MOK LAI HING v. KAI FU PROPERTY SERVICES CO LTD

DCPI 3250/2023

[2026] HKDC 1634

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO. 3250 OF 2023

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JUDGMENT

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1.  This is a personal injury claim.

2.  At the relevant time, the plaintiff was employed by the defendant, a limited company incorporated in Hong Kong carrying on the business of, inter alia, provision of cleaning services, to work as a cleaner at Choi Ying Estate, Ngau Tau Kok, Kowloon (“the Estate”).

Background

3.  The accident happened inside a room which was serving as either a rest room (according to the plaintiff) or a refuse collection point (according to the defendant) on the ground floor of the Estate (“the Room”).

4.  From various photographs of the interior of the Room, I note that there were trolleys containing stacked folded cardboard boxes and foam boxes (Trial Bundle p. 114, 185) and various cleaning equipment (mops, buckets etc.) (Trial Bundle p. 186, 187). However, there were also a few tables (with cups on them) and chairs (Trial Bundle p. 141, 142, 143 and 188). Self-evidently, the Room was used as both a resting room and a storage room for cleaning equipment and refuse like discarded carboard and foam boxes etc.. In any case, I do not think the dispute on how the Room was used is of much relevance.

5.  The layout of the Estate is that the Room has an entrance (open doorway) into a loading area (Trial Bundle p. 171, 172 and 175) where lorries enter to load and unloads goods (“the Loading Area”). There are 2 large rubbish dumps and some smaller rubbish bins in the Loading Area (Trail Bundle p.173, 174). Across the Loading Area (opposite to the entrance to the Room), there is an entrance to a passageway where the backdoor of a supermarket (ParknShop) and the public toilets are opened to (Trial Bundle p. 169-171).

6.  It is the plaintiff’s evidence that her work as a cleaner involved, amongst others, clearing cardboard and foam boxes and any rubbish left by the staff of ParknShop. She would put any rubbish (like unsold and expired food) into the rubbish dumps and bins in the Loading Area. She would take the cardboard boxes into the Room, flatten them and put them in a stack on the trolleys for recycling. Similarly, she would tie up the foam boxes and left them stacked up.

7.  These carboard and foam boxes would then be regularly collected by the transport vehicles of the defendant for recycling.

8.  There was some dispute as to where the foam boxes were stored: either inside the Room according to the plaintiff, or at the back wall of the Loading Area according to the defendant.

9.  I found that some photos show that the foam boxes were stacked up on trolleys in the Room (e.g. Trial Bundle p.114) and others show that they were stacked up in the Loading Area (e.g. Trial Bundle p.180). As such, I think on balance that the foam boxes were stored in both these areas.

10.  The dispute of where the foam boxes were stored would only concern the argument whether there was a chance that the floor of the Room could be wet, since the plaintiff’s evidence was that “sewage would leak out” from the foam boxes containing unsold and discarded food etc. However, I do not think that this dispute is very relevant (which I shall explain later).

11.  According to photographs showing the inside of the Room (e.g. Trial Bundle p. 114-116, 134 and 140), there are floor drains (with metal covers) running along the entrance between the Room and the Loading Area and this drain continues (turning 90 degrees) down one side of the Room.

12.  Further, there are various mops, buckets, sweeps, bins, cleaning agents and also a “Caution Wet Floor” sign inside the Room (Trial Bundle p. 186-187).

13.  It is also the plaintiff’s evidence that it was her duty as cleaning lady to deal with wet floors, and she told the court that she would assess the situation: if there was a large amount of standing water, she would clean it up first, and if there was only a little, she might decide that she could do other work first. It was also her duty to place the “Caution Wet Floor” sign when required.

14.  On 26 March 2021, the plaintiff had an accident (the exact nature of which was disputed) on 26 March 2021 inside a room which involved an eversion injury to the left ankle (which is commonly known as “拗柴” or “扭柴” as mentioned by the defendant’s witness 洪利貞 (“Madam Hung”) who was the security supervisor on duty at the time. Madam Hung was notified of the accident via the plaintiff’s co-worker, Madam Tin Siu King “田小鯨”  (“Madam Tin”).

