Case Details
For Applicant(s):
Mr Tommy Cheung, instructed by M/s Chu & Lau
Listing:
OCBC BANK (HONG KONG) LTD (formerly known as OCBC WING HANG BANK LTD) v. GE JING AND OTHERS
OCBC BANK (HONG KONG) LTD (formerly known as OCBC WING HANG BANK LTD) v. GE JING AND OTHERS
[2026] HKCFI 6204 · HCMP 229/2025
Court of First Instance
HCMP 229/2025
[2026] HKCFI 6204
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 229 OF 2025
_______________________
IN THE MATTER of Flat B (including the Bay Window, the Balcony and the Utility Platform thereof) on 16th Floor of Tower 2A, The Latitude, No 638 Prince Edward Road East, Kowloon
and
IN THE MATTER of Order 88 rule 1 of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A
______________________
BETWEEN
______________________
Before: Deputy High Court Judge Reyes SC in Chambers
Dates of Hearing: 26-27 October 2026
Date of Judgment: 13 November 2026
JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
Ge Jing and Ye Yongqiang were husband and wife from March 2004 to April 2026. Forest Win is a company established by Ye Yongqiang and his father Ye Linbo. The property known as Flat B, 16th Floor, Tower 2A, The Latitude, 638 Prince Edward Road East, Kowloon (the Property) belongs to Ge Jing. By an Originating Summons, OCBC (the Bank) sought judgment against Ge Jing: (1) jointly and severally with Forest Win for the payment of monies due under a Legal Charge dated 31 March 2022 (the Legal Charge), (2) jointly and severally with Ye Linbo for monies due under a Guarantee dated 12 March 2022 (the Guarantee), and (3) against Ge Jing for vacant possession of the Property. The Legal Charge gave rise to a second mortgage over the Property in the Bank’s favour.
The Bank obtained summary judgment from Master Jocelyn Leung on 26 February 2026. Master Leung ordered that (1) Ge Jing, Forest Win and Ye Linbo pay the Bank HK$23,529,507.09 together with interest under the Legal Charge and the Guarantee and (2) Ge Jing deliver vacant possession of the Property to the Bank. By the Master’s order, upon payment of the monies secured by the Legal Charge, subject to any prior sale of the Property under the Legal Charge, the Bank was to re-deliver the Property to Ge Jing’s possession. Ge Jing (but not Forest Win and Ye Linbo) appealed against the Master’s order. On hearing the appeal, I gave directions for these proceedings to be set down for a speedy trial before me.
Ge Jing’s defence is that she signed the Legal Charge and the Guarantee because of the undue influence exerted upon her by Ye Yongqiang. Further, according to Ge Jing, Ye Yongqiang misrepresented to her that “all repayments would be made by [Forest Win], and [she] would not be held responsible for the same; [Ye Yongqiang] represented to [her] that other properties would also be offered as security on this occasion (including [Jian Yi’s] factory in Mainland China) and so she needs not worry”. Jian Yi is a Mainland company belonging to Ye Yongqiang and his relatives, with which Ge Jing is not involved.
Ge Jing completed high school in Mainland China and then obtained a diploma in tourism in Singapore. She signed Forest Win’s audited financial statements for the years ended 31 December 2018, 31 December 2019 and 31 December 2020 as a director of Forest Win. But she claims never to have been involved in Forest Win’s management or operation. The Bank suggests, apparently based on what it was told by Ye Yongqiang, that Ge Jing was involved in some way with Forest Win’s sales and marketing. Ge Jing says (and I accept) that she had no such involvement.
The Bank intended the Legal Charge and the Guarantee to serve as security for monies loaned to Forest Win under a 1st Facility Letter dated 24 February 2022 (the 1st Facility Letter). Ge Jing “specifically recall[s] that before signing the facility letter [that is, the 1st Facility Letter] and personal guarantee, one of the [Bank’s] staff represented to me that there were other properties being offered as security (including [Jian Yi's] factory in Mainland China and another property in Hong Kong) and so I need not worry”. Ge Jing says that she only signed the Guarantee on the strength of such representation. The Bank denies that any such representation was made by its staff.
Ge Jing counterclaims for the Legal Charge and the Guarantee to be set aside.
The issues that I have to determine are consequently as follows:
Whether Ge Jing was induced to execute the Legal Charge and Guarantee by Ye Yongqiang’s (a) undue influence or (b) misrepresentation.
Whether the Guarantee was procured as the result of a misrepresentation by the Bank’s staff that other properties (including Jian Yi's factory and the Jordan Property) would also be provided as security for the Guarantee.
Whether the Bank was put on inquiry as to the possibility of undue influence or misrepresentation by Ye Yongqiang.
Whether the Bank took sufficient reasonable steps to satisfy itself that Ge Jing was not acting (a) under undue influence or (b) as a result of Ye Yongqiang’s misrepresentation.
Whether the Legal Charge and Guarantee should be set aside as against Ge Jing if the Bank had:
actual or constructive notice of:
Ye Yongqiang’s undue influence on Ge Jing, or
Ye Yongqiang’s misrepresentation to Ge Jing, or
through someone on its staff, misrepresented the position in relation to the Jian Yi factory and the Jordan Property.
BACKGROUND
The present case is not the first time that the Property has been mortgaged. It has been under a first or second mortgage since 2011.
Ge Jing purchased the Property in March 2011 with a mortgage loan of $3.5 million from Nanyang Commercial Bank Limited (NCB). In 2012 Ye Yongqiang asked Ge Jing to take out a second mortgage on the Property to secure loan facilities for Forest Win from NCB. According to Ge Jing, Ye Yongqiang “promised that all repayments would be made by {Forest Win}, and [she] would not be held responsible for the same”. She agreed to the NCB 2nd mortgage on that basis. In 2015, the NCB loan facilities were replaced with a facility from Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) secured by a 2nd mortgage on the Property. ICBC required a personal guarantee from a Forest Win director. Ge Jing says that Ye Yongqiang accordingly “arrange[d] for [her] to be appointed as a director of [Forest Win] for such purpose” and “promised that all repayments would be made by [Forest Win], and [she] would not be held responsible for the same”. Ge Jing agreed to the ICBC mortgage on that basis. In 2018, the ICBC loan facilities were replaced with a facility from DBS Bank (Hong Kong) Limited (DBS). The Property remained on 2nd mortgage (this time to DBS) as security for the DBS loan facilities. Ge Jing stresses that Ye Yongqiang “again promised that all repayments would be made by [Forest Win], and [she] would not be held responsible for the same”. She agreed to the DBS 2nd mortgage on that basis. In due course, the DBS loan facilities were replaced by loan facilities granted by the Bank and secured by the Bank’s 2nd mortgage over the Property as described in the Introduction to this Judgment.
