WONG WA FUN v. SECRETARY FOR THE CIVIL SERVICE
[2026] HKCFI 2661 · HCAL 905/2024
Court of First Instance
HCAL 905/2024
[2026] HKCFI 2661
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 905 OF 2024
BETWEEN
WONG WA FUN Applicant
and
SECRETARY FOR THE CIVIL SERVICE Putative
Respondent
________________
Before: Hon Coleman J in Court
Date of Hearing: 23 September 2024
Date of Judgment: 30 June 2026
____________________
J U D G M E N T
____________________
A. Introduction
At the material time of the events giving rise to this case, the Applicant
was a Court Prosecutor in the Eastern Magistracy. He faced disciplinary
action and was ultimately dismissed.
By his Form 86, the Applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review to
challenge two decisions, namely (1) the decision dated 7 July 2023 (“Guilt
Decision”) made by an Inquiry Committee in finding the Applicant guilty of
two disciplinary charges, and (2) the decision dated 11 March 2024
(“Dismissal Decision”) made by the Putative Respondent Secretary for the
Civil Service (“Secretary”) in accepting the Guilt Decision and directing
the Applicant to be punished by dismissal under section 10 of the Public
Service (Administration) Order (“PS(A)O”).
By way of relief, the Applicant sought an order of certiorari to bring up
and quash the Guilt Decision and the Dismissal Decision.
I gave directions to bring the matter to a ‘rolled-up’ hearing, which was
eventually heard on 23 September 2024.
At the hearing, the Applicant appeared in person and the Secretary was
represented by Mr Anthony Chan SC and Ms Vivian Kao, Senior Government
Counsel of the Department of Justice. Both the Applicant and the Secretary
elected to rely wholly upon the Form 86 and written submissions
respectively. At the end of the hearing, I reserved my decision.
This is my Judgment.
B. Background
The Applicant joined the Government in October 1992 as a Court Prosecutor
(“CP”) under the Prosecutions Division (“PD”) in the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”), and was promoted to Senior Court Prosecutor II in August 2004.
As stated, at the time of his dismissal the Applicant was a Court
Prosecutor (“CP”) in the Eastern Magistracy.
On 1 August 2019, the Secretary issued an open letter to all civil servants
titled “Cherishing the Core Values of the Civil Service”. The letter
instructed civil servants that:
1) The core values and principles of the civil service include law-
abiding, dedication, impartiality, political neutrality, etc.
2) According to the Civil Service Code, political neutrality means
that civil servants shall serve the Chief Executive and the
Government of the day with total loyalty and to the best of
their ability, no matter what their own political beliefs are.
They shall not allow their own personal political beliefs to
determine or influence the discharge of their official duties
and responsibilities.
3) The Government will, in accordance with the established
mechanism, seriously follow up any violations of regulations by
civil servants.
4) When civil servants express their views, they should ensure that
their views would not give rise to any conflict of interest with
their official duties, or might not be seen to compromise the
important principle of maintaining impartiality and political
neutrality when discharging their duties. Civil servants shall
at all times ensure that their behaviour would not impede their
performance of official duties in a fair and professional
manner.
5) The entire civil service has to stay united amidst all the
pressure and challenges, and work together to uphold the core
values of the civil service and not to affect the effective
operation of the Government because of personal beliefs, as this
may undermine public confidence in the impartial discharge of
duties by civil servants.
On 2 September 2019, 4 June 2020 and 24 December 2020 respectively, the
Applicant issued three emails, which were later the subject of the
Disciplinary Inquiry he faced:
1) The Applicant, in his then stated capacity as the Chairman of
the Court Prosecutors (Department of Justice) Association
(“Association”), sent an email from his office email account to
the Secretary of Justice (“SJ”), the Director of Public
Prosecutions (“DPP”) and all DOJ staff alleging that the Police
were “telling lies” about the motive of the arrests of several
public figures on 30 August 2019 (“First Email”).
2) The Applicant sent an email from his office email account to all
CP grade staff as follows (“Second Email”):
Dear all,
I am asked to send this e-email.
“Any other thing more meaningful to do tonight?
Wish we do the same thing then.”
Regards,
William WONG
Dated this the last June 4 before the enactment of the
National Security Law
3) The Applicant sent another email to the Chief Inspectors of the
Police Formations under the purview of the Eastern Magistracy
(“CIPs”) about the Police’s preparation of court case papers
(“Third Email”), allegedly against instructions to route emails
to the Police or other working partners through his supervisor
first.
On 11 September 2019, the PD invited the Applicant to give explanations as
to whether there was any objective or statutory basis for him to express
the views in the First Email. On 12 September 2019, the Applicant replied
“no comment”.
From September to October 2019, the DOJ received emails from CP grade
officers and members of the public expressing objection and/or concerns
about the allegations made by the Applicant in the First Email. The DOJ
also received an email enquiry from a British law firm whose employees had
been given a blind copy of the email.
On 27 August 2020, the Applicant was once again invited to provide
information and explanations in relation to the First Email and Second
Email, in particular whether he copied the First Email to staff members of
a British law firm. On 25 September 2020, the Applicant stated that he
“did not copy the email to any members of the British law firm or any
outsiders”.
On 7 October 2020, the DOJ issued another letter to the Applicant quoting
parts of the Civil Service Code and Prosecution Code and invited him to
provide explanations for his alleged misconduct, on or before
21 October 2020. On 29 October 2020, the Applicant replied that “the
allegations against me cannot be substantiated in court. If there is any
adverse finding made against me in the disciplinary proceedings (if any), I
shall apply for judicial review. I am prepared to take the case to Court
of Final Appeal one day”. The Applicant also demanded full disclosure of
all materials relating to the decision and implementation of the arrests
made by the Police as alluded to in the First Email.
From 11 December 2020 to 18 December 2020, the Applicant sent six emails to
all CIPs without the prior knowledge and authorisation of his supervisor
concerning matters about the Police’s preparation of court case papers in
general and some related common mistakes which were not case specific.