15.  There is no dispute that the photographs taken by Madam Hung (or under her instructions) immediately after the accident show the actual situation with the plaintiff still on the floor of the Room (Trial Bundle p.112).

16.  The plaintiff was taken by ambulance to the A&E Department of United Christian Hospital. X-ray revealed no ankle fracture. She was diagnosed as having a left ankle sprain and a subluxation of the 2^nd toe proximal interphalangeal joint. She was treated with a slab to protect the left ankle and a frame to assist walking, and was discharged with analgesics with an urgent referral to the Orthopaedics Department for follow-up.

17.  The plaintiff was seen at the Orthopaedics Outpatient on 9 April 2021 as a follow-up. X-ray again revealed no fracture and she was referred to undergo out-patient physiotherapy and occupation therapy.

18.  Subsequent MRI scan on 15 May 2021 revealed low grade tear of the anterior talo-fibular ligament and posterior talo-fibular ligament and also a small crack facture at the posterior inferior border of the lower tibia with no significant displacement. Having seen the MRI scan, the orthopaedic surgeon saw no need to alter the management of the plaintiff and sought for continuation of physiotherapy.

19.  The plaintiff received 2 courses of physiotherapy but still reported residual pain and weakness. The plaintiff also attended occupational therapy but the report stated that her performance did not match her pre-injury job demand etc..

20.  In late 2021, the plaintiff reported various suspected psychiatric symptoms and she was referred to the psychiatric department and treated with medications.

21.  In any case, the plaintiff was granted sick leave from 27 March 2021 to 19 March 2024.

22.  The plaintiff was examined by single joint orthopaedics expert Dr. Danny Tsoi Chi Wah (“Dr. Tsoi”) and in his report dated 2 October 2024. Dr. Tsoi opined that there was residual left ankle pain and mild stiffness etc., but sick leave should be allowed up to 2 years or at the end of the rehabilitation.

23.  She was also examined by single joint psychiatric expert Dr. Henry Kwok (“Dr. Kwok”) who opined his report dated 5 June 2025 that the plaintiff suffered from Adjustment Disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood, but her condition had improved after medication with only mild residual psychiatric symptoms.

Liability

The plaintiff’s case

24.  The plaintiff’s case is that:

“At about 9:20pm, whilst the plaintiff was walking in…(the Room) with a view to dispose of the garbage placed outside…by the staff(s) of ParknShop, she slipped upon some water and fell on the floor…” and that such accident caused the injury, loss and damage. (paragraphs 5(c) and (d) of Statement of Claim, Trial Bundle p. 12-13)

25.  Under paragraph 6 of the Statement of Claim, the plaintiff’s causes of action were based upon negligence, breach of common duty of care and / or breach of statutory duties on the part of the defendant and /or the breach of employment terms / covenants of the defendant. The particulars were listed under 10 sub-paragraphs which can be summarised as:

a.  Causing cardboards and foam boxed to be stored in the Room (thus, as I understand it as above, causing possible water / sewage to be leaked onto the floor of the Room);

b.  Failing to keep the floor dry and clean which created a danger for slipping;

c.  Failing to have any system of inspection / maintenance for water upon the floor;

d.  Failing to give warning of such risk to the plaintiff;

e.  Failing to ensure that the water have been cleaned up by the responsible cleaning workers;

f.  Failing to affix the relevant warning sign;

g.  Requiring the plaintiff to walk on the floor of the Room;

h.  Failing to operate adequate safety system to ensure safety in the Room; and

i.  Exposing the plaintiff to the risk of injury which the defendant knew or ought to have known from inspection or supervision.

26.  Under paragraph 7 of the Statement of Claim, the plaintiff also sought to rely on res ipsa loquitur to establish that the accident was caused by the defendant.

