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SARI WARWATI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
SARI WARWATI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 6023 · HCAL 1459/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1459/2023
[2026] HKCFI 6023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 1459 of 2023
BETWEEN
| |Sari Warwati |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board/ |Putative |
| |Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| |Application for Leave to Apply for | |
| |Judicial Review | |
| |NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord | |
| |53 r 3) | |
Following:
|( |consideration of documents only; or |
| | |
|( |consideration of documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open |
| |court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Keith Lam:
The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By Form 86 filed on 21 August 2023 (“Form 86”), the Applicant seeks
leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture
Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”) dated 2 May 2023 (“TCAB Decision”), which
affirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration (“DOI”) dated 23
August 2022 (“DOI Decision”).
2. The Applicant requested for a hearing of this application, which was
held on 17 September 2026. When asked, she said she had nothing to
add.
Background
3. The Applicant is a national of Indonesia. In gist, she fears that she
will be killed by her brothers if refouled because her family are
staunch Buddhists but she had converted to Islam. The Applicant’s
personal background, the relevant facts and relevant procedural
history have been sufficiently set out in the TCAB Decision, which can
be viewed through a hyperlink.[1] There is no need for me to repeat
the same. Unless otherwise specified, the abbreviations and
descriptions used in the TCAB Decision are adopted herein.
Legal Principles
4. The leave application operates as a filtering process and there is no
requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision:
Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at §23. I therefore set out below brief
reasons for my decision, which I have reached upon considering all the
materials before me.
5. In a judicial review, this court does not provide a further avenue of
appeal. While I remind myself that in non-refoulement cases, I would
adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinising the decision of the TCAB
given the seriousness of the issue at hand, this court would not usurp
the role of the TCAB, which together with the DOI are the primary
decision-makers. A finding of fact is exclusively within the realm of
the TCAB, and this court will not intervene by way of judicial review
unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or
irrationality in the decision of the TCAB: Nupur Mst v Director of
Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at §14(1). There must be a reasonably
arguable case with a realistic prospect of success before leave for
judicial review will be granted: Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676 at §§14-17.
6. An applicant is required to clearly and succinctly identify the
grounds of judicial review relied upon in the Form 86 and the
supporting affirmation: Ho Loy v Director of Environment Protection,
HCAL 21/2015 (unrep.) 22.12.2016 at §142. He or she is also under a
duty to make full and frank disclosure of material facts: Kan Hung
Cheung v The Director of Immigration [2008] HKC 323 at §§14-17.
7. Given RHC O.53 r.4(1) and s.21K(6) of the High Court Ordinance
(CAP 4A), where an Applicant applies for leave to apply for judicial
review more than 3 months after the decision:
1) The failure to apply within 3 months constitutes “undue delay”.
To justify an extension of time in which to apply for leave, the
Applicant must show “good reason” to extend time. In deciding
this, certain factors that are likely to be significant are:
(i) the length of the delay; (ii) the explanation for the
delay;[2] (iii) the merits of the substantive application;[3]
(iv) prejudice; and (v) whether the application raises questions
of general public importance.
2) Where the court considers that there is no good reason for
extending the period, it will refuse leave to apply for judicial
review. The refusal of an extension of time is part and parcel of
a refusal to grant leave to apply. It is not the case that the
court refuses the extension of time as a discrete decision and
then makes no decision on the question of leave to apply for
judicial review, treating this as a separate matter entirely.
3) If the court is satisfied that there is good reason for extending
the period, it does not follow that leave to apply for judicial
review will automatically be given. While the court might grant
leave, it retains a discretion to refuse to do so and the
existence of a good reason for undue delay is only one facet of
the question, others including sufficiency of interest and the
need to satisfy the arguability test. Leave may also be refused
on the basis that the granting of the relief sought would be
likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially
prejudice the rights of, any person or would be detrimental to
good administration.
See: Thing Sunil v TCAB [2025] HKCFI 4366, at §9, citing AW v Director
of Immigration & anor. [2016] 2 HKC 393 (CA) at §§23-36 and Thomas Lai
[2014] 6 HKC 1 at §§43-45; H v Director of Immigration (2020) 23
HKCFAR 248 at §§17-22, 36-44.
Discussion
8. The application by the Form 86 was out of time by 19 days. Such a
delay is not too long.
9. In considering whether to extend time, I have considered the following
matters.
10. I note that the Applicant has not explained the delay on paper. When
asked about this in Court, the Applicant said she had nothing to add.
It follows that she has given no good reason for the delay.
11. In any event, I am not satisfied that the Applicant’s intended
application for judicial review of the Board’s Decision is reasonably
arguable with any realistic prospects of success, and I would have
dismissed the present application even if it had been brought within
time.
12. The Applicant stated the following grounds of judicial review in the
supporting affirmation: -
1) “Adjudicator did not consider my claim. Adjudicator directly
dismissed. He did not even take time or did not think about my
life.” (“Ground 1”)
2) “I had some documents but all in my mother language. I submitted
all but Adjudicator did not accept because he could not
understand.” (“Ground 2”)
3) “I request him to give me some time to translate in English of my
all documents and I too took some preparation but my officer had
no time.” (“Ground 3”)
4) “Translator did not help me at all. If I did not understand he
became angry.” (“Ground 4”)
5) “Interpreter asked me to not take long time for interview as he
had another job.” (“Ground 5”)
6) “Please help me and safe my life.” (“Ground 6”)
13. I have scrutinised the TCAB Decision carefully and come to the view
that none of the above Grounds can be established or considered as
valid or effective public law grounds. I also do not find any error
of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality on the part of the
TCAB Decision.
