DING HING HUI v. ZHENG NENGHUAN AND ANOTHER

HCA 78/2026

[2026] HKCFI 2148

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 78 OF 2026

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J U D G M E N T

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A.  INTRODUCTION

1.  This is the hearing of the Summons taken out by the Plaintiff (“Ding”) filed on 11 March 2026 (the “Summons”) pursuant to O.19 r.7 Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4A) (“RHC”), whereby Ding seeks:

(1)  Final judgment against the Defendants (“Zheng” and “Han Vision” respectively) for

(a)  an order that Zheng and Han Vision issue a public and formal apology to Ding in one local newspaper;

(b)  an order that Zheng and Han Vision procure Raffles Interior Limited (the “Company”) to withdraw the EGM Circular (as defined below) and issue a clarification announcement; and

(c)  an injunction restraining Zheng and Han Vision from further publishing the defamatory statements; and

(2)  Interlocutory judgment against Zheng and Han Vision with damages to be assessed.

2.  There is also a belated Summons issued by Zheng and Han Vision on 8 April 2026 for leave to file the Acknowledgement of Service (“A/S”) and Defence out of time (“the Leave Summons”).

3.  By way of procedural background:

Date	Event
15.01.2026	The Writ of Summons (“Writ”) was issued.
19.01.2026	The Writ was served on Zheng and Han Vision.
02.02.2026	The time for acknowledging service of the Writ expired.
10.02.2026	The Statement of Claim (“SOC”) was served.
10.03.2026	The time for service of the Defence expired.
11.03.2026	The Summons was filed and served.
16.03.2026	A/S of the Writ filed out of time without leave of the Court.
17.03.2026	The Notice of Intention to Enter Judgment pursuant to O.19 r.8A RHC was filed and served on Messrs. C.C. Chau & Co.
17.03.2026	Defence filed out of time without Ding’s consent and without leave of the Court.
02.04.2026	Zheng and Han Vision wrote a letter to Ding seeking his consent to the late filing of the A/S and Defence. Ding rejected this proposal.
08.04.2026	Zheng and Han Vision filed and served their Leave Summons

B.  THE PLEADED CASE IN THE SOC

4.  Ding is a businessman and an executive director of the Company, a company incorporated in the Cayman Islands and listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (Stock Code: 1376).

5.  Han Vision is an investment holding company incorporated in Hong Kong owned by Zheng and his spouse Zheng is the sole director of Han Vision. Han Vision became a substantial shareholder of the Company on or around 10 September 2025.

6.  On 10 September 2025, Zheng was appointed as executive director and chairman of the Board of the Company (“Board”). His roles were subsequently suspended by the Board on around 15 December 2025.

7.  On 21 November 2025, Zheng and Han Vision sent a letter (“the Letter”) by email to the Board, the company secretary and the legal representatives of the Company requesting the convening of an EGM for the removal of Ding as executive director.

8.  The Letter contained the following defamatory words (the “Statements”):

“[t]he proposed removal of [the Plaintiff] ... is based on concerns regarding his conduct and compliance record of the Listing Rules. Specifically, The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited sanctioned [the Plaintiff] on 12 December 2022 for his involvement in a bribery case ...”

9.  On 12 December 2025, Zheng and Han Vision again emailed the Board, the company secretary, the chief financial officer and the legal representatives of the Company (“Email”), attaching the Letter and a draft EGM Circular (“Draft Circular”), which contained the same Statements.

10.  In their natural and ordinary meaning, the Statements meant and were understood to mean that Ding was involved in acts of bribery and was sanctioned and/or penalised by a regulatory body accordingly.

11.  On 5 January 2026, the Company published an EGM Circular substantially in the same form as the Draft Circular, which contained the Statements (“EGM Circular”).

12.  By a letter dated 12 January 2026, Ding demanded Zheng and Han Vision to (1) cease and desist from publishing the Statements; (2) formally withdraw the Letter and the Email; and (3) procure the Company to withdraw the EGM Circular and issue a clarification.

13.  However, on 14 January 2026, Zheng and Han Vision (through their legal representatives) refused to accede to Ding’s demand. Zheng and Han Vision asserted that the Statements were “substantially true” and constituted “fair comment on a matter of public interest”.

14.  Ding claims that the Statements are incorrect and defamatory. Among others:

(1)  The Statement of Disciplinary Action issued by the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Limited (“HKEX”) on 12 December 2022 (“Disciplinary Decision”) contains no reference to any bribery conduct.

