RAKESH KUMAR v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 1424/2020

[2025] HKCFI 5326

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1424 of 2020

 Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following:

1.  The Form 86 is amended on the Court’s own motion, adding “/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office” behind the first appearance of the words “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and naming only the Director of Immigration as the Putative Interested Party; and

2.  The application for leave to apply for Judicial Review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.  The Applicant is a national of India. By a Form 86 filed on 8 July 2020 (“Form 86”), which was accompanied by a supporting Affirmation also dated and filed on 8 July 2020 (“the Affirmation”), the Applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review of a decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”)/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“NRCPO”) made on 19 November 2018 (“the TCAB Decision”)[1].  I will use the abbreviations and definitions from the TCAB Decision unless otherwise specified herein.

2.  The Applicant sought and attended the oral hearing of his application on 7 August 2025.  In relation to the question of delay, he made some submissions with reference to his previous application for leave to apply for judicial review in HCAL 2727/2018. I hence adjourned the hearing to 14 August 2025 (on which date it concluded) to ensure access, and to hear further submissions from him in relation, to the relevant documents. I will set out such below where relevant.

3.  I have amended the Form 86 of my own motion to reflect the identities of the proper Putative Respondent, and the Putative Interested Party.

Background

4.  The background to the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim is, and his procedural and immigration history are, set out in the TCAB Decision.  While I will not repeat the contents thereof, in summary and in relation to the assessment of his claim:

(1)   The Applicant claimed non-refoulement relief on the basis that if he were sent back to India, he would be harmed or killed by his uncle (“Uncle”) and his people because of a land dispute, and as he had assaulted his Uncle’s son in revenge;

(2)   The claim was assessed on the grounds of Torture Risk[2], BOR 2 Risk[3], BOR 3 Risk[4], and Persecution Risk[5] and was rejected by the Director of Immigration (“Director”) in a decision dated 14 February 2018 (“Director’s Decision”)[6]; and

(3)   The Applicant appealed/petitioned to the TCAB/NRCPO, which determined the matter without an oral hearing in the TCAB Decision issued on 19 November 2018, whereby the Applicant’s appeal/petition was dismissed and the Director’s Decision was confirmed.

5.  The Applicant then sought leave to apply for judicial review of the TCAB Decision in HCAL 2717/2018 (“the 2018 Leave Application”). The 2018 Leave Application was filed within three months of the TCAB Decision time limit and consisted of a Form 86 and Affirmation (“2018 Form 86” and “2018 Affirmation” respectively). Both documents clearly had input from someone with legal training, given their layout, contents, and formatting, including the requests for relief and other contents thereof, and the complaints contained in the 2018 Affirmation.

6.  The Applicant then filed an affirmation in the 2018 Leave Application on 22 January 2020 (“January 2020 Withdrawal Affirmation”), in which he said “Respectfully, I write this affirmation to know the Court that my all problem was finished and solved in my Country. So I want to go back. So it is my kindly request to the Court to please withdrawl(sic) my case as soon as practicable.”

7.  Upon reading the January 2020 Withdrawal Affirmation, Bruno Chan DHCJ. ordered on 10 March 2020 that the 2018 Leave Application be withdrawn (“March 2020 Order”), but did not dismiss the 2018 Leave Application.

8.  On 8 July 2020, and hence over 3 months after the March 2020 Order, the Applicant filed the present Form 86 and Affirmation in support of the present leave application. He was allowed to do so by a Master as the 2018 Leave Application had been withdrawn.

Legal Principles

9.  An applicant, even one acting in person, is required to identify the grounds of judicial review clearly and succinctly in the Form 86, and to fully and frankly disclose all material facts and potential legal answers (Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, unrep. HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016, Chow J. (as he was then) at §142; Leung Kwok Hung, unrep., HCAL 83/2012, 28 September 2013, Lam J. (as he was then) at §35; Begum Khadija [2018] HKCA 571; Khan Kamran [2020] HKCA 380).

