CHAN SUN JUDY v. QIN XIAOJIAN, the sole administrator of the estate of CHAN WAI HING ALEXANDER, deceased

HCMP 2396/2024

[2025] HKCFI 5225

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 2396 OF 2024

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HCMP 142/2025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 142 OF 2025

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J U D G M E N T

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INTRODUCTION

1.  These 2 actions concern the estate of the late Chan Wai Hing Alexander (“the Estate”), in respect of which Qin Xiao Jian (“the Widow”), the widow of the Deceased, has been appointed as the sole administratrix by virtue of the Letters of Administration granted on 16 February 2024 (“the Letters of Administration”).

2.  The first set of proceedings (HCMP 2396/2024)  (“the 2396 Proceedings”)  was commenced by Chan Sun Judy (“Judy”), the Deceased’s daughter (born out of his first marriage), on 15 November 2024.

3.  The second set of proceedings (HCMP 142/2025)  (“the 142 Proceedings”)  was started by Chen Taocheng (“Taocheng”)  who alleged to be a son of the Deceased born out of wedlock subsequently on 23 January 2025.

4.  Both actions are commenced primarily for the purpose of obtaining an order of removal of the Widow as the administratrix of the Estate (“the Applications”).  Hence, by virtue of an order dated 7 May 2025, these actions have been ordered to be heard together.

BACKGROUND OF THE APPLICATIONS

5.  The Deceased married one Gu Wangjiang (also known as Kuk Mong Kong)  (谷望江)  in 1970 and they had a daughter (Judy).  The couple divorced in 1991.

6.  According to Taocheng’s evidence, he was born in 1989, out of the relationship between his mother and the Deceased who were cohabitees since around 1987. 

7.  On 14 March 1998, the Deceased and the Widow had a son, Chan Kwun Shing (“Kwun Shing”), who is the 2^nd defendant in the 142 Proceedings.

8.  In 2003, the Deceased got married with the Widow.

9.  Prior to marrying the Deceased, the Widow had a daughter from her previous marriage, Chen Miaoxiang (“Miaoxiang”).

10.  The Deceased died intestate on 29 July 2023.

11.  As aforesaid, the Widow was granted the Letters of Administration in February 2024.

12.  It is undisputed that:

(1)  The Estate’s main asset is the 199,999 shares (or 99.9% shareholding)  in Multi-Sources Industrial Limited (“the HK Company”), of which the Widow and Kwun Shing were at all material times the directors;

(2)  At the time when the Deceased passed away, the HK Company held at least 5 landed properties situated in Hong Kong, namely:

(a)  Office No. 1612 on 16^th Floor of Tower 1, Silvercord, No. 30 Canton Road, Kowloon (“the Silvercord 1612 Property”);

(b)  Flat A, 17^th Floor & Car Parking Space No. 31 on 3^rd Floor, Yukon Heights, No. 21 Tai Hang Road, Hong Kong (“the Yukon 17A Property”);

(c)  Flat A, 18^th Floor & Car Parking Space No. 40 on 3^rd Floor, Yukon Heights, No. 21 Tai Hang Road, Hong Kong (“the Yukon 18A Property”);

(d)  Flat A on 20^th Floor & Car Parking Space No. 20 on 2^nd Floor, Yukon Heights, No. 21 Tai Hang Road, Hong Kong (“the Yukon 20A Property”);

(e)  Flat D on 21^st Floor and the Flat Roof Appertaining Thereto Golden Dragon Building Nos. 41-51 Tang Lung Street, Hong Kong (“the Golden Dragon Property”).

(3)  According to the land registration records, the first 4 properties mentioned above had been caused to be sold by the Widow and Kwun Shing:

(a)  The Silvercord 1612 Property was sold on 24 April 2024 to the Widow herself.  The sale price was stated to be $21.5 million;

(b)  The Yukon 17A Property was sold on 24 April 2024 to Miaoxiang.  The sale price was stated to be $19 million;

(c)  The Yukon 18A Property was sold on 24 April 2024 to Kwun Shing.  The sale price was stated to be $19.2 million;

(d)  The Yukon 20A Property was sold on 24 April 2024 to the Widow herself.  The sale price was stated to be $19.5 million.

