彌敦道安寶樓業主立案法團 v. 寶力置業有限公司 AND OTHERS
[2026] HKLdT 58 · LDBM 51/2023
LDBM 51/2023
[2026] HKLdT 58
IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
BUILDING MANAGEMENT APPLICATION NO.51 OF 2023
__________________
BETWEEN
| |彌敦道安寶樓業主立案法團 | Applicant |
| |and | |
| |寶力置業有限公司 |1st Respondent |
| | |(Discontinued) |
| |你和我活動室有限公司所經營 |2nd Respondent |
| |U N ME STUDIO |(Discontinued) |
| | | |
| |耀舜兄弟發展有限公司所經營 |3rd Respondent |
| |大紅袍火鍋料理 |(Discontinued) |
_________________
|Before: |Deputy District Judge W.Y. HO, |
| |Presiding Officer of the Lands Tribunal, in Court|
|Date of Hearing: |22 July 2026 |
|Date of Decision: |16 October 2026 |
_________________________
DECISION
_________________________
The Applicant seeks the following orders after having discontinued the
action on 15 September 2025:
1) The 1st , 2nd and 3rd Respondents do pay the Applicant’s costs
of this action (including all costs reserved) in respect of
items 1 – 12 of the 《加建物及改動列表》(as annexed to the Amended
Notice of Application filed on 25 February 2025) (“the List”),
to be taxed on the District Court Scale if not agreed, with
certificate for counsel; and
2) The 1st , 2nd and 3rd Respondents do pay the Applicant’s costs
of this application (including the hearing of 22 July 2026 and
all costs reserved), with certificate for counsel.
BACKGROUND
The Applicant is the Incorporated Owners of Amber House at Nos 777 - 781
Nathan Road, Kowloon, Hong Kong (“Amber House”). The 1st Respondent is the
owner of Shop B1 (“Shop B1”), 1/F (including the Flat Roof), and 2/F of
Amber House (collectively referred to as “the Premises”). The 2nd
Respondent is the tenant in respect of 1/F (including the Flat Roof) of
Amber House (“the 1/F Premises), and the 3rd Respondent is the tenant in
respect of the 2/F of Amber House (“the 2/F Premises”).
I set out the salient undisputed events as follows:
|Date |Event |
|28 September 1984 |The Applicant was incorporated. |
|11 February 2010 |The 1st Respondent became the owner of the|
| |Premises. |
|2016 |The 3rd Respondent became the tenant of |
| |the 2/F Premises |
|2019 |The 2nd Respondent became the tenant of |
| |the 1/F Premises |
|Since October 2022 |The Applicant took various steps asking |
| |the Respondents to demolish the structures|
| |on the external wall of the Premises. |
|6 March 2023 |The Applicant issued a final letter before|
| |action the Respondents. |
|18 May 2023 |The Applicant filed its Notice of |
| |Application (Form 29) against the |
| |Respondents. In Table 5.1 (as annexed to |
| |the Notice of Application), 11 items were |
| |described as being the structures referred|
| |to in the Notice of Application. |
|January 2024 – May 2025 |The Applicant and 1st Respondent engaged |
| |in negotiations and mediation. |
|8 April 2024 |HHJ Wong gave leave to the parties to |
| |adduce expert evidence. |
|25 June 2024 |By the parties’ expert reports, the |
| |experts confirm 6 structures of those |
| |listed in Table 5.1 as annexed to the |
| |Notice of Application. have been removed |
| |and/or demolished. |
|Around end of 2024 to |The 2nd Respondent vacated the 1/F |
|early 2025 |Premises and the 3rd Respondent vacated |
| |the 2/F Premises. |
|25 February 2025 |The Applicant amended the Notice of |
| |Application (“the Amended Notice of |
| |Application”). The List specified 14 |
| |structures required to be demolished or |
| |removed (of which 11 of the items in the |
| |List were those as described in Table 5.1 |
| |of the Notice of Application). |
|Around 25 February to 28|The Applicant discovered 4 more structures|
|April 2025 |listed in the List have been removed |
| |and/or demolished. |
|19 June 2025 |All remaining structures listed in the |
| |Amended Notice of Application were removed|
| |and/or demolished. |
|July 2025 |Renovations on the external walls of Amber|
| |House commenced. |
|15 September 2025 |Parties appeared before HHJ Lam for a |
| |call-over hearing. At the hearing, the |
| |Applicant indicated it was minded to take |
| |out an application to re-amend the Amended|
| |Notice of Application. After discussions, |
| |the Applicant discontinued the present |
| |action with the following orders made: |
| |Costs relating to Items 1 – 12 of the List|
| |be reserved. |
| |There be no order as to costs between the |
| |Applicant and the 1st Respondent in |
| |respect of Items 13 – 14 of the List. |
|2 February 2026 |HHJ Lam fixed the argument on costs |
| |relating to Items 1 – 12 of the List to be|
| |heard on 26 August 2026, with 3 hours |
| |reserved. |
The Applicant submitted this Tribunal should depart from the usual rule of
making a costs order against the party whom discontinued the action (that
is, the Applicant) for the following reasons:
1) The Respondents would not have demolished and/or removed the
structures on the List but for the institution of the present
proceedings.