10.  It is trite that the role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal, and that the Court should not usurp the role of the TCAB/NRCPO which is (and together with the Director are) the primary decision‑makers.  The assessment of evidence, COI materials, and credibility, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the TCAB/NRCPO and the Director, which are entitled to make evaluations based on the evidence available and to decide the weight to be given to them.  While the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinising the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the TCAB/NRCPO.  (Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524; Re Kartini [2019] HKCA 1022; Re Rupinder Singh [2021] HKCA 886).

11.  In order for me to give leave for judicial review, I have to be satisfied that there is an intended ground of review which is reasonably arguable, which is one that enjoys a realistic prospect of success (Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676).  As a leave application of this sort is meant to be a filtering process, I am not expected to give elaborate reasons for my decision (see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14, at §23).

12.  Given RHC O. 53 r. 4(1) and s. 21K(6) High Court Ordinance (CAP. 4A), where an Applicant applies for leave to apply for judicial review more than 3 months after the decision:

(1)   The failure to apply within 3 months constitutes “undue delay”. To justify an extension of time in which to apply for leave, the Applicant must show “good reason” to extend time.  In deciding this, certain factors that are likely to be significant are (i) the length of the delay (ii) the explanation for the delay[7] (iii) the merits of the substantive application[8] (iv) prejudice, and (v) whether the application raises questions of general public importance;

(2)   Where the court considers that there is no good reason for extending the period, it will refuse leave to apply for judicial review.  The refusal of an extension of time is part and parcel of a refusal to grant leave to apply.  It is not the case that the court refuses the extension of time as a discrete decision and then makes no decision on the question of leave to apply for judicial review, treating this as a separate matter entirely;

(3)   If the court is satisfied that there is good reason for extending the period, it does not follow that leave to apply for judicial review will automatically be given.  While the court might grant leave, it retains a discretion to refuse to do so and the existence of a good reason for undue delay is only one facet of the question, others including sufficiency of interest and the need to satisfy the arguability test.  Leave may also be refused on the basis that the granting of the relief sought would be likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the rights of, any person or would be detrimental to good administration; and

(4)   Even if leave to apply is granted, the issue of undue delay on the part of the applicant may be raised again at the substantive hearing of the judicial review application.  That is a separate consideration of whether relief should be refused on the basis that the court thinks that relief would be likely to cause substantial hardship or prejudice to the rights of another or be detrimental to good administration.

See AW v Director of Immigration & anor. [2016] 2 HKC 393 (CA) (at §§23 to 36), Thomas Lai [2014] 6 HKC 1 (at §§43 to 45 as also cited in AW, supra), and H v Director of Immigration (2020) 23 HKCFAR 248 at §§17-22, 36-44 citing inter alia both AW and Thomas Lai.  See also Re Hariatiningsih [2021] HKCFI 1194 at §§12-13, 16-19 citing the aforesaid, upheld in [2022] HKCA 1321.

Discussion

13.  The application was filed some 18 months after the TCAB Decision, and over 3 months after the March 2020 Order. I consider that there has been undue delay, and that there is no good reason to extend time for the Applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review.  I therefore refuse to grant such extension of time, and I dismiss the application for leave to apply for judicial review.  This is for the following reasons.

14.  As to merits, the Form 86 and Affirmation did not set out any grounds for judicial review of, or hence advance any allegation of procedural unfairness in relation to, and/or of any error of law in, and/or any irrationality/failure to meet the enhanced Wednesbury test in, the TCAB Decision. Indeed, the 2018 Form 86 also contained no grounds for judicial review.

15.  However, at the resumed hearing, the Applicant asked me to take into account the allegations and complaints made in the 2018 Affirmation in support of his case, as he said his case and problem were the same. Although he has failed to specify such grounds or complaints in the present Form 86 and the Affirmation, I have given the seriousness of the issues at hand considered such below.