(collectively, “the Transactions”)

(4)  According to the land registration records, the Golden Dragon Property was sold on 9 April 2025 to a To & Campbell Limited.  The sale price was stated to be $3.2 million.

13.  The Applications have been made on the basis of, inter alia, the Transactions.

THE WIDOW’S STANCE

14.  On 19 December 2024, the Widow filed an affirmation in opposition to the 2396 Proceedings (“the Widow’s 1^st Affirmation”).  As far as the Transactions are concerned, the Widow explained that:

(1)  In around June 2023, the Deceased was urgently in need of cash flow for the purpose of certain investment projects in the Mainland;

(2)  As a result, the Deceased contacted Earnings Machines Limited (“the BVI Company”)  for an urgent loan;

(3)  At the instruction of the Deceased, the Widow (as a director of the HK Company)  executed a loan agreement on behalf of the HK Company with the BVI Company on 6 July 2023 (“the Loan Agreement”), pursuant to which the BVI Company lent HK$80 million (“the Loan”)  to the HK Company for a period of 22 days (from 6 July 2023 to 28 July 2023)  at the annual rate of interest of 8%;

(4)  As the HK Company was unable to repay the Loan upon the expiry of the 22 days’ period, the repayment period was extended to 6 March 2024 by consent;

(5)  As the HK Company was still unable to repay the Loan after the expiry of the extended period, the BVI Company commenced a legal action at the Court of First Instance against the HK Company (HCA 583/2024)  (“the HCA Action”), which was subsequently settled by virtue of a settlement agreement dated 22 April 2024 (“the Settlement Agreement”), pursuant to which the HK Company was obliged to transfer the sale proceeds obtained from the Transactions to the BVI Company’s designated account in the Mainland;

(6)  The HK Company then sold 4 out of the 5 aforementioned properties for the purpose of repaying the Loan.  The buyers of those properties were the Widow herself, her son and her daughter, because they were the only people who were willing to purchase those properties at the time;

(7)  Those properties were sold at market price.

15.  However, in the Widow’s 2^nd Affirmation filed on 29 April 2025 in the 2396 Proceedings (which was nearly identical to another affirmation which was filed by her on the same day in the 142 Proceedings), the Widow asked to “withdraw” her 1^st Affirmation on the basis that she had not received legal advice at the material time, and as a result she did not have clear understanding on legal concepts concerning “estate” and “debt”.

16.  In the Widow’s 2^nd Affirmation, she no longer referred to the Loan Agreement nor the Transactions.  On the other hand, she treated as if the Silvercord 1612 Property, the Yukon 17A Property, the Yukon 18A Property and the Yukon 20A Property had never been sold by the HK Company, and referred to the total value of these properties as part of the “現時遺產的估值”.  On the above basis, she estimated that the total net value of the Estate is about $70 million, and as a result, she anticipated that Judy and Taocheng[1] would be entitled to around $11.58 million each from the Estate.

17.  According to the Widow’s 2^nd Affirmation, the grounds of opposition of the Applications are that:

(1)  It would be a waste of time and money to appoint professional administrator as the composition of the Estate is simple and it does not worth a lot of money;

(2)  There is no need to appoint any professional administrator because the administration of the Estate is a simple matter, which may be completed upon the sale of the Silvercord 1612 Property which has been valued at $21.5 million;

(3)  It is undesirable to appoint a professional administrator who may sell the HK Company and all the properties held thereby, which are something which the Deceased treasured much.

TAOCHENG’S LOCUS

18.  Before I turn to the substantive merit of the Applications, I would deal with 2 preliminary points raised by the Widow first.

19.  The first point concerns the locus standi of Taocheng in bringing the 142 Proceedings.

20.  The Widow alleged that she had never heard of the existence of Taocheng before and therefore his biological connection with the Deceased is not admitted.

21.  For the above reason, her counsel submitted on her behalf that Taocheng had no locus to commence the 142 Proceedings.

22.  This argument may be disposed of quickly.

23.  Section 33(3)  of the Probate and Administration Ordinance (Cap.10, Laws of Hong Kong)  (“the Ordinance”)  provides that:

“The court may, if satisfied that the due and proper administration of the estate and the interests of the persons beneficially entitled thereto so require, suspend or remove an executor or administrator (other than the Official Administrator)  and provide for the succession of another person in place of such executor or administrator and for the vesting in that other person of any property belonging to the estate.”