The defendant’s case

27.  The defendant does not admit that the accident happened as the plaintiff alleged.

28.  The main dispute is that defendant does not admit that the floor of the Room was wet or slippery: in summary, the defendant argued that:

a.  ParknShop was not a wet market and food would mostly be wrapped up;

b.  any rotten food would have been discarded in the Loading Area and would not enter the Room;

c.  any sewage would have drained into the drains at the entrance of the Room;

d.  it was the duty of the cleaners including the plaintiff to clean any sewage / water and there were sufficient equipment in the Room for doing such work etc.;

e.  in any case, the plaintiff failed to inform the defendant of any such risk; and

f.  it is denied that res ipsa loquitur is applicable.

(paragraphs 7 – 19 of the Defence, Trial Bundle p. 23-27)

29.  In addition, the defendant claimed that the accident was caused by (contributory) negligence of the plaintiff by e.g. failing to keep the floor of the Room clean and failing to take any reasonable care including keeping a proper lookout etc. (paragraph 20 of the Defence, Trial Bundle p. 27).

Consideration

30.  After the plaintiff completed her case at the trial, I have expressed my concern to her counsel, Mr. Patrick Lim (“Mr. Lim”). The question I asked was: “Where was the breach?”

31.  My concern was that the particulars of negligence were framed as though this was the usual “slip and fall” case regarding Occupier’s Liability etc. whereby a licensee entered a premises and slipped and fell on some water on the floor with no warning signs etc.

32.  This is not the case here.

33.  In the current case, the Plaintiff was in fact in charge of the very task of dealing with water / sewage on the floor within the Estate. During cross-examination, she admitted that:

a.  she has the equipment to deal with such (mops and buckets etc.);

b.  when she spotted any wet areas, she would decide, by her own judgment and assessment, how to deal with them: if there was a lot of water, she would mop it up immediately, but if there was only a little, she might choose to do some other work first; and

c.  it was also her job to put up the “Wet Floor” warning sign if needed.

34.  Further, she did not dispute that she was wearing anti-slip water boots provided by the defendant when the accident happened (as shown in the photographs in Trial Bundle p. 112).

35.  Clearly, on face of her own evidence, most, if not all, heads of particulars of negligence would immediately fall away: failure to keep the floor dry; failure to have any system to deal with water on the floor, failure to ensure the water was cleaned up by the “responsible cleaner”, failure to put up a warning sign etc.

36.  Thus, the factual disputes on where the foam boxes were placed and whether there was actually water / sewage on the floor of the Room at the time of the accident might be rendered entirely irrelevant due to the defence (as raised by the defendant and not disputed by the plaintiff) that it was the plaintiff’s duty to deal with it (and any risks that it may cause).

37.  Thus, a proper negligence claim under the circumstances should lie in form of any allegations of breach (for example, under the Occupational Safety and Health Ordinance, Cap. 509 (“the OSHO”)) in failure to provide safe system of work and training etc. as far as reasonably practicable, to ensure the health and safety of the plaintiff etc.

38.  I would envisage that such a claim might involve allegations of lack of proper equipment, safe system, training etc. on part of the defendant to enable the plaintiff to deal with water and sewage on the floor in reasonable safety.

39.  However, besides mentioning the relevant provisions under the OSHO (and the OLO and matters regarding implied terms in the contract of employment etc.), the plaintiff raised no specifical allegation as to what equipment, safe system, training etc. was lacking.

40.  For example, if the plaintiff was alleging a lack of proper training or safety system, she would need to plea what the reasonable level of training or safety system in the cleaning industry should be, and which part of such training or system specifically that the defendant had failed to provide. And if there was an allegation of lack of proper equipment, she would need to plea what the proper and reasonable equipment should be and what equipment that the defendant had failed to provide.

41.  Instead, I note that the defendant did plead specifically that there was adequate drainage system in the Room and sufficient manpower and cleaning utensils etc. in the Defence. There was no Reply nor evidence to address why these were inadequate.