On 23 February 2021, the Applicant was invited to provide written
explanations as to why the instructions given to him were not complied
with. On the same day, the Applicant replied “I prefer to remain silent”.
On 31 December 2021, the Applicant was informed that a Disciplinary Inquiry
would be held against him on three charges, one related to each of the
emails.
The Statement of Alleged Misconduct set out the particulars of the
disciplinary charges as follows:
Particulars
You, WONG Wa-fun, William, misconducted yourself, while you served as
Senior Court Prosecutor II (“SCP II”) in the Department of Justice (“DoJ”),
in that –
(a) on 2 September 2019, contrary to Paragraphs 3.4, 3.6, 3.7
and 3.12 of the Civil Service Code and Paragraphs 1.2 and
3.6 of the Prosecution Code, you failed to meet the
requirements of integrity, impartiality, political
neutrality and professionalism which are core values under
the Civil Service Code and the Prosecution Code in the
discharge of your duty, by sending out an email from your
official email account making unwarranted allegations
against the Police, which brought you in conflict, or
appeared to be in conflict with your role and duties as a
SCP II of DoJ;
(b) on 4 June 2020, contrary to Paragraph 3.1 of the
Prosecution Code, you failed to meet the requirement of
professionalism which is a core value under the Prosecution
Code in the discharge of your duty, by sending out an email
from your official email account which could have been
perceived to invite/incite colleagues to take part in
activities prohibited under the social distancing policy,
which brought you in conflict, or appeared to be in
conflict with your role and duties as a SCP II of DoJ;
(c) on 24 December 2024, contrary to the Civil Service
Regulations 400 and 410(1), you failed to comply with the
instructions given to you by the Chief Court Prosecutor
(Administration) as then conveyed to you by the Acting
Senior Court Prosecutor I of Eastern Magistracy (“SCP I/E”)
in the morning of 24 December 2020, namely, to route
through the incumbents of SCP I/E prior to sending any
emails to the Police, by sending out an email to the Police
in the afternoon of 24 December 2020, without routing
through the incumbents of SCP I/E.
Subsequently, an inquiry hearing against the Applicant under section 10 of
the PS(A)O was made by an Inquiry Committee and held between
24 January 2022 and 3 April 2023.
The Inquiry Committee was (1) Ms Stella Wong Wai-fun as Chairperson, and
(2) Mr Chong Ping-keung as second member. Mr Jonathan Kwan, a barrister in
private practice, was appointed as Legal Adviser to the Inquiry Committee.
The duty to present all relevant evidence to the Inquiry Committee fell on
an Assisting Officer, in this case originally Ms Francesca Lam,
subsequently replaced by Ms Andrea Young. Ms Jane TC Ho, another barrister
in private practice, was appointed as the Legal Representative of the
Assisting Officer.
On 7 July 2023, in its Inquiry Report, the Inquiry Committee decided the
Applicant was guilty of charges (a) and (b), but acquitted him of
charge (c).
Later, by letter dated 11 March 2024, the Applicant was notified of the
Dismissal Decision, in the following material terms (bold in original):
I write to you regarding the Disciplinary inquiry held between
24 January 2022 and 3 April 2023. The Secretary for the Civil Service, in
exercise of the authority delegated to her by the Chief Executive, has
considered the report of the Inquiry Committee and is satisfied that you
had misconducted yourself as per the charges at Annex.
Having considered the gravity of the misconduct, your service and
disciplinary records, mitigating factors as well as precedent cases, and
having regard to the advice of the Public Service Commission, the Secretary
for the Civil Service has directed that you be punished by dismissal under
section 10 of the Public Service (Administration) Order. The punishment
will take effect from 11 March 2024.
Upon dismissal, all claims to your retirement benefits or other like
benefits and to any other benefits or advantages, including but not limited
to all your earned leave and the emoluments withheld during interdiction,
will be forfeited in full.
Other than the Annex relating to the charges, there were no other
attachments to the letter.
C. Relevant Legal Provisions
Section 10 of the PS(A)O provides for the initiation of an inquiry for
misconduct warranting dismissal or compulsory retirement as follows:
10. Misconduct warranting dismissal or compulsory retirement
(1) If it is represented to the Chief Executive that an
officer has been guilty of misconduct, and the Chief
Executive is of the opinion that the misconduct
alleged may be serious enough to warrant the
dismissal or compulsory retirement of the officer, he
may cause an inquiry to be made into the officer's
conduct in such manner as may be prescribed by
regulations made by the Chief Executive under
section 21(2).
(2) If after such inquiry the Chief Executive is of the
opinion that the officer has been guilty of
misconduct, he may inflict such punishment upon the
officer as may seem to him to be just.
(3) Where an officer is absent from duty without leave for
a period exceeding 14 days and it is represented to
the Chief Executive that the officer—
(a) cannot be traced; or
(b) on being required by notice in writing (sent by
post to his last known address) to give, within
the period specified in the notice, an excuse
for his absence, has failed to give any excuse
or to give an excuse that is reasonable,
the Chief Executive need not cause an inquiry to be made
under subsection (1) and may summarily dismiss the officer.
Section 16 states that an officer who is dismissed forfeits all claims to
retirement benefits or other like benefits and to any other benefits or
advantages of an officer.
The Public Service (Disciplinary) Regulation governs the conduct of
disciplinary proceedings and procedures leading up to the removal of
officers in the Civil Service.
The relevant paragraphs of the Civil Service Regulations provide as
follows:
400. An officer is subject to Government Regulations, to the
regulations for the time being in force in his department,
to any special regulations (whether administrative or
statutory) which apply to the office to which he is
appointed, and to the Public Service (Administration) Order
and the Public Service (Disciplinary) Regulation insofar as
these are applicable to him.
410. (1) An officer who commits any breach of Government
Regulations or any other official instructions,
whether oral or written, or who by his actions brings
the Government Service into disrepute is liable to
dismissal or lesser punishments depending upon the
gravity of the case.