2) The Applicant is to be considered substantially successful in
that it has obtained most of the relief set out in the Amended
Notice of Application.
3) If the matter proceeded to trial, the Applicant would have
likely been the successful party.
4) The Applicant is duty bound to enforce against breaches of the
Deed of Mutual Covenant (“DMC”).
The 2nd and 3rd Respondents have not participated in the proceedings since
15 September 2025 and have not filed any submissions or evidence in respect
of the Applicant’s application for costs.
The 1st Respondent vehemently objects to the Applicant’s application for
costs for the following reasons:
1) The Applicant cannot be regarded as being substantially
successful by the mere reason the structures have now been
demolished and/or removed. By the offers of settlement made to
the 1st Respondent , the Applicant has demonstrated their aim
was not to remove or demolish the structures but to extract
payment from the use of the external wall of the Premises.
2) The demolition and/or removal of structures by the 1st
Respondent was done in good faith without making any admissions
or concessions on the Applicant’s claims.
3) The 1st Respondent would have been the successful party if the
matter proceeded to trial because the Deed of Mutual Covenant of
Amber House (“the DMC”) and the various assignments show the 1st
Respondent has the exclusive use, occupation and enjoyment of
the external wall of the Premises.
I shall not repeat each and every submission made by the parties’
respective counsel. Suffice to say, I have considered their submissions in
reaching my decision and shall only deal with the salient submissions as
relevant to the issues.
I now proceed to set out the legal principles governing the present costs
application.
THE LAW
The Tribunal’s power to award costs is set out in section 12 of the Lands
Tribunal Ordinance, which states, inter alia:
“(1) The costs of and incidental to all proceedings in the
Tribunal are in the discretion of the Tribunal, and the Tribunal
has full power to determine by whom and to what extent the costs
are to be paid.
In so far as the considerations to be had when considering the issue of
costs after discontinuance, I find the legal principles to be succinctly
summarized by HHJ S. Lo in the case of Bright China Investment Limited &
others v Yip Siu Kwong Timmy & others [2018] HKLdT 46 as follows:
“Legal Principles on Costs
8. Rule 27 of the Lands Tribunal Rules (“LTR”) confers wide
discretion on the Lands Tribunal in determining the question
of costs upon discontinuance:
“Discontinuance and withdrawal
(1) A party may, without leave of the Tribunal,
discontinue the proceedings or withdraw any part thereof by
serving a notice to that effect on the other party.
(2) A party upon whom a notice mentioned in subrule (1) is
served may, within 14 days of that service, apply to the
Tribunal for an order for costs and, subject to the Landlord
and Tenant (Consolidation) Ordinance (Cap. 7), the Tribunal
may make such order as it thinks fit.”
. . .
