BEGUM LAILA v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 1077/2021

[2026] HKCFI 3896

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1077 OF 2021

BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  By a summons issued on 30 January 2026, the Applicant applies for extension of time to appeal the order of this Court dated 13 January 2026 (“the Order”) refusing her leave to apply for judicial review (“JR”). Her intended JR was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“TCAB”) dated 16 July 2021 on her non-refoulement claim.

2.  An applicant does not require leave to appeal against a Court of First Instance (“CFI”) judge’s refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review (Order 59, rule 21(1)(g), Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A). However, an applicant who wishes to appeal against such refusal has to observe the time limit under Order 53, rule 3(4), i.e., within 14 days after the refusal. The 14-day period against the Order expired on 27 January 2026. The Applicant was late for three days when the present summons was filed.

3.  A CFI judge has the power to extend the said 14-day appeal period under Order 59, rule 2B(6). The application to extend time must be made promptly. It should be supported by an affirmation deposing any facts relied upon by an applicant and giving a full account of, and explanation for, the whole delay since the expiry of time. In considering whether to extend time for the intended appeal, the Court shall have regard to: (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reasons for the delay; (iii) the prospect of success in the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if extension of time was granted (Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226; and Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346).

4.  In the Applicant’s summons, she claimed that she had only received the letter (presumably the Form CALL-1 containing the Order) on 28 January 2026. There was no further explanation as to why she received it late and what she had done to ensure that she would have received the letter promptly, the Applicant has obviously failed to provide any reasonable explanation. Nevertheless, the delay in this case is not very significant, and it does not seem to me that there will be any prejudice if an extension of time is granted.

5.  I should accordingly focus on the prospect of success in the intended appeal instead. It is well established that the Court does not provide a further avenue of appeal on the merits of the underlying non-refoulement claim. In an appeal against refusal of JR leave in a non-refoulement case, the Court of Appeal would only examine the decision of the CFI judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge, the appeal should be dismissed (Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

6.  In the decision refusing the Applicant leave to apply for JR, I explained that the Applicant had failed to identify any alleged errors of law, irrationality or procedural unfairness in the TCAB Decision to make good her challenge either in the Form 86, the supporting affirmation or oral submissions in open court. I was unable to detect any after a vigorous reading of the TCAB Decision.

7.  In the Applicant’s summons and supporting affirmation, the Applicant failed to put forth any proposed ground(s) of appeal. In the absence of any suggested error in my decision to refuse her JR leave, I do not see any prospect of success in her intended appeal at all.

8.  Having considered all the relevant factors to which I should have regard, I decide that the interest of justice does not require me to grant an extension of time in the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the application for extension of time to appeal is refused and the Applicant’s summons is dismissed.