RE CHAN CHI SAT

HCB 533/2025

[2026] HKCFI 1766

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO 533 OF 2025

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J U D G M E N T

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I. INTRODUCTION

1.  By a bankruptcy petition filed on 21 January 2025 (as amended on 17 October 2025) (the “Petition” and the “Amended Petition” respectively), the Petitioner seeks a bankruptcy order against the Debtor in respect of a sum of approximately HK$8.9 million (the “Debt”) under a settlement agreement entered into among, inter alios, the Petitioner and the Debtor on 24 May 2024.

II. BACKGROUND

2.  Valley Sports Group Limited (“Valley Sports”) is a company incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. On 28 June 2019, Valley Sports entered into a subscription agreement (the “Subscription Agreement”) for US$500,000 convertible note with the Petitioner offered by Valley Sports. On the same day, Valley Sports, the Petitioner, the Debtor, one Tiara Agriculture Holding Limited (“Tiara”) and MT Investment Group Limited (collectively, the “Parties”) entered into a supplemental agreement (the “1^st Supplemental Agreement”). The Debtor was one of the guarantors of the Subscription Agreement. Subsequently, the Parties entered into a supplemental agreement dated 1 March 2021 (the “2^nd Supplemental Agreement”), a supplemental agreement dated 1 June 2021 (the “3^rd Supplemental Agreement”), and a supplemental agreement dated 13 June 2023 (the “4^th Supplemental Agreement”) (collectively, the “Supplemental Agreements”).

3.  Disputes arose from the Subscription Agreement. Eventually, the Parties entered into the Settlement Agreement on 24 May 2024 (the “Settlement Agreement”). Under the Settlement Agreement, the Debtor shall be liable to pay the Petitioner a total of HK$6,083,713.70 to the Petitioner with interest. The first instalment was due on 25 May 2024. The Debtor defaulted, and as a result of the default, the whole amount became immediately due and payable.

4.  On 19 June 2024, the Petitioner issued a statutory demand (the “Statutory Demand”) in respect of the Debt. On 21 January 2025, the Petitioner presented the Petition, and on 17 October 2025, the Petitioner filed the Amended Petition. When the Petition was presented, the Debtor was not in Hong Kong.

III. THE DEBTOR’S GROUNDS OF OPPOSITION

5.  For the present purpose, Mr Alex Yeung, counsel for the Debtor, does not dispute the Debt. He raises the following grounds of opposition:-

(1) The Debtor had not been ordinarily resident, or had had a place of residence, in Hong Kong at any time in the period of 3 years prior to the presentation of the Petition under section 4(1)(c)(i) of the Bankruptcy Ordinance (Cap. 6) (the “BO”); and

(2) The Debtor had not carried on business at any time in the period of 3 years prior to the presentation of the Petition under section 4(1)(c)(ii) of the BO; and

(3) The Debtor is not domiciled in Hong Kong under section 4(1)(a) of the BO; and/or

(4) The Petitioner failed to take any reasonable steps to serve the Statutory Demand on the Debtor.

6.  The first three grounds are jurisdictional grounds, and to say that the Court has no jurisdiction, all the three grounds must exist. Further, all the above grounds are all set out in the Notice by Debtor of Intention to Oppose Petition filed on 21 March 2025. Thus, by rule 70 of the Bankruptcy Rules (Cap. 6A), the burden lies upon the Petitioner to prove otherwise: see Re Leung Cherng Jiunn, HCB 244/2014, 21 May 2015 at §§26-27 per Recorder Linda Chan SC (as she then was).

7.  I shall analyse each of the ground below.

IV. ORDINARY RESIDENCE AND PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN HONG KONG?

8.  The legal principles in relation to whether a debtor is “ordinarily resident” in Hong Kong are set out in Re Kok Hiu Pan [2002] 3 HKLRD 20 at §§27-29 per Kwan J (as she then was):-

(1) Whether a debtor is ordinarily resident is a question of fact and degree (§27);

(2) The Court should have regard to the ordinary and natural meaning of the expression “ordinarily resident” (§27);

(3) Ordinarily resident connotes residence in a place with some degree of continuity and apart from accidental or temporary absences (§28);

(4) Ordinary residence means no more than that the residence is not casual and uncertain, and that the person resides in the ordinary course of his life (§28);

(5) The person must be habitually, voluntarily and for settled purpose and normally resident in the place, apart from temporary or occasional absences of long or short duration (§28); and

(6) Mere transient or fortuitous presence in Hong Kong is not sufficient (§29).