The Civil Service Code provides for the constitutional order of the HKSAR,
the constitutional roles and responsibilities of civil servants as members
of the executive authorities, as well as the core values and standards of
conduct which civil servants should uphold. Of note are the following
paragraphs:
3.4 Integrity: Civil servants shall ensure that no actual,
perceived or potential conflict of interest shall arise
between their official duties and private interests. Where
an actual, perceived or potential conflict of interest
arises, they shall declare it to their supervisors so that
the latter can determine how best to proceed or escalate
the matter for a determination as necessary. They shall
not use their official position to further personal
interests or the private interests of others. They shall
not solicit or accept, directly or indirectly, any
advantage or gift which would, or might reasonably be seen
to, compromise their integrity or judgment or influence the
discharge or non-discharge of their duties and
responsibilities. They shall not place themselves under
any financial or other obligation to outside individuals or
organisations that might seek to influence them in the
performance of their official duties. They shall ensure
that the views they express will not compromise their
capacity to fulfil their official duties professionally,
effectively and impartially. They shall use information
gained by virtue of their official position for authorised
purposes only. They shall not disclose documents,
information or knowledge received in confidence from others
in the course of their duties or by virtue of their
official position.
3.6 Impartiality: Civil servants shall carry out their duties
and responsibilities in accordance with the policies and
decisions of the Government of the day and in a way that is
fair, just and equitable. They shall act according to the
merits of the case.
3.7 Political neutrality: Civil servants shall serve the Chief
Executive and the Government of the day with total loyalty
and to the best of their ability, no matter what their own
political beliefs are. They shall not allow their own
personal party political affiliation or party political
beliefs to determine or influence the discharge of their
official duties and responsibilities, including the advice
they give and the decisions or actions they take. In their
official capacity, they shall not engage in party political
activities1 or use public resources for party political
purposes such as electioneering or fund-raising activities
for political parties.
3.12 Dedication, professionalism and diligence: Civil servants
shall act with a spirit of service to the community and in
a professional manner. They shall conduct themselves in a
way that instils and retains the confidence of all those
whom they have official dealings with. They shall fulfil
their duties and obligations responsibly. They shall deal
with the public and their affairs fairly, efficiently,
promptly, effectively and sensibly, to the best of their
ability. Where necessary, the Government has a prior call
at all times on the abilities, energies and attention of
civil servants.
The Prosecution Code guides prosecutors in conducting prosecutions.
Paragraph 1.3 of the Prosecution Code provides for the independence of
prosecutors:
1.2 A prosecutor must not be influenced by:
a. any investigatory, political, media, community or
individual interest or representation;
b. the personal feelings or beliefs of the prosecutor
concerning the offence, the suspect, the accused or a
victim of crime;
c. the possible effect of the decision on the personal or
professional circumstances of those who have the
conduct of the case;
d. the possible political effect on the government, any
political party, any group or individual;
e. possible media or public reaction to the decision;
f. the race, religion, sex, ethnic or national origin,
colour, language, political or other opinion, social
origin, social or political affiliation, official or
other position in the community, lawful activities,
beliefs, property, health, disability or any other
personal characteristics of the suspect or accused or
any other person involved or concerned (although such
considerations may need to be addressed for other
reasons).
Paragraph 3.6 of the Prosecution Code provides that a prosecutor must not
argue any proposition of fact or law which the prosecutor does not believe
on reasonable grounds to carry weight and to be capable of reasonably
contributing to a decision of the court. Material put to a witness
(including an accused) must be considered on reasonable grounds to be
accurate and reliable and its use justified in the circumstances.
D. Grounds of Review
The Applicant put forward no less than nine intended grounds of review,
being:
1) Ground 1: The Inquiry Committee was wrong in law in interpreting
the Prosecution Code in charge (b).
2) Ground 2: The Inquiry Committee failed to take into account
relevant considerations in arriving at the Guilty Decision for
charges (a) and (b).
3) Ground 3: There was an error of law in placing the burden of
proof on the Applicant regarding the element of the offence of
“making unwarranted allegations” in charge (a).
4) Ground 4: The Inquiry Committee failed to take into account
relevant considerations in arriving at the Guilty Decision for
charge (a), namely the veracity of the contents of the First
Email.
5) Ground 5: The words “could have been perceived” in charge (b)
are imprecise, rendering the offence uncertain and vague and
therefore unconstitutional.
6) Ground 6: The Inquiry Committee failed to apply the correct
standard of proof to determine charge (b).
7) Ground 7: The Inquiry Committee made an error in law in finding
that what happened after the issuing of the 1st email (i.e. the
“silent stance” of the Police) was inadmissible to prove the
truthfulness of the 1st Email.
8) Ground 8: The Applicant was denied a fair hearing.
9) Ground 9: The punishment of dismissal without benefits is so
harsh and oppressive in the overall circumstances that its
imposition must have involved some error of law.
Some of the intended grounds of review overlap and/or are interconnected
with one another, and as such can be dealt with together.
As a preliminary point, Mr Chan highlighted six material factual matters:
1) The three charges against the Applicant concerned three emails
sent by him using his office email account.
2) The Applicant must have known he should not use his office email
account for matters other than work duties.
3) The Applicant as a civil servant and CP was subject to various
codes and/or regulations including the Civil Service Code, the
Prosecution Code and the Civil Service Regulations.
4) The Applicant has received specific instructions issued to all
civil servants reiterating the core values of civil service.
5) The Inquiry Hearing was conducted with due process observed, and
the Applicant was capable of presenting his case. Further, the
Inquiry Report was well-reasoned with detailed findings on the
issues discussed.
6) The Inquiry Report was considered by the DOJ, Public Service
Commission (“PSC”) and Secretariat on Civil Service Discipline
(“SCSD”) all of whom recommended dismissal as the appropriate
punishment having considered all the relevant circumstances.
Apart from the “due process” point, the Applicant did not himself seriously
dispute the above points.
E. Grounds 1 and 2: “Discharge of Duty”
Grounds 1 and 2 at their core concern the same issue, namely that the
Inquiry Committee was wrong in finding that the First Email and Second
Email were sent whilst the Applicant was “on duty”. As such, they can be
dealt with together.