20. In my view, the correct approach on the question on costs
after discontinuance by the applicant in the Lands Tribunal when
the matter becomes academic is as follows:
i. The Lands Tribunal has very wide discretion as to the
question of costs under rule 27 LTR including the discretion
to apply any rule or rules of Order 62 RHC, if appropriate,
pursuant to section 10 of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance;
ii. The Tribunal has to determine if the matter has become
totally or just partly academic. In other words, the fact
that there is/are still live issue(s) to be resolved will
greatly affect the discretion to be exercised;
iii. The general rule that a respondent is entitled to
costs when the proceedings are discontinued, is not an
invariable rule, which may be departed from a case where the
discontinuance is due to good reason(s), rather than to any
acknowledgment by the applicant of likely defeat;
iv. The burden is on the applicant to show good reason(s)
for displacing the general rule governing costs upon
discontinuance;
v. It is not justified to have a full-blown hearing to hear
oral evidence in order to determine the sole question of
costs, which is contrary to the objectives of Order 1A, rule
1 RHC, unless in the exceptional circumstances;
vi. The overriding objective is to do justice between the
parties without incurring unnecessary court time and
consequential additional costs. The Tribunal may look at all
other relevant factors including the merits of the parties in
order to achieve this overriding objective;
vii. When the Tribunal is to consider the merits of the
parties, the appropriate merit threshold is whether the party
has an arguable case against the other unless the applicant
is seeking costs against the respondent, the threshold is
that the applicant has to show a strong case that is bound to
win;
viii. At the end, the Tribunal shall make an appropriate
costs order which may be no order as to costs or a party
shall pay costs or a portion of costs to the other side.
With the above principles in mind, I now proceed to consider the
Applicant’s application for costs.
WHETHER COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS INEVITABLE AND WHETHER THE APPLICANT IS
SUBSTANTIALLY SUCCESSFUL
The Applicant argued it should recover costs because the Applicant is duty
bound to enforce the DMC and therefore must commence the present
proceedings in discharge of its duties. Furthermore, because the
Respondents have now removed Items 1 – 12 of the List, the Applicant is
considered substantially successful in the present action.
There cannot be any dispute that the Applicant, being the IO of Amber
House, is duty bound to enforce the DMC if there is any breach of the same.
It is undisputed the DMC did not assign any shares to the external walls.
The DMC read together with the First Assignment does not state that the
external walls have been assigned to the first or second owner. The DMC
merely granted a right to use the external walls. In such circumstances, I
am of the view the Applicant cannot be faulted for believing it had the
duty to request the 1st Respondent and its occupiers to demolish and/or
remove the structures on the external wall of the Premises. Whether the
Applicant is correct in its belief is another question. Nevertheless, once
the Applicant believed the Respondents were in breach of the DMC, the
Respondents’ repeated failure to remove or demolish the said structures
would inevitably lead to the present proceedings.
As for whether the Applicant has obtained most of the relief pleaded in the
Amended Notice of Application, the 1st Respondent does not deny that most
of the structures (that is, Items 1 – 12 of the List) have been removed
and/or demolished since the commencement of these proceedings. However, the
1st Respondent submitted the following:
1) During negotiations between the parties from 2024 to 2025, the
Applicant’s initial request to the 1st Respondent was for
payment of fees for the use of the external wall, not for the
removal or demolition of the structures. The 1st Respondent sets
out the chronology of the Applicant’s various offers as follows:
a) 23 January 2024: The Applicant proposed the 1st
Respondent to pay $5,000 per month as rent for the
use of the external wall.
b) 18 October 2024: The Applicant requested the 1st
Respondent to undertake to never use the external
wall of the Premises and not to let its occupiers do
the same.
c) 8 May 2025: The Applicant invited the 1st Respondent
to consent to the Applicant’s application to re-amend
the Amended Notice of Application by adding an
injunctive relief. The Applicant intended to seek an
injunction prohibiting 1st Respondent from erecting
or installing any structures on the external wall.
d) 26 June 2025: The Applicant asked the 1st Respondent
to agree the external wall of the 1/F Premises and
2/F Premises is a common area and to undertake not to
occupy the external wall of the 1/F Premises and 2/F
Premises.
e) 27 August 2025: The Applicant asked the 1st
Respondent to provide a written undertaking not to
use the external walls without prior approval.
f) 13 November 2025: Despite having discontinued the
proceedings, the Applicant asked the 1st Respondent
to fully settle the renovation expenses of the
external walls, failing which the 1st Respondent
“will be deemed to have given up any dispute [sic]
the ownership of the external walls”.
