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NGUYEN DINH THANH v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
NGUYEN DINH THANH v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5535 · HCAL 2600/2025
Court of First Instance
HCAL 2600/2025
[2026] HKCFI 5535
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 2600 of 2025
BETWEEN
| |Nguyen Dinh Thanh |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
|(|consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |Applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
1. The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.
2. There shall be no extension of time granted to the applicant for the
filing of the Form 86.
3. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be
dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Background
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in
the prescribed Form 86 filed on 25 November 2025, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”).
The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture
Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office
(“Board”) dated 21 November 2025 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the
applicant’s appeal against a decision of the Director of Immigration
(“Director”) dated 22 September 2025 rejecting the applicant’s non-
refoulement claim based on all applicable grounds[1]. The Board’s
Decision is set out in the following hyperlink: -
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2025/HCAL002600_
2025_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. In the Form 86, the applicant named both the Board and the Director as
the proposed respondents and did not name any interested party. As
the Board should have been the proper putative respondent and the
Director the proper putative interested party, the Form 86 shall be
amended accordingly on the court’s own motion.
3. The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Vietnam,
he would be harmed or killed by the loan shark and his henchmen for an
unpaid loan. The reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the
Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them.
Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s
abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision.
4. The applicant has not requested for an oral hearing in the Leave
application. On 24 September 2026, the applicant filed an affirmation
together with a letter in English, applying for the withdrawal of the
Leave Application. In the affirmation, the applicant stated that he
would like to withdraw the Leave Application as it was safe for him to
return home, that he made the withdrawal application out of his free
will and that he understood the consequences of the withdrawal. In
the circumstances, this court will dispose of the Leave Application on
paper.
Discussion
5. The leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence, there
is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my
decision.[2] It is therefore sufficient to state my observations
after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials
adduced.
6. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds
of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full
and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an
affidavit. In the applicant’s Form 86, the applicant averred that the
Board’s decision was unreasonable and procedurally unfair as the Board
had placed too much reliance on the COI but failed to take into
account his personal background. It also averred that the Board was
procedurally improper and unfair when assessing his evidence. The
supporting affirmation provided no such grounds.
7. As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively
within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will
not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law,
procedural unfairness, or irrationality.[4] In the present case, the
Board found that the applicant’s evidence on the loan was
unconvincing, and found that the applicant was not an honest witness.
All in all, the Board found that the material aspects of the
applicant’s case were insufficient, conflicting and not believable.
Even if the Board were to accept his account, the Board found that the
alleged past ill-treatment failed to meet the requisite level of
severity. The Board further found that state protection and internal
relocation would be reasonably available. These are findings of fact,
which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with subject
to there being any public law errors.
8. Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in
scrutinizing the decision of the Board, this court is satisfied that
the Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and
observed a very high standard of fairness. The grounds the applicant
provided in the Form 86 were vague and general and did not condescend
to particulars. The applicant has not shown any errors of law or
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not
reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success such that
would enable this court to grant leave[5].
Withdrawal application
9. Apart from the application to withdraw the Leave Application referred
to above, there is nothing outstanding in this action. In the
circumstances, I make an order to dismiss the Leave Application, and
hereby order the dismissal of the Leave Application: see Re Manik Md
Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471; Ngo Xuan Tuyen v Torture Claims Appeal
Board [2024] HKCA 1140.
Order
10. The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.
11. There shall be no extension of time granted to the applicant for the
filing of the Form 86.
12. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be
dismissed.
Dated the 6th day of October 2026
(Alfred CHAN)
for Registrar, High Court
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the Applicant:| | |
| | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the |Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such |Applicant |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 6/10/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the | |solicitors / such |
|Court the order granting|Nguyen Dinh Thanh |Putative Interested |
|leave and any directions| |Parties as may be |
|given within 14 days |Applicant’s ref. no:|directed by the Court / |
|after the leave was |Nil. |the Putative Interested |
|granted (Order 53, rule | |Parties’ solicitors on |
|4A); | |6/10/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the originating| |Torture Claims Appeal |
|summons within 14 days | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|after the grant of leave| |Claims Petition Office |
|and serve it in | |Putative Respondent’s |
|accordance with Order | |ref. no.: USM 27274 |
|53, rule 5; and | | |
| | |Director of Immigration |
|c) supply to every other| |Putative Interested |
|party copies of every | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|affidavit which the | |753/25 (Formerly RBCZ |
|Applicant proposes to | |5000641/25) |
|use at the hearing, | | |
|including the affidavit | |Department of Justice, |
|in support of | |Senior Assistant Law |
|the application for | |Officer |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |(Civil Law) |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the
Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the
risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong
Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers
to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the
risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under
Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s
Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to
process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description
of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor
[2015] 3 HKC 293.
[2] Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at §23.
[3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL
21/2015, 22 December 2016 at §142.
[4] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328;
Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v
Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
[5] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676.