Ge Jing’s account of the undue influence and misrepresentation exerted by Ye Yongqiang in order to obtain her signature on the Legal Charge was set out in paragraph 21 of her 1st Affirmation (Ge Jing I) as follows:
“In November 2021, My Husband and his sister informed me that the 2nd Defendant [that is, Forest Win] would like to secure loan facilities from yet another bank (this time, the Plaintiff [that is, the Bank]) (“the Plaintiff's Loan Facilities”) to replace the DBS Loan Facilities, and the Property would continue to be pledged as security. My Husband again promised that all repayments would be made by the 2nd Defendant, and I would not be held responsible for the same; he further represented to me that other properties would also be offered as security on this occasion (including [Jian Yi’s] factory in the Mainland) and so I need not worry (“My Husband's Promise/Representation”). There are now produced and shown to me marked “GJ-9”, extracts of the WeChat messages exchanged between me and My Husband in November 2021. As can be seen from those messages, My Husband exerted a lot of pressure on me by saying things like “[You already stopped caring whether I live or die anymore?” (English translation of Chinese original)] and “[Cannot go through hardship together?” (English translation of Chinese original)]. I felt that I had no choice but to comply.”
In her 2nd Affirmation (Ge Jing II), Ge Jing embellished upon Ge Jing I. Ge Jing II characterised Ye Yongqiang’s attempts at getting Ge Jing to sign the security documents needed by the Bank as “emotional exploitation and blackmail”. Ge Jing says that Ye Yongqiang:
“accused me, in substance, of not treating them [that is, Ye Yongqiang and Ye Linbo and their relatives] as family and of being willing to abandon them in their time of need if I refused. I felt bullied, cornered and guilt-tripped into submission. They also told me not to worry, as the 2nd Defendant [that is, Forest Win], my Husband and his family would make all the repayments, and that using my Property as security was only a formality to satisfy the bank's requirements. Faced with this pressure, I did not feel I had a real choice. Also, I believed in their promise that they would be solely responsible to make repayments. Accordingly, I did as they requested and took out the second mortgage.”
Ge Jing II continued:
“10. My Husband also responded, as he had done on previous occasions, by turning the matter into an attack on my loyalty and character. He asked me, in substance, whether I had already stopped caring if he lived or died, and whether I was now unwilling to go through hardship together with him as his wife. My Husband knew that I reposed trust and confidence in him as my husband, and that I was emotionally vulnerable to him. He repeatedly exploited this by using the threat of harm to his own life as leverage to pressure me into doing things I was reluctant to do. I felt bullied and manipulated into compliance by these accusations, which were calculated to make me feel that refusing him would make me a disloyal and heartless wife.
11. Caught between the threat of losing the Property immediately if I refused and the promise that nothing would be asked of me as the 2nd Defendant [that is, Forest Win], My Husband and his family would be solely responsible for making the repayment, and even better protection would be afforded to me with Jian Yi’s factory being used as security, coupled with the emotional exploitation and blackmail exerted by My Husband on me which had worn me down and overbore my judgment, I had no genuine or free choice but to continue the cycle of refinancing.
12. I wish to add that the reason why I believed My Husband’s promise that the 2nd Defendant, he and his family would make the repayments and that I need not worry, was that, in each of the previous refinancing exercises, My Husband's family had in fact honoured that very promise. The 2nd Defendant and/or My Husband’s family made all the repayments to the relevant bank on each occasion, and my Property remained safe and intact, exactly as had been promised to me when I first took out the second mortgage in 2012. It was this consistent track record that gave me every reason to trust him again.
13. Further, My Husband clearly knew exactly how to exploit my sense of duty and loyalty to him and his family to override my own judgment and better interests. Beyond the emotional blackmail and manipulation I have described above, it was, in my view, a particularly cynical act on his part to misrepresent to me that Jian Yi's factory would be used as security for the Plaintiffs Loan Facilities, when in truth it was not. He plainly knew that I would rely on this representation in agreeing to sign the documents. It was only after the Plaintiff commenced the present proceedings that I discovered Jian Yi' s factory had never in fact been used as security at all.”
Ge Jing thus not only maintains that Ye Yongqiang exerted undue influence on her in respect of the Bank’s 2nd mortgage. Her allegation is much wider. She claims that Ye Yongqiang has, over the decade since 2012, all along been exerting undue influence on her, with the result that she previously signed the NCB 2nd mortgage, the ICBC 2nd mortgage, and the DBS 2nd mortgage.
Ge Jing adds that she cannot produce WeChat messages exchanged in 2022 with Ye Yongqiang as supporting evidence. This is because she “foolishly deleted the entire chat history with My Husband in or about November/December 2021, in a moment of fury following his continuous emotional blackmail”. But Ge Jing does not explain why she did not systematically exhibit WeChat messages with Ye Yongqiang from 2012 onwards to back up her allegation that Ye Yongqiang routinely exerted undue influence on her to sign mortgages over a decade. It is possible to retrieve WeChat messages even after their deletion. Cross-examined on why she did not attempt to do so, Ge Jing said that she asked an unidentified friend whether this could be done, and the friend told her that it could not. She did not investigate further.
Ge Jing nonetheless deployed selected excerpts from WeChat exchanges with Ye Yongqiang in 2021 in support of her case. To establish that “[o]ver the years, My Husband has from time to time acknowledged that he is indebted to me and my parents for helping him and his family financially,” Ge Jing exhibited her WeChat exchanges reproduced in Annex A to this Judgment. In order:
to show that Ye Yongqiang:
“promised that all repayments would be made by [Forest Win], and I would not be held responsible” and
“represented ... that other properties would also be offered as security on this occasion (including [Jian Yi’s] factory in the Mainland) and so I need not worry,” and
to evidence that Ye Yongqiang pressured her in connection with the Bank’s mortgage,
Ge Jing II exhibited the WeChat communications reproduced in Annex B to this Judgment.
Ge Jing’s account of how the 1st Facility Letter, Legal Charge and Guarantee were signed is in Ge Jing I paragraph 23:
“(1) Facility Letter dated 24 February 2022 ...and Guarantee dated 12 March 2022 ...: As far as I recall, at the arrangement and request of My Husband, I attended the Plaintiff’s office one day in March 2022 [emphasis supplied]. I recall that I went there together with My Husband and Yip Shui Wa (My Husband’s cousin and a director of the 2nd Defendant [that is, Forest Win]). We met with two staff of the Plaintiff [that is, the Bank]. The whole meeting lasted for around 30 minutes, but the majority of the time (up to 20 minutes) was used for explaining the terms of an insurance policy (which as far as I understand was required to be issued as part of the transaction) by one of the Plaintiff's staff. As for the facility letter and personal guarantee, I recall that I was simply asked to sign at various places, but the terms and legal consequences/effect thereof were not explained to me. I specifically recall that before signing the facility letter and personal guarantee, one of the Plaintiff's staff represented to me that there were other properties being offered as security (including [Jian Yi’s] factory in the Mainland and another property in Hong Kong) and so I need not worry ... Further, I was not advised to seek independent legal advice at any time during the meeting.