The Applicant admits it is inappropriate to issue the First Email and
Second Email as a SCP II, but submits they were not issued in the discharge
of his duty, but in his own time. Ultimately, the question to be asked is
whether the Applicant was “on duty” at the time the Emails were sent.
I note the preliminary point made by Mr Chan, which has force, that both
Grounds 1 and 2 impermissibly seek to appeal the Inquiry Committee’s
findings, in circumstances where the Court does not evaluate the evidence
or make findings of fact where there is a dispute. It is trite that the
Court does not substitute its own views for those of the decision-maker
made in good faith.
The Applicant submitted that the Prosecution Code only governs the
conducting and handling of prosecution by a prosecutor whilst on duty, but
does not apply to the circumstances where a prosecutor acts on his own time
on a matter unrelated to any particular court case he was handling or
conducting.
He relies on the timings. The First Email was sent at 1:38pm, and the
Second Email was sent at 1:17 pm. But both Emails were sent from the
Applicant’s office email account.
The Applicant also suggested that there is a difference between (a) “in the
discharge or in the course of duty” and (b) “in relation to, or in
connection with, the duty”. The Applicant referred to the findings of the
Court of Final Appeal in Sin Kam Wah Lam Chuen Ip v HKSAR [2005] 8 HKCFAR
192 at §47, where it was stated:
47. … To constitute the offence of misconduct in public
office, willful misconduct which has a relevant
relationship with the defendant’s public office is enough.
Thus, misconduct otherwise than in the performance of the
defendant’s public duties may nevertheless have such a
relationship with his public office as to bring that office
into disrepute, in circumstances where the misconduct is
both culpable and serious and not trivial.
I do not think this assists the Applicant’s case. In fact, it goes to the
opposite, namely that misconduct outside of the scope of the Applicant’s
public duties may nevertheless be a relevant consideration such that it
amounts to misconduct in public office.
I agree with Mr Chan that the Prosecution Code does not cease to apply just
because the First Email and Second Email were sent during the prescribed
lunch time and/or because they were unrelated to any particular court case
the Applicant was handling. The references to the international guidelines
appended to the Prosecution Code, which state prosecutors shall “at all
times maintain the honour and dignity of their profession”, “always conduct
themselves professionally, in accordance with the law and the rules and
ethics of their profession”, and “at all times exercise the highest
standards of integrity and care”, seemingly imply the Prosecution Code
extends beyond working hours to “all times”.
I also agree with Mr Chan’s submission that “misconduct” under the PS(A)O
may not even necessarily be related to a civil servant’s work or his
official duties.
I note the Applicant’s argument that the term “in the discharge of your
duty” must be an element of offence to be proved for the offences of both
charge (a) and (b). I also note the Applicant acknowledges that he did
not, at any stage of the Disciplinary Inquiry, raise this issue as he
failed to notice the term where it appeared in the long particulars of the
charges. Whilst the Applicant suggests that the matter ought to have been
identified by the two private barristers present, it was not, and hence (he
says) the Inquiry Committee did not take the issue into consideration when
it should have. But I do not think the argument takes him far.
In Dr Benjamin Mark Herbert v Veterinary Surgeons Board of Hong Kong [2018]
3 HKRLD 133, the Court of Appeal found at §§18-20 that an inquiry committee
is not restricted to determining only whether there has been a
transgression of only those matters set out expressly in the relevant rules
of professional conduct or codes of practice, but may include personal
behaviour which falls short of standards and reflects adversely on the
profession. Although this case was in the context of professional
misconduct committed by a registered veterinary surgeon, the rationale may
equally be applied to other allegations of professional misconduct. As
such, the mere fact that the Applicant sent the First Email and the Second
Email during his prescribed lunch hour does not assist his case.
In Tam Yuk Fun Toffee v Secretary for the Civil Service [2024] 3 HKLRD 528
(CFI), it was my finding at §§83-95 that misconduct may not necessarily be
related to a civil servant’s work or his official duties, and the
expression of personal views outside the work context may nevertheless
impact the work context or the perception of others about persons working
in that context. Although Tam Yuk Fun Toffee involved a teacher making
Facebook posts, I believe my findings are nevertheless applicable in the
current context. Those findings were not criticised on the appeal made in
that case (see below).
I note in particular the circumstances in which the First Email and Second
Email were issued:
1) Both emails were sent from the Applicant’s office email.
2) There is no suggestion that the First Email and Second Email
were not sent from his place of work.
3) The First Email was sent to all DOJ staff, and the Second Email
was sent to all CP grade staff.
4) In the First Email, the Applicant specifically alluded to his
position as Chairman of the Association and repeated twice that
he was asked in his “official capacity of the Association”.
5) The First Email was signed off with “Chairman, Court Prosecutors
(Department of Justice) Association”. The Applicant also
referred to his professional capacity “as prosecutors of DOJ”.
6) The Applicant clarified that “being asked in his official
capacity” meant that some of the Applicant’s friends “previously
asked him to do something in his official capacity to bring out
the faults of the Police in order to uphold justice in Hong
Kong”.
7) The Applicant has admitted that he did not consult the
Association before sending out the First Email.
8) In the Second Email sent to all CP grade staff, the Applicant
claimed he was “asked to send this email”.
Cumulatively, those circumstances are such that it would be reasonable for
the Inquiry Committee to find that the Applicant sent the two Emails in his
capacity as a CP – or, as it was put, in his “official capacity, using his
office email account and sending out to the whole DOJ”.
Both Emails can properly be thought to have affected the Applicant’s proper
discharge of his official duties. The First Email placed the Applicant in
an embarrassing position with his close work counterparts, the Police.
Although it might be said that the Second Email is somewhat vague and open
to broad interpretation, I think it was deliberately cryptic but its
intention was clear. I note that the Second Email had in fact aroused
concern from other staff and the media that the Applicant was inviting his
colleagues to join a prohibited rally.
