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HCAL 1204/2022
[2023] HKCFI 222
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1204 of 2022
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Sardar Md Manir |
Applicant |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative Respondent |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)
Following;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:
1. Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and
2. A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the applicant.
Observations for the Applicant:
THE APPLICATION
1. This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Decision of the Director of Immigration dated 21 September 2022 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 492 of 2017 (the “previous claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115 (the “Ordinance”).
2. The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.
3. The applicant appeared before the Court on 5 December 2022.
The procedural history
4. The applicant is a national of Bangladesh. He entered Hong Kong on 5 February 2014 illegally and was arrested by the police on the same day. After his arrest, he lodged a non-refoulement claim on 8 February 2014 on the applicable grounds of the BOR 2 risk[1], the BOR 3 risk[2], the persecution risk[3] and the torture risk[4].
5. By Notice of Decision dated 19 July 2016 (“the Director’s First Decision”) and by Notice of Further Decision dated 28 February 2017 (“the Director’s Second Decision”), the Director refused his claim on all applicable risks.
6. The applicant appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board. Having considered the applicant’s reasons, the Board dismissed his appeal by the Board’s Decision dated 30 June 2017 (the “Board’s Decision”).
7. His application for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision was dismissed by the Court of the First Instance by its Order dated 7 June 2018 (“the Court’s Order”)
8. His application for extension of time to appeal against the Court’s Order was first dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 28 September 2018.
9. His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal by way of Notice of Motion was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 18 January 2019.
10. His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 9 October 2020.
11. He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection by letter dated 2 August 2022.
12. By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application.
The subsequent claim application
13. The applicant’s previous claim was based on the threat from members of an opposing political party.
14. The Director found that his previous claim was not substantiated.
15. He appealed to the Board. The Board considered the applicant’s evidence and found that the applicant’s case was unreliable and dismissed his appeal on this basis.
16. Under section 37ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.
17. In support of his subsequent claim, he submitted to the immigration officer additional information. His fear of part of his enemies, the AL people remains unchanged. He did not mention anything in relation to his fear of the Bangladesh police and the creditor in his previous claim. Therefore, his fear remains the same fear as in his previous claim, which had been considered and rejected by the Board. The new evidence does not advance his case.
18. The Director therefore found that the applicant relies upon the facts, which when considered together with his previous claim, will not give him a realistic chance of success in his subsequent claim. The Director dismissed the applicant’s subsequent claim application.
The application for leave to apply for judicial review
19. The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application, in which he said the Director did not consider his subsequent claim properly.
DISCUSSION
20. The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision. The Court will not usurp his fact finding power. See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, §14 (1).
21. The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny.
22. Before me, the applicant said that he would like the Court to review his case, taking into account that he has a son of six and a half years of age and his son’s mother, that if his girlfriend, had passed away 6 years ago. However, he agreed that the Director is not wrong in making his decision.
23. I find that the issues raised by the applicant before are not valid reasons to challenge the Director’s Decision.
24. There is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.
The RPO
25. The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his previous claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process. The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him. See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1.
26. RPO is appropriate for the present case. See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991 by Hon. Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25.
27. In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process. The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case.
28. For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him. Upon my enquiry of what comments he had on the intended RPO, he asked the court to re-consider his claim.
29. I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only. I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:
(1) The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the High Court, and any appeal, including this Order, without leave of the Court of First Instance.
(2) All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to Deputy High Court Judge K. W. Lung or in his absence, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List.
(3) At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of his intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave.
(4) Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the Court written representations regarding the same.
(5) All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the Court on paper and without any oral hearing unless the Court should otherwise direct.
(6) If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the Court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to the Court for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.
(7) Notice of each decision by this Court or the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings.
(8) Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of the Court, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the Court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly.
(9) No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months.
(10) No appeal shall lie from a decision of the Judge granting or refusing leave within this Order, unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Judge.
(11) This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order.
(12) A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.
DISPOSITION
30. The applicant’s application is dismissed.
31. RPO in terms of paragraph 29 be made against the applicant.
Dated the 27th day of January 2023.
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(C.S. FUNG (Ms))
for Registrar, High Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent to the Applicant
on 27 January 2023
Sardar Md Manir
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil.
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Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 27 January 2023
Director of Immigration
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
L/M (26284) in ImmD RA 7/37/C
(formelry RBCZ/1425/14; RBCZ/9000052/17)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2)
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Form CALL-1
[1] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.
[2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under article 3 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.
[3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
[4] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.
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