42.  Even at the trial, no such evidence alleging any inadequacy (of equipment, training, safe system at work etc.) were raised by the plaintiff.

43.  Further, even if specific allegations and evidence are raised, the test is “as far as reasonably practicable”. The law clearly does not impose a strict liability and the application is more akin to the common law duty of care. As such, I am of the view that expert evidence may be needed to address the standard of care and breach.

44.  Thus, the question the court raised to Mr. Lim after the plaintiff closed her case was: “Where is the breach?”

45.  Mr. Lim later attempted to apply to re-call the plaintiff, informing the court that he has new instructions from her that she has been wearing her anti-slip water boots for about 2 years.

46.  I did not allow the application. I find that such evidence irrelevant given that there was no expert evidence as to the proper length of time before the water boots would lose effective anti-slip property. Indeed, if the plaintiff has initially framed her claim that way, experts should have been instructed to scientifically test the anti-slip properties of her shoes.

47.  Mr. Lim submitted in his Closing Submission that:

“the defence does not aver that by supplying anti-slip water boots to the plaintiff, the defendant has discharged its duty of care as employer to the plaintiff…With the greatest of respect to the Court, the “issue of having discharged its duty by having supplied anti-slip water boots” was not in issue…”

48.  I think that is putting the cart before the horse. It is for the plaintiff to plead specifically what equipment supplied by the defendant was below standard and thus in breach. In absence of such, it is not for the defence to aver (nor provide evidence of) how each piece of equipment provided were of reasonable standard in order to discharge its duty.

49.  Thus, I agree with Mr. Lim that “the “issue of having discharged its duty by having supplied anti-slip water boots” was not in issue”. But this was because no allegations of inadequacy of the anti-slip water boots (or any other specific equipment) was pleaded by the plaintiff in the first place. And, as I stated above, if that was pleaded, expert evidence would be required.

50.  I also note that Mr. Lim attempted to make an argument that the Orthopaedic expert report by Dr. Tsoi somehow support the plaintiff’s case on how the accident happened because Dr. Tsoi opined that:

“The above left ankle and 2^nd toe injuries were caused by the subject accident with a compatible mechanism.” (paragraph 2 of I. Diagnosis and Causation under Comments, Trial Bundle p. 252)

51.  As I have expressed in Court during the Opening Submission, I cannot see how one could read anything more into this: by using the term “compatible mechanism”, Dr. Tsoi had simply opined that the injury was consistent with the mechanism in the accident as told to him by the plaintiff (as part of the “subjective” history).

52.  But one must not extrapolate this to mean that Dr. Tsoi had opined that, on balance of probability, there could be no other mechanism causing such injuries except a slip on a wet surface.

53.  Indeed, one would easily imagine, as a matter of common sense, that there may be many other mechanisms of accidents (maybe a slip on a non-wet surface, or placing the foot on the ground at a wrong angle) that could cause a similar eversion injury to the ankle. If an injury is exclusive to only one particular mechanism of accident, then perhaps Dr. Tsoi would use another term other than “compatible mechanism”, and might be expected to support that assertion by producing relevant medical research papers.

54.  Although, as stated above, the factual dispute on whether there was water / sewage on the floor of the Room is arguably of little relevance, I will go into this as a matter of completeness.

55.  I do not find that, on balance, the accident happened as alleged by the plaintiff, in particular that her slip was caused by water or sewage on the floor of the Room (paragraph 5(c) of the Statement of Claim, Trial Bundle p. 12-13 and paragraph 8 of the plaintiff’s Witness Statement, Trial Bundle p. 101) for the reasons below.

56.  Firstly, I find no objective evidence of such. I cannot see any obvious wetness on the floor in the photographs taken immediately after the accident (Trial Bundle p. 112). The paper cardboard box lying on the floor next to the plaintiff’s injured left foot also showed no signs of any wetness.