(2) Legal Charge dated 31 March 2022 ...: I recall that this document was signed in a law firm. I was asked by my Husband to attend the law firm for signing the same. I recall that a staff of the law firm checked my identity card and confirmed with me that I was the registered owner of the Property. After that the staff simply told me that the document was a legal charge of the Property in favour of the Plaintiff, but did not explain to me the terms and legal consequences/effect thereof. I was then asked to sign the document in front of a lawyer who subsequently came in the meeting room just for witnessing my signature. The whole meeting was very short and only took about 5-10 minutes. I was not advised to seek independent legal advice at any time during the meeting.
(3) Facility Letter dated 24 February 2023 ...: I have no real recollection of this document. In any event, I was not aware of the terms and effect thereof.
(4) Facility Letters dated 12 April 2024 ...: I also have no real recollection of these document[s]. In any event, I was not aware of the terms and effect thereof.”
I italicised “March 2022” in paragraph 15(1) above because in examination-in-chief Ge Jing revised that evidence. She stated that, although uncertain about the exact date, she must have signed the 1st Facility Letter and the Guarantee in the Bank’s offices in February 2022. She explained that, based on her records, she could not have been in Hong Kong on 11 or 12 March 2022, as she left Hong Kong for Shanghai on 3 March 2022 and did not return until 10 April 2022. Ge Jing applied at the start of trial to introduce a 3rd Affirmation (Ge Jing III), exhibiting documents showing that she was in Shanghai from 3 March to 11 April 2022 and in COVID-19 quarantine on 11 and 12 March 2022. I refused to allow Ge Jing III to be adduced as there was no good explanation for its lateness. When issued in May 2026, Ge Jing I accepted that the 1st Facility Letter and Guarantee were signed at the Bank’s offices in March 2022. It was not apparent why it was only at the eve of trial that Ge Jing sought to verify whether the signing actually took place in March 2022.
Immediately before the trial of this matter, the Bank’s version of events in connection with the signing of the security documents for its 2nd mortgage was as follows:
On 5 October 2021 Ge Jing signed a “Consent Relating to Mortgage Data” and a “Consent to subscribe to the Land Registry’s e-Alert Service for Authorized Institutions” in the Bank’s favour. The Consents are preliminary to the application for a mortgage loan. The Consents authorised the release of information by TransUnion Limited. The Consents also agreed to the Land Registry alerting the Bank in respect of charges and encumbrances made against the Property.
On 24 February 2022 the Bank instructed K M Lai & Li (KMLL), solicitors, to prepare the Legal Charge. Ge Jing and Forest Win were referred to KMLL by an Alex Yuen, described in the Bank’s evidence as “an accounting staff of another client of KMLL at the material time”. Alex Yuen served as the liaison point between KMLL on the one hand and Ge Jing and Forest Win on the other, before the 1 March 2022 meeting mentioned below. Alex Yuen provided KMLL with an authorisation letter signed by Ge Jing for the redemption of the DBS mortgage.
On 1 March 2022 KMLL (acting through its senior conveyancing clerk Chan Wai Ming) emailed Warning Notices relating to the proposed Transaction to Ge Jing through Alex Yuen as intermediary. These were specifically (a) a Warning Notice to Ge Jing in English and Chinese prepared by the Bank and (b) a Warning Notice to Ge Jing in English alone prepared by KMLL.
On 2 March 2022 a meeting with Ge Jing and Yip Shui Wa took place at KMLL’s offices. The meeting was conducted in Cantonese and transpired in three parts.
The first part of the 2 March 2022 meeting (estimated by the Bank’s witnesses to have taken about 15 minutes), Chan Wai Ming asked Yip Shui Wa to leave the room and spoke to Ge Jing alone in Yip Shui Wa’s absence. Chan Wai Ming summarised the key contents and practical implications of:
the Warning Notices,
a confirmation letter to be signed by Ge Jing and KMLL pursuant to Appendix D of the Law Society’s “Guidelines on Solicitors' Duties in Relation to Security Transactions with Potentially Unduly Influenced Party” (the Law Society Guidelines),
a Deed of Assignment of Rental Income to be signed by Ge Jing,
the Legal Charge to be signed by Ge Jing and Forest Win, and
specimen signatures of Ge Jing and Forest Win to be provided to the Bank.
Bonnie Lok, a solicitor at KMLL, joined the meeting for the second part (estimated by the Bank’s witnesses to have taken about 10 minutes). In Bonnie Lok’s presence, Chan Wai Ming again summarised the documents listed in the preceding sub-paragraph. He expressly recommended that Ge Jing instruct her own solicitor for independent legal advice in connection with the transaction. Ge Jing confirmed that she had no questions at that stage and signed the Warning Notices. Chan Wai Ming then went through Ge Jing’s obligations as set out in the Appendix D confirmation letter, mentioning “the financial information of [Forest Win] provided by the [Bank]”. Ge Jing confirmed that she had no queries and signed the confirmation letter. Finally, Chan Wai Ming drew Ge Jing’s attention to the bilingual “IMPORTANT NOTICE” on pages 1 and 2 of the Legal Charge. The “IMPORTANT NOTICE” stated in English and Chinese that Ge Jing was “strongly advised to seek independent legal advice from her own lawyer” before signing the Legal Charge. The legal obligations under the Legal Charge were then summarised in the “Important Notice” in English and Chinese. Chan Wai Ming noted that the security to be provided was "unlimited". Ge Jing confirmed that she had no questions and signed the Legal Charge. Before she signed, Chan Wai Ming asked if Ge Jing understood and agreed the document’s contents. Ge Jing confirmed that she had no issues or queries. Thereafter, Ge Jing signed the Deed of Assignment of Rental Income.
At the 2 March 2022 meeting, Chan Wai Ming affirmed that he was “fully satisfied that [Ge Jing] understood the serious nature of the liabilities she was undertaking and the practical implications of entering into this transaction”. He deposed in his Affirmation that Ge Jing “never mentioned about her husband nor his/her family nor any circumstances that could potentially give rise to undue influence”.
For the third part of the 2 March 2022 meeting, Chan Wai Ming invited Yip Shui Wa back into the room and briefly explained the Legal Charge to him. Thereafter, Yip Shui Wa signed the Legal Charge on Forest Win’s behalf.
Following the meeting, Bonnie Lok on behalf of KMLL signed the Appendix D confirmation letter previously executed by Ge Jing and sent the same to the Bank. In the confirmation letter, Bonnie Lok stated:
“As a result of the meeting(s), we further confirm that we have received a written confirmation from [Ge Jing] and that [Ge Jing] wishes to proceed and we are satisfied that [D1] understands the practical implications of entering into this transaction. We confirm that we are not aware of any circumstances of undue influence...”
The confirmation letter was dated (and sent to the Bank) on 2 March 2022.
