KORITA PACKAGING LTD AND ANOTHER v. SHAHANEYS (H.K.) LTD

HCA 2167/2020

[2022] HKCFI 2082

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2167 OF 2020

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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A. INTRODUCTION

1.  This Decision deals with the Defendant’s Summons dated 26 May 2022 (the “Summons”) for leave to file fresh evidence on appeal by way of the 3^rd Affirmation of Rajesh Gobind Shahani (together with its exhibits) dated 26 May 2022.

2.  On 28 January 2022, Master D. To entered summary judgment against the Defendant. The Defendant appealed against the summary judgment on 10 February 2022. The hearing of his appeal was scheduled to be heard before this Court on 31 May 2022. On 26 May 2022, 5 days before the appeal hearing, by the Summons returnable at the same time of the appeal hearing, the Defendant applied for leave to adduce new evidence on appeal.

3.  At the hearing on 31 May 2022, the parties agreed that if the Defendant’s application to adduce new evidence is allowed, the Plaintiff should be given opportunity to file evidence in reply. Therefore, the hearing of the Defendant’s appeal was adjourned to a date to be fixed and not to be heard before this Decision.

B. THE PLAINTIFFS’ CASE

4.  The Plaintiffs’ cause of action is money had and received. In gist, in January 2020, the 1^st Plaintiff and the 2^nd Plaintiff respectively ordered (the “Alleged Purchase Agreement”) certain specified machines (the “Goods”) from the Defendant at the price of USD3,411,855 (the “Money”) and paid for them in full, but the Purchase Agreement was terminated because the Defendant had failed to deliver the Goods. After the Plaintiffs’ demand, on diver dates from February to April 2020, the Defendant returned various sums totalling USD850,000 to the 1^st Plaintiff. No further repayment was made to either plaintiff. The Plaintiffs therefore commenced the present proceedings claiming the balance in the sum of USD2,561,855 (USD1,401,855 for the 1st Plaintiff and USD1,160,000 for the 2^nd Plaintiff) from the Defendant.

5.  There is no dispute between the parties that the Plaintiffs did pay the Money to the Defendant, and that the Defendant did not deliver any Goods to the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs produced invoices of the Goods issued by the Defendant (the “Invoices”) evidencing the existence of the Purchase Agreement and submit that their case is simple and straightforward.

C. THE DEFENDANT’S CASE

6.  Essentially, the Defendant says that:

(1) The Plaintiffs’ payments of the Money to the Defendant were in fact repayment of a loan owed by the 1^st Plaintiff to the Defendant arising from the 1^st Plaintiff’s non-payment of the purchase price at USD1,225,000 for machineries sold and delivered by the Defendant to the 1^st Plaintiff in 2003 and 2004 (the “Alleged 2003/04 Loan”).

(2) The non-payment was caused by a fire broke out at the 1^st Plaintiff’s factory in 2003.

(3) At that time, the parties agreed that the 1^st Plaintiff should repay the Alleged 2003/04 Loan to the Defendant by November 2010.

(4) However, the 1^st Plaintiff did not do so because it had not yet received insurance compensation for the fire.

(5) It was until 2019 that the 1^st Plaintiff received the insurance compensation.

(6) The parties then agreed to reduce the terms of the Alleged 2003/04 Loan into writing, which was called the Machinery Funding & Loan Agreement (the “Alleged Machinery Funding & Loan Agreement”), and to backdate this agreement to 25 November 2003.

(7) According to the Alleged Machinery Funding & Loan Agreement, the Alleged 2003/04 Loan should be repaid by 24 November 2010 and should carry interest accrued at 7.5% per annum. The 2^nd Plaintiff was named as the guarantor of the 1^st Plaintiff’s obligation to repay.

(8) Only the Defendant signed the Alleged Machinery Funding & Loan Agreement. The Plaintiffs did not sign it.

(9) The Invoices were a sham. The Defendant issued the Invoices at the Plaintiffs’ request to satisfy the bank’s query (that the original invoices were from years ago and clearance for remittance could not be given; hence more updated documents had to be provided before remittance would be permitted[1]).

(10) The Plaintiffs then remitted the Money from Thailand to Hong Kong for repayment of the Alleged 2003/04 Loan.