14. Most if not all of the grounds merely consist of generic, vague and/or
unparticularised assertions without reference to any underlying facts
or matters establishing why, how and where each of those complaints
arise in relation to the TCAB Decision. General assertions without
particulars are not effective grounds and cannot assist the Applicant:
Re Haider Khalil [2021] HKCA 223 at §16.
15. Ground 1 is clearly not correct given that the TCAB Decision
considered the Applicant’s evidence about the alleged threat to her
life in detail, as discussed in §18 below.
16. Ground 2 to Ground 5 are bare assertions and are contrary to what was
recorded in the DOI Decision and the TCAB Decision and must be
rejected: -
1) Before the DOI, the Applicant had been represented by the Duty
Lawyer Service as the Notice of Decision of 23 August 2022 was
sent to the Applicant through them. This was also recorded in
TCAB Decision §7.
2) It would appear from the DOI Decision that, in the Applicant’s
initial application and at her interview with the Immigration
Department, she had no difficulty in providing detailed
information about her claim: see DOI Decision §7. In particular,
the DOI Decision quoted or referred to various responses from the
Applicant to the DOI’s questions at the screening interview:
§§7.3, 7.7, 7.8, 7.11, 7.12, 7.15-7.19, 7.22, 7.23, 7.31, 7.32,
7.36, 7.37, 7.42-7.45, 7.47-7.54, 21, 30.
3) Despite the allegation that the Applicant had some documents in
her mother language to submit to the Adjudicator which he refused
to consider, no such documents are presented in her supporting
affirmation in this application.
4) The Applicant attended the oral hearing before the TCAB without
legal representation. There was however no indication of any
difficulty in giving evidence and/or answering the questions
raised by the TCAB. As recorded in the TCAB Decision, the
Applicant was able to provide various additional information
during the oral hearing before the TCAB, and her responses to the
TCAB’s questions were recorded: see TCAB Decision §§32-51.
17. Ground 6 self-evidently has no substance.
18. As can be seen from the TCAB Decision, the TCAB took into account all
the evidence available and found that on the basis of the same,
applying the correct legal principles in respect of all applicable
grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism, the Applicant’s
allegations were insufficient to make out any of the applicable
grounds: §§52-72. It is clear that the TCAB considered the evidence
available thoroughly and in detail. In particular, the TCAB found
that:
1) Contrary to the Applicant’s claims, she was not raised as a
Buddhist and had never been one. The TCAB in particular noted
that in responding to its questions, the Applicant showed
extremely limited knowledge, bordering on no knowledge, of
Buddhism, its practices, principles, symbols and teachings: §§53-
54.
2) The TCAB also noted a significant inconsistency in the Applicant’s
evidence as to the reason for her conversion to Islam (she claimed
before DOI that she converted because of a previous employer, but
at the TCAB she said she converted so that she could marry her
boyfriend), and that this undermined the veracity of her claim:
§§56-57.
3) The TCAB therefore was not satisfied that the Applicant was ever a
Buddhist who had converted to Islam, and found that her claim for
non-refoulement was not established: §59. I consider that it is
entitled to do so based on the evidence and its analysis.
4) The TCAB also found no credible evidence of any harm with the
consent or acquiescence from a public official: §66.
19. Therefore, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness or
irrationality on the part of the TCAB Decision. I would have
dismissed the application in any event.
20. Further, an extension of time for an unmeritorious application such as
the present one would result in further undue delay, prove
prejudicial, and undermine the orderly conduct and progress of the
refoulement process.
Conclusion
21. In light of the foregoing, no extension of time is granted and the
application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.
Dated the 3rd day of November 2026
| | |
| |(Joyce Ooi) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|Applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the |Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such |Applicant |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 3/11/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the | |solicitors / such |
|Court the order |Sari Warwati |Putative Interested |
|granting leave and any | |Parties as may be |
|directions given within|Applicant’s ref. no:|directed by the Court / |
|14 days after the leave|Nil. |the Putative Interested |
|was granted (Order 53, | |Parties’ solicitors on |
|rule 4A); | |3/11/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|originating summons | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|within 14 days after | |Claims Petition Office |
|the grant of leave and | |Putative Respondent’s |
|serve it in accordance | |ref. no.: USM 20870 |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | | |
|and | |Director of Immigration |
| | |Putative Interested |
|c) supply to every | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|other party copies of | |738/22 (Formerly RBCZ |
|every affidavit which | |5000572/22) |
|the Applicant proposes | | |
|to use at the hearing, | |Department of Justice, |
|including the affidavit| |Senior Assistant Law |
|in support of the | |Officer |
|application for leave | |(Civil Law) |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1]https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL0014
59_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
[2] In that the presence of a credibly valid explanation for the delay
will strengthen, and the absence of an acceptable explanation will weaken,
the Applicant’s request for what is an indulgence to be granted in the
court’s discretion.
[3] Although where an applicant is many months out of time, leave may be
refused however strong the
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Director of Immigration & anor. [2016] 2 HKC 393 (CA) at §27(iii) as
approved in the other cases cited below, in particular H v Director of
Immigration (2020) 23 HKCFAR 248 at supra at §37(2)).