On 11 March 2022, Ge Jing signed the 1st Facility Letter in the presence of Russell Lok, who was then (but is no longer) a Relationship Manager & Assistant Vice-President at the Bank. The Bank says that, apart from the Property, no security (including the Jian Yi factory or the Jordan Property) was ever offered to the Bank for the facilities being extended to Forest Win. Russell Lok denies that the Bank said anything to Ge Jing about other properties being put up as security for the loan facilities to be granted to Forest Win. Russell Lok recalls that his then Supervisor (Otto Watt) explained the 1st Facility Letter to Ge Jing. That would have included the following paragraph on page 8 of the 1st Facility Letter:
“After having read and understood all the terms and conditions of this letter and the General Terms and Conditions of Banking Facilities, I/we (each) have carefully and duly considered all the said terms and conditions, and hereby approve the same. In the event that I/we am/are guaranteeing or providing security against all monies and obligations of the Borrower(s) owed to you without a limited amount I/we also understand that I/we may be personally liable for any debts and liabilities of the Borrower(s) to an unlimited extent which may well exceed the amount of the Facilities granted to the Borrower(s} hereunder and includes debts that may have nothing to do with the Facilities, such as future debts of the Borrower(s}.”
But Russell Lok accepts that he himself was not present when Otto Watt gave his explanation.
On 12 March 2022 Ge Jing signed the Guarantee at the Bank’s offices. The first page of the Guarantee advised Ge Jing to seek independent legal advice before signing. The Guarantee included a Chinese version. According to Russell Lok, Otto Watt must have drawn Ge Jing’s attention to the front page of the Guarantee in accordance with the Bank’s normal practice.
Mo Yin Keung (the Bank’s Vice-President), Russell Lok, Chan Wai Ming, and Bonnie Lok gave evidence for the Bank at the trial. Ge Jing gave evidence on her own behalf. During the trial, the following matters emerged in connection with the Bank’s version of events:
On 2 March 2022 Chan Wai Ming expressly confirmed with Ge Jing that she had received the Warning Notices from Alex Yuen on 1 March 2022.
Although signed on 2 March 2022, the Warning Notices are dated 1 March 2022. This backdating was done to comply with paragraph 25 of the Law Society Guidelines which states that solicitors should ensure that Warning Notices are signed by a surety at least one working day before the execution of security documents. Chan Wai Ming’s evidence is that, where (as here) there is less than a working day between the receipt of a Warning Notice and a surety signing security documents, back-dating is typically done if the surety does not wish to return to the solicitors’ offices on the following or later day to sign the security documents. The surety is asked whether he or she (a) would like to return to the solicitors’ offices on the following day to sign or (b) is content to sign then and there with the Warning Notice being backdated to the previous day.
Because of the time that has elapsed since 2022 and the present and the large number of mortgage transactions which they have overseen in the intervening years, Chan Wai Ming and Bonnie Lok do not have a clear recollection of what actually happened when Ge Jing attended at KMLL’s offices to sign the Legal Charge. In giving their evidence of what happened with Ge Jing, they were relying in large part on their standard practice in handling the signing of mortgages by sureties.
There was no dispute that (a) Ge Jing signed the Legal Charge at KMLL’s offices on 2 March 2022 and (b) Ge Jing signed the 1st Facility Letter and the Guarantee at the Bank’s offices. There was an issue as to whether the 1st Facility Letter and the Guarantee were (i) signed on different days or on the same day and (ii) actually signed on 11 and 12 March 2022 or on some other date or dates. The Bank’s witnesses accepted that, given the time that has elapsed since the actual signing, they were simply going by the dates stated in the 1st Facility Letter and the Guarantee. Plainly, if (as seems to have been the case) Ge Jing was in Shanghai between 3 March and 10 April 2022, the 1st Facility Letter and the Guarantee could only have been signed (i) on or before 3 March 2022 when Ge Jing left Hong Kong for Shanghai or (ii) on or after 10 April 2022 when Ge Jing returned to Hong Kong from Shanghai. The fact that the drawdown for the loan apparently took place on 31 March 2022 suggests that (i) is more likely, as it is improbable that the Bank would have released loan monies without the 1st Facility Letter and the Guarantee having been executed. In the latter instance, the Bank would risk loan monies being released without the security of the Guarantee.
Following the Legal Charge’s execution by Ge Jing and Yip Shui Wa on 2 March 2022, KMLL held onto the document in escrow until 31 March 2022 (the date appearing on the Legal Charge) when the document was released to the Bank.
Otto Watt no longer works for the Bank. The Bank attempted to contact Otto watt through its human resources department but received no response.
The NCB 1st mortgage which Ge Jing took out on the Property was paid off some time ago. Consequently, the Bank’s 2nd mortgage operates as a first charge over the Property.
DISCUSSION
Issue (1): Whether Ge Jing was induced to execute the Legal Charge and Guarantee by Ye Yongqiang’s undue influence or misrepresentation
I have no doubt that Ge Jing understood the practical effect and implications of the Legal Charge and Guarantee that she signed.
This is because the mortgage in the Bank’s favour was not the only mortgage that Ge Jing entered into in respect of the Property. In answer to a question from the court, Ge Jing acknowledged that she understood the Third Schedule of the 2nd mortgage executed over the Property in NCB’s favour. That Third Schedule (entitled “Important Matters for the attention of the Mortgagor”) set out in English and Chinese what the practical effect of the NCB 2nd mortgage was. As the ICBC, DBS and the Bank’s 2nd mortgages all replaced the NCB 2nd mortgage, she would at least have understood that the Bank’s 2nd mortgage had a similar effect as the NCB 2nd mortgage. I note, in this connection, that the NCB 2nd mortgage and the DBS 2nd mortgage were all interpreted to her in Chinese at the time of their signing.
Further evidence of Ge Jing’s understanding of mortgages may be seen from the WeChat messages annexed to this Judgment.
In Annex A, there are the following exchanges between Ge Jing and Ye Yongqiang:
on 21 July 2021 at 11.51 am:
Ge Jing: “I feel many are using my property as collateral.”
Ye: “I don't want to say any more.”
Ge Jing: “Anyone who considers the issue from my perspective. People on my side wouldn't do that. You kept saying you only mortgaged my property for 8 million. What happens eventually.”
on 21 July 2021 at 4.38 pm:
Ge Jing: “My Shanghai property has also been pledged. I don’t understand why It’s like I owe you guys something. [It’s like] my help is only natural, expected and being taken for granted. And not helping would be heartless.”
Ye: “Not possible to even lend me 10 million (1000)?”
Ge Jing: “Where would the money come from. Cannot. I beg you don't be like this.”
Ye: “Can't lend me a single penny?”
Ge Jing: “Not possible I lent you last time already. Have you repaid me on time. Your debt outside is like a bottomless hole. Have you ever told me the truth for once. And don't even know how much is needed next month.”
In Annex B, there are the following exchanges between Ge Jing and Ye Yongqiang:
on 8 November 2021 at 12:27 pm:
Ge Jing: “Why did your sister say that many instalments for DBS haven't been repaid. And now must transfer to OCBC. And it is only in respect of my property.”
on 8 November 2021 at 12.42 pm:
Ge Jing: “So the money you said you had, came from the mortgage of my property.”
on 8 November 2021 at 1.53 pm:
Ye: “Time is running out, the banks in Mainland China still have procedures to go through, so the funds won't arrive quickly, the fastest solution right now is to switch banks and increase the credit limit; this is for repaying debt in Hong Kong! I hope you can help.”