(2)  The Disciplinary Decision also specifies that Mr. Chua Boon Par (the former Chairman, CEO, and executive director) (i.e. not Ding) was primarily responsible for the conduct being investigated. Ding was only found to have failed to exercise independent judgment in respect of the engagement of the service providers by the Company and had no or insufficient supervision over investments under an investment management agreement entered into by the Company.

(3)  Ding was never a subject of any criminal investigation by the authorities in relation to the matters set out in the Disciplinary Decision.

15.  In respect of the A/S and the Defence, Ding submits that retrospective leave for their late filing was only sought by the Leave Summons and served on Ding less than 24 hours before this hearing. As such, Ding continues to seek default judgment against Zheng and Han Vision.

C.  THE PLEADED DEFENCE

16.  Zheng and Han Vision do not deny that the Letter, Email, Draft Circular, and EGM Circular all contained the Statements.

17.  Zheng and Han Vision deny that the Statements are defamatory. Their defences can be summarized as follows:

(1)  That the Statements were taken out of context by Ding and that the emphasis of the Statements was on the fact that Ding was sanctioned by the Listing Committee (“first defence”);

(2)  Insofar as the Statements were taken to suggest that Ding was “involved in bribery acts”, such allegations are true in substance and in fact because the concerns raised by the Listing Committee regarding the Service Agreements and the Investment Management Agreement “bear the resemblance of a bribery case” (“second defence”);

(3)  Qualified privilege applies on the grounds that:

(a)  The Statements concern the integrity, skills and corporate governance of Ding as an on-going director of the Company which is a listed company; and

(b)  Zheng and Han Vision had a moral and social duty to voice their concern to the Board and for the Board as a whole to consider (including what steps to be taken as the Board considered appropriate) (“third defence”);

(4)  In relation to the EGM Circular, it was the decision of the Board to make the Statements public and that Zheng and Han Vision should not be held responsible for the disclosure (“fourth defence”).

18.  As for the delay in filing the A/S and the Defence, Zheng and Han Vision explain that since Zheng was not resident in Hong Kong, service of the Writ was effected through Han Vision’s registered office in Hong Kong. There was delay on the part of Han Vision’s company secretarial agent in notifying Zheng and Han Vision of these proceedings; Zheng and Han Vision were only informed on 12 March 2026. They instructed solicitors shortly after and filed the A/S and the Defence on 16 and 17 March 2026 respectively. As Ding’s consent for the late filings was not forthcoming, Zheng and Han Vision thus took out the Leave Summons after the intervening Easter holidays.

D.  LEGAL PRINCIPLES FOR ENTERING DEFAULT JUDGMENT

19.  In an application for default judgment under O.19 r.7, the court cannot receive any evidence in cases hereunder, but must give judgment according to the pleadings alone: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026 (“HKCP 2026”) at §19/7/11.

20.  A defence served after expiration of the prescribed time but before judgment has been given cannot be disregarded, and will generally prevent the plaintiff from entering judgment, even though it is not served until after the plaintiff has served his summons for judgment under Order 19, rule 7 RHC, but the defendant may be ordered to pay the costs occasioned by his delay. In such a case, the court will have regard to the contents of the defence served out of time, and deal with the case in such a manner that justice can be done. This is the position even when a draft defence consisting of bare denials of the plaintiff ’s case is handed to the court, without leave and out of time, upon the hearing of a plaintiff ’s motion for judgment and a defendant’s cross summons for time to file its defence (California Insurance Co. Ltd v. Choung Suk Wah (HCA 172/2002, [2002] HKEC 1184)”. See Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026 (“HKCP 2026”) at §19/7/4.

21.  If a defence filed is (even one out of time), the Court must take the pleas in it at the highest and should enter default judgment only if no reasonable defence is disclosed.

E.  ANALYSES

22.  The Notice of Intention to Enter Judgment was issued on the same day, the Defence was filed. That should not be taken against Ding because the Summons was filed well before the A/S and Defence were filed.

23.  The SOC does disclose a meritorious case of libel, ie

(1)  the Statements was a defamatory statement that makes reference to Ding and has been published: Tort Law and Practice in Hong Kong, 4^th ed, at §18.001; and

(2)  the Statements would expose Ding to “hatred, contempt, or ridicule”, to lower Ding in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally or to cause him to be “shunned or avoided”: Tort Law and Practice in Hong Kong, 4^th ed, at §18.001.

24.  With regard to the first defence, Ding does not deny that he was sanctioned. However, the bases of the sanction as pleaded in the Defence was not bribery, but failure to exercise independent judgment in respect of the engagement of the service providers by the Company and having no or insufficient supervision over investments. The allegation of bribery is a distinct and serious allegation. It clearly goes far beyond providing ‘context’ for the Disciplinary Decision, especially since that Decision did not make any reference to a bribery act on Ding’s part.