57.  Secondly, according to the contemporaneous A&E Department records on 26 March 2021 (Trial Bundle p. 584), she gave a history of:

“sprain L (left) ankle tonight when walking, cannot recall exact mechanism”

58.  Thirdly, all along with the orthopaedics follow-ups, the history was documented as “S/F (Slip and Fall) with left ankle sprain” (e.g. Trial Bundle p. 684, 681, 678 etc.) All along, all the doctors only documented the accident in similar terms in medical records and medical reports (by A&E department and various Orthopaedics and Traumatology Departments, Outpatient Clinic Departments etc.)

59.  The only reference to a “slip and fall on wet floor” was in the Prosthetic and Orthotic Report dated 17 August 2021 (Trial Bundle p. 225). However, I note that this was written by two prosthetic and orthotists. They were clearly not medical doctors and it was unclear as to when and how they come to this information and how accurate this would be since “wet floor” was not documented in any medical records or reports.

60.  Fourthly, I note that the Incident Report (Trial Bundle p. 324) and Form 2 (Trial Bundle p. 326) prepared by the defendant’s staff only recorded that the accident was a “fall” with no mention of “a wet floor” or “water / sewage on the floor”. Both can be considered contemporaneous records.

61.  Fifthly, according to the evidence of 馮寶貞 (“Madam Fung”), the Human Resources Specialist of the defendant, the plaintiff has claimed for employee’s compensation after the accident and this was settled by the defendant on 25 April 2025 (for a sum of HK$281,106.59). All through the process, the plaintiff had never mentioned that her injury was caused by a wet floor in the Room. The first time the defendant was aware that the plaintiff was alleging a wet floor was when the defendant received the letter before action from the plaintiff’s solicitor dated 7 June 2023. Up until then, the plaintiff never mentioned that her injury was caused by the wet floor in the Room (paragraphs 7-8, Witness Statement of 馮寶貞, Trial Bundle p.125).

62.  This evidence was not challenged by the plaintiff.

63.  One must ask the obvious question: if the accident was really caused by the plaintiff slipping on a wet floor, why would the plaintiff not inform the defendant until more than 2 years after the accident?

64.  There is a further implication: this is consistent with the information in the Incident Report and Form 2. There was no mention of “wet floor” in such documents because the plaintiff never alleged such until much later. Thus, any suspicion that the defendant’s staff might be biased in the preparation of such documents and purposely left out prejudicial information (i.e. wet floor) is unfounded.

65.  Sixthly, the plaintiff admitted in court that the accident was not a “slip and fall” after all. She now claimed that she had slipped (on wet floor) and twisted her left ankle, and since she could not put weight on the left foot, she decided to sit down on the floor. As such, she did not “fall on the floor” contrary to what was pleaded in the Statement of Claim and stated in her Witness Statement.

66.  One might raise a question as to why the plaintiff has been so inconsistent on the rather simple (but important) matter of “how the accident happened”. Indeed, this would raise a question on her credibility.

67.  It is not in dispute that there was only one witness (other than the plaintiff herself) to the accident: the above-mentioned Madam Tin (the plaintiff’s co-worker who reported the accident to Madam Hung).

68.  During cross-examination, the defendant’s counsel, Miss Ann Lui (“Miss Lui”), asked why the plaintiff did not call Madam Tin to give evidence to support her version of how the accident occurred. The plaintiff replied that Madam Tin was still working with the defendant and would not give evidence for fear of losing her job. Miss Lui suggested that the defendant’s contract with the Estate had ended but the new cleaning company had retained all the workers so Madam Tin was not working with the defendant.

69.  In order to be fair to both parties with this line of questioning, I have asked Miss Lui to seek further instructions to see if there were employment records to verify whether Madam Tin was currently under the employment of the defendant.

70.  Later, Miss Lui informed the court that, after searching the records, the defendant would confirm that although Madam Tin had worked in the Estate after the defendant left, she has now return to work for the defendant in another site.