Ge Jing: “Your Jordan property is just sitting there anyway. No increase in value. Better to sell it.”
Ye: “Already considering.”
Ge Jing: “Considering what.”
Ye: “Selling Jordan property.”
Ge Jing: “The problem is even after you sell you would still not repay the money for my property.”
Ye: “The interest rate in Hong Kong is very low, should consider transferring the ones with higher interest first.”
Ge Jing: “Why use my property as collateral.”
Ye: “Currently the $300,000 monthly rent received by the company is for paying interest. You already stopped caring whether I live or die anymore?”
Ge Jing: “I’m raising two [kids].”
The exchanges show that Ge Jing was not a novice when it came to mortgages and guarantees as security for a loan facility. She was fully cognisant of the vocabulary and the consequences of mortgages, including in the present case the appreciable risk that Forest Win would default in its repayments of the Bank’s mortgage and the Bank could enforce against the Property.
In Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge No.2 [2002] 2 AC 773, Lord Nicholls stated:
“17. The availability of this forensic tool [that is, the forensic tool of “presumption”] in cases founded on abuse of influence arising from the parties' relationship has led to this type of case sometimes being labelled "presumed undue influence". This is by way of contrast with cases involving actual pressure or the like, which are labelled "actual undue influence": see Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA v Aboody [1990] 1 QB 923, 953, and Royal Bank of Scotland pic v Etridge (No 2) [1998] 4 All ER 705, 711-712, paras 5-7. This usage can be a little confusing. In many cases where a plaintiff has claimed that the defendant abused the influence he acquired in a relationship of trust and confidence the plaintiff has succeeded by recourse to the rebuttable evidential presumption. But this need not be so. Such a plaintiff may succeed even where this presumption is not available to him; for instance, where the impugned transaction was not one which called for an explanation.
18. The evidential presumption discussed above is to be distinguished sharply from a different form of presumption which arises in some cases. The law has adopted a sternly protective attitude towards certain types of relationship in which one party acquires influence over another who is vulnerable and dependent and where, moreover, substantial gifts by the influenced or vulnerable person are not normally to be expected. Examples of relationships within this special class are parent and child, guardian and ward, trustee and beneficiary, solicitor and client, and medical adviser and patient. In these cases the law presumes, irrebuttably, that one party had influence over the other. The complainant need not prove he actually reposed trust and confidence in the other party. It is sufficient for him to prove the existence of the type of relationship.
19. It is now well established that husband and wife is not one of the relationships to which this latter principle applies. In Yerkey v Jones (1939) 63 CLR 649, 675 Dixon J explained the reason. The Court of Chancery was not blind to the opportunities of obtaining and unfairly using influence over a wife which a husband often possesses. But there is nothing unusual or strange in a wife, from motives of affection or for other reasons, conferring substantial financial benefits on her husband. Although there is no presumption, the court will nevertheless note, as a matter of fact, the opportunities for abuse which flow from a wife's confidence in her husband. The court will take this into account with all the other evidence in the case. Where there is evidence that a husband has taken unfair advantage of his influence over his wife, or her confidence in him, “it is not difficult for the wife to establish her title to relief”: see In re Lloyds Bank Ltd; Bomze and Lederman v Bomze [1931] 1 Ch 289, 302, per Maugham J.”
Building on this, I stated in Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft v Orient Profit Investment Ltd [2025] HKCFI 5308, at [33]:
“Husband and wife typically repose mutual trust and confidence in each other. That is not enough to establish that, whenever a wife does what a husband asks her to do, that the wife acted under the husband’s undue influence. There is no automatic presumption of undue influence merely because a case involves a husband-and-wife relationship. Undue influence connotes some form of impropriety. Thus, when assessing a husband’s statements or conduct, so long as such behaviour does not go beyond the bounds of what may be expected of a reasonable husband in the circumstances, the court should not characterise the same as undue influence (Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (No. 2) [2002] 2 AC 773, at §32). Difficult discussions between husband and wife, even heated exchanges between them, are a fact of daily life. Such matters will not be sufficient to constitute the exertion of undue influence by the former over the latter. Something more -- positive misrepresentation, excessive pressure, emotional blackmail or bullying -- has to be proved before the court can infer that a husband has exerted undue influence over a wife and thereby constrained the exercise of the wife’s free will (Etridge (No.2), at §§160, 221). Mere pressure applied by a husband to persuade a wife that an unattractive course of action may nonetheless be in their best interest or that of the family, would not justify a finding of undue influence. It must be shown that the husband’s pressure was excessive, leading to the wife’s will being overcome without her reason being persuaded.”
Consistently with my dictum in Deutsche Bank, despite there being no presumption of undue influence between husband and wife, and although Ge Jing and Ye Yongqiang have since divorced, I will proceed on the basis that, at all material times, Ye Yongqiang and Ge Jing reposed trust and confidence in each other as husband and wife. But that does not mean that, when signing the Legal Charge and Guarantee as Ye Yongqiang asked her, Ge Jing acted under undue influence. The real question that I have to determine is whether Ye Yongqiang’s conduct or behaviour towards Ge Jing went “beyond the bounds of what may be expected of a reasonable husband”.
I am unable to conclude that was the case.
Ge Jing says that Ye Yongqiang induced a guilt-trip by accusing her “in substance, of not treating them [that is, Ye Yongqiang and Ye Linbo and their relatives] as family and of being willing to abandon them in their time of need”. But what Ye Yongqiang said to Ge Jing strikes me as not uncommon between husbands and wives who find themselves in a difficult economic situation and a spouse seeks to cajole the other into contributing financially. I do not think that the statements attributed to Ye Yongqiang exceed the bounds of what might be expected in conventional husband and wife relationships. It may be inferred from the WeChat exchanges exhibited to this Judgment that there were probably angry face-to-face arguments between the couple on the matter. But that is not exceptional in marriage and would not by itself qualify as undue influence.
On the contrary, it can be seen from the WeChat exchanges annexed to this Judgment that Ge Jing gave back as good as she got from Ye Yongqiang. Ge Jing fought back. See, for example, the sarcastic reference to “raising two kids” quoted above and the exchange on 8 November 2021 at 12.59 pm in which Ge Jing ironically retorts that Ye Yongqiang should take a hard look at the dire circumstances of his business as reflected in its financial statements:
Ye: That's just one of them [that is, the mortgage of the Property is “just one” of the mortgages to be executed], Jianyi is also doing it; the purpose of doing it in Hong Kong is to operate in Hong Kong.
Ge Jing: “How much business do you have now. Do you look at your financial statements.”
In the witness box, out of the blue, Ge Jing stated that her husband threatened suicide to induce her to agree to mortgage the Property to the Bank. This threat had not previously been mentioned in Ge Jing I or Ge Jing II. Nor does it feature in the rejected Ge Jing III. I am therefore sceptical that Ye Yongqiang actually made such a threat. But, even supposing that he did, in times of stress, spouses often engage in hyperbole without meaning what they say and I am do not think that such statement without more can constitute “going beyond the bounds”. I note that Ge Jing herself appears to have engaged in emotional manipulation with Ye Yongqiang, as evidenced by the following WeChat exchange on 12 November at 4.25 pm in which Ge Jing portrays herself as one of life’s victims.
Ye: “You don't care about me anymore when I have no money? Cannot go through hardship together?”
Ge Jing: “I have never enjoyed [life] anyway.”
Ye: “What do you mean ...”
Taking account of the foregoing, it seems to me more probable that, despite being against the idea of mortgaging the Property to the Bank, at the end of the day Ge Jing of her own accord and after weighing all the circumstances, reluctantly agreed to sign the Legal Charge and the Guarantee. Her reasoning was not overborne. She instead signed the documents willingly with eyes wide open as to the potential risks and consequences involved.
Ge Jing additionally relies on what she says was a misrepresentation by Ye Yongqiang that the Jian Yi factory and the Jordan Property would be mortgaged to the Bank as additional security when in fact the properties were not so mortgage. However, this allegation of misrepresentation is problematic on a number of fronts.
First, an actionable representation must be of statement of present fact. A representation of what someone will do in the future is not actionable as a matter of law. At best, such representation is merely a prediction of what one will be doing. There may be many reasons why the prediction does not come true, including that through no fault of anyone it turns out that it is simply not possible to do what one has predicted.
Forensically, lawyers attempt to turn a statement of what a person will do in the future (such as the representation here) into a statements of present fact by suggesting that the statement is an implied representation of a present intention to do something. Thus, here the implied representation would be that, when making the statement, Ye Yongqiang intended to mortgage the Jian Yi factory and the Jordan Property to the Bank in addition to the Property. The allegation would then be that Ye Yongqiang actually no such present intention. However, the difficulty is that there is no evidence one way or another as to the truth or falsehood of that implied present representation. For all we know, when stating that he would mortgage the Jian Yi factory and Jordan Property, Ye Yongqiang really intended to do so, but later changed his mind for some reason.
Second, ignore the legal difficulty just described and assume that Ye Yongqiang “misrepresented” that the Jian Yi factory and the Jordan Property would be mortgaged as additional security for the Bank’s loan facilities. Assume that Ge Jing relied on the “representation” and agreed to execute the mortgage to the Bank as a result. The assumed circumstances would undermine the contention that Ge Jing acted under undue influence such that her reason was overborne. Ye Yongqiang’s representation would instead have been a factor (possibly a dominant factor) which Ge Jing would have weighed in deciding whether to agree to what Ye Yongqiang was asking of her.
For the foregoing reasons, I answer issue (1) as follows:
There was no undue influence exerted by Ye Yongqiang on Ge Jing in connection with the mortgage in the Bank’s favour.
There was no actionable misrepresentation by Ye Yongqiang to the effect that the Jian Yi factory and Jordan Property would be mortgaged to the Bank as additional security for the loan facilities to be granted by the Bank.
B. Issue (2): Whether the Guarantee was procured by a misrepresentation on the part of the Bank’s staff that the Jian Yi's factory and the Jordan Property would serve as additional security for the Guarantee
Ge Jing’s evidence on the alleged misrepresentation is sketchy. She claims that on a date unknown, possibly in February 2022, an unidentified male in the Bank’s offices told her before she signed the Guarantee that “there were other properties being offered as security (including [Jian Yi’s] factory in the Mainland and another property in Hong Kong) and so [Ge Jing] need not worry”. Russell Lok having denied that such representation was made by him, it was suggested at trial that the person who made the representation must have been Otto Watt. Since Otto Watt was not called, it was suggested by Ge Jing’s counsel that I should draw adverse inferences against the Bank and deem the alleged representation to have been made by Otto Watt.
I am unable to draw such adverse inference. On the contrary, I doubt that the alleged representation was ever made.
There is an evidential burden on Ge Jing to adduce prima facie evidence to support her positive case that a representation was actually made. If that evidential burden is met, it will fall upon the Bank to discharge the probative burden of establishing that no such representation was made. See, for example, Lord Hobhouse in Etridge (No.2), at [107]. Here, Ge Jing’s case amounts to no more than a vague, unparticularised allegation. She has not met her evidential burden and it consequently does not fall upon the Bank to prove a negative, namely, that no such representation was made.
There is the further difficulty that the alleged representation is not actionable as a matter of law. That is because the alleged representation does not amount to an assurance that the Jian Yi factory and the Jordan Property would be accepted by the Bank as additional security for the Bank’s loan facility. The alleged representation is merely that properties “were being offered”. The properties may conceivably have been offered by Ye Yongqiang, although the Bank has no record of such an offer ever having been made. If the properties were being offered, that does mean that the properties would be accepted by the Bank as security. Indeed, I doubt that the Bank would or could accept Jian Yi’s factory in Mainland China as security for a Hong Kong loan facility.
I note in passing that, in one of her WeChat exchanges with Ye Yongqiang quoted above, Ge Jing herself pointed out that there was a “problem” because the sale proceeds from the Jordan Property would be insufficient to cover the outstanding loan monies owed by Forest Win. It therefore strikes me as improbable that any “representation” by the Bank’s staff as to the Jordan Property being offered as additional security, would have comforted Ge Jing and motivated her to sign the Legal Charge. She would have known that the Jordan Property was insufficient to cover what was needed to repay the loan monies owed by Forest Win.
Consequently, I answer issue (2) in the negative. No member of the Bank’s staff made any representation of the nature alleged by Ge Jing.
C. Issue (3): Whether the Bank was put on inquiry as to the possibility of undue influence or misrepresentation by Ye Yongqiang.
The short answer to issue (3) is that, given the answer to issue (1) (namely, that there was no undue influence and that there was no actionable misrepresentation by Ye Yongqiang), issue (3) falls away.
Ge Jing’s counsel submits that the Bank was put on inquiry as to the possibility of undue influence or misrepresentation. Counsel suggests that, being aware of the husband-wife relationship between Ge Jing and Ye Yongqiang, the Bank should have realised that the relationship between Ge Jing and Forest Win was “non-commercial”. Counsel asserts that the transaction with the Bank was “clearly disadvantageous” to Ge Jing who had “no apparent interest from the transaction or shareholdings in [Forest Win]”. Counsel concludes from the foregoing that the Bank was “clearly put on inquiry”.
Plainly, of its own initiative, the Bank treated Ge Jing’s situation as one potentially concerning an unduly influenced property. Otherwise, the Bank would not have instructed KMLL to (1) meet with Ge Jing for the purposes of explaining the Legal Charge and (2) provide the Bank with the Appendix D confirmation letter following such meeting. But it does not follow from this that the Bank knew or ought to have realised that the transaction was “clearly disadvantageous” to Ge Jing or that Ge Jing “had no apparent interest from the transaction”.