2) The Applicant did not consider asking for an injunction
prohibiting the Respondent from using the external walls until 8
May 2025.
3) At the time of discontinuance, the Applicant was aware that
Items 1 – 12 of the List have all been removed from the external
walls. Hence, the Applicant discontinued the proceedings because
it was unable to achieve the real purpose of the proceedings,
that is, to obtain a usage fee for the usage of the external
walls.
4) Furthermore, the Applicant is unable to prove it would be able
to obtain a reinstatement order and/or damages for reinstatement
against the 1st Respondent since all reinstatements done by June
2025 were not done by the 1st Respondent
Having considered the 1st Respondent’s submissions, the without prejudice
letters and the relevant draft consent summons, I do not accept the
Applicant’s true aim of the proceedings is to extract a usage fee from the
1st Respondent for the usage of the external walls.
It is clear the relief sought in the original Notice of Application was a
mandatory injunction against the Respondents mandating them to remove,
inter alia, the structures at Items 1 – 12 of the List. It is not
disputed that at the time of the filing of the Notice of Application, the
Respondents did not heed to the Applicant’s requests to demolish and/or
remove the same. It was not until almost 2 years later did the Respondents
remove / demolish all the structures. However, even after the removal, the
1st Respondent still refused to reassure the Applicant it would not use the
external walls in the future. Therefore, I do not find it peculiar the
Applicant considered applying for a prohibitory injunction at the call-over
hearing before HHJ Lam.
As for the Applicant’s offer of settlement relating to usage fees of the
external walls, I do not find anything sinister in such offers. The offers
were made in an attempt to avoid litigation. Offers of settlement
inevitably involve compromising and offering potentially viable solutions
in an attempt to resolve differences in position. I do not see how without
prejudice offers of settlement can be seen as an indication of ulterior
motives. I do not accept the 1st Respondent’s submission on any purported
“true motive” behind the present proceedings.
In so far as the 1st Respondent alleges the Applicant is unable to prove it
would be able to obtain a reinstatement order and/or a damages order
against it, it is clear the majority of the Applicant’s pleaded relief is
to have the structures demolished and/or removed. Hence the Applicant had
achieved its main aim of having the Respondents remove the structures
listed in the List.
WHETHER THE APPLICANT WOULD HAVE LIKELY SUCCEEDED AT TRIAL
The 1st Respondent submitted it would have likely succeeded in defending
the present proceedings because the 1st Respondent has the exclusive use
occupation and enjoyment of the external wall of the Premises.
Having considered the evidence filed by the parties, the DMC, and the
assignments, I am of the view the 1st Respondent would, taking its case at
its highest, only be partially successful in asserting exclusive use and
occupation over the external wall of the Premises.
The First Assignment between Yee Tak Investment Company Limited (as vendor)
(“Yee Tak”) and Yau Kit Lai Josephine (as purchaser), in respect of the
sale of Flat A of Amber House, does not stipulate the assignment of the
external walls or any part thereof. The only mention of the external walls
is where Yee Tak reserves a right to use the same. The reservation as set
out in the First Assignment is as follows:
“…excepting and reserving unto the Vendor the right to the
exclusive use occupation and enjoyment of the external wall at
the rear of the said Building from the first floor level to the
roof of the said Building and shall have the right to permit its
purchaser or licensees of appointees to install chimneys and/or
Air-ventilation pipes for he purposes of running the business of
a Restaurant…” (own emphasis added)
According to the Block Plan attached to the First Assignment, Amber House
faces Nathan Road and a narrow scavenger lane. Although not defined in the
First Assignment, it is common sense the front of the building is the side
facing Nathan Road and the rear of the Amber House is the side facing the
scavenger lane.