9.  As regards “place of residence” in Hong Kong, the principles are summarised by DHCJ Phoebe Man at §28 of Re William Zeng [2025] 1 HKLRD 382:-

(1) The place of residence must be that of the Debtor but not someone else;

(2) “Residence” is different from “mere occupation”. Residence connotes a degree of substantial and continual connection with the jurisdiction, and cannot be satisfied by mere occupation, especially when it is fleeting and transient;

(3) To reside is “to dwell permanently or for a considerable time, to have one’s settled or usual abode, to live in or at a particular palace”;

(4) A place of residence is a factual situation rather than a matter of legal right, and therefore, a moral claim to the premises may be sufficient; and

(5) Temporary occupation of a third party’s place of residence is not sufficient.

10.  First, I start with the Statement of Travel Records issued by the Immigration Department on 9 April 2025 (the “Travel Records”) for the travel records of the Debtor during the period from 1 January 2020 to 1 April 2025. The relevant period of 3 years for the purpose of section 4(1)(c) of the BO is from 22 January 2022 to 21 January 2025 (the “Relevant Period”).

11.  It is unnecessary for me to set out all the entries in the Travel Records. Suffice for me to say that there are several features drawn from the Travel Records for the Relevant Period:-

(1) The Debtor came to Hong Kong about 3 – 5 times a month;

(2) Out of 1,096 days, the Debtor spent 85 days in Hong Kong, approximately 7.76%;

(3) Out of 1,096 nights, the Debtor spent 29 nights in Hong Kong, approximately 2.65%;

(4) Out of the 36 months, the Debtor did not spend any night in Hong Kong in 26 months;

(5) The longest stay in Hong Kong was 3 nights happened only once, on 18 – 21 January 2024;

(6) The Debtor’s stay in Hong Kong with 2 nights or more happened only 4 times, on (a) 29 – 31 December 2023; (b) 18 – 21 January 2024; (c) 26 – 28 January 2024; and (d) 18 – 20 October 2024;

(7) December 2023 and January 2024 were the only two consecutive months during which the Debtor spent more than one night in Hong Kong; and

(8) There was no identifiable pattern of coming in and out of Hong Kong.

12.  The above shows that the Debtor’s visits and stays in Hong Kong were insubstantial and sporadic, and lacked of regularity and continuity.

13.  For the only two consecutive months during which the Debtor spent more than one night in Hong Kong mentioned in §(7) above, it happened that a 240-hour community service order (the “CSO”) was imposed on the Debtor on 5 December 2023. Mr Yeung suggests that it shows that the Debtor did not come to Hong Kong voluntarily. However, in his opposing affirmation, the Debtor does not say that. Therefore, I cannot accept such suggestion.

14.  Ms Hannah Tang, counsel for the Petitioner, points out that the Debtor has failed to explain the purposes of his stays, and apparently asks me to draw adverse inference from the absence of explanation. However, as rightly pointed out by Mr Yeung, as a matter of facts, the stays, for whatever purposes, were insubstantial and sporadic, and lacked regularity and continuity. The inference I could draw can at best be an inference of some occupation in Hong Kong, but not anything near “residence”, let alone “ordinary residence”. For deciding whether there was ordinary residence in the circumstances, I would have to look at all the relevant evidence as a whole.

15.  Second, the Debtor holds a Hong Kong Permanent Residence Identity Card. This may be taken as an indicator that the Debtor had permanent residence in Hong Kong. However, I bear in mind that permanent residence as evidenced by the Identity Card is a legal status, and this does not necessarily mean that factually, the Debtor was resident in Hong Kong: see Re Wong Lei Kwan Joanne [2009] 3 HKLRD 173 at §22 per Barma J (as he then was). In any event, permanent residence can be lost, and a permanent resident identity card is not conclusive of permanent residence: see Re Zhu Guoling [2025] HKCFI 458 at §24 per DHCJ Phoebe Man.