(11) The various sums totalling USD850,000 returned from the Defendant to the Plaintiffs were in fact interest rebates on the loan repayment which the Defendant agreed to give to the Plaintiffs at their request[2].

D. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT

7.  On 28 January 2022, after hearing the parties, Master D. To granted summary judgment against the Defendant, who was adjudged to pay:

(1) the 1^st Plaintiff the sum of USD1,401,855 (or its Hong Kong Dollar equivalent), together with interest thereon at 1% above the prime rate from the 28th day of December 2020 until the date hereof and thereafter at the judgment rate until payment; and

(2) the 2^nd Plaintiff the sum of USD1,160,000 (or its Hong Kong Dollar equivalent), together with interest thereon at 1% above the prime rate from the 28th day of December 2020 until the date hereof and thereafter at the judgment rate until payment.

In addition, the Defendant was ordered to pay the Plaintiffs’ costs of the action.

8.  By a Notice of Appeal dated 10 February 2022, the Defendant appealed against the summary judgment.

E. THE FRESH EVIDENCE THAT THE DEFENDANT SEEKS TO ADDUCE

9.  The fresh evidence sought to be adduced consists of screenshots from certain WhatsApp messages exchanged between Mr Nilkesh Choksi (“Mr Choksi”) for the Plaintiffs and Mr Rajesh Gobind Shahani (“Mr Rajesh Shahani”) for the Defendant, exhibited as

(1) “RGS-12”: with 2 pages, which are messages exchanged between 11am to 11:40am on 21 February 2020, and

(2) “RGS-13”: with 4 pages, which are messages exchanged between 8:29pm and 10:35pm on 5 May 2020

to 3^rd Affirmation of Rajesh Gobind Shahani filed on 26 May 2022.

10.  The contents of those messages which the Plaintiffs sought to rely on and the significance which the Plaintiffs intend to attach to them are set out in paragraphs 20 and 21 (in respect of RGS-12) and paragraphs 23 and 24 (in respect of RGSA-13) of the 2^nd Affirmation of Mr Rajesh Shahani filed on 26 May 2022 in support of the Summons:

(1) Paragraphs 20 and 21 of Mr Rajesh Shahani’s 2^nd Affirmation:

“20. At 21 February 2020 at 11:35, the following underlined text message from Choksi to Rajesh tends to show Ps were making the remittances for repayment of the 2003 Loan (but was cut out from Choksi’s WhatsApp Record):-

21 February 2020

11:34 a.m.	Rajesh:	I will need some time to redo all the invoices to Shahaneys and print out
11:34 a.m.		Lets meet at 12
11:35 a.m.	Choksi:	Okay. Sorry for that. Since this is a 17 year old matter I don’t want any doubts raised by the Auditors. Thanks.
11:40 a.m.	Rajesh:	yea sure no problem

21. It is common ground that the timeframe when the Plaintiffs’ made remittances to the Defendant was 20 to 27 February 2020.  I verily believe that the underlined text message sent on 21 February 2020 (which has been omitted from Choksi’s WhatsApp Record), is important since it supports two propositions:-

(1) The Plaintiffs’ remittances to the Defendant was indeed made for payment of the 2003 Loan (recorded in the Machinery Funding & Loan Agreement);

(2) The Re-Issued Invoices were indeed sham documents created at the instructions of Choksi, so as to tackle the remittances, when in fact the true transactions were the 2003 machine purchases”.

(2) Paragraphs 23 and 24 of Mr Rajesh Shahani’s 2^nd Affirmation:

“23. It will be recalled that at paragraph 31 of Choksi 1st, the Plaintiffs alleged that Gautam has, by his text message dated 5 May 2020 at 20:01:58 (identified in the grey box below), acknowledged the Defendant had an obligation “clear USD 3M” repayment to the Plaintiffs (“the Gautam USD3M Message”). The Gautam USD3M Message, together with its accompanying contextual text messages, was forwarded to Rajesh, but the entire chunk (as underlined) of the forwarded conversation was cut out from Choksi ‘s WhatsApp Record:-