25.  With regard to the second defence,

(1)  As a matter of law, where the defamation covers an allegation of the commission of a specific criminal offence, a defendant cannot give particulars of other acts not constituting the alleged criminal offence to support a plea justifying the act alleged in the plaintiff's case. See Tort Law and Practice in Hong Kong (4^th ed.) at §18.062.

(2)  No part of the Disciplinary Decision, cited in paragraph 14(2) above, came anywhere close to finding factual involvement in bribery or acts in resemblance to bribery.

26.  With regard to the third defence, qualified privilege only applies where the statement is fairly warranted by the occasion, i.e. reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose for which the law granted the privilege: Tort Law and Practice in Hong Kong (4^th ed.) at §§18.072.

27.  Even if Zheng and Han Vision had concerns over Ding’s fitness as a director, making unfounded allegations of his involvement in bribery (as opposed to mentioning his sanction) does not serve any legitimate purpose for which Zheng and Han Vision might be granted qualified privilege.

28.  With regard to the 4^th defence, to constitute defamation, it suffices that the defendants were in the chain of communication leading to the defamatory statements. See Tort Law and Practice in Hong Kong (4^th ed.) at §18.043. By circulating the Letter, the Email and the Draft Circular to the Board, company secretary, CFO and the legal representatives of the Company, Zheng and Han Vision directly instigated the chain of communication culminating in the publication of the EGM Circular. Zheng and Han Vision were therefore “publishers” for the purposes of defamation.

29.  Having regard to the above analyses, the Defence discloses no reasonable defence to the publication of the Statements. The Plaintiff is entitled to default judgment based on his pleaded case.

F.  LEAVE APPLICATION

30.  To decide if leave shall be granted, the Court takes into account the length of delay in filing the A/S and the Defence, the reasons for the delay, the merits of the Defence and the prejudice that may be caused to Ding.

31.  In the present case, Zheng and Han Vision were 6 weeks out of time in serving the A/S and a week out of time in serving their Defence.

32.  There was no good explanation for the delay. Even accepting that Zheng was normally resident outside of Hong Kong, it was the responsibility of Zheng and Han Vision to keep in touch with the company secretarial agent to ensure that court documents are responded to in time. Further, the Writ had come to Zheng and Han Vision’s notice by 16 March 2026 at the latest. Zheng and Han Vision could have taken out the Leave Summons earlier, before the long Easter holidays started on 3 April 2026.

33.  The delay may be forgiven if it is unjust to drive Zheng and Han Vision from the judgment seat. However, given my finding that no reasonable defence is disclosed on the Defence, there is no point in giving leave to file the Defence out of time. Otherwise, Ding will be unnecessarily delayed in getting a rightful judgment.

G.  CONCLUSION

34.  On the basis of the above finding, I order as follows:

(1)  The Leave Summons is dismissed with costs to the Plaintiff;

(2)  There be default judgment entered against Zheng and Han Vision in terms of paragraph 1(1) and (2) above:

(3)  On a nisi basis, costs of the Summons for default judgment be to the Plaintiff to be summarily assessed.

35.  Time and again, the Court has emphasized the need to submit a costs statement together with the submission of counsel as provided for in PD 14.3, §8. In the present case, this was not done, when in fact the Plaintiff’s solicitors were able to produce one for costs of the Summons when asked by the Court at the end of the hearing. This does not assist the Court in quickly disposing of a costs issue upon disposal of a matter.

36.  The Plaintiff’s solicitors explained that they thought the costs of the action should be taxed at the end of the whole action. With respect, that is not the correct position. The costs of the action is now crystallized and can be assessed upon the grant of the default judgment. Other costs to be incurred for the assessment of damages can be dealt with at the end of that assessment. There is no reason to trouble the taxing master to assess the costs of the action later.

37.  I do not see the need to engage more than one fee earner especially since senior counsel was engaged at the pleading stage nor is there a need for more than one solicitor’s attendance at the hearing.

38.  The practice of this Court is to reduce the party and party costs claimed where the successful party’s solicitors have not complied with PD 14.3, §8. In the premises, I summarily assess the costs and award $250,000 to the Plaintiff reduced to $220,000 for the reason given in paragraph 35 above. The difference is not recoverable by the Plaintiff’s solicitors from the client. I make an order nisi accordingly.

39.  I thank counsel for their assistance.