On a reading of the First Assignment, it is clear Yee Tak did not reserve
the exclusive right to use the whole of the external walls of the Premises.
Yee Tak merely reserved the right to use the external wall from 1st Floor
to the Roof at the rear of the Building (“the Rear External Wall”). There
is no mention of reserving the right to use the external wall of the
Premises in so far as it faces Nathan Road (“the Front External Wall”).
I note the First Schedule of the DMC states the Vendor has the exclusive
use and occupation of “THE WHOLE BUILDING (including all flats, floors,
parts, flatted roofs, main roofs, and the exterior walls of the said
building.” However, this must be read in conjunction with the First
Assignment.
The Court of Final Appeal in the recent case of Donora Co Ltd v
Incorporated Owners of Tsuen Kam Centre (荃錦中心業主立案法團) (2024) 27
HKCFAR 166 at paragraph 39 of the judgment, set out the proper approach to
be adopted as follows:
“Therefore, the crucial question is not whether the DMC has
superseded the Earlier Reservation in the First Assignment.
Instead, the correct approach is to read the DMC together with
the First Assignment in discerning the common intention of the
parties with regard to the external walls. Applying the
statutory definition in section 2 of the BMO, the question is
when these documents are read together whether they manifest a
common intention to specify or designate the external walls as
being for the exclusive use, occupation or enjoyment of an
owner. These documents should be construed together contextually
and purposively in a coherent fashion.”
Having considered the DMC and the First Assignment, I am of the view the
DMC is consistent with the arrangement set out in the First Assignment.
Clause 6 of the DMC is telling in that it refers to “the parties or party
hereto who are or is entitled to the exclusive use occupation and enjoyment
of the whole or part of the external walls.” This clause clearly envisages
the situation where the external walls may not be wholly owned or used by
one party. This mirrors the arrangement as set out in the First Assignment
where it is clear Yee Tak did not intend to reserve the whole of the
external walls for its exclusive use. Furthermore, this arrangement is
consistent with the fact that the DMC does not allot separate shares to the
external walls.
It was not until the Sub-Deed of Mutual Covenant (“the Sub-DMC”) executed
by Denz Limited and Union Bank of Hong Kong Ltd (“Union Bank”) on 4 October
1995, was Union Bank given the right to use the Front External Wall of Shop
B and B1. The use of the Front External Wall was limited to the shop front
area on the Ground Floor as marked X to Y and Y to Z, respectively, on the
plan attached to the Sub-DMC. There is no mention of any right to use the
Front External Wall above the Ground Floor. Hence, I am of the view the Sub-
DMC only permits the 1st Respondent to use the Ground Floor Front External
Wall of Shop B1 as corresponding to the area marked Y to Z on the said
plan.
However, the 1st Respondent’s use of the Front External Wall of Shop B1 is
not without restrictions. Clause 7 (a) of the Sub-DMC does not permit any
structural alterations to Amber House and does not permit the installation
or fixture which would affect the supply of electricity or gas to other
parts of Amber House. The same clause further restricts the use so that the
1st Respondent cannot cut or damage any of the main walls or beams or
floors of the said Building.
Hence even if the 1st Respondent was entitled to use the Front External
Wall of Shop B1, the 1st Respondent must still prove it did not contravene
the Sub-DMC provisions in its use of the same. A determination of whether
there has been any structural alteration is clearly a dispute of fact and
law.
I am of the view that without the benefit of a trial to resolve the issues
that require a factual determination, this Tribunal is not in a position to
gauge which party is likely to succeed on their respective case in so far
as the use of the Front External Wall of Shop B1 is concerned.
As for the use of the Front External Wall on the 1st and 2nd Floor of Amber
House and the use of the canopy areas, subject to the 1st Respondent’s
argument of laches and acquiescence, I fail to see how the 1st Respondent
could maintain the DMC or the various assignments confer the exclusive
right to use and occupy the same.
Laches and/or acquiescence
The 1st Respondent submitted its tenants have been using the external wall
of the Premises for more than 14 years. Hence the Applicant’s inaction of
the years would have constituted acquiescence and/or laches.