16.  Third, the Debtor’s address in the Subscription Agreement and the companies record of the companies of which he was a director or shareholder is consistently stated to be the same address in Symphony Bay, Ma On Shan (the “Symphony Bay Address”). In this regard, the Debtor’s evidence is that it regarded the Symphony Bay Address as his correspondence address in Hong Kong only. Further, the registered owner of the property at the Symphony Bay Address is not the Debtor. As regards the Debtor’s evidence that the registered owner is his friend, there is no evidence from the Petitioner to traverse the same and no evidence from the Petitioner to suggest that the registered owner is related to the Petitioner more than a friend. Insofar as there is any suggestion that the Debtor did intend to use the Symphony Bay Address in the Subscription Agreement and the companies records to be his residential address, this may be a factor for consideration, but still, I have to look for evidence of actual residence: see Re Zhu Guoling, supra at §26.

17.  Fourth, as to whether there was actual place of residence in Hong Kong, the Debtor’s evidence is that he did not reside at the Symphony Bay Address. Even assuming that the Debtor stayed there each and every time he visited and stayed in Hong Kong, his stays there were, as described above, insubstantial and sporadic, and lacked continuity. I note that there is no suggestion that the Debtor had any moral claim to reside in the property there.

18.  Fifth, any reliance on Valley Sports’ business for the Petitioner’s favour would be misplaced, given that the business of Valley Sports was stated to be focused in Mainland in the presentation slides for the subscription, and the daily operation was stated by the Settlement Agreement to be in the Mainland.

19.  Sixth, Ms Tang’s reliance on the CSO to say that the Debtor was ordinarily resident in Hong Kong must be based on the premise that a CSO can be imposed only upon a person ordinarily resident in Hong Kong. However, there is no such requirement at all.

20.  Having considered all the above holistically, I am not satisfied that the Debtor had been ordinarily resident, or had had a place of residence, in Hong Kong at any time during the Relevant Period.

V. BUSINESS CARRIED ON IN HONG KONG?

21.  The legal principles in relation to whether a debtor carries on a business in Hong Kong can be summarised as follows:-

(1) “It must be established that the debtor was conducting a business of his own, separate and distinct from his company’s business”: see Re Kok Hiu Pan, supra at §37;

(2) There must be “some evidence of activities on the part of the debtor over and above those attributable to the company to show that the debtor has carried on business of his own”, such as company promotion or acquisition of a company for speculation: see Re Chen Mei Huan [2020] 1 HKLRD 409 at §8 per G Lam J (as he then was); and

(3) “[A] single transaction can constitute the carrying on of business if in a particular context and on the totality of evidence that appears to be the position”: see Re Wang Huimin [2021] HKCFI 3472 at §36 per Ng J.

22.  In the present case, first, Ms Tang submits that the Debtor had been actively involved in the management and operation of Valley Sports. She refers to the fact that the Debtor signed the Settlement Agreement, the Subscription Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements on behalf of Valley Sports. She also refers to the presentation slides made for promoting the convertible notes under the Subscription Agreement, in which slides the Debtor named himself as a director of Valley Sports and made presentation of how the business of Valley Sports would be run, developed and expanded. However, taken the highest, this evidence only suggests that all these activities carried out by the Debtor were attributable to Valley Sports, rather than to the Debtor himself separately and distinctly in his own personal capacity. For example, the presentation slides for the subscription of the convertible notes named other directors as well, showing that the business and management was not the Debtor’s own business and management. Further, in respect of the place of business, the presentation slides unequivocally show that the target of Valley Sports would be the Mainland, but not Hong Kong.

23.  Second, Ms Tang also refers to the conviction of the Debtor of the offence of failure to pay wages to his footballers contrary to section 63 of the Employment Ordinance (Cap. 57). The evidence in this regard is only the newspapers reports, and the Debtor does not adduce any evidence in this regard. Mr Yeung submits that the offence catches those persons authorised by the employer as well, and thus mere evidence of the conviction of the offence cannot be taken to mean that the Debtor himself personally employed the footballers. The evidence here is not clear either way. Given that the burden lies upon the Petitioner, I am not satisfied that this evidence shows that the Debtor carried out business in Hong Kong.

24.  Third, Ms Tang refers to the money transfer carried out by one Glorious Sports Group Limited in Hong Kong, of which the Debtor was a director, in 2021. Putting aside that this transfer would be attributable to the company and that this transfer could be regarded as carrying on business, this took place in 2021, outside the Relevant Period. Thus, this money transfer is simply irrelevant. Similarly, Ms Tang refers to various companies set up by the Debtor in Hong Kong, and stresses that these companies were active in Hong Kong. However, at best, these were still activities attributable to the respective companies.