24.  In Tristram & Coote’s Probate Practice (32^nd Edition), the learned author stated at paragraph 28.1 that:

“The foundation of title to be a party to a probate claim is interest – so that whenever it can be shown that it is competent to the court to make a decree in a claim for probate or administration, or for the revocation of probate or of administration, which may affect the interest, or possible interest, of any person, such person has a right to be party to such a suit.”

25.  On the above basis, it was submitted by Mr Martin Ho for Taocheng that it is adequate for Taocheng to show that it is possible that he has an interest in the Estate for him to have locus to commence the 142 Proceedings.  In other words, it is sufficient for Taocheng to establish that it is possible that he is indeed a son of the Deceased as far as locus is concerned. 

26.  While Ms Tang for the Widow accepted that that was all Taocheng had to show so as to have the necessary standing to make the present application, she argued that he had failed to pass the threshold. 

27.  With respect, Ms Tang’s submission must be rejected:

(1)  It is undisputed that the parties in the 2396 Proceedings and the 142 Proceedings were all parties to a court action in the Mainland (“the Mainland Proceedings”)  in which 2 DNA reports had been adduced as evidence (“the DNA Reports”), and that both reports came to the conclusion that Taocheng is a biological son of the Deceased;

(2)  The DNA Reports are admissible hearsay evidence herein by virtue of section 47(1)  of the Evidence Ordinance (Cap.8, Laws of Hong Kong)  and Order 38 rule 36(2)  of the Rules of the High Court[2] (Cap.4A, Laws of Hong Kong);

(3)  On the strength of the DNA Reports, there is no question that it must be possible that Taocheng is a biological son of the Deceased. 

28.  Indeed, Ms Tang accepted at the hearing that it is possible that Taocheng is a biological son of the Deceased.  That being the case, with greatest respect, it is difficult to understand why Ms Tang still thought fit to challenge the standing of Taocheng to commence the 142 Proceedings.

29.  To conclude, I accept that Taocheng has the locus required to commence the 142 Proceedings.

DUPLICITY OF PROCEEDINGS

30.  It can be seen that 2 separate actions have been commenced for the same purpose of removing the Widow as the administratrix of the Estate. 

31.  This was caused by the refusal on the part of Judy to join Taocheng as a party in the 2396 Proceedings, which in turn, as explained by Mr Kwan, was attributed to Judy’s worry that the proposed joinder would delay the disposal of the 2396 Proceedings.

32.  With greatest respect, while the proposed joinder would indeed lead to delay of the resolution of the 2396 Proceedings, this does not justify Judy’s refusal to join Taocheng, for this would amount to a breach of the requirement set out in paragraph 45 of Practice Direction 20.2 which provides that:

“Every administrator of the estate (if a grant has been obtained), all persons having a beneficial interest in the estate, residuary beneficiaries (unless numerous)  should be joined as a party, unless their written consent to the application is available.”

33.  Be that as it may, I do not think this Court should dismiss the 142 Proceedings as advocated by the Widow, as this would only lead to further delay of the resolution of the whole matter.  Further costs would also have to be incurred unnecessarily.

34.  The most that the Widow may say is that, in the event she is unable to oppose the Applications successfully, she should not bear the entirety of the 2 sets of costs.  I will deal with this matter at the end of this Judgment if required.

APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES ON REMOVAL OF ADMINISTRATOR

35.  The statutory basis for the Court to remove an administrator is provided by section 33(3)  of the Ordinance (see [23] above).

36.  The court’s discretion under section 33(3)  of the Ordinance has been summarised in Law Wai Hay v Law Po Chong Priscilla [2021] HKCFI 3017 at [28]:

“(1)  The discretion to remove an administratrix under section 33 of the [Probate and Administration Ordinance] involves an assessment and a value judgement in all the relevant circumstances of whether removal is required for the due and proper administration of the estate and the interests of the beneficiaries.

(2)  Not every mistake or neglect of duty, or inaccuracy of conduct of trustees will induce to court to remove the administratrix.

(3)  The acts or omissions must be such as to endanger the trust property or to show a want of honesty, or want of proper capacity to execute the duties, or a want of reasonable fidelity.

(4)  Hostility between the administratrix and the beneficiary is not a ground for removal, unless the breakdown of the relations between them is such as to lead to the administration coming to a standstill, or makes it difficult or impossible for the administration to be completed by an existing personal representative.