I shall deal with this point briefly.
In the case of Centre Chase Investment Limited v The Incorporated Owners of
Castle Peak Road International Industrial Building and anor [2026] HKCFA
26, the Court of Final Appeal opined that in appropriate cases, defence of
waiver, estoppel or acquiescence may be available against incorporated
owners in matters concerning the enforcement of a DMC. I cite paragraphs 56
and 57 of Mr Justice Lam PJ’s judgment as follows:
“ 56. Hence, the reasoning of Godfrey JA in Hoi Luen Industrial
Centre and Chungking Mansions cannot be sustained and should not
be followed. In terms of the availability of the defences of
acquiescence or waiver as matter of law, there should not be any
distinction dependent on whether a claim for enforcement of a
deed of mutual covenant is brought by an individual owner or an
IO.
57. In the light of this conclusion, it is not necessary to
embark on drawing distinctions by reference to the specific type
of breach in question. Apart from breaches involving illegality,
the doctrines of waiver and acquiescence apply to a claim by an
owners’ corporation in the same manner as to a claim advanced by
an individual owner. Section 18(1)(c) of the Ordinance does not
give rise to a special rule precluding these defences from being
relied upon when a claim is brought by an owners’ corporation.”
In the case of Mo Ying v Brillex Development Ltd and anor [2014] 3 HKLRD
224, Deputy High Court Judge Eugene Fung SC (as he then was) set out the
test for acquiescence and laches as follows:
“156. The term “acquiescence” is used where a person having a
right, and seeing another person about to commit, or in the
course of committing an act infringing upon that right, stands
by in such a manner as to induce the person committing the act,
and who might otherwise have abstained from it, to believe that
he assents to its being committed, he cannot afterwards be heard
to complain of the act: see De Bussche v Alt (1878) 8 Ch D 286
at 314.
…
159. Laches essentially consists of a substantial lapse of time
coupled with the existence of circumstances which make it
inequitable to enforce the claim. Accordingly, delay alone is
insufficient to constitute laches. Further, there can be no
abandonment of a right without full knowledge of all the relevant
circumstances. See Snell’s Equity (32nd edn, 2010) §5-019.
160. The essence of equitable doctrine of laches was summarised
by Lord Selbourne LC in Lindsay Petroleum v Hurd (1874) LR 5 PC
221, 239-240:
“Now the doctrine of laches in Courts of Equity is not an
arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically
unjust to give a remedy, either because the party has, by his
conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded as a waiver of
it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has, though perhaps
not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation
in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy
were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapses
of time and delay are most material.””
In the recent case of The Incorporated Owners of Pak Tat Mansion
(百達大廈業主立案法團) v Tang Kee Tong Trading as Chili King
(鄧屺堂經營麻辣王) [2026] HKCU 3077, HHJ LJ Cruden summarized the
principles of acquiescence as follows:
“141. Acquiescence arises if:
(a) There is an assent or lying by to the acts of another
person; and
(b) In view of the assent or lying by and consequential
acts, it is unjust in all the circumstances to grant the
relief in question.
142. The party in the position of the IO, against whom
acquiescence is contended should also have knowledge of the
other person’s acts:
(a) The degree of knowledge required depends on the
circumstances.
(b) It is sufficient that at the relevant time the party
concerned knew of the facts or matters that gave rise to
his right to equitable relief, even although he may not
have fully understood, as a question of law, the rights
that he possessed.
(c) It is sufficient that the party has been put on
suspicion, that is, that he is aware of sufficient matters
to raise in his mind a doubt whether an infringement of his
rights has taken place.”
The Applicant does not seem to dispute the 1st Respondent has been using
the external wall of the Premises for over 14 years. However, the Applicant
explained it had issued oral warnings to the 1st Respondent throughout the
years objecting to the structures erected on the external wall of the
Premises. This is disputed by the 1st Respondent.
