More importantly, her arguments are directed at the decisions of the Board and the Director and she failed to identify any specific error in the Judgment with sufficient particulars.  General assertions of her fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].  Furthermore, the matters raised in her written submissions largely repeated those submissions made previously before the Court, which had been considered and dismissed at [14] - [19] of the Judgment and she failed to specifically identify any error in the Judgment.  It is well established that the Court of Appeal will not allow an application of this nature to be deployed as an occasion for re-running the arguments which had already been canvassed at the appeal: Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling & Another (unreported, CACV 221/2013, 14 November 2014)  at [2] and [3].  Accordingly, the applicant’s grounds are not viable and her intended appeal plainly has no merit.

7.  Further, even taking her case at its highest, her allegations are fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

8.  Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b)  of the HKCFAO.

9.  For the above reasons, the Notice of Motion is dismissed.