71.  I would draw no adverse inference on either party for failing to call Madam Tin. The plaintiff was clearly correct in stating that Madam Tin was currently employed by the defendant. But I also think that it would be a very unlikely scenario that the defendant was aware of this, had approached Madam Tin but found the evidence not supportive, and then sort to challenge the plaintiff in court for not calling Madam Tin knowing that the basis for challenge was not correct, only to then admit this to the court. I cannot see why the defendant would bother to conspire to do something like that with no benefit to its own case.

72.  One interesting note is that, on inspection of the relevant photographs taken immediately after the accident, one would notice the proximity of a folded carboard box on the floor next to the plaintiff’s left foot. One might speculate that, since the plaintiff was wearing anti-slip water boots, the mechanism of the accident might have been that she accidentally stepped on the cardboard box, and whilst her shoes would have gripped the surface of the cardboard box, the cardboard box might slip on the floor given that there might be little friction (even without any water or sewage) between the carboard box and the floor.

73.  Nevertheless, the plaintiff denied in court that this might have been what happened. (As a passing comment, I note that the plaintiff, rather strangely, denied that the photographs actually showed a cardboard box on the floor next to her left foot.) Thus, the court has no evidence and such speculation has no bearing in the decision of the court on the dispute on how the accident happened.

74.  In any case, after considering all the evidence, I find that, on balance, the accident did not happen as the plaintiff alleged in any of her versions of the event. On balance, I find that she may have slipped, but she did not slip on any water or sewage on the floor of the Room.

75.  Finally, it is clear that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot apply in this case.

76.  It is well established in law that the common law duty of the employer is to provide a reasonable level of safety and not subject his employees to unnecessary risks (that he can reasonably foresee and which he can guard against by any measures, the convenience and expense of which are not entirely disproportionate to the risk involved). Thus, the duty is not absolute. (see Wong Siu Wa v Win Sino Engineering Limited [2018] HKCFI 1663, General Cleaning Contractors Ltd v Christmas [1953] AC 180, Harris v Brights Asphalt Contractors Ltd [1953] 1 WLR 341, Paris v Stepney Borough Council [1951] 1 All ER 42, Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co Ltd v English [1938] AC 57).

77.  Thus, in conclusion, I find that the plaintiff has failed to establish liability on part of the defendant. There is, therefore, no need to deal with contributory negligence.

Quantum

78.  For the sake of completeness, I will proceed to assess quantum.

PSLA

79.  The plaintiff’s injury and subsequent management, as well as the opinion of both single joint experts are stated above under “background” and need not be repeated.

80.  In addition, the court has reviewed the surveillance videos taken on various dates in March to April 2024. I am of the view that the videos shows that although the plaintiff was carrying a walking stick (and on the correct side for her injury), it is clear that she only required minimal support from it and that she was walking, climbing stairs, carrying her shopping and riding public transport without difficulty.

81.  In the Revised Statement of Damages, the plaintiff claims HK$450,000 under this head of claim. I do not agree that the injuries suffered by the plaintiff fall within the serious category as set out in the case of Lee Ting Lam.

82.  Dr. Tsoi, the Orthopaedics expert, assessed a total of 4.5% whole person impairment as a result of her injury with various residual pain and stiffness (Trial Bundle p. 255).

83.  Dr. Kwok, the psychiatric expert, diagnosed “Adjustment Disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood” but qualified his comments by opining that “it is likely that she magnified or exaggerated the intensity of her symptoms” but objectively, “the persisting (residual) psychiatric symptoms are mild in severity” (Trial Bundle p.272). He gave 2% as permanent impairment on psychiatric grounds.

84.  As such, I am of the view that this was a sprained ankle (thus soft tissue) injury but with an additional crack fracture of distal tibia (which required no additional treatment) and subluxation of a toe joint, with the recovery complicated by an episode of adjustment disorder.

85.  The injury is clearly less serious than the wrist fracture cases (Liu Cairong v Parker Cleaning Services Company Limited, HCPI 189/2013, Cheng Yuk Chun v Winson Cleaning Service Company Limited and Ors, DCPI 629/2006) where around HK$300,000 were awarded, and perhaps more comparable to ankle soft tissue injuries cases (Leung Yung Cheung v Fly King Transportation Company Limited, DCPI 611/2015) where around HK$100,000 was awarded.