25.  Fourth, Ms Tang submits that filing of corporate documents with the Companies Registry may be regarded as carrying on business in Hong Kong. She refers to Re Ku Chu Keung (a debtor) [2007] 2 HKLRD 292 at §§54-62 per DHCJ Louis Chan. In my view, first, as a matter of fact, the evidence in the present case only shows that the Debtor signed the corporate documents, but not filing of the documents, and second, with respect, insofar as Re Ku Chu Keung (a debtor), supra, can be regarded as supporting a proposition that filing of corporate documents with the Companies Registry itself could be regarded as carrying on business in Hong Kong, I would respectfully differ. Such a proposition is, in my view, clearly inconsistent with Re Chen Mei Huan, supra, and Re Kok Hiu Pan, supra. In my view, Re Ku Chu Keung (a debtor), supra, did not have the benefit of the detailed analysis by G Lam J in the subsequent case Re Chen Mei Huan, supra, and apparently did not consider Re Kok Hiu Pan, supra. Rather, that case apparently only considered §4.10 of Butterworths Hong Kong Bankruptcy Law Handbook (2^nd edition, 1999), and the learned judge only said that §4.10 shows that “business” was a broad term, without much analysis or exposition of the relevant legal principles.

26.  Fifth, insofar as there is any suggestion that the Debtor’s charitable contributions in Hong Kong would amount to business in Hong Kong, I reject such suggestion as contrary to any ordinary understanding of “business”.

27.  Having considered the above holistically, I am not satisfied that the Debtor had carried on business in Hong Kong at any time during the Relevant Period.

VI. DOMICILE IN HONG KONG?

28.  In relation to the legal principles determining where a debtor is domiciled, Madam Recorder Eva Sit SC has summarised the same at §19 of Re Gregory and Bottomley (Debtors) [2025] 5 HKLRD 816 as follows:-

“(1) “Domicile” is a legal concept distinct from “permanent home”. The requirements of domicile go beyond those of permanent home. A person who desires to acquire a domicile in a country or place must intend to reside in it permanently or indefinitely.

(2) An independent person can acquire a domicile by, and only by, residing there with the intention to reside there permanently or indefinitely.

(3) In determining whether a person has the intention to reside permanently or indefinitely in a place, the court must have regard to the motive for which he has taken up residence there.

(4) To acquire a domicile in a country or place, a person must freely choose to reside there and must not reside there because he is prescribed or dictated by external factors such as duties of office, the demands of creditors or the need to seek medical treatment.

(5) If a person has a special purpose for going to and staying there and he will leave that place once the purpose is achieved, then he lacks the intention to stay in that place as required by law and hence cannot acquire a domicile in that place.

(6) The intention of residence must be fixed and must be for the indefinite future. It is not enough that at any given point in time its length has not been determined.

(7) The existing domicile of a person is deemed to continue until it is proved that he has acquired a new domicile, and he who asserts a change of domicile bears the burden of proving the truth of the assertion.

(8) As abandonment or change of domicile is a very serious issue, satisfactory evidence is needed to prove an intention to change a domicile.

(9) Further, a domicile of origin is distinguishable from a domicile of choice in 2 respects. Firstly, a domicile of original is more tenacious, in that it is more difficult to prove that a person has abandoned a domicile of origin than to prove that a person has abandoned a domicile of choice. Secondly, if a person leaves the country of the domicile of origin, intending never to return to it, he continues to be domiciled there until acquiring a domicile of choice in another country; but if a person leaves the country of his domicile of choice, intending never to return to it, the domicile of choice is immediately lost, and unless and until a new domicile of choice is acquired the domicile of origin revives.

(10) Any circumstance which is evidence of a person’s residence, or of his intention to reside permanently or indefinitely in a country, must be considered in determining whether he has acquired a domicile of choice in that country.” (emphasis added)

29.  First, the Debtor was born in Guangzhou on 5 December 1971. Therefore, his domicile of origin is Guangzhou.

30.  Second, the Debtor moved to Hong Kong in 1994, and acquired permanent resident identity card in 2001. This 7-year period is consistent with the requirement that the person in question had to be ordinarily resident in Hong Kong for 7 years. Therefore, I am satisfied that since 1994, the Debtor acquired a domicile of choice in Hong Kong.

