SHAHZAD KHURRAM v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

CACV 290/2020

[2021] HKCA 428

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 290 OF 2020

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1486 of 2018)

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JUDGMENT

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Hon S T Poon J (giving the Decision of the Court):

1.  On 29 January 2021, this Court (Cheung JA, B Chu and S T Poon JJ) handed down our judgment^[1] (the “Judgment”) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan given on 13 July 2020 refusing leave to apply for judicial review. The applicant had sought judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dismissing his appeal from the decision of the Director of Immigration rejecting his non-refoulement claim.

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal before the Court of Appeal, as well as the Court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.

3.  On 11 February 2021, the applicant filed a notice of motion to apply for leave to appeal against our judgment to the Court of Final Appeal. 

4.  Having considered the applicant’s notice of motion, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining applications of this kind on paper without a hearing.

5.  As best as we can understand from the applicant’s handwriting, the applicant stated in his notice of motion that he would like to reject and review the Board’s decision as it has disregarded his dangerous situation.  He stated that the Board did not consider cultural specifics of Pakistan.  These are all bare assertions of the applicant without any particulars as to how they relate to the applicant’s case.

6.  Under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484), leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.  Here, the applicant’s notice of motion does not properly identify any error in our judgment, let alone any question of great general or public importance.  The hurdle for obtaining leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal is not met.  Nor is there any reason for leave to be given under the “otherwise” ground in section 22(1)(b).

7.  Accordingly, we dismiss the applicant’s notice of motion.