RE IP CHI YUNG also known as RYAN IP

HCB 3285/2026 &
HCB 3286/2026
(Heard together)

[2026] HKCFI 4233

HCB 3285/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO 3285 OF 2026

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AND

HCB 3286/2026

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS NO 3286 OF 2026

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________________________

(Heard together)

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J U D G M E N T

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 I.  INTRODUCTION

1.  The petitioning debts, approximately HK$6.3 million, are the costs to be taxed ordered under Lok J (the “Trial Judge”)’s judgment of 28 March 2022 (the “Trial Judgment”)  handed down after trial in HCA 1659/2012 (the “Trial”), and the allocaturs for the taxed costs were issued on 26 November 2025 and 12 January 2026.  The Debtors oppose the Petitions, seeking an adjournment pending the appeal of HCA 1659/2012 in CACV 160/2022 (the “Appeal”), to be heard on 10 November 2026. 

2.  Mr Michael Ng, counsel for the Petitioner, seeks an immediate bankruptcy orders in the respective proceedings.

3.  Mr Ian Chau, counsel for the Debtors, opposes.  He applies for a stay of the Petitions or alternatively an adjournment of the Petitions pending the Appeal.  He submits that the Debtors “do not currently have the means to pay a meaningful portion of the petitioning debts”.  While this shows the insolvency of the Debtors, Mr Chau argues that such (alleged)  insolvency effectively arises from the erroneous findings in the Trial Judgment.  Mr Chau emphasises that the hearing of the Appeal is less than 4 months away.

4.  After all, I have to consider whether on a tentative assessment, there are reasonable prospects of success in the appeal: see Re Lau Wang Chi, Barry [2024] 3 HKLRD 118 at §50 and Re Tam Mei Kam, CACV 87/2012, 8 May 2013 at §25.  If the prospects are less than reasonable, there is no point staying or adjourning the Petitions pending such an appeal, especially when the Court has to bear in mind that a bankruptcy petition is a class action and has to bear all the creditors’ (not just the petitioners’)  interests in mind.

 II.  GROUNDS OF APPEAL

5.  The Notice of Appeal for the Appeal contains 28 grounds or paragraphs.  In his submissions, Mr Chau only seeks to address me on Grounds (or paragraph)  2(e), 4 and 9.  These Grounds, as well as the other Grounds, have been considered by the Court of Appeal (Kwan VP and Yuen JA)  in the judgment handed down on 25 September 2023 (the “CA Judgment”)  dismissing the application to stay the execution of the Trial Judgment.  Mr Chau appears to submit that her Ladyships’ view expressed in the CA Judgment would not assist me because (1)  no oral arguments were heard but only written submissions with 10-page-limit were made; and (2)  the threshold for a stay application was “strong” rather than reasonable prospects of success.  With respect, I am unable to accept Mr Chau’s submissions.

6.  First, her Ladyships specifically stated in §17.2 of the CA Judgment that they did not see the need to direct an oral hearing despite the appellants’ request.  This means that her Ladyships thought it was appropriate to deal with the matter on paper, and in such circumstances, I can see no reason why less regard should be paid to the CA Judgment.  The submissions that there were page limits seem to suggest that no full argument had been made, but for the purpose of determining whether there were strong merits, and similarly for the present purpose to determine whether there are reasonable prospects of success, the Court of Appeal is of course experienced enough to deal with the same on paper, and always has the option to direct an oral hearing if, having read the written submissions, it would think that disposal on paper would somehow be unfair. 

7.  Second, while the threshold for a stay application was strong, I have gratefully considered their Ladyships’ analysis of the merits, and come to the conclusion for the present purpose that not only the Appeal is not strong, but that the prospects of the Appeal are less than reasonable.  Specifically:-

(1)  For Grounds 2(e)  and 9, §21 of the CA Judgment already explained that “it is well-established that subsequent acts are admissible to show whether there was a contract, although not to construe the terms thereof.” Therefore, the prospects of Grounds 2(e)  and 9 complaining that the Trial Judge erroneously considered subsequent acts are, in my view, not only not strong, but even less than reasonable.

(2)  For Ground 4, §§20 and 22 of the CA Judgment already explained that the Trial Judge had seen and heard the witnesses and made the relevant fact-findings.  It is within the purview of the Trial Judge and unless the fact-findings are plainly wrong, the appellate court would not disturb the fact-findings.  In my view, the prospects of Ground 4 are also less than reasonable.

8.  Mr Chau has not made submissions on the merits of the other Grounds of Appeal.  While the burden is on the Debtors to explain the merits of the Grounds in order to persuade me that there are reasonable prospects of success in the Appeal, I take upon myself to consider the other Grounds.  The other Grounds are, in my view, also grounds on fact-findings.  Having considered the Trial Judgment in detail, I am of the view that the prospects of the other Grounds are also less than reasonable.

9.  Although Mr Chau submits that the Trial Judge erroneously applied Nirmal Singh Chahal v Krishan Dev Mahal, Pooja Deol (nee Lynda Mahal) [2004] EWHC 2859 (Ch)  at §129 of the Trial Judgment (mentioned in Ground 9 of the Grounds of Appeal), that case, in my view, does not stand for any rigid legal principles but simply serves an example of fact-findings. 

10.  Mr Chau also submits that the Trial was not easy to decide, stressing that the Trial Judge made findings on balance of probabilities and thus apparently suggesting that the Court of Appeal may readily turn the tide.  However, in my view, where the fact-findings are, so to speak, 50-50, this would only mean that the threshold of plainly wrong for a successful appeal on facts would not be easy to pass.

11.  After all, the fact-findings were findings the Trial Judge, having seen and heard the witnesses and considered all the other relevant evidence, were able to make: see CA Judgment §19.1. 

12.  In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the prima facie evidence of indebtedness arising from the Trial Judgment has been rebutted.

 III.  CONCLUSION

13.  As a matter of case-management, I have considered whether I should adjourn the Petitions given that the Appeal is to be heard in November 2026, especially that the present hearing is the first hearing of the Petitions before Judge.  However, given (1)  the Debtors’ own admission that they have no means even to pay any meaningful portion of the petitioning debts as security for any adjournment (and on this, Mr Chau confirms to me that he has no instructions to offer any undertaking as to security); (2)  the less-than-reasonable prospects of the Appeal; (3)  the creditors’ interests; and (4)  that an approximately 3-4 month time (not including the Court of Appeal’s time to deliberate the judgment)  is not a short period of time, the better course for me to take is not to adjourn the Petitions even as a matter of case-management decision.

14.  It remains for me to say that any bankruptcy order would not stifle the Appeal, because the trustees-in-bankruptcy would be entitled to carry on the Appeal if they think fit: see Toeca National Resources BV v Baron Capital Ltd [2013] 5 HKLRD 178 at §17.

15.  In the circumstances, I make the usual bankruptcy order.

16.  I thank Mr Ng and Mr Chau for their assistance.