31.  Third, in March 2017, the Debtor got married:-

(1) Shortly before his marriage, in January 2017, he renewed his Hong Kong Permanent Identity Card. This could be taken as evidence that he continued to regard Hong Kong as his domicile. However, as mentioned above, the Hong Kong Permanent Identity Card is only evidence of legal status of his permanent residency, but such evidence is not conclusive.

(2) The Debtor got married in the Mainland. This may show that he intended to move back to the Mainland, but such evidence is not conclusive.

(3) At the same time, in registering the marriage, he declared to the Ministry of Civil Affairs in the Mainland that he was a Hong Kong citizen and registered his marriage with his Hong Kong Permanent Identity Card number. This may show that he still intended to be domiciled in Hong Kong.

32.  Fourth, there is no evidence as to the household registration of the Debtor in the Mainland. Nor is there any evidence as to any renunciation of the Debtor’s permanent residence in Hong Kong. Had the Debtor really moved back to the Mainland, Ms Tang submits, the Debtor would have adduced such evidence in his favour. Ms Tang submits that this is similar to Re Deng Jiang [2024] HKCFI 2260 at §37(1) per Linda Chan J. I agree that this is a significant consideration in favour of the Petitioner. However, this is not conclusive. I am also aware that no travel record such as the Travel Records of the Debtor was considered in that case.

33.  Fifth, the Debtor produces a utility bill payable to an electricity supplier in Guangzhou in an attempt to show that he has resided in Guangzhou. However, the bill shows very little information. Neither the address of the household in question, nor the amount of usage, nor the period, is stated. I pay no regard to such evidence.

34.  Sixth, the search reports and the corporate materials of certain PRC companies showing that the Debtor is a legal representative can be regarded as evidence of some activities of the Debtor in the Mainland. However, clearly, such evidence in itself is not conclusive. Such evidence does not constitute any significant consideration, though still something I have to consider.

35.  Seventh, the online tax returns produced by the Debtor show his insignificant income in the Mainland. However, the amount of income has no direct relationship to his domicile. The tax returns do show that the Debtor had some activities, though not generating substantial profits, in the Mainland.

36.  Eighth, I accept the Debtor’s evidence, which is not traversed, that the Debtor’ family members all live in the Mainland, and thus he had shifted his home to the Mainland.

37.  Ninth, any reliance on Valley Sports’ business would be misplaced, given that the business of Valley Sports was stated to be focused in Mainland in the presentation slides for the subscription, and the daily operation was stated by the Settlement Agreement to be in the Mainland. This points towards that the Debtor, running Valle Sports, lives and intends to live in the Mainland.

38.  Tenth, Ms Tang also relies on the other companies of the Debtor which she says are active in Hong Kong and show that the Debtor, actively managing these companies, should be in Hong Kong. However, first, in this day and age, managing a company does not necessarily require the manager’s presence in the same place, and second and in any event, this is only one factor for consideration but not conclusive.

39.  Eleventh, any reliance on the CSO to say that the Debtor was domiciled in Hong Kong must be based on the premise that a CSO can be imposed only upon a person ordinarily resident in Hong Kong. However, there is no such requirement at all.

40.  Lastly, the Travel Records. As mentioned above, the stays were insubstantial and sporadic, and lacked of regularity and continuity. Further, one outstanding feature is that during the COVID-period from 2020 to 2023, the Debtor did not visit Hong Kong at all. In the circumstances, even assuming I would be prepared to draw the inference from the absence of explanation of the purposes for the Debtor’s visits and the absence of any evidence of where the Debtor lived in the Mainland, that there was some occupation in Hong Kong and/or he did not live in the Mainland, in my view, the Travel Records is still strong evidence showing that the Debtor no longer intended to live in Hong Kong permanently or indefinitely, or had abandoned any acquired domicile in Hong Kong.

41.  Having considered all the above holistically, I am of the view that by the time of the presentation of the Petition, the Debtor was no longer domiciled in Hong Kong and by the rule of revival of the domicile of origin, he was domiciled in the Mainland.

VII. NO JURISDICTION

42.  Given my views above on the Debtor’s ordinary residence, carrying out of business and domicile, and given the common ground that the Debtor was not in Hong Kong during the presentation of the Petition, the conditions under section 4(1) of the BO are not satisfied, and therefore, the Court does not have jurisdiction over the Debtor on the Petition. There is sufficient for me to dismiss the Amended Petition.