16.  The 2018 Affirmation is entirely in English with no interpretation clause, and as I have mentioned, its contents have clearly had the input of someone with legal training. The Applicant had at Paragraphs 14 to 29 thereof set out various complaints on which he now relies, portions of which have been copied more or less word for word from other cases.  They can be summarised and organised as follows:

(1)   The Applicant does not agree with decisions made by the Director and the TCAB, as he “believes that his case has been determined unfairly” (see Paragraph 14 of the 2018 Affirmation); (Complaint 1)

(2)   He believes that the Director “has rejected my claim simply for the sake of rejecting all non-refoulement claims and hence only adopted a very uninformed approach in concluding” and has “wrongly determined his case” (see Paragraphs 19, 21 of the 2018 Affirmation); (Complaint 2)

(3)   There has been a breach of the high standard of fairness given the following allegations (which are said at Paragraph 20 of the 2018 Affirmation to be “paired together”):

a.   As he had been advised by the Duty Lawyer that there were no merits of appeal against the Director’s Decision, he had no language assistance and no legal assistance in relation to his Notice of Appeal/Petition against the Director’s Decision. With “very little legal guidance it was not possible for me to satisfy any authorities, ground by ground, in accordance with USM grounds”, he did not have an “adequate amount” of language assistance (as English was not his first language), and he could not “understand the Notice of Appeal, fill in the relevant information”, and receive, understand and respond to correspondence, and that there “should be… language assistance provided to me whenever it was required” such as in those contexts. Hence “As [the Applicant had] explained to the [TCAB/NRCPO, the Applicant] filed an appeal because [his] life was in danger, but [he] could not understand the procedure”, and “the lack of language assistance has been detrimental of(sic) my case” (see Paragraphs 15 to 17, 20, 22 of the 2018 Affirmation); and (Complaint 3A)

b.   There was no hearing, but he believed “there should be a hearing” and the TCAB erred in his consideration by “failing to take into account(sic) without a hearing” (see Paragraph 20 of the 2018 Affirmation); (Complaint 3B)

(4)   Not only had the Director wrongly determined his case, but “despite laying these out as grounds of appeal”, the Adjudicator “did not properly address those issues properly and instead just came up with the assessment on more or less of a templet(sic) basis.” He says that “For instance, one of my complaints was that the immigration officer had wrongly decided that my fear is not well-founded.” (see Paragraph 21 of the 2018 Affirmation); (Complaint 4);

(5)   He had no legal or language assistance in relation to the contents of the TCAB Decision, and he has never had it read to him in his first language or translated on paper, and does not understand the reasons for rejection of his case by the TCAB/NRCPO (see Paragraphs 22 to 23, 26 to 28 and 29 of the 2018 Affirmation) (Complaint 5):

i.   Even though, with apparent reference to a passage which he says he has quoted from the “AM” case, adequate reasons must be given by the TCAB/NRCPO; (Complaint 5A)

ii.   The “oversight of the need of language assistance is alarming” as “some of the claimants who had gone through Pilot scheme have been provided with translations, while the Duty Lawyer service did not. There should not have been a differential treatment”; (Complaint 5B)

iii.   He has hence been “deprived of the opportunity to make a full application for leave to apply for judicial review” and reserves “the right to submit” further evidence and further grounds either orally or in writing “upon the Determination of petition issued… being read back to me in my first language via a qualified interpreter”. He hence requested “an oral hearing to be arranged for me with an interpreter available”, and was also “currently seeking legal presentation(sic) and reserve the right to submit additional and/or amended grounds and documents in support of [his] claim.”; (Complaint 5C)

iv.   “… the fact that there was absolutely no assistance provided to me as a non-refoulement claimant is far from achieving the high standard of fairness” which he says “should be measured against the normal standard of non-refoulement claimants, and not the wider public.” (Complaint 5D).

(6)   He also claims that the wrong decision was reached on the merits as “On top of the procedural unfairness, I respectfully submit that there still remains a high risk and that my life is genuinely in danger should I return in(sic) India, and I am happy to discuss in detail on the day of an oral hearing, upon which I will be able to provide oral evidence in my first language, which is what I am most comfortable with.” (see Paragraph 24 of the 2018 Affirmation) (Complaint 6)

17.  Firstly, once the Applicant had pursued his appeal to the TCAB/NRCPO the Director’s Decision was (absent exceptional circumstances, of which none have been suggested to me) no longer susceptible to judicial review (Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549; Yeni Setyawati v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2019] HKCA 1310; Sherpunja Thapa Kul Prasad [2022] HKCFI 2434 §18). Accordingly:

(1)   Complaint 2 is unarguable and cannot found any basis for leave to apply for judicial review; and

(2)   When considering the other Complaints (in particular Complaints 1 and 4) I shall ignore any portions that apparently relate to the Director and/or decisions made by him, as such are not reasonably arguable and must be dismissed.