[Tsang Wing Kwai v Tsang Wing Fai (No 2)[2019] 1 HKLRD 1300 (CA); Tsang Wing Kwai v Tsang Wing Fai [2018] HKCFI 1060 (CFI), §§27-32; Chang Wing Ka John v Chang Wing Dee [2021] HKCFI 47, §§157-160].”

37.  In Chang Wing Ka John v Chang Wing Dee & Another [2021] HKCFI 47, DHCJ To further explained the legal principles on the removal of administrators under section 33(3)  of the Ordinance as follows:

“159. In exercising its discretion, the court should have regard to the size of the estate, the nature of the assets that need to be administered, the background and education, training and experience of the remaining and substituted personal representatives and the interests of the beneficiaries: see Wong Tat Lun Eddie & Ors v Wong Chi Ho Jimmy & Ors [HCMP 2391/2013 (unreported), 21 October 2014 at §72]. The view of the majority beneficiaries is a relevant factor: see Chan Yu Hong v Chan Kam Hong [HCMP 888/2013 (unreported), 19 July 2017 at §108, per B Chu J]. The discretion is to be exercised with great caution and sparingly. In general, removal of a representative is not to be preferred unless the administration is still far from completion:Chan Yu Hong [Supra at §33 per B Chu J]. The courts are reluctant to exercise the discretion where the incumbent executor or administrator wishes to carry on, without allowing that incumbent an opportunity to repair or remedy any defects and progress promptly with due administration. The fact that administration of the estate could have been done better is not of itself sufficient ground:Wong Tat Lun Eddie & Ors [Supra at §85 per DHCJ B Chu (as she then was)]. Hostility between the trustee and beneficiaries as such is not a ground for removal of the trustee, unless the breakdown of relations between them is such as to lead to the administration coming to a standstill, or makes it difficult or impossible for the administration to be completed by an existing personal representative: Chan Sau Heung v Kwan Siu Fai [HCMP 2620/2012 (unreported), 17 April 2013 at 15, per Poon J (as he then was)]; Re Estate of Kwan Chung [[2013] 6 HKC 29]; Jones v Firkin-Flood [[2008] EWHC 2417 (Ch)].”

38.  Both plaintiffs herein relied on the rule against self-dealing which has been examined by B Chu J in Ng, Rose Kai Ching & Others v Liang Yum Shing Howard& Another [2023] HKCFI 1867 as follows:

“129. The self-dealing rule has also been explained at paragraph 46-008 of Lewin on Trusts (20^th Edition) as follows:

‘A trustee is disabled from purchasing the trust property … The rule was developed because a person who undertakes to act for another in any matter cannot, in the same matter, act for himself. The situation of a trustee gives him an opportunity of knowing the value of the property, and, as he acquires that knowledge at the expense of the beneficiary, he is bound to apply it for the beneficiary’s benefit. The rule, now often called the self-dealing rule, is based not only upon the consideration that a trustee cannot be both seller and buyer… but also on the wider principle that a trustee must not put himself in a position where there is conflict or possible conflict between his interest and duty. Moreover, unless there are exceptional circumstances, the court will not entertain any inquiry as to whether the trustee did in fact take any advantage of his situation, for the fact that he held the office of trustee and might possibly have had the means of taking advantage of his situation suffices to make him subject to the rule. The rule is thus a severe one which applies however honest the circumstances, even though the price is fair and irrespective of whether any profit is made by the trustee. Where the rule applies, the trustee and his successors in title (other than a bona fide purchaser for value of a legal estate for value without notice)  take a voidable title on the authorities as they stand, and any beneficiary whose claim is not barred by concurrence or delay is entitled to have the transaction set aside ex debito justitiae. This may, however, be more a rule of practice than an absolute rule of law.’ (emphasis added)

[…]

132.  Mr Lam had further submitted that the rule precludes not merely the purchase by a fiduciary personally but extends also to his nominee company or a company in which he is controlling shareholder and director, given the conflict of interest with his duty as trustee, and in this respect, the Court was referred to 46-023 of Lewin on Trusts, which sets out as follows:

‘A sale by a trustee to a ‘one man’ company formed by the trustee for the purpose of the sale, and in effect the alter ego of the trustee, is within the self-dealing rule. A self-dealing transaction in favour of a company of which the trustee is a substantial shareholder and managing director has also been held to be within the self-dealing rule, for even though the company may have a genuine separate identity from the trustee, nonetheless there is a conflict between the duty of the trustee as such and his duty as director of the company. But where the purchase is a company in which the trustee is a small minority shareholder the transaction, though considered suspect, may be justified by showing that the consideration was adequate at the time, even though a better price might have been obtained by postponing the sale, but the weight of authority suggests that the strict self-dealing rule applies to such a purchase, unless the shareholding is so small that it can as a practical matter be disregarded. …..’ ”

DISCUSSION

Removal of the Widow as administratrix of the Estate

39.  At the outset, I should point out that, once an affidavit/affirmation has been filed, it cannot be “withdrawn” as such on the basis that the deponent/affirmant has had a change of mind as to what he/she would like to adduce as evidence. In the event he/she finds that there was any mistake made in a previous affidavit/affirmation, it is up to him/her to file another affidavit/affirmation to make necessary correction(s)  with reasons as to why the mistake was made in the first place. It is then up to the Court to consider the weight which should be given to the deponent/affirmant’s evidence (both generally and the evidence which was said to have contained mistake(s)).

40.  In the present case, the Widow stated that she would like to withdraw her 1^st Affirmation because she was not legally advised at the material time.  With respect, this cannot be an acceptable reason to disregard the evidence filed in her 1^st Affirmation, because it is trite that an affirmation should only contain factual matters rather than legal arguments.  Although I can understand that the lack of legal advice might lead to the omission of relevant evidence and inclusion of irrelevant evidence, I cannot see how the availability of legal advice would have any bearing on the correctness of factual matters (for example, the existence of the Loan Agreement and the Transactions in the present case). 

41.  I therefore take the view that the Court should not disregard the Widow’s 1^st Affirmation in the deliberation of the Applications.

42.  Adopting the above approach, I have no hesitation to conclude that this is a clear case in which the Widow should be removed as the administratrix of the Estate for the due and proper administration of the Estate and for the protection of the interests of the beneficiaries.

43.  First, according to the Widow’s 1^st Affirmation, the Silvercord 1612 Property and the Yukon 20A Property had been sold to herself.  This is in clear breach of the self-dealing rule, even if those properties had been sold at market price.  This is so even though those properties were held only indirectly by the Deceased through the HK Company because the conflict of interest must still exist given the value of the shareholdings in the HK Company (which are properties of the Estate)  must be affected by the sale of those properties.  This is a weighty factor to be taken into account.

44.  Second, the fact that the Transactions had taken place is a matter which is not only a factual assertion made in the Widow’s 1^st Affirmation but reflected by legal documents which have been formally executed and registered at the Lands Registry.  Hence, this is something which has to be sorted out further, and cannot be treated as if they had not taken place simply by the Widow “withdrawing” her 1^st Affirmation.

45.  Given the Widow’s involvement in the matter, she apparently is not an appropriate person to be entrusted with the resolution of the issues concerning the Transactions.

46.  Third, as a related matter, the contradictory evidence given by the Widow on the existence of the Transactions has rendered it necessary to look into the proprietary of those alleged transactions and the documents executed.

47.  In fact, the more the Widow said about it, the more puzzled other bystanders (including this Court)  have become in relation to what had actually happened while the Widow was the sole administratrix of the Estate.  This is not helped by her submissions as follows:

“[The Widow and Kwun Shing] had neither deprived the ‘trust’ or the Deceased’s Estate of any asset or obtained any advantage. The Properties being sold were still part of the pool of assets of the Deceased’s Estate for [the Widow]’s calculations of the account of the Estate. None of the beneficiaries’ interests was prejudiced in [the Widow]’s administration of the Deceased’s Estate.”

48.  If the sale proceeds of the Transactions have already been used to repay the BVI Company pursuant to the Settlement Agreement (as a result of which the HCA Action was settled), how can the Transactions be “reversed” as the Widow seems to be suggesting?  Does it mean that no money has ever changed hand in the Transactions in the first place? 

49.  The above matters are apparently subject to further investigation, particularly when there is suggestion that Miaoxiang is in fact the sole director of the BVI Company.

50.  In these circumstances, the Widow simply cannot be a suitable person to discharge the duty to investigate.

51.  Fourth, as submitted by Ms Tang for the Widow, the continuation of the administration of the Estate would involve the “return” by the Widow, Kwun Shing and Miaoxiang of the properties concerned to the HK Company.  While the Widow alleged through counsel that she was in a position to procure such return by Miaoxiang (of the Yukon 17A Property), it is noted that Miaoxiang is not a party to either of the proceedings herein, nor has she made any affirmation for the purpose of confirming that she is willing to return the said property.  That being the case, the Widow has not satisfied the Court that she has any authority to express Miaoxiang’s stance at all.  In the event Miaoxiang is not cooperative in the process, the Widow will be caught in a conflict of interest position if she remains the sole administratrix of the Estate.

52.  Fifth, there may well be conflict of interest even on the Widow’s and Kwun Shing’s own case.

53.  In their written submissions, it was argued that:

“27(1)  […] [The Widow and Kwun Shing] are the directors of the Company. As such, it would be within their power to decide how the Company was to enter into dealings. Importantly, [The Widow] is simultaneously the sole administrator of the Deceased’s Estate. [The Widow]’s dual role necessitate that: -

i. She owes duties to the Company, where the Deceased’s Estate holds shares in.

ii. She owes duties to the beneficiaries of the Deceased’s Estate.

27(2)  Hence, any decision to be taken by [the Widow] must cater to both duties at the same time. […]”[3]

(emphasis added)

54.  To say the least, the aforesaid “dual role” may lead to conflict of interest.

Identity of the new administrator 

55.  Having reached the above conclusion, the next issue is the identity of the administrator who should replace the Widow.

56.  All parties, except Taocheng, agreed that in the event the Widow is removed, an independent administrator should be appointed.

57.  For Taocheng, his counsel informed this Court that his primary position is that he should be appointed given the Estate appears to consist only of shares in the HK Company and limited bank balances.

58.  With greatest respect, this suggestion is unrealistic, given Taocheng’s status as the Deceased’s biological son is still not admitted by all beneficiaries of the Estate.  It is therefore possible that there will be conflict of interest if he is appointed.

59.  The appointment of an independent administrator is hence unavoidable in the present case. 

60.  Judy suggested that a certified public accountant should be appointed because there is a need to investigate into various matters including:

(1)  the accounts to be produced by the Widow;

(2)  the investment projects in the Mainland which the Widow alleged that the Deceased had engaged in;

(3)  the circumstances under which the Loan was made;

(4)  the alleged liabilities owed by the Deceased.  

61.  Judy therefore proposed that either Mr Wong Kwok Keung or Mr Osman Arab should be chosen.

62.  On the other hand, Taocheng submitted that a solicitor should be more appropriate in the present case, and he proposed to appoint Mr Wong Tak Shing who is a practising solicitor.

63.  While the Widow agreed (in the event she is replaced)  that a solicitor should be appointed, she put forward Mr Ng Kin Yuen for the Court’s consideration.

64.  On my part, I have serious doubts as to whether there is anything to investigate into in relation to the alleged investments in the Mainland, particularly when most of the alleged projects were said to have been done in the 1990s.  Indeed, according to the Widow’s latest affirmation, the HK Company did not have much business activities other than holding landed properties and earning rental income (“倍源沒有甚麼商業活動，主要是持有物業和收租”[4]). It should also be noted that the Widow had not referred to those alleged investments in the Mainland in her Affirmations filed in April 2025.

65.  Even if there is any such alleged investments, it would probably be necessary to appoint a professional in the Mainland for the purpose of such investigation. 

66.  In relation to the accounts to be produced and the alleged liabilities owed by the Deceased, there is no evidence that such matters are complicated. 

67.  Hence, having regard to the nature of the possible disputes, I am of the view that it is more appropriate to appoint a solicitor to be the independent administrator of the Estate in the present case.  

68.  Out of the candidates put forward by the parties, I am of the view that Mr Wong Tak Shing should be appointed, purely because the fee quoted by him is more attractive.

69.  I therefore make the following orders in both Applications:

(1)  The Letters of Administration (Grant No. HCAG 18855/2023)  in respect of the Estate granted to Qin Xiao Jian be revoked.

(2)  Qin Xiao Jian be removed as the administratrix of the Estate, and Mr Wong Tak Shing (“the Independent Administrator”)  be appointed as the administrator of the Estate in her place.

(3)  The Letters of Administration shall be lodged by Qin Xiao Jian with the Probate Registry within 14 days of this Judgment.

(4)  Qin Xiao Jian as administratrix of the Estate do furnish the Independent Administrator with a true and perfect inventories and accounts of the Estate (“the Inventories and Accounts”)  and her dealings of the assets upon the grant of the Letters of Administration up to the date of this Judgment with all supporting documents by way of an affirmation within 28 days from the date of this Judgment.

(5)  Simultaneous upon the furnishing of the Inventories and Accounts, Qin Xiao Jian do deliver to the Independent Administrator, and allow the Independent Administrator to retain, the original copies of all supporting documents in relation to the Inventories and Accounts.

(6)  A fresh grant of Letters of Administration of the Estate be issued to the Independent Administrator upon compliance with the usual procedures required by the Registrar of the Probate Registry.

(7)  All the assets of the Estate be vested in the Independent Administrator as administrator of the Estate upon the issuance of the fresh grant of Letters of Administration pursuant to the preceding paragraph.

(8)  Qin Xiao Jian do deliver up to the Independent Administrator all assets, monies, proceeds and documents of the Estate within 28 days of this Judgment.

COSTS

70.  As a matter of principle, costs should follow the event.

71.  The slight complication as far as cost herein is concerned is that Judy should have joined Taocheng as a party in the 2396 Proceedings.  As a result of the non-joinder, Taocheng had to commence a separate action himself. 

72.  Having said that, I take the tentative view that not much duplicated work has been caused as a result. 

73.  Ms Tang has drawn my attention to the fact that the Widow has to file 2 separate affirmations in the 2 sets of proceedings and that has led to extra costs.  This may be so.  However, in my view, given the Widow’s way in the conduct of these proceedings, she would have to file further evidence to support her stance on Taocheng’s lack of locus anyway even if Taocheng were to be added as a party to the 2396 Proceedings.  There was therefore no “extra work” as such.  As to the other part of the Widow’s affirmation filed in the 142 Proceedings, she could have simply referred to her own 2^nd Affirmation filed in the 2396 Proceedings.  The duplication of work is thus minimal.  The same applies to the costs of perusal of the documents filed in the 142 Proceedings. 

74.  Ms Tang also argued that she had to lodge two sets of submissions in light of the fact that there are 2 cases.  With respect, this argument is misconceived, because there was nothing which stopped her from lodging one single set of submissions covering both Applications, particularly when many of the issues involved are common to both actions.

75.  The only “extra” cost which had been incurred by reason of the separate action seems to me to be Taocheng’s costs of filing the Originating Summons in the 142 Proceedings.  Given Judy’s involvement in the Mainland Proceedings, it is indisputable that she has had knowledge of Taocheng’s potential claim as the Deceased’s son and the content of the DNA Reports.  In my view, it is unreasonable for her not to join Taocheng as a party in the 2396 Proceedings, not to mention refusing to join him as such despite his express request. 

76.  I therefore take the tentative view that the filing fee of the Originating Summons in the 142 Proceedings together with the costs of correspondences between Judy’s solicitors and Taocheng’s solicitors should be borne by Judy.

77.  For the above reasons, I make the following costs order nisi:

(1)  Judy shall bear the following costs:

(a)  The filing fee of the Originating Summons in the 142 Proceedings;

(b)  Taocheng’s costs of correspondences between Judy’s solicitors and his solicitors.

(2)  Subject to paragraph (1)  above, Qin Xiao Jian shall bear Judy’s costs of the 2396 Proceedings personally, to be taxed on party and party basis if not agreed.

(3)  Subject to paragraph (1)  above, Qin Xiao Jian and Chan Kwun Shing shall bear Judy’s costs of the 142 Proceedings personally, to be taxed on party and party basis if not agreed.

(4)  Subject to paragraph (1)  above, Qin Xiao Jian and Chan Kwun Shing shall bear Taocheng’s costs of the 142 Proceedings personally, to be taxed on party and party basis if not agreed.

78.  The above order nisi shall become absolute in the absence of application to vary (which, if any, will be disposed of on paper)  within 14 days hereof.