The Inquiry Committee was fully entitled to conclude that the First Email
and the Second Email were sufficiently serious that they offended the core
values of the Civil Service Code and the Prosecution Code.
Grounds 1 and 2 are not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of
success. Alternatively, even if there were a proper basis for the grant of
leave, I would refuse both Grounds 1 and 2 on substantive hearing.
F. Grounds 3 and 4: Veracity of Claims
Similarly, Grounds 3 and 4 challenge the same issue of the “truthfulness”
of the allegations made by the Applicant in the First Email, and can be
dealt with together.
Ground 3 contends that the burden is on the Inquiry Committee to prove that
the content of the First Email amounts to “unwarranted allegations”,
whereas Ground 4 is premised on the Inquiry Committee’s alleged failure to
take into account the “truthfulness” of the First Email.
At §11.7 of the Inquiry Report, the Inquiry Committee decided it was for
the Applicant to explain the basis for his allegation as it was he who made
the allegation in the first place. Indeed, the Inquiry Committee concluded
that falsity is not an element of the charge, and the main issue was
whether the Applicant had any concrete evidence to support allegations. It
was not for the Assisting Officer to adduce evidence to prove what the
Applicant said was not true.
In Law Fei Shing v The Disciplinary Committee of the Hong Kong Institute of
Certified Public Accountants and another [2019] 4 HKLRD 225, Au JA held at
§26 that the focus should be on circumstances known to the applicant rather
than the correctness of the allegation:
26. As observed by the Judge, the Third Complaint is about the
applicant’s failure to qualify his opinion in the 2010 and
2011 Audited Reports in relation to the Impairment
Provision, but not on the correctness or amount of that
provision. It is an objective fact that the applicant did
not qualify his opinion in the 2010 and 2011 Audited
Reports. Hence, as rightly pointed out by the Judge, the
only essential and operative issue that needs to be
determined in this complaint is whether the applicant can
provide any reasonable explanations to justify why as at
the time of these reports he did not find it necessary to
qualify the opinion vis-à-vis the Impairment Provision.
The issue in turn relates to matters, circumstances and
information that are known to the applicant at the time
when he prepared those audited reports. These do not and
would not depend on what happened or existed during the
time of the Former Auditor, in particular when these
matters were not even known to the applicant at the time
when he prepared the 2010 and 2011 Audited Reports.
The Applicant contends the contents of the First Email were true and
therefore they are not “unwarranted allegations”. The Applicant goes
further to categorise the First Email as “a piece of valuable advice to the
Police not to commit unprofessional mistake [sic] in the eyes of the
public”. But, this is premised on the Applicant’s allegations being true,
to which the Inquiry Committee disagreed – and, as said, holding that
falsity is not an element of the charge.
The Applicant’s allegations can be seen as unwarranted for two reasons:
firstly because they are not supported by concrete evidence, and secondly
because there was no reason for the Applicant to air those allegations to
the SJ, DPP and all DOJ staff. The latter is to some extent a consequence
of the former, in that the allegations did not warrant being sent to the
SJ, DPP and DOJ staff precisely because they are not supported by concrete
evidence.
It is clear the Inquiry Committee took into account the support or
otherwise for the Applicant’s allegations in finding him guilty of
charge (a). It considered all relevant factors in concluding that the
First Email contained unwarranted allegations, namely (1) the Applicant’s
allegations were based on views informally expressed to him at a social
gathering by persons not directly involved in the arrests, (2) such
circumstantial evidence was no reliable proof to support the truth of his
allegations, and (3) the fact the Applicant sent the First Email to all of
the SJ, the DPP and all DOJ staff was particularly unwarranted.
Grounds 3 and 4 are not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of
success. Alternatively, even if there were a proper basis for the grant of
leave, I would refuse both Grounds 3 and 4 on substantive hearing.
G. Ground 5: Imprecision of Charge
The Applicant challenges the inclusion of the phrase “could have been
perceived” in charge (b) on the basis that it is too uncertain and vague,
and therefore unconstitutional.
The Applicant suggested that the Second Email could also have been
perceived to mean to invite/incite people to report to police if anyone
sees another person doing any unlawful act on the material day. With
respect, as a matter of law it is not now open to the Applicant to debate
the meaning of the Second Email with the benefit of hindsight, nor is it
open to the Court to substitute its own findings in place of that of the
Inquiry Committee.
On the other hand, Mr Chan submitted that there is no ambiguity arising
from “could have been perceived” because the matter can be sensibly tested
from an objective viewpoint. There is force to this argument. Ultimately,
the analysis of charge (b) seeks to determine whether the Second Email can
be capable of being understood as “inviting/inciting others to take part in
activities prohibited under the social distancing policy”. Further, it was
stated that the “reasonable man” principle should apply in determining
charge (b).
Mr Chan contended the Inquiry Committee was plainly entitled to reach the
conclusion it did on the Second Email, taking into account that the Second
Email was sent on 4 June 2020, coinciding with the date of an annual vigil
in Victoria Park. Mr Chan further submitted that an objective third party
would have understood the Applicant was not referring to online activities
(as had been suggested by the Applicant in the Disciplinary Inquiry), but
rather the in-person commemoration either in Victoria Park or elsewhere. I
note in particular the inclusion in the Second Email of “dated this the
last June 4 before the enactment of the National Security Law”. In
fairness, the Second Email had in fact been understood by some members of
the public as a concealed appeal to participate in those activities. In
the 7 October 2020 email to the Applicant, the DOJ interpreted the Second
Email as carrying an association with the vigils and the National Security
Law, felt it gave the impression of a “strong political stance”, and “could
be perceived to be inviting or even inciting others to participate in
prohibited activities such as a vigil at Victoria Park”.
The Inquiry Committee had the benefit of competing arguments as to what to
make of the Second Email, and it was well able to have formed its own view
through an objective lens with the benefit of that argument. Insofar as
the “reasonable man” principle is applied, it would not be unreasonable for
the Inquiry Committee to reach their conclusion on charge (b).
Ground 5 is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.
Alternatively, even if there were a proper basis for the grant of leave, I
would refuse Ground 5 on substantive hearing.
H. Ground 6: Standard of Proof
At its core, Ground 6 seeks to challenge the use of the “balance of
probabilities” standard by the Inquiry Committee.
It is settled that the more serious the act alleged, the more inherently
improbable must it be regarded, and the more compelling will be the
evidence needed to prove it on a preponderance of probability: A Solicitor
v Law Society of Hong Kong [2008] 2 HKLRD 576 at §116.
The Applicant submitted (what he described as) the more flexible standard
of “preponderance of probabilities” should have been applied. With
respect, this argument has no merit. In reality, both “balance of
probabilities” and “preponderance of probability” simply indicate the
standard that must be established, namely that it is “more likely than not”
that the person committed the act of which he is accused. “Preponderance”
may perhaps suggest some flexibility, but is otherwise no different from
“balance of probabilities”. Indeed, the Applicant admits in the Form 86
that the two terms “theoretically and legally could have no difference”.
That is correct. They are different ways of expressing the same test.
In determining the Disciplinary Inquiry against the Applicant, the Inquiry
Committee clearly paid mind to the correct standard of proof. At §11.2 of
the Inquiry Report under the subheading “Standard of Proof”, the Inquiry
Committee explicitly stated the standard of proof for disciplinary
proceedings to be the civil standard, i.e. the balance of probability, and
addressed the principle that the more serious the allegation is, the more
compelling/cogent the evidence required to prove it will be.
On the matter of whether the Inquiry Committee applied the requisite
standard of proof in actuality, I find in the affirmative. The contextual
circumstances of the Applicant’s case must be borne in mind and cannot be
viewed in a vacuum. The Applicant had previously issued the First Email
during a period of social and political unrest. It is undoubtedly well-
recognised that June 4 used to mark the occurrence of a vigil in Victoria
Park. The Second Email was also understood by some to be a request
“calling on all court prosecutors in a concealed style to commemorate that
night”. In light of the above, it seems reasonable for the Inquiry
Committee to arrive at the conclusion that it was indeed more likely than
not that the Second Email “could have easily been perceived to be inviting
colleagues to take part in activities that evening prohibited under the
prevailing social distancing policy at that time”.
Ground 6 is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.
Alternatively, even if there were a proper basis for the grant of leave, I
would refuse Ground 6 on substantive hearing.
I. Ground 7: Admissibility of ‘Silent Stance”
The Applicant argues the Inquiry Committee committed an error in law in
finding that the “silent stance” of the Police after the issuing of the
First Email was inadmissible to prove the truthfulness of the First Email.
§11.9 of the Inquiry Report is as follows (bold in original):
11.9 [The Applicant’s] so-called circumstantial evidence was
also no reliable proof to support the truth of his
allegations. We consider it mainly a speculation rather
than a compelling inference that the timing of the seven
arrests must be a deliberate decision to frighten off
potential protestors on the sensitive date of
31 August 2019. We also do not find it acceptable
circumstantial evidence to take into account circumstances
after the issuing of his email, not to mention that the
silent stance of the Police could not be construed to mean
that his allegation was true.
In my view, it was not the finding of the Inquiry Committee that the
“silent stance” was inadmissible. There was no indication as to the
admissibility of evidence in the Inquiry Committee’s findings. Further, as
accepted by the Applicant in the Form 86, after such evidence was admitted
the Inquiry Committee was entitled not to attach any weight to it and
reject it. That is precisely what has happened in my opinion: the Inquiry
Committee found it was circumstantial evidence raised by the Applicant to
substantiate his claim which in any event was not accepted by the Inquiry
Committee.
I further agree with Mr Chan that it is simply a quantum leap to suggest
silence implies wholesale acceptance. Indeed, the First Email was not sent
nor copied to the Police, but rather to DOJ staff only. The circumstances
and context in which the First Email was sent must also be borne in mind.
During such a period of social turbulence, where similar allegations were
routinely directed at the Police, it would be absurd to draw inferences
from the Police’s lack of response to those allegations.
Moreover, charge (a) does not concern the truthfulness of the Applicant’s
claims in the First Email. Whether his allegations are substantiated by
such “silence” was, with respect, irrelevant.
Ground 7 is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.
Alternatively, even if there were a proper basis for the grant of leave, I
would refuse Ground 7 on substantive hearing.
J. Ground 8: Fair Hearing
Ground 8 is premised on the challenge that the Applicant was denied a fair
hearing for three reasons, being (a) there was no severance of the charges,
(b) the Applicant was denied the opportunity to cross-examine a crucial
witness originally listed on the witness’ list, and (c) there was no
disclosure of disclosable police materials.
On severance of charges, the Applicant submitted that charge (a) and
charge (b) are not of the same or similar character or “so connected
together as to form the same transaction”, and therefore should not have
been heard together. The Applicant further alleged he suffered prejudice
as a result of the failure to severe the charges, namely (1) the loss of
choice to elect to give evidence for one of the charges but not the other,
and (2) the Inquiry Committee’s decision for one charge being influenced by
prejudicial evidence in the other charge.
On the other hand, Mr Chan submitted the Inquiry Committee had no authority
to amend the three charges, nor was there any need to sever those charges.
As is clear from the outset, the nature of the case against the Applicant
was not that of a criminal trial, but rather an internal disciplinary
inquiry. As such, the usual rules and regulations which govern such trials
do not apply. The overall purpose of the Disciplinary Inquiry was to
determine whether the Applicant was guilty of misconduct serious enough to
warrant dismissal or compulsory retirement in accordance with section 10 of
the PS(A)O. Those charges merely set out individual instances which
cumulatively formed the larger pattern of misconduct of which the Applicant
was accused.
I further note the Inquiry Committee addressed this issue specifically at
§3.10 of the Inquiry Report. In particular, it was stated that the Inquiry
Committee “would be mindful that it would consider each charge separately,
unprejudiced by the other charges”. The Inquiry Report shows that to have
been so. There is no evidence the Applicant has suffered any prejudice as
a result of the charges being heard together either. This point is
unsubstantiated and must fail.