18.  Thirdly, and in relation to Complaints 3A and 3B, I do not see that there has been a breach of the high standard of fairness in relation to the alleged lack of legal or language assistance after the Director’s Decision (in particular on appeal/petition to the TCAB/NRCPO), and/or given that the appeal/petition was disposed of without an oral hearing. Nor do I see that Complaint 4 is made out, whether on its own, in relation to or support of Complaints 3A, 3B, and/or such as to establish a reasonably arguable breach of the high standard of fairness or another public law error:

(1)   The high standard of fairness does not grant the Applicant an absolute right to free legal representation or interpretation services at all stages of the proceedings. (Re Zafar Muazam (unrep., CACV 2/2018, 23 March 2018); Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14; Re Zahid Abbas [2018] HKCA 15, Re Tariq Farhan [2018] HKCA 17; Re Lopchan Subash [2018] HKCA 37; Re Ahmed Syed Rafiq [2018] HKCA 178 at §22; Akhondo Shakil [2021] HKCA 1616 at §20[9]; Vu Hong Diep v Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office [2023] HKCA 1378; Kamran Khan [2022] HKCFI 1924 at §§21-25 and [2022] HKCA 230 at §§16-17).

(2)   There is nothing amiss in relation to the issue of legal representation after the Director’s Decision.  The Applicant had been legally represented and assisted up to the making of the Director’s Decision, not only in relation to completion of the NCF but also at the Interview, and had been repeatedly reminded (as stated in Director’s Decision Paragraph 4) that he was obliged to provide all information relevant to the claim and to make prompt and full disclosure of all material facts in support of the claim, including any documents supporting those facts. While the DLS can appear in appeal proceedings, this is subject to a merits test, and absent any assertion that the merits test had not been properly applied, the Applicant cannot complain about the lack of legal representation in proceedings before the TCAB/NRCPO (Zunariyah, supra, at §19).  No such assertion is advanced, and there is no sufficient basis to support such.

(3)   Similarly, the high standard of fairness does not require or include provision of interpretation at any time the Applicant claimed or desired, particularly when it was his choice to enter Hong Kong illegally and claim non-refoulement relief[10], where the official languages are Chinese and English. He has to find assistance from among his friends and ethnic community. In any event, all of the 2018 Form 86, the 2018 Affirmation, the January 2020 Withdrawal Affirmation, and the present Form 86 and Affirmation were in English, and only the Affirmation contained an interpretation clause. Hence the Applicant either understood English[11] or has access to, and would have been able to seek, interpretation services and language assistance if necessary (Gurnishan Singh, supra; Gurung Sagar, supra; Kamran Khan, supra; Zafar Muazam, supra).

(4)   Insofar as the Applicant alleges that the lack of legal and language assistance has led to procedural unfairness, he has not provided any details of how the lack of such assistance led to any error, or unreasonable/unfair procedure, at the TCAB/NRCPO-level, let alone with any reference to the Notice of Appeal/Petition and “correspondence” (as to which on the evidence there does not appear to have been any). Without such details, the argument is untenable (see Akhondo Shakil, supra, at §§18-19). Moreover, if the Applicant alleges that in Paragraph 17 of the 2018 Affirmation that he had explained to the TCAB/NRCPO that he could not understand the procedure, I reject this as a bare and unsubstantiated allegation as he has not produced or referred me to, nor do I see, any documents (including his of Appeal/Petition) which show that he did so.