86.  Having taken into account the addition crack fracture, subluxation and adjustment disorder, I think an award of HK$150,000 is reasonable under this head.

Pre-trial loss of earnings

87.  There is no dispute that the plaintiff was earning HK$9,861.00 per month at the time of the accident which was increased to HK$10,369.00 from 1 January 2023.

88.  Although the plaintiff has obtained sick leave from 27 March 2021 to 10 June 2024, the surveillance video taken in March and April 2024 does not show any obvious serious disabilities. Dr. Tsoi has reviewed such evidence and I would agree with his expert opinion that sick leave up to 2 years or at the conclusion of the whole rehabilitation would be reasonable.

89.  Dr. Tsoi also opined that her residual symptoms may prevent her returning to work as a cleaning worker in full capacity and she would need intermittent rest periods as specified. Dr. Kwok opined that her residual psychiatric symptom would not prevent her from returning to the pre-accident job and any adverse effect on efficiency and performance should be small.

90.  In any case, it is the plaintiff’s evidence that she has returned to work as a full-time cleaner earning HK$11,197 from 1 November 2025.

91.  As such, I am of the view that whatever permanent residual symptoms that the plaintiff might have, she was able to work full time as a cleaner earning similar (in fact a slightly higher) salary. Thus, I see no reason why she could not return to such work after 2 years as opined by Dr. Tsoi (i.e. in March 2023) instead of in November 2025.

92.  I would therefore only allow a pre-trial loss of earning for 2 years:

a)  From 26 March 2021 to 31 December 2022:

HK$9,861 x 21 months = HK$207,081

b)  From 1 January 2023 to 31 March 2023

HK$10,369 x 3 months = HK$31,107

Sub-total: HK$238,188

Plus MPF HK$238,188 x 5% = HK$11,909.40

Total: HK$250,097.40

Post-trial loss of earnings

93.  In view of the above, there should be no awards under this heading.

Loss of earning capacity

94.  I think that the plaintiff may have a small disadvantage in the open labour should she losses her current job. I think an award of HK$30,000 or roughly 3 months’ salary is reasonable.

Future medical expenses and disbursement

95.  Dr. Tsoi opined that there is no need for further orthopaedic treatment. Dr. Kwok opined that the plaintiff may benefit from further psychiatric follow-up for 6-9 months more after this case, with a frequency of consultation around every 2 months.

96.  I think that an award of HK$2,000 is reasonable.

Special damages

97.  The plaintiff claims HK$8,550 under medical expenses. I will allow this reimbursement.

98.  The plaintiff also claims HK$10,000 for tonic food. I will allow HK$5,000.

99.  The plaintiff further claims HK$8,000 as travelling expenses. I will allow HK$4,000.

100.  Thus the total award under this head is HK$17,550.

Employees’ Compensation

101.  It is not disputed that the plaintiff received HK$281,106.59 as employees’ compensation so this sum would be deducted from the current award.

102.  In summary, should there be an award, it should be:

HK$

PSLA	150,000
Pre-trial loss of earnings and MPF	250,097.40
Post-trial loss of earnings	0
Loss of earning capacity	30,000
Future medical expenses	2,000
Special damages	17,550
Sub-total:	449,647.40
Less: Employees’ Compensation	(281,106.59)
Total:	168,540.81 (plus interest)

103.  There should be interest on the award of general damages at 2% per annum from the date of the writ to the date of judgment, and interest on the award of pre-trial loss of earnings and special damages at half judgment rate from the date of the accident to the date of the judgment.

Order

104.  I would accordingly dismiss the plaintiff’s claim.

105.  There be a cost order nisi that the plaintiff shall pay the defendant’s costs of the action to be taxed if not agreed with certificate for counsel. The plaintiff’s own cost be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulation.