RE BARUA SAJU alias CHOUDHARY ANIMESH BIMOL

CACV 280/2025, [2026] HKCA 1414

On Appeal From [2025] HKCA 1073

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 280 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 2979 OF 2019)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 26 May 2026, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal out of time against this court’s judgment of 11 December 2025 (“the Judgment”) ([2025] HKCA 1073).  In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge To (“the Judge”) dated 28 April 2025, by which the Judge refused his application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2025] HKCFI 1714).

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment.  We will not repeat them here.  After reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.

3.  Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484) (“the HKCFAO”) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

4.  Pursuant to section 24(2) of the HKCFAO, an appellant has 28 days from the date of the Judgment to seek leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  In the present case, the deadline for the applicant to seek leave to appeal against the Judgment fell on 8 January 2026.  Accordingly, the applicant was over 4.5 months late in taking out his application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.

5.  In his Notice of Motion, the applicant stated:

“With due respect and humble request to review my appeal and the claim, because I do not agree with the decision of the Court and the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board. The all the decisions are made by the decision maker simply. No decision makers did scrutinize my claim properly. My problem is very severe in my home country and if I return there I will be killed by my enemies.” (sic)

6.  In his supporting affirmation dated 26 May 2026, the applicant stated:

“… I did not receive the decision from the Court, it is out of time to apply the Notice of Motion, so according to the procedure of law I need to make an affirmation for the time extension of this application.” (sic)

7.  Pursuant to Practice Direction 2.1, the applicant lodged written submissions on 8 June 2026.  In those submissions, he reiterated the factual and procedural background of his non-refoulement claim and submitted that the Judge erred in failing to consider the principles of irrationality, procedural unfairness, the high standards of fairness and had reviewed the matter lightly.  He reiterated that he would face hardship upon returning to his home country as his enemies would kill him and that the Board had significantly relied on news that was not officially recognised, or was hearsay.  He also complained that the Board’s Decision was irrational in that the Board failed to evaluate whether there was a consistent pattern of gross and mass violation of human rights in his home country and whether state protection existed.

8.  At the outset, the applicant’s delay of over 4.5 months was extremely substantial and he failed to provide any reason, let alone any good and sufficient reason, to explain his delay.  The Court’s record shows that the Judgment was sent to the applicant on 11 December 2025 to his last reported address in Causeway Bay without being returned through undelivered post.  It is noted that the applicant has provided a different address in Tsim Sha Tsui in the Notice of Motion.  However, there is no detail or documentary evidence provided by the applicant to corroborate his bare assertion that he did not receive the Judgment.  In any event, it is his duty to inform the Court any update as to his address and the applicant should bear the consequences of his failure to do so.  In the circumstances, we are not satisfied that he has provided any good or valid reason for his inordinate delay.

9.  More importantly, the applicant’s application is plainly devoid of merit:

(1)  Most of his assertions raised in his written submissions are new grounds not raised in the Court below or previously in his appeal before this Court.  It is not the practice of the Court of Appeal to grant leave to appeal on new points that were not canvassed previously before it; nor generally is it the practice of the Court of Final Appeal to grant leave on new fact‑sensitive points not argued in the Court of Appeal: see Re Orense Marian Masangkay [2022] HKCA 33 at [7] and Re Dandiwal Sandeep Singh [2021] HKCA 870 at [7].

(2)  His assertions are all vague and bare, and not supported by any particulars or evidence. General assertions of fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].

10.  He has therefore failed to identify any specific error in the Judgment.  His assertions therefore do not constitute proper grounds of appeal.

11.  Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest, his allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.

12.  Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.

13.  For these reasons, the applicant’s intended appeal has no merit and it will be futile to grant him extension of time to pursue a hopeless appeal.  We dismiss the Notice of Motion.