The evidence simply does not support counsel’s contentions. As Lord Nicholls observed in the passage from Etridge (No.2) cited above, there is no presumption of undue influence arising from the mere fact that a borrower and a surety are husband and wife. I have already found that there actually was no undue influence. The evidence is instead that Ye Yongqiang, with Ge Jing’s knowledge and agreement, “arrange[d] for [Ge Jing] to be appointed as a director of [Forest Win] for such purpose [that is, obtaining loan facilities]”. Ge Jing thus willingly accepted appointment as a director of Forest Win in order to show lenders that Ge Jing had a stake in Forest Win and the Property could safely be put up as collateral to loan facilities extended to Forest Win. Additionally, to reinforce the impression that Ge Jing had some stake in Forest Win, Ge Jing signed Forest Win’s financial statements as director. In believing that Ge Jing had a real connection with Forest Win, the Bank was reacting precisely as Ge Jing and Ye Yongqiang intended. It is difficult in those circumstances to see why the Bank should have been put on inquiry of undue influence. I am thus unable to accept the Bank would have been put on notice that Ge Jing was uninterested in Forest Win and had no commercial reason for allowing the Property to be mortgaged in support of facilities granted to Forest Win.
As for any misrepresentation by Ye Yongqiang, even on the premise that there was some sort of false “representation” by him to Ge Jing, there is no evidence at all that the Bank had any notice (whether actual or constructive) of the same.
D. Issue (4): Whether the Bank took sufficient steps to satisfy itself that Ge Jing was not acting (a) under undue influence or (b) as a result of Ye Yongqiang’s misrepresentation.
The short answer is that issue (4) falls away in light of the answer to issue (1).
Ge Jing’s counsel submits that, having been put on inquiry, the Bank failed to take reasonable steps to satisfy itself that Ge Jing was not acting undue influence or misrepresentation. Counsel’s argument therefore assumes that the Bank was put on inquiry. I have found in issue (3) that there was nothing to put the Bank on inquiry. But assume, for the sake of argument, that the Bank was on inquiry.
Counsel for Ge Jing suggests that Otto Watt ought to have been called as a witness and Russell Lok did not in fact know what (if any) explanation Otto Watt gave Ge Jing in respect of the Guarantee and 1st Facility Letter. Counsel criticises the Bank for not adducing “evidence of any private meeting between its own staff and Ge Jing, separate from Ye Yongqiang, at which she was told of the extent of her liability as surety and urged to take independent legal advice”. Counsel therefore urges me to accept Ge Jing’s statement that she executed the 1st Facility Letter and Guarantee at the Bank’s offices in Ye Yongqiang’s presence without any or any adequate explanations from the Bank.
Counsel further submits that the Bank wrongly relied on KMLL’s Appendix D confirmation letter to satisfy itself that there was no undue influence. It follows from this reliance (counsel argues) that the Bank:
“clearly would not have considered itself to be under any duplicative duty to explain the documents to {Ge Jing} directly and this supports [Ge Jing’s] version of what happened at the meeting with the bank staff when she executed the 1st Facility letter and the Guarantee.”
Counsel argues that there is “a further, serious difficulty for [the Bank] concerning the dates on which the 1st Facility Letter and [Ge Jing’s] Purported Guarantee were in fact executed. It is “alarming” (counsel says) that the Bank’s staff “cannot vouch for the accuracy of the execution dates recorded on the face of the documents [and] yet [were] not surprised at all that the actual date of execution would be different from the date stipulated on the document”. This (counsel speculates) “tends to suggest that [Russell Lok] knew of a practice where bank staff could alter or manipulate execution dates to suit the Bank’s purposes”.
Counsel submits that the 1st Facility Letter and Guarantee were either signed (a) before Ge Jing’s meeting with KMLL on 2 March 2022 or (b) after Ge Jing returned to Hong Kong on 10 April 2022, by which time the loan would already have been drawn down. Either hypothesis is said to be problematic. If Ge Jing executed the 1st Facility Letter and Guarantee before meeting KMLL, she would have done so without having received the legal advice and financial information which ought to have been given to prevent the bank from being fixed with constructive notice of undue influence. If Ge Jing only executed the documents after the drawdown, such execution was (counsel reasons):
“no doubt a mere formality [as the Bank] had already permitted the Company to draw down the loan before obtaining [Ge Jing’s] signature on the Facility Letter, and [the Bank] did not inform [Ge Jing] that the loan had already been drawn down, a matter plainly relevant to [Ge Jing’s] assessment of the risk she was being asked to assume.”
Counsel is just as scathing about what happened in KMLL’s offices.
Counsel suggests that it would have been impossible to explain the contents of the Legal Charge to Ge Jing in about 10 minutes during the second part of the 2 March 2022 meeting when Bonnie Lok was present. Counsel characterises Chan Wai Ming’s evidence on the matter as “very shifting”.
Counsel accuses Bonnie Lok and Chan Wai Ming of having as their “priority” the “preparing [of] documents to give a (false) impression that the Law Society’s Guidelines ... had been fulfilled”. Counsel says that this “casts serious doubt on whether Mr Chan and Ms Lok had in fact [done] all the steps they claimed they had in their Affirmations”. In this respect, counsel refers to the backdating of the Warning Notices to 1 March “to give a false impression that the Guideline had been ‘strictly followed’”. Counsel adds that, while backdating of Warning Notices may be common conveyancing practice, such conduct falls short of the necessary standard of care. The purpose of the one-day requirement is to give a surety enough time to consider one’s position, especially whether to instruct an independent solicitor to advise on a transaction. There was (counsel contends) insufficient time in this case. Counsel further refers to the Appendix D confirmation letter. Counsel denies that the confirmation letter constitutes a correct and contemporaneous note of the 2 March 2022 meeting. That is because the letter did not record that Chan Wai Ming was present and that it was Chan Wai Ming (not Bonnie Lok) who explained the Legal Charge.
Counsel complains that the box electing “unlimited liability” in respect of the Legal Charge was pre-ticked before Ge Jing’s arrival. The Legal Charge states that Ge Jing could choose between a limited or unlimited security and elected the latter. However, the box marked “unlimited” having been pre-ticked by Chan Wai Ming, Ge Jing did not have a genuine choice.
I am unable to accept any of counsel’s criticisms. On the assumption that the Bank was placed on inquiry, there was nothing to complain about in respect of the Bank’s conduct or that of KMLL.
I have dealt with Otto Watt in my discussion of issue (2).
Russell Lok deposed in his affirmation to his belief that Otto Watt properly explained the 1st Facility Letter and Guarantee to Ge Jing, stating:
“My ... belief is founded on the fact that my Supervisor [that is, Otto Watt] was highly professional and qualified to provide explanations to signatories and would have provided such explanations as would be required.”
Ge Jing’s own evidence on what transpired before the signing of the 1st Facility Letter and Guarantee is vague. Having initially deposed that the documents were signed, she suddenly suggested during her examination-in-chief that the documents may have been signed in February 2022. Of the signing itself, she stated:
“The whole meeting lasted for around 30 minutes, but the majority of the time (up to 20 minutes) was used for explaining the terms of an insurance policy (which as far as I understand was required to be issued as part of the transaction) by one of the Plaintiff's staff. As for the facility letter and personal guarantee, I recall that I was simply asked to sign at various places, but the terms and legal consequences/effect thereof were not explained to me. I specifically recall that before signing the facility letter and personal guarantee, one of the Plaintiff's staff represented to me that there were other properties being offered as security (including [Jian Yi’s] factory in the Mainland and another property in Hong Kong) and so I need not worry ... Further, I was not advised to seek independent legal advice at any time during the meeting.”