5 May 2020:

10:34 p.m.	Choksi:	Response from Gautam FYI ...
10:34 p.m.	Choksi: (forwarded)	Hold your tongue, I completed everything on 20th April 2020 for USD3M. Now bank is just completing some AMA procedure. You will get a good news tomorrow. Keen calm, I am going send you some emails, I order many machines and some are ready for shipment now. I am able to do the shipment even under current conditions. They will be reaching by mid of June 2020. One Line of Bags and three Lines for Mask.
10:34 p.m.	(forwarded)
10:34am	(forwarded)

24. The cutting out of the underlined messages is critical because it evinces that the Gautam USD3M Message was uttered in the context of Gautam telling Choksi about Gautam’s own business costs in Gautam’s mask-making business, not indebtedness towards Choksi’s or the Plaintiff (N.B. The Plaintiffs’ business has nothing to do with mask-making). This USD3M refers to the costs of raw materials for Gautam’s mask-making business. This becomes clear once the Court juxtapose p57 of NC-I [16/3/20 18:07:06] (Ps’ own evidence - WhatsApp conversation between Gautam and Choksi on 16 March 2020):-

[16/3/20 18:07:06]

HK Gautam Shahani:

The machines are costly, USD 2.2M per line. We are going for 3lines and we require USD 3M for raw material.

F. APPLICABLE PRINCIPLE FOR ADMISSION OF NEW EVIDENCE ON APPEAL

11.  According to Order 58, rule 1(5) of the Rules of the High Court, no further evidence (other than evidence as to matters which have occurred after the date on which the judgment was given) may be received on the hearing of this appeal except on special grounds.

12.  As explained in paragraph 58/1/3 of Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2022, the phrase ‘special ground’ is the same expression as in Order 59, rule 10(2) and requires the conditions laid down in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 to be satisfied, namely, that further evidence is admissible on appeal only where such evidence:

(1) could not have been obtained at the trial with reasonable diligence;

(2) would or might, if believed, have a very important influence on the result of the case, though it need not be decisive; and

(3) is apparently credible though it need not be incontrovertible.

13.  In the context of an appeal against summary judgment, Lam VP (as he then was) in Yu Wing Cheong & the other v Yu Wing Yin [2020] HKCA 629 applied the approach of the United Kingdom’s House of Lords in Langdale v Danby [1982] 1 WLR 1123 at 1133B to F per Lord Bridge:

“In the situation arising on an appeal to the Court of Appeal from a summary judgment, the application of these conditions and perhaps the conditions themselves will require some modification. It may well be that the standard of diligence required of a defendant preparing his case in opposition to a summons for summary judgment, especially if under pressure of time, will not be so high as that required in preparing for trial. The second and third conditions will no doubt be satisfied if the further evidence tendered is sufficient, according to the ordinary principles applied on applications for summary judgment, to raise a triable issue. But I can see no injustice at all in requiring a defendant to use such diligence as is reasonable in the circumstances to put before the judge on the hearing of the summons, albeit in summary form, all the evidence he relies on in defence, whereas it would be a great injustice to the plaintiff to allow the defendant to introduce for the first time on appeal evidence which was readily available at the hearing of the summons but was not produced.”

14.  However, this approach does not simply mean a more relaxed approach towards the admission of new evidence, in view of the litigation culture preferred by the court since the introduction of the Civil Justice Reform in Hong Kong SAR, namely, that parties should prepare their case properly prior to the hearing before a Master. The court will adopt a holistic approach, taking into account the overall context with all relevant factors. See paragraph 58/1/3 of Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2022.

G. ANALYSIS

G(1) Could the further evidence not have been obtained at the hearing before the Master for summary judgment with reasonable diligence

15.  The Defendant’s explanation was set out in paragraphs 5 to 16 of the 2^nd Affirmation of Mr Rajesh Shahani. In essence, Mr Rajesh Shahani said the further evidence in RGS-12 and RGS-13 are WhatsApp messages missing from exhibit NC-1 of Mr Choksi’s 1^st Affirmation, which contained WhatsApp messages exchanged between Mr Choksi and Mr Rajesh Shahani. In essence only one explanation was given. Mr Rajesh Shahani said he did not check those messages exhibited by Mr Choksi in NC-1, because he assumed that those messages were complete but in fact not. He gave various reasons why he made the assumption: that Mr Choksi “would be honest and exhibit the complete conversion and not to cut things out”, that Mr “Choksi’s WhatsApp Record was in the format of a transcript (not in the form of WhatsApp screenshot interface, which made it less easy to cross-check), that he “was being naïve for [he] had trusted Mr Choksi as a close friend of [his] father (who [he] used to respect and trust as a family friend when [he] was young) would at least present his [Mr Choksi’s] evidence in a fair way”.