Secondly, the Applicant complained he was unable to cross-examine a witness
originally listed on the witnesses list, that witness being Ms Lily Ho
(“Ms Ho”) who was an ex-Senior Court Prosecutor I and the immediate
supervising officer of the Applicant in the same court at the material
time.
Whether a fair hearing requires that there be an opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses is largely dependent on the circumstances of the case in
question. The reasons and purposes for requiring cross-examination and the
prejudice occasioned by the want of cross-examination are important
considerations in deciding whether an applicant had been deprived of a fair
hearing: Tsui Ma Ching v An Investigation Committee Appointed Pursuant to
Section 6 of the Public Service (Discipline) Regulation and Section 10 of
the Public Service (Administration) Order 1997 and another (unreported,
HCAL 20/2004, 26 January 2005) at §42.
After careful consideration, I am persuaded by Mr Chan’s submissions.
Ms Ho was not a key witness to charge (c), nor was her evidence relevant to
charges (a) and (b). The Applicant in any event has not suffered any
prejudice as a result of not being afforded the opportunity to cross
examine the witness as he was acquitted of charge (c).
Indeed, Ms Ho’s relevance to the Disciplinary Inquiry is rather limited in
scope for charge (c) only, and is in fact completely irrelevant to charge
(a) and (b). Of any significance at all was Ms Ho’s meeting with the
Applicant on 23 December 2020, whereby she informed the Applicant to follow
the recommendations by Mr Ricky Fung (OC Court) to stop sending emails
directly to the police, but to route them through OC Court. On
24 December 2020, i.e. the date of the Third Email, Ms Ho also conveyed to
Mr Vincent Siu (“Siu”) who was acting in her post as SCP I the instructions
of Mr Aaron Lee (“Lee”) for the Applicant to route any messages to police
or other working partners through his supervisor.
The Inquiry Committee also held that the key witnesses in respect of
charge (c) were Lee and Siu. However, the Applicant elected not to cross-
examine either Lee or Siu.
Ultimately, Ms Ho was removed as a witness because she left Hong Kong after
retirement and was unwilling to come back to Hong Kong or give online
testimony. The Legal Representative considered there was sufficient
evidence against the Applicant even without Ms Ho. On 2 September 2022,
Ms Ho was contacted once again to see if she was willing to give evidence,
to which she replied she had not received a vaccination, and did not wish
to come back nor did she wish to give evidence online. I further note that
the Applicant on 15 November 2022 withdrew his request for Ms Ho’s presence
at the Disciplinary Inquiry. The Applicant repeated his request on
30 January 2023, but the Assisting Officer had by then already submitted
her evidence and called her witnesses.
I find there was no procedural unfairness arising out of Ms Ho’s absence
from cross-examination.
Lastly, the Applicant’s submission that there was no disclosure of
disclosable police materials does not stand. Mr Chan reiterated that the
central issue in charge (a) is whether the allegations in the First Email
were unwarranted, not the truthfulness of those allegations. I agree. In
any event, the Applicant accepts this Ground stands or falls with Ground 4,
i.e. that the Inquiry Committee failed to take into account the relevant
consideration of the veracity of the Applicant’s allegations in the First
Email. I repeat my findings above, and consequently find this point must
also fail.
In Leung Fuk Wah Oil v Commissioner of Police [2002] 3 HKLRD 653, Cheung JA
held that the existence of actual prejudice was a relevant factor to be
considered in a fairness challenge at §§40 and 76:
40. Judicial review is a discretionary remedy. If the breach
of the principle of fairness does not produce a substantial
prejudice to the applicant, the court is bound to take this
into account in deciding whether relief should be given.
This is consistent with the concept that the court should
not substitute its own decision for that of the decision-
maker.
76. Judicial review being a discretionary remedy, if Mr Leung
does not, as a matter of substance, suffer prejudice, then
the failure to observe the principle of fairness should not
be a ground for quashing the decision. This is what
happens here. As the judge was not invited to consider the
question of discretion, we are entitled to exercise the
discretion ourselves. The discretion should be exercised
against the granting of any relief. The Commissioner’s
appeal must be allowed.
I am not convinced there was any breach of fairness, nor am I persuaded
that the Applicant has suffered any prejudice, from the points above.
As such, Ground 8 is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of
success. Even if leave were to be granted, I would dismiss Ground 8 on
substantive review.
K. Ground 9: Wednesbury Unreasonableness
Ground 9 is essentially a challenge to the Dismissal Decision on the basis
of Wednesbury unreasonableness. In other words, the question is whether
the Dismissal Decision is so disproportionate to the misconduct in question
as to be perverse, or so unduly oppressive as to be unreasonable or
irrational in the public law sense.
The punishment imposed on the Applicant was indeed the most serious kind
which could be imposed on a civil servant charged with disciplinary
offences, being dismissal with forfeiture of all pensions accrued for
roughly 30 years.
The general approach regarding challenges against sanctions imposed by a
disciplinary authority on the ground of irrationality was laid down by the
Court of Appeal in Tam Yuk Fun Toffee v Secretary for the Civil Service
[2026] HKCA 389 at §§40-43 and can be readily summarised as follows:
1) As a disciplinary sanction is not primarily punitive in nature,
considerations which would ordinarily weigh in mitigation of
punishment have less effect than on the ordinary run of
sentences.
2) The reputation of the profession is far more important than the
fortunes of any individual member. Thus, even when a severe
penalty might heavily impact an applicant, which might attract
some sympathy, nevertheless “duty to the public” is the test to
be applied.
3) However, it is ultimately a matter for the disciplinary
authority to decide the weight to be attached to such
circumstances in the overall weighing exercise when deciding on
the appropriate sanction.
4) The disciplinary authority with the requisite judgment and
expertise regarding the professional standards of its discipline
is most qualified to conduct the assessment and weighing
exercise.
5) Therefore, the Court should exercise a considerable degree of
judicial restraint and give due deference to the disciplinary
authority’s judgment as to the appropriate sanction.