VIII. SERVICE OF THE STATUTORY DEMAND

43.  For the sake of completeness, I express my view on the service of the Statutory Demand.

44.  Rule 46 of the Bankruptcy Rules (Cap. 6A) requires the Petitioner to “do all that is reasonable for the purpose of bringing the statutory demand to the debtor’s attention and, if practicable in the particular circumstances, to cause personal service of the demand to be effected” (emphasis added). The requirements have to be strictly complied with. Therefore, when not all reasonable steps have bene taken and no personal service has been effected, the rule is still not complied with even if the debtor has acknowledged the existence of the statutory demand. This is not being technical, but concerns the certainty of when the calculation of days should commence for complying with the statutory demand in question: see Re Li Xiaoming [2020] HKCFI 361 at §§8-12 per Mimmie Chan J.

45.  In the present case, the Petitioner’s solicitors made two attempts to serve the Statutory Demand at the Symphony Bay Address. After the first attempt failed, on 21 June 2024, the Petitioner’s solicitors sent by post an appointment letter to the Symphony Bay Address calling for an appointment on 3 July 2024 for service of the Statutory Demand a copy of which was enclosed. On 3 July 2024, Petitioner’s solicitors, however, were denied access to the Symphony Bay Address. Then, without any substituted service order, the Petitioner purported to serve the Statutory Demand by way of advertisements in one Chinese and one English newspaper on 16 July 2024.

46.  However, the Petitioner never tried to serve the Statutory Demand through the means of text message, the availability of such means being evidenced by the Petitioner’s own evidence of a text message from the Debtor which he attempts to rely on to show that the Debtor had notice of the Statutory Demand, and there is no explanation why he did not do so.

47.  The appointment letter with the Statutory Demand enclosed cannot be taken as service of the Statutory Demand, for the simple reason that the letter was for the purpose of calling an appointment for service. Therefore, even the Petitioner himself did not regard this as service. Assuming that the Debtor did receive this appointment letter and the enclosure, one would not take this as commencement of the calculation of days for complying with the Statutory Demand.

48.  For the advertisements, if the advertisements would bring the Statutory Demand to the Debtor’s notice, this would be strong evidence that reasonable steps had been taken. In this regard, Ms Tang relies on the text message sent on 29 July 2024 by the Debtor to the Petitioner’s solicitors seeking for indulgence from the Petitioner for complying with the Settlement Agreement. Although the text message did not mention the Statutory Demand, Ms Tang submits that the timing is telling – the message was sent about two weeks after the advertisement on 16 July 2024, and the message was sent to the Petitioner’s solicitors named in the Statutory Demand. Ms Tang also points out that the Debtor did not adduce any evidence in respect of the service. Nor is there any evidence to explain the message, even though the Debtor had filed an affirmation to reply to the Petitioner’s affirmation exhibiting the message.

49.  Mr Yeung points out that when on the date of the advertisements on 16 July 2024, the Debtor was not in Hong Kong. In my view, that he was not in Hong Kong does not necessarily mean that he would not be able to read newspapers or that someone else would bring to his attention the advertisements in the newspapers.

50.  Mr Yeung also points out that the Petitioner’s solicitors were the solicitors named in the Settlement Agreement, and therefore, it would not be surprising that the Debtor would contact the solicitors. However, the Settlement Agreement does not mention anything like contact of the solicitors for the Petitioner. The solicitors were named only on the execution page apparently as witnesses to the execution.

51.  Further, the difficulty for Mr Yeung is that there is no evidence from the Debtor to explain how he would know whom to contact, and there is no reason why he has not done so.

52.  Having considered the above, I am of the view that the advertisements did successfully bring the Statutory Demand to the Debtor’s notice. The advertisements in the circumstances were reasonable steps for the purpose of rule 46. Therefore, I am satisfied that service of the Statutory Demand was duly effected on the Debtor on 16 July 2024 by way of the advertisements.

IX. CONCLUSION

53.  In the circumstances, I dismiss the Amended Petition. I order that the Petitioner shall pay the Debtor costs summarily assessed at HK$200,000. I also order that the Official Receiver’s costs in the sum of HK$4,100 shall be deducted from the Petitioner’s deposit.

54.  It remains for me to thank Ms Tang and Mr Yeung for their assistance.