It is trite that mere inaction or delay itself is insufficient to establish
the defence of laches or acquiescence. The 1st Respondent must also
establish the Applicant’s knowledge, and whether the Applicant’s
enforcement is unjust. Needless to say, I am unable to resolve the said
issues (which would inevitably involve factual disputes) at this juncture
without the benefit of a trial. I therefore am unable to gauge with
certainty which party would be the more likely to succeed had the matter
proceeded to full trial.
THE TIME LAPSE OF 3 MONTHS FROM REMOVAL OF STRUCTURES TO DISCONTINUANCE
The 1st Respondent further submitted the Tribunal should not grant the
Applicant’s costs incurred after 19 June 2025, that is, when the Applicant
had knowledge that all structures were removed/demolished by the
Respondents.
The Applicant conceded there is a time lapse of 3 months from the removal
of all structures until it discontinued the action. However, the Applicant
does not view this lapse to be so inordinate so as to justify any adverse
costs order.
I note the Applicant has not provided a clear answer on why they did not
discontinue earlier. The Applicant merely explained that since the
Applicant needed to consider the matter and seek legal advice, it was not a
delay as such.
I find the explanation offered unsatisfactory. The Applicant clearly
succeeded in having the Respondents remove the Items 1 – 12 of the List.
Yet at the call-over hearing before HHJ Lam, the Applicant sought leave (or
at least indicated they intended to seek leave) to amend the Amended Notice
of Application to add a new injunctive relief. I am of the view that if
the Applicant’s aim was to proceed with its claim for damages and the
intended prohibitory injunction, it would not have chosen to discontinue
the proceedings. It would seem that by discontinuing the action without
proceeding on the other relief sought in the Amended Notice of Application,
the Applicant’s main aim was to secure the removal of Items 1 – 12 of the
List. Once those items were removed, there was no further reason for the
Applicant to continue with the present proceedings. In such circumstances
and for reasons already set out above, I fail to see how the Applicant can
justify its claim for costs after 19 June 2025.
SUMMARY
For reasons set out above, I am of the view this Tribunal is not in a
position to gauge with certainty which party would be more likely to
succeed had the matter gone to trial. Although the Applicant is not bound
to win, I am of the view the 1st Respondent is erroneous in its belief that
it had the right of exclusive use and occupation of the canopy areas and
the Front External Wall of the 1st and 2nd Floor Premises. Having
considered the evidence before me and the parties’ submissions, I am of the
view that there should be no order as costs of the action, up to and
inclusive of 19 June 2025. I therefore refuse the Applicant’s application
for costs against the Respondents.
In respect of the costs of the action incurred after 19 June 2025 for
reasons set out above and in accordance with the legal principles as cited,
I see no reason to depart from the usual costs order upon discontinuance.
As for the costs of the present application for costs, costs should follow
the event and the Applicant should pay the 1st Respondent’s costs.
In so far as the 2nd and 3rd Respondents are concerned, because they have
not participated in the present proceedings since 15 September 2025, I will
make no order as to costs as between the Applicant, and the 2nd and 3rd
Respondents in respect of the Applicant’s present costs application.
I therefore make the following orders:
1) There be no order as to costs of this action (in so far as it
relates to Items 1 – 12 of the List) incurred up to and
including 19 June 2025.
2) Costs of this action (in so far as it relates to Items 1 – 12 of
the List) incurred on or after 20 June 2025 be to the 1st - 3rd
Respondents to be taxed if not agreed, on the District Court
Scale, with certificate for counsel.
3) There be no order as to costs between the Applicant, 2nd
Respondent and 3rd Respondent in respect of the Applicant’s
application for costs.
4) The 1st Respondent’s costs of the Applicant’s application for
costs be paid by the Applicant, to be taxed if not agreed, on
the District Court Scale, with certificate for counsel.
|(Wai Yang Ho) |
|Deputy District Judge |
|Presiding Officer |
|Lands Tribunal |
Mr Wong, Iverson C.M., instructed by Messrs C.W. Chan & Co., for the
Applicant
Mr Felix H.F. Tsang, instructed by Messrs Gallant, for the 1st Respondent
The 2nd Respondent acting in person, absent
The 3rd Respondent acting in person, absent
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