MADBAR SOHEL v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HCAL 743/2022

[2022] HKCFI 2969

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 743 of 2022

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

	consideration of documents only;          or
	consideration of documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

1.  Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and

2.  A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

THE APPLICATION

1.  This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 27 June 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 797 of 2017 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).

2.  The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.

3.  The applicant appeared before the Court on 5 September 2022.

The procedural history

4.  The applicant is an illegal immigrant from Bangladesh. On 15 December 2013, he was arrested by police for illegally entering Hong Kong. He lodged non-refoulement claim on BOR 3 risk by way of written representation on 17 December 2013. His claim was then considered on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance; BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance; BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance and Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention.

5.  His claim on Torture risk, , BOR 3 risk and Persecution risk was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 19 May 2016. His claim on BOR 2 risk was rejected by the Director’s Notice of Further Decision dated 3 March 2017.

6.  He appealed the Director’s Decisions to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”). By its Decision dated 17 October 2017 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed his appeal on claim on all grounds.

7.  He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and was dismissed by the Court by its Order dated 24 August 2018 (“the Court’s Order”).

8.  His application for extension of time to appeal against the Court’s Order was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 26 April 2019.

9.  His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 25 March 2021.

10.  His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 31 December 2021.

11.  He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 22 February 2022.

12.  By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application.

The subsequent claim application

13.  The factual basis of his previous claim is that if refouled, he would be harmed or killed by a group of Awami League (“AL”) members including Javed Hossain and B.M. Mozzammel, who was the AL leader and Member of Parliament of Shariatpur because he was the general secretary in a committee of Bangladesh Nationalist Party (“BNP”).

14.  The Director found that his claim was not substantiated. He found that the risk of him being harmed by his enemies was low as shown by the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatments from them; that state protection would be available to him and that internal relocation was a viable option open to him.

15.  He appealed the Director’s Decisions to the Board. The Board, having considered the evidence, agreed with the Director. It further found that the state was not involved and there was no evidence of state acquiescence in this case; that the injuries he suffered from the alleged assaults did not amount to torture as defined in the Ordinance. The Board therefore found that the applicant had failed to establish that he had well-founded fear of harm or being killed if he returned to Bangladesh.

16.  Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

17.  In support of his subsequent claim, he submitted a certificate of marriage of his marriage in Hong Kong, a birth certificate of his 4-year old son and a kindergarten admission pass of his son in Hong Kong. The applicant submitted that his family in Bangladesh had moved to live elsewhere. He had been in Hong Kong for the past 10 years. He was not allowed to work here. If he returned to Bangladesh, he would have no place to live. His family would be in danger as his enemies and the police will file cases against him. His enemies are still looking for him and they would be more active in harming the BNP people near the election. He knows that many of the BNP people had been killed by the AL people. He will not have police protection as he had no money to bribe them.

18.  The Director considered that the applicant relied upon the same or similar facts of his previous claim, which had been considered in his previous claim. His claim of police filing cases against him was not raised in his previous claim. His evidence of his neighbour’s information is only hearsay evidence, which cannot be verified. His family members in Hong Kong issue had been considered in his previous claim. There is no evidence to show that his wife and his son would also be harmed of killed if he returned to Bangladesh.

19.  The Director therefore found that the applicant relies upon the same or similar facts in support of the subsequent claim, such facts, when considered together with his previous claim, will not give him a realistic chance of success in his subsequent claim. The Director dismissed the applicant’s subsequent claim application.

The application for leave to apply for judicial review

20.  The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application without raising any specific ground. Before the hearing, the applicant sent a letter to the Court saying that his family and other relatives in Bangladesh will not accept his wife and kid and they are angry too. His brother threatened to kill them if he returned. The application for leave for judicial review of his wife and son is still being processed. If his application is refused, he will be removed from Hong Kong to his risk state.

DISCUSSION

21.  The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1).

22.  The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny. Before me, the applicant agreed that he did not bring up what he said in his letter to the Court to the Director for his consideration. That is the reason the Director did not take this issue into consideration in the Director’s Decision.

23.  The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision. The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational.

24.  Since there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

The RPO

25.  The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1.

26.  RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25.

27.  In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case.

28.  For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. Upon my enquiry what comments on the intended RPO, he said he had nothing to say.

29.  I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:

(1)  The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court, and any appeal, including this Order, without leave of the Court of First Instance.

(2)  All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to Deputy High Court Judge K. W. Lung or in his absence, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.

(3)  At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of his intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.

(4)  Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the Court written representations regarding the same.

(5)  All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the Court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the Court should otherwise direct.

(6)  If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the Court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the Court for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.

(7)  Notice of each decision by this Court or the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.

(8)  Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the Court, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the Court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.

(9)  No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.

(10)  No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave within this Order, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Judge.

(11)  This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.

(12)  A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

DISPOSITION

30.  The applicant’s application is dismissed.

31.  RPO in terms of paragraph 29 be made against the applicant.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1