16.  Mr Rajesh Shahani said it was only until 20 May 2022, 12 days before this hearing and after Mr Ng, counsel for the Defendant who was instructed for this appeal after the summary judgment was granted, asked him during conference to check the accuracy of the WhatsApp messages in NC-1, that he “checked the chat box stored in my iPhone and was alarmed to find out for the first time that Choksi’s WhatsApp Record has been substantially doctored”.

17.  I haste to first point out that the Defendant’s accusation of “doctoring” evidence is serious. Without yet hearing any explanation from Mr Choksi, it would not be fair for me to comment.

18.  However, on the face of what Mr Rajesh Shahani said in his affirmation, it was plain that the Defendant has failed to show to the Court that the further evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence, for the following reasons:

(1) The further evidence (i.e. the missing WhatsApp messages according to Mr Rajesh Shahani) could have been obtained simply by comparing the complete record kept in Mr Rajesh Shahani’s mobile phone and the messages produced by Mr Choksi in NC-1. It is almost certain (if not certain) that the discrepancy would have been discovered.

(2) Mr Rajesh Shahani did not compare, nor did those representing him advise him to do so.

(3) During preparation for the hearing below, apparently Mr Rajesh Shahani did not recall that there was anything important or material in the WhatsApp messages exchanged between him and Mr Rajesh Shahani, or otherwise he would have or should have seen the need to check and ensure that the messages produced by Mr Choksi in NC-1 were complete and accurate record of what they have discussed.

(4) The Plaintiffs attached great importance to and extensively relied on various WhatsApp messages in NC-1, including those between Mr Rajesh Shahani and Mr Choksi, in their summary judgment application to show that the Defendant had repeatedly admitted liability towards the Plaintiff for the Money. In opposition to the application for summary judgment, faced with these contentions, it was really incumbent upon Mr Rajesh Shahani, and indeed those representing the Defendant, to check and confirm the completeness and accuracy of the record produced by Mr Choksi in NC-1.

(5) A very important contention of the Defendant’s defence (as summarised in paragraph 6 above) is that the Invoices are sham documents. The circumstance leading to, and the purpose for, the Defendant’s issuance of the Invoices were set out in section E, paragraphs 32-54 of Mr Rajesh Shahani’s first Affirmation filed on 20 December 2021. Whilst Mr Rajesh Shahani said Mr Choksi orally instructed him to issue the Invoices (paragraph 39 of the Affirmation), Mr Rajesh Shahani referred to text communications with Mr Choksi. For example, in paragraph 35 of the Affirmation, Mr Rajesh Shahani also referred to certain WhatsApp conversation with Mr Choksi in NC-1. As such, before Mr Rajesh Shahani sought to rely on those messages exhibited by his opposite side in NC-1, he should have checked, and could have checked, their contents, completeness and accuracy.

(6) In terms of time, there was plenty of it for Mr Rajesh Shahani and those representing the Defendant to check and identify the WhatsApp messages which they now contend to be important. The Plaintiffs commenced these proceedings on 28 December 2020. They applied for summary judgment on 29 October 2021. Mr Choksi’s 1^st Affirmation, which exhibited NC-1, was filed and served on 4 November 2021. Mr Rajesh Shahani’s Affirmation in opposition was filed on 20 December 2021. The hearing was heard before Master D. To on 28 January 2022. I could not say that the Defendant did not have sufficient time or opportunity to have been able to discover the further messages with reasonable diligence.

(7) Conversely, the further evidence was only exhibited by Mr Rajesh Shahani’s 2nd Affirmation on 26 May 2022, five days before this hearing. Again, I could not say that the Defendant could not have discovered the further evidence with reasonable diligence earlier, and indeed well in advance.

(8) As described in paragraph 16 above, Mr Rajesh Shahani mentioned at paragraph 8 of his 2^nd Affirmation that it was only in the conference of 20 May 2022 that Mr Felix Ng, the Defendant’s counsel asked him to check the accuracy of NC-1. As explained above, they should have been done, and could have been done, many months ago before the hearing before the Master. If Mr Rajesh Shahani had done so, with reasonable diligence, the further evidence should have and could have been obtained and produced before the Master.

19.  Therefore, the Defendant has failed to satisfy the first condition in Ladd v Marshall as set out in paragraph 12(1) above.

G(2) Does the fresh evidence have important influence on the outcome of this appeal?

20.  The fresh evidence sought to be adduced has been described in section E above. At the hearing, Mr Felix Ng for the Defendant fairly accepted that the further evidence now sought to be adduced by the Defendant could not by itself raise triable issue. Nonetheless, he submits that the following utterance by Mr Choksi in RGS-12 is influential to the outcome of this appeal because it provides support for the two propositions which I have already set out in paragraph 10(1) above:

“Okay. Sorry for that. Since this is a 17 year old matter I don’t want any doubts raised by the Auditors.”

As quoted in paragraph 10(1) above, before Mr Choksi mentioned this, Mr Rajesh Shahani (Rajesh) wrote that he would need some time “to redo all invoices to Shahaneys and print out” and that they would meet at 12 on that day (21 February 2020).

21.  I do not accept that Mr Choksi’s above mention (assuming that he did make such a mention) provides any support to the two propositions as suggested by Mr Ng.

22.  Firstly, there was no reference in the above mention what the “17 year old matter” was. The Defendant submits that it referred to the Alleged 2003/04 Loan. I do not accept. The mere mention of the words “17 year old matter” cannot in any way serve to evince that there was a loan, not to mention that the loan was derived from outstanding payments for certain machineries purchased by the 1^st Plaintiff from the Defendant in 2003 and 2004.

23.  Secondly, Mr Rajesh Shahani mentioned “redo all invoices to Shahaneys”. There was no mention on what the invoices were and why they needed to be redone. Moreover, if “Shahaneys” was intended to mean the Defendant (i.e. Shanhaneys (H.K.) Ltd), then Mr Rajesh Shahani would be saying that he would redo the invoices “to” the Defendant. Then from which company the invoices were issued? And why Mr Rajesh Shahani would redo invoices to be issued to the Defendant? On the other hand, if “Shahaneys” did not mean the Defendant, then to which company Mr Rajesh Shahani would address the invoices and on which company behalf? Further, there was no clue on what “redo” mean”. It could not be readily inferred from the word “redo” that sham invoices were to be prepared at the instruction of Mr Choksi, and there was nothing that could be drawn from here to show that invoices to be “redone” were the Invoices.

24.  All in all, in those few messages which the Defendant now seeks to adduce, nothing was mentioned on and no reference was made to the Alleged 2003/04 Loan and the Alleged Machinery Funding & Loan Agreement.

25.  For the above reasons, in my view, RGS-12 is a red herring. To assert that it provides support for the two propositions set out in paragraph 10(1) above is reading too much into it, or simply a misreading.

26.  RGS-13 seeks to introduce two pictures (and some additional messages as well) following the text message shared grey as set out in paragraph 10(2) above. In Mr Ng’s submission, these two pictures, together with the text message, show that when Mr Rajesh Shahani mentioned USD3 million, he was not referring to the payment that the Defendant should return to the Plaintiffs but the costs of raw materials for the mask-making business of Mr Gautam Shahani, Mr Rajesh Shahani’s brother. Mr Ng said it was in line with another reference to USD3 million for raw material by Mr Gautam Shahani in an earlier message to Mr Choksi on 16 March 2020.

27.  I do not consider RGS-13 helpful, and that it would have important influence on the outcome of the Defendant’s appeal against the summary judgment.

28.  Firstly, as submitted by Mr Keith Cheung, the Plaintiffs’ counsel, reading in context, I doubt whether the reference to USD 3 million really means the costs of raw materials for Mr Gautam Shahani’s mask-making business. The two pictured seem to depict a mask-making machine and its certain specifications. However, Mr Rajesh Shahani mentioned that, “I completed everything on 20 April 2020 for USD 3M. Now bank is just completing some AMA procedure. You will get good news tomorrow. …” There is no mention or reference or indication from which it can be said “USD 3M” in that sentence refers to the costs of raw material for Mr Gautam Shahani’s mask-making machines. It seems to me it is more likely to mean the money that the Defendant should return or promised to return to the Plaintiffs.

29.  Secondly, the Defendant say these messages are important evidence supporting its case. It is necessary to look at the words and the context objectively and see whether these messages do have strong influence on the Defendant’s success in this appeal, i.e. establishing triable issue. I do not consider these messages bear out what Mr Ng said they mean.

30.  Thirdly, in any event, the highest that the Defendant can put with regard to these messages in RGS-13 is that Mr Rajesh Shahani’s reference to USD 3 million was not an admission that the Defendant should pay or has promised to pay USD 3 million to the Plaintiffs. Even if this is accepted by the Court, in my view, they could not negate or diminish the effect of other pieces of evidence which serve to support the Plaintiffs’ case. Therefore, the probation value of RGS-13 is minute, and is not anywhere close to have any important influence on the result of this appeal.

31.  The failure to satisfy the first and second conditions as explained in sections G(1) and G(2) above have been sufficient for me to dispose of the Summons. For completeness, I shall briefly deal with the third condition in Ladd v Marshall.

G(3) Apparent credibility of RGS-12 and RGS-13

32.  The Defendant discovered the further evidence sought to be adduced at the eleventh hour before the appeal. Its solicitors wrote to the Plaintiffs’ solicitors enclosing the further evidence on 24 May 2022, only seven days before the appeal hearing. The summon for leave to adduce the further evidence was taken out on 26 May 2022, together with the filing and serving of Mr Rajesh Shahani’s 2^nd Affirmation in support.

33.  The Defendant asserts that there are substantial messages missing in the WhatsApp record produced in NC-1 by Mr Choksi, and the complete record of all the messages exchanged is attached to the letter from the Defendant’s solicitors to the Plaintiffs’ solicitors dated 24 May 2022 and exhibited as RGS-10, although the material messages are only those shown in RGS-12 and RGS-13.

34.  The Defendant expressly accuses the Plaintiffs of “doctoring” the WhatsApp messages. No doubt this is a very serious allegation which entitle the Plaintiffs to be given reasonable opportunity to reply. This should include a reasonable opportunity to verify the authenticity and completeness of the further evidence. Without this opportunity being given to the Plaintiffs, the Court is in no position to hold that the third condition in Ladd v Marshall has been satisfied.

G(4) Overall Context

35.  As mentioned above, Mr Choksi’s 1^st Affirmation, which exhibited the WhatsApp messages between Mr Rajesh Shahani and Mr Choksi (NC-1), was filed and served on 4 November 2021. Although it was suggested in Langdale v Danby above that the standard of diligence required of a defendant preparing his case in opposition to a summons for summary judgment, especially if under pressure of time, may not be so high as that required in preparing for trial, many months have indeed passed since the Defendant has had sight of the WhatsApp record which it now says incomplete and applies for leave to adduce the further evidence. This does not sit well with the litigation culture preferred by the Court since the introduction of the Civil Justice Reform in Hong Kong SAR, that parties should prepare their case properly prior to the hearing before a Master. And as explained in section G(1) above, it would be rather unjust to the Plaintiffs to allow the Defendant to introduce for the first time on appeal evidence which was readily available at the hearing of the Summons but was not produced, the sole reason of which is attributed to the Defendant’s own omission to check the accuracy and completeness of the WhatsApp record produced by the Plaintffs many months ago.

36.  Moreover, as noted in section G(2) above, the further evidence is incapable of raising a triable issue, and its probative value is, in my view, peripheral at best.

H. CONCLUSION & DISPOSAL OF THE SUMMONS

37.  Taking into account the overall context with all relevant factors, for the above reasons, the Summons should be dismissed.

38.  I make an order that the Summons be dismissed. Hence, there is no need for the Plaintiffs to file and serve evidence in reply.

39.  There is no reason why the costs of the Summons should not follow the event. I therefore order that the costs of the Summons be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiffs, the amount of which is to be assessed summarily on paper, with the following directions:

(1) The Plaintiffs file a statement of costs within 7 days from the date of this Decision.

(2) The Defendant file a statement of objection (if any) within 3 days thereafter.

(3) The Plaintiff file a reply to the statement of objection (if any) within 3 days thereafter.