6) To succeed in an irrationality challenge, the applicant must
satisfy the court that the sanction is so unduly oppressive and
out of proportion to the occasion that it falls outside the
bounds of any decision open to a reasonable authority.
7) It is not enough for the Court to intervene even where it is
felt that a less severe sanction could have been imposed.
8) It is trite that differently constituted disciplinary
authorities will reasonably take different views on the gravity
of the accused misconduct and/or the sanctions to be imposed.
9) Therefore, mere citation of other decisions in which lighter
sanctions were imposed cannot be a valid ground of rationality
challenge.
Ultimately, the proper question to ask was whether dismissal falls within
the reasonable range of sanctions in the circumstances of the present case,
and the assessment and weight to be attached to the factors relevant to the
exercise at hand is a matter for the Secretary: see Tam Yuk Fun Toffee (CA)
at §62.
The Applicant was informed of the outcome of the Disciplinary Inquiry and
was provided with a copy of the Inquiry Report on 10 July 2023. The
Applicant was also invited to submit representations as to whether the
disciplinary authority should accept the findings of the Inquiry Committee
and in mitigation of punishment. The deadline for the Applicant to submit
his representations was extended to 2 August 2023 upon his request, yet he
failed to provide any representations by the deadline.
There is significant weight to the fact that the Dismissal Decision
involved a multi-tiered review. The Inquiry Committee’s findings were
reviewed by the DOJ and the PSC before the Dismissal Decision was
ultimately reached by the Secretary.
The Applicant sought to highlight two distinct features in the present case
which he argued rendered such severe punishment an error in the public law
sense, being (1) the evidence upon which charge (b) was founded was vague
and open to interpretation, and (2) the Inquiry Committee failed to
determine the veracity of the contents of the First Email.
With respect, it is apparent these “distinct features” are essentially
reruns of previous Grounds raised by the Applicant, namely Grounds 5 and 4
respectively. My findings were that both Grounds are not reasonably
arguable and/or refused upon substantive hearing. Therefore, this argument
is moot.
The Applicant further advanced the argument that, as the Inquiry Committee
“failed to determine the issue of truthfulness or falsity of the contents
of the First Email”, the version of fact most favourable to the Applicant
must be adopted for the purpose of imposing punishment, i.e. that the First
Email was “valuable advice given to police”. But, the Inquiry Committee
found that the important point was whether the Applicant had concrete
evidence to support his allegation at the time of issuing the email, and
not whether the Applicant’s allegations were true, i.e. what the actual
motive of the police arrests were. Therefore, whether the Applicant’s
allegations in the First Email were “true” is immaterial to the severity of
punishment. Further, it can be said that the very act of sending an email
stating his personal views, from his office account, to the SJ, DPP and
other DOJ staff went against the Prosecution Code and Civil Service Code,
and the necessary principles of impartiality, professionalism and political
neutrality.
In arriving at the Dismissal Decision, the Secretary took into account the
gravity of the Applicant’s misconduct as demonstrated by the following
factors:
1) The issuance of the First and Second Emails reflected a lack of
proper regard to the core values of integrity, impartiality,
political neutrality and professionalism as set out in the Civil
Service Code. This was particularly so in light of the
Applicant’s 26 years of experience in the Government and as a CP
of the DOJ, and in spite of a letter from the Secretary in
August 2019 reminding civil servants of the need to cherish the
core values of the Civil Service Code.
2) The Applicant’s actions reflected a serious failure to uphold a
high standard of professionalism and to exercise sound judgment
in expressing his views.
3) The First Email gave rise to a perception of conflict of
interest with the Applicant’s official duties, or was seen to
have compromised the important principle of maintaining
impartiality and political neutrality in discharging his duties
in an unbiased and professional manner.
4) The Second Email was issued at a sensitive time which could have
easily led others to associate the email with the vigil. It
would easily be perceived to have incited others to participate
in the prohibited activities under the Government’s social
distancing measures at the time, and could give the impression
that CPs have a strong political stance and possibly compromise
the principle of maintaining political neutrality.
5) Because of the Applicant’s actions, a number of complainants
cast doubts on the neutrality of the prosecution and the
judicial system.
6) The Applicant took an evasive approach in the subsequent
departmental investigation, and behaved in a poor manner in the
Disciplinary Inquiry.
7) The Applicant pleaded not guilty in the Disciplinary Inquiry,
and did not show any remorse.
The Secretary had not lost sight of the possibility of an alternative,
lesser punishment. But, it was the finding of the Secretary that the
gravity of the Applicant’s misconduct was very serious and at the higher
end of the scale, which did not justify a lighter punishment other than
dismissal to reflect the gravity and to achieve the desired punitive and
deterrent effect.
The Secretary also took into account the fact that the Applicant had a
clear disciplinary record and consistently received “Outstanding” or
“Highly Effective” ratings for his performance in the past five years prior
to the Disciplinary Inquiry.
For completeness, two precedent cases were considered, but they were not
considered to be comparable to the Applicant’s case. In any event, the
fact that those cases imposed less severe sentences does not assist, nor
does it constitute ground to trigger an irrationality exercise. Even where
the sentence is not lenient by comparison with other cases, that does not
in itself warrant interference by the Court, and a severe award does not
make it irrational: see Wong Chun Wai Pett v Commissioner of Police [2020]
2 HKLRD 325 at §37.
In light of these circumstances, the Dismissal Decision cannot be said to
be “so harsh and oppressive” that its imposition involved some error of law
and/or unreasonableness in the public law sense so that the Court might
interfere.
As such, Ground 9 must also be rejected.
L. Result
Grounds 1 to 9 all fail, and the Applicant’s application for judicial
review is dismissed.
As to costs, I see no reason why they should not follow the event, and I
order the Applicant to pay the Secretary’s costs, to be taxed if not
agreed.
(Russell Coleman)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court
The applicant, acting in person
Mr Anthony Chan SC, instructed by, and Ms Vivian Kao, Senior Government
Counsel of, the Department of Justice, for the putative respondent
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