But it is doubtful that the insurance policy could be meaningfully explained without first providing the context of the 1st Facility Letter and the Guarantee. It is more probable that Ge Jing’s recollection has simply melded together explanations relating to the 1st Facility Letter, the Guarantee and the Legal Charge. Moreover, even if one takes Ge Jing’s estimated timings at face value and it took the better part of 20 minutes to explain the insurance policy, that will still leave some 10 minutes of the approximately 30 minutes’ length of the meeting. That 10 minutes would be adequate time to explain the practical implications of the 1st Facility Letter and the Guarantee, especially to someone who had previously entered into similar transactions with NCB, ICBC and DBS.
The reality is that, after the lapse of over four years from the signing of the documents, all the witnesses before me were now unable to remember exactly what happened. On that premise, the safest course is to go by what documents state on their face (unless contradicted by other documents) and the Bank’s standard or routine practices. This approach is consonant with Russell Lok’s belief. I am thus unable to accept as plausible Ge Jing’s recollection that no explanation was given of the 1st Facility Letter and Guarantee prior to their signing.
As mentioned earlier in this Judgment, if Ge Jing was in Shanghai from 3 March to 10 April 2022, the documents must have been signed on or before 3 March 2022 (that is, before Ge Jing’s flight from Hong Kong to Shanghai on that day) or on or after 10 April 2022 (that is, from the time of Ge Jing’s arrival in Hong Kong). If (for example) Ge Jing’s flight to Shanghai (identified as CX 360 in Ge Jing III) left Hong Kong in the afternoon, she could still have signed the documents in the Bank’s offices in the morning of 3 March 2022. That would have been after the 2 March 2022 meeting at KMLL’s offices, and the Bank will then have held onto the signed documents in escrow until 11 or 12 March 2022, post-dating the documents accordingly. The point of dates only arose on the first day of trial, not having previously been raised by Ge Jing. The Bank therefore did not have sufficient notice to investigate the matter. Nor was it squarely put to Russell Lok in cross-examination that the Bank had “a practice where ... staff could alter or manipulate execution dates to suit the Bank’s purposes”. In those circumstances, I am unable to infer anything sinister, untoward or amiss from the Bank’s inability to say precisely when Ge Jing came to its offices to sign the 1st Facility Letter and the Guarantee.
I am unable to see why the Bank could not rely on KMLL’s Appendix D confirmation as a factor pointing to the absence of undue influence. I do not see how reliance on the confirmation letter implies that the Bank was abdicating its legal duties with the result that Ge Jing’s evidence on the signing of the 1st Facility Letter and Guarantee should be preferred. Such conclusion does not follow from the premise.
I accept, as more likely to have been the case, the evidence of Bonnie Lok and Chan Wai Ming on what happened at the meeting on 2 March 2022. It seems to me perfectly plausible that Chan Wai Ming went through the key elements of the Legal Charge in the first part of the meeting and then repeated the gist of what he had said in Bonnie Lok’s presence during the second part. I am unable to infer anything wrong in the fact that Chan Wai Ming (and not Bonnie Lok) delivered the explanation in the second part. Bonnie Lok was present to ensure the correctness of Chan Wai Ming’s explanation during the second part. I am unable to infer anything amiss from the fact that the Appendix D confirmation letter did not mention Chan Wai Ming’s presence in the room during the second part or that it was he (rather than Bonnie Lok) who explained the Legal Charge during that part. I do not see how counsel’s criticism in this respect makes any practical difference, since Bonnie Lok was present in the room to correct or augment what Chan Wai Ming said.
Nor am I able to find anything amiss in the fact that the “unlimited liability” box was pre-ticked. As Chan Wai Ming explained at trial, it was open to Ge Jing to refuse to sign the confirmation letter if she was only prepared to accept a “limited liability”. In that case, there would have to be a re-negotiation of the terms of the loan facility. As a result, in all likelihood, it would not be possible for drawdown to take place on 31 March 2022. Forest Win would not then obtain its much-needed loan monies until later. The redemption of the prior mortgage to DBS would have to be postponed, probably with more interest having to be paid to DBS and less of the loan monies provided by the Bank becoming available to Forest Win.
On the backdating of the Warning Notices, Chan Wai Ming explained that this was done as a convenience to clients. Otherwise, they would have to return to KMLL’s offices on the following day to sign. In any event, I am unable to see how counsel’s point has any material consequence. The purpose of the one working day interval is to ensure that a surety has adequate time to consider whether instruct one’s own solicitor to advise on a security transaction. Here the Legal Charge was signed in escrow. It was not dated and released until 31 March 2022. Ge Jing could have informed KMLL at any time between 2 and 31 March 2022 that she was withdrawing her signature. She had ample time to instruct her own solicitor to advise on the matter if she wished. She did not do so.
I have already dealt with the question whether the 1st Facility Letter and Guarantee were signed before or after the Legal Charge. I only add on issue (4) that, given the discussion above, there is no basis whatsoever for counsel’s suggestion that Bonnie Lok and Chan Wai Ming prioritised giving “a (false) impression that the Law Society's Guidelines ... had been fulfilled”.
E. Issue (5): Whether the Legal Charge and Guarantee should be set aside as against Ge Jing.
Given the answers to issues (1), (2), (3) and (4), Ge Jing’s defence fails and her counterclaim to set aside the Legal Charge and Guarantee is dismissed.
CONCLUSION
In the event that the Bank prevailed, its counsel provided me with the draft Order in Annex C to this Judgment. Paragraph 1 of the draft is an update of the terms which Master Leung ordered on 26 February 2026. I understand from both counsel that the figures in Master Leung’s order were previously agreed as figures among the parties. Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft reflect the fact that the 1st mortgage in NCB’s favour has now been discharged, so that the Bank’s 2nd mortgage effectively operates as a 1st mortgage. Paragraph 5 of the draft awards costs on an indemnity basis in accordance with clause 35 of the Legal Charge. Such clause is common in mortgages and normally upheld by the court.
At the end of the trial, I invited Ge Jing’s counsel to comment on the draft Order, especially as to costs being awarded on an indemnity basis if the Bank is successful. Counsel had no substantive comments. Counsel accepted that, under clause 35 of the Legal Charge, costs should be on an indemnity basis if the Bank succeeds.
In my view, the Bank having prevailed, it is appropriate to make an Order in terms of the draft in Annex C. I would only add to the draft Order provided by the Bank’s counsel, a paragraph dismissing Ge Jing’s counterclaim.
(Anselmo Reyes)
Deputy High Court Judge
Mr Tommy Cheung, instructed by M/s Chu & Lau, for the Plaintiff
Ms Abigail Liu, instructed by M/s LCS Legal, for the 1st Defendant
ANNEX A