Case Details
Listing:
FATIMAH BT MUHAMAD HASAN IBRAM v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
FATIMAH BT MUHAMAD HASAN IBRAM v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5461 · HCAL 517/2024
Court of First Instance
HCAL 517/2024
[2026] HKCFI 5461
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 517 of 2024
BETWEEN
| |Fatimah Bt Muhamad Hasan Ibram |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
|(|consideration of the documents only; or |
| |consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |Applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
1. The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.
2. No extension of time be granted to the applicant to file the Leave
Application out of time.
3. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in
the prescribed Form 86 filed on 27 March 2024, the applicant applied
for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The
intended judicial review was against the decisions of the Torture
Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office
(“Board”) dated 5 December 2023 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the
applicant's appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration
(“Director”) dated 29 December 2022 rejecting the applicant's non-
refoulement claim on all applicable grounds[1]. The Board’s Decision
can be viewed at the following hyperlinks: -
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2024/HCAL000517_
2024_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. In the Form 86, the applicant named the Board as the proposed
interested party addition to it having also been named as the proposed
respondent. As the Director should have been the proper putative
interested party, the Form 86 shall be amended accordingly on the
court’s own motion.
3. The applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Indonesia, she would be
harmed or killed by (i) the loan shark for an unpaid loan; and (ii)
her husband who found out the applicant’s extra-marital affair in Hong
Kong. The reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the
Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them.
Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s
abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision.
4. The applicant has requested for an oral hearing. On 18 August 2026,
the applicant filed an affirmation for the withdrawal of the Leave
Application stating that she wanted to go home as soon as possible.
On 2 September 2026, the Removal Assessment and Litigation (Removal
and Deportation) Section (1) of the Immigration Department separately
faxed a letter to the court, informing the court that the applicant
would like to withdraw her judicial review application. Enclosed with
the said letter was the applicant’s signed memo in her native language
as well as in English dated 25 August 2026. In the memo, the
applicant stated that she would like to withdraw the Leave Application
as her problems at home had been solved. In the circumstances, this
court will dispose of the Leave Application on paper.
Discussion
5. A leave application operates as a “filtering” process. Hence, there
is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my
decision.[2] It is therefore sufficient to state my observations
after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials
adduced.
6. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds
of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full
and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an
affidavit. The applicant’s Form 86 contained no such grounds. In the
supporting affirmation, the applicant alleged procedural impropriety
in that the Board had failed to conduct sufficient inquiry into the
country-of-origin conditions and the risk she faced.
7. As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively
within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will
not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law,
procedural unfairness, or irrationality.[4] In the present case, the
Board found that the applicant’s evidence was largely unsatisfactory.
However, since the applicant came from a remote and under-developed
area of Indonesia, the Board was prepared to extend the benefit of
some doubt to her in respect of some aspects of her evidence.
Regarding the fear of harm from her husband, the Board found that the
applicant would not be at risk of harm from her husband as it was
found that the husband had no intention to carry out any threats of
harm and that they had not been in contact for more than 2 years.
Concerning the fear of harm from the loan shark, the Board found that
her fear was baseless and entirely speculative as the loan shark never
threatened the applicant with harm of any kind. Hence, the Board
found that the applicant would not be subjected to risk of harm if
refouled. It further found that internal relocation would be
reasonably viable. These are findings of fact, which the court in a
judicial review will not interfere with subject to there being any
public law errors.
8. Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in
scrutinizing the decision of the Board, this court is satisfied that
the Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and
observed a very high standard of fairness. The purported grounds the
applicant advanced in the supporting affirmation are all general
allegations without particulars. Hence, the applicant has not shown
any errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the
Board’s Decision. The applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s
Decision is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of
success such that would enable this court to grant leave[5].
9. Another matter I need to consider is the delay. Pursuant to O 53 r
4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, an application to apply for
judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within 3
months from the date of the Board’s Decision. The applicant was late
for about 2 weeks. Despite the short delay, the applicant shall still
be required to provide reason for the delay. The applicant has not
provided any. In the circumstances, I’d be disinclined to grant leave
for an extension of time.
Withdrawal application
10. Apart from the application to withdraw the Leave Application referred
to above, there is nothing outstanding in this action. In the
circumstances, I make an order to dismiss the Leave Application, and
hereby order the dismissal of the Leave Application: see Re Manik Md
Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471; Ngo Xuan Tuyen v Torture Claims Appeal
Board [2024] HKCA 1140.
Order
11. The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.
12. No extension of time be granted to the applicant to file the Leave
Application out of time.
13. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be
dismissed.
|Dated the 6th day of October 2026 | |
| |(Alfred Chan) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the Applicant:| | |
| | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the Applicant|Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such | |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 6/10/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the | |solicitors / such |
|Court the order granting|Fatimah Bt Muhamad |Putative Interested |
|leave and any directions|Hasan Ibram |Parties as may be |
|given within 14 days | |directed by the Court / |
|after the leave was |Applicant’s ref. no: |the Putative Interested |
|granted (Order 53, rule |Nil. |Parties’ solicitors on |
|4A); | |6/10/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the originating| |Torture Claims Appeal |
|summons within 14 days | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|after the grant of leave| |Claims Petition Office |
|and serve it in | |Putative Respondent’s |
|accordance with Order | |ref. no.: |
|53, rule 5; and | |USM 21368 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every other| |Director of Immigration |
|party copies of every | |Putative Interested |
|affidavit which the | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|Applicant proposes to | |1210/22 (formerly RBCZ |
|use at the hearing, | |5001083/22) |
|including the affidavit | | |
|in support of | |Department of Justice, |
|the application for | |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the
Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the
risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong
Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to
the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of
persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33
of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified
Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process
claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the
USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3
HKC 293.
[2] Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at §23.
[3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015,
22 December 2016 at §142.
[4] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328;
Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v
Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
[5] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676.