RE GURNISHAN SINGH

CACV 256/2018

[2019] HKCA 91

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 256 OF 2018

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 240/2015)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 18 October 2018, this court (Yeung VP and Barma JA) handed down a judgment dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the judge”) on 15 June 2018 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The applicant had sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dismissing his appeal from the decisions of the Director of Immigration rejecting his non‑refoulement claim.

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as the court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in our judgment.[1]  We will not repeat them here.

3.  The applicant subsequently applied, by a notice of motion dated 29 October 2018, for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  The applicant stated in his notice of motion that the observations of the judge are not justified.  Further, the applicant should have received legal representation for his claim based on BOR2 risk, just as other non-refoulement claimants.  He also should have received language assistance. 

4.  In compliance with the directions of the court, the applicant lodged a written submission in support of his application on 12 November 2018.  In his written submission, the applicant reiterated the matters raised in the Notice of Motion.

5.  Having considered the applicant’s notice of motion and written submission, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining an application of this kind on papers.  We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of his notice of motion and written submission.

6.  The matters stated by the applicant in his notice of motion and written submission do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  The applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484.  Nor is any such question apparent to us from the matters he has raised in his notice of motion and his written submission.  We have dealt with the issue regarding legal representation at [11] and the issue of language assistance at [13] of our judgment.  Having considered the Notice of Motion and the written submission, we can find nothing amiss in our judgment.  The applicant failed to specify which observations of the judge he disagrees with, and this ground is not reasonably arguable before the Court of Final Appeal.

7.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).

8.  For these reasons, the notice of motion dated 29 October 2018 is dismissed.