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HCAL 2670/2025
[2026] HKCFI 541
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2670 OF 2025
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BETWEEN
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Binti Musa Adah |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board |
Putative |
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Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative |
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Interested Party |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 2 December 2025, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 5 November 2025 (“the Board’s Decision”). The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2025/HCAL002670_2025_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board rejected the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection on all the applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal/petition and confirmed the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 5 September 2025, which rejected her non-refoulement claim.
Amendment
3. The applicant named the Board and Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office as the putative respondents in Form 86, when only the Board should be the putative respondent.
4. The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office which provides administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the Board and should not be named as a putative respondent at all.
5. Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”.
The applicant’s case
6. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
7. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if refouled to Indonesia, she would be harmed or even killed by her husband Rohmat Santoso since she was in a relationship with another man in Hong Kong and she filed a divorce against her husband.
Disposal on paper
8. The applicant did not request for an oral hearing of the Leave Application. This court is also satisfied that the Leave Application can be disposed of based on the written materials before this court.
Grounds for judicial review
9. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
10. The applicant did not advance any grounds for the intended judicial review in Form 86, but annexed a 2-page document, which was handwritten in Indonesian, to her supporting affidavit/affirmation dated 2 December 2025. The document was translated by an interpreter engaged by the Court Language Section.
11. In the said document, the applicant repeated her claims that if returned to Indonesia, she would be killed by her husband. She further mentioned that she could not relocate within Indonesia, not all the police would help, and even though there was a women’s protection agency, she did not know where it was and she needed money to go to the agency.
Discussion
12. First of all, the danger that the applicant might face from her husband had been duly assessed but rejected by the Board.
13. The applicant also sought to challenge the Board’s finding on the availability of state protection and the viability of internal relocation upon her refoulement to Indonesia.
14. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness, or irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).
15. Thus, the applicant cannot challenge the Board’s finding of facts, including the availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation, unless it was irrational.
16. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an oral hearing on 24 October 2025. The applicant was present and hence she was given the chance to present her case to the Board in person.
17. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board gave very full and detailed reasoning in rejecting the applicant’s claims. The Board found that the applicant was only verbally threatened by her husband regarding her relationship with another man in Hong Kong through telephone calls and text messages. The alleged past ill-treatments by her husband occurred during their marriage and the most significant events happened in 2011 and 2012. The applicant did not seek any medical treatment after these two incidents. The applicant did not have any physical contact with her husband after coming to Hong Kong to work as a domestic helper in 2013, and the husband had never physically harmed her family members.
18. The Board also noted the applicant’s admission that she overstayed in Hong Kong because she wanted to secure employment. The Board was not convinced that her main reason to seek protection was due to her fear for her own life if she was to return to Indonesia.
19. The Board concluded that the applicant’s appeal/petition should be dismissed because there was no factual basis to establish any of the applicable grounds under the USM. Even taking the applicant’s account at its highest, there was no real risk that she would be subjected to serious harm on her return. State protection was available to her on her return and internal relocation was a viable option for the applicant.
20. In view of the applicant’s assertions about state protection and internal relocation as mentioned in the document attached to her supporting affidavit/affirmation, this court has considered the applicant’s assertions but noted that the Board had given full justifications in paragraphs 39 to 51 of the Board’s Decision for its conclusion that internal relocation was a viable option for her. This court finds no flaw or irrationality in the Board’s conclusion.
21. As to state protection, the Board had detailed in paragraphs 52 to 66 of the Board’s Decision its reasoning as to why it did not accept that reasonable protection from the Indonesian government and its authorities was not available to the applicant upon her return to the country. This court notes that the Board had gone through very extensive country of origin information (“COI”) and assessed the applicant’s own situation before coming into that conclusion. Again, this court finds no flaw or irrationality in the Board’s conclusion in this regard.
22. The finding of facts relating to a non-refoulement claim, including the assessment of evidence, COI and risk of harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board in dealing with the applicant’s appeal/petition. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way the Board reached its conclusion.
23. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof. The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its decision.
24. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence leave must be refused.
Conclusion
25. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 28th day of January 2026
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( Irene LEE )
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
Notes for the applicant:
If leave has been granted, the applicant or his solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent/Handed to the applicant/the applicant’s solicitors
on: 28 January 2026
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil |
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Sent/Handed to the putative respondent / the putative respondent’s solicitors / such putative interested parties as may be directed by the Court / the putative interested parties’ solicitors on:
28 January 2026
Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 27145
Director of Immigration
Putative interested party’s ref. no.:
QA T/C 1568/25
(formerly RBCZ/5001489/25)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
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