(5)   I also do not see how it can be said that the lack of such assistance resulted in any relevant public law error by, or unreasonable/unfair procedure before, the TCAB/NRCPO whether on its own or “paired together” with the lack of an oral hearing:

i.   It is trite that there is no entitlement to an oral hearing. Rather, whether one should be held is a matter subject to the considerations mentioned in ST v Betty Kwan [2014] 4 HKLRD 277 (CA). Here, the TCAB/NRCPO reviewed the papers before it, referred to the factors in ST v Betty Kwan, supra, and determined that the appeal/petition could be justly determined without an oral hearing; and

ii.   The Applicant has not explained, or provided the requisite particulars with reference to the facts of the case, how or why this approach breached the high standard of fairness. Rather, the Applicant has only made generic, vague, and unparticularised assertions without reference to any underlying facts or matters, which general assertions or propositions without particulars are not effective grounds to support a judicial review and cannot assist the Applicant (Akhondo Shakil, supra, at §15; Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20 at §17; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA 578 at §24; Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626 at §24; Re Salim Ahmed [2020] HKCA 244 at §20; Haider Khalil [2021] HKCA 223 at §16);

(6)   Similarly, there is no detail as to how Complaint 4 has been made out or arises with requisite particulars in relation to the fact of the case.

(7)   In any event, I have conducted a rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny of the TCAB Decision, applying the enhanced Wednesbury standard and bearing in mind the need for a high standard of fairness. I do not see that such gives rise to any reasonably arguable ground for judicial review in the nature of Complaints 3A, 3B, and 4, or indeed procedural unfairness, an error of law, and/or irrationality/failure to meet the enhanced Wednesbury test, that is sufficient to vitiate the NRCPO Decision and justify the grant of leave. In particular, I cannot discern any public law error to vitiate the TCAB/NRCPO’s finding, on the evidence, that there was no evidence of a Convention reason in relation to Persecution Risk (Paragraphs 24(b), 26, 33). Nor do I see any reasonable argument that the TCAB/NRCPO committed any public law error when it assessed the extent and type of past harm to the Applicant based on the Applicant’s own evidence, and assessed the likely risk of harm, and the availability of state protection and internal relocation on the other evidence and COI before it, which areas and findings are all within the province of the TCAB/NRCPO. I do not see any reasonable argument that the decision-maker did not properly address the Applicant’s case, or carried out the assessment on a template basis (having had regard, also, to the duty to give reasons which I address below). There is also no public law basis to vitiate the conclusions reached in relation to each type of risk and that would justify the grant of leave[12].

19.  The remainder of Complaint 1 has been dealt with by the aforesaid analysis, not least because even if and insofar as the Applicant is claiming that there is some other free-standing unfairness other than those already identified above, that is entirely inadequate as a ground of judicial review and does not assist him given the lack of requisite particulars per the authorities as analysed at Paragraph 18(5)ii above.

20.  I also do not consider that Complaints 5 to 5D and 6 (whether on their own, cumulatively, and/or in relation to the overarching complaint relating to the contents of the TCAB Decision) raise any reasonably arguable ground of judicial review. Nor do I see that they are relevant to or assist the leave application:

(1)   AM v Director of Immigration & anor.  [2014] 1 HKC 416 does not actually contain the quoted portion at Complaint 5A, and I also do not see that Complaint 5A alleges that inadequate reasons were given by the TCAB/NRCPO, let alone with reference to the requisite particulars in relation to the facts of the case. Nevertheless, I have considered the contents of the TCAB Decision and I do not consider that there is any reasonably arguable case that the TCAB/NRCPO breached its duty to give adequate reasons, having regard to the relevant principles that have been set out by the appellate courts in Secretary for Security v Prabakar (2004) 7 HKCFAR 187 at §51 and Melemoko Ndiala Saint Juste Seguy Lionel [2021] HKCA 609 at §5. Indeed, the contents of the TCAB Decision are patently sufficient to enable the Applicant to consider the possibilities of administrative and judicial review.

(2)   The Applicant has produced no evidence to support his bare allegation that there has been some “oversight” or “differential treatment” mentioned in relation to Complaint 5B, including as to which (if any) claimants to which he is referring, and the relevant circumstances thereof.

(3)   Further, and in any event, not only do I see nothing amiss with regard to the situation regarding legal or language assistance in relation to the TCAB Decision (particularly when Legal Aid may be sought and granted, subject to a merits test), but I also see no basis for the Applicant’s claim that the alleged lack of such assistance has inhibited his ability to proceed with the present leave application, particularly when he either sufficiently understood English or had been able to seek and had in fact obtained language assistance in the 2018 Leave Application, as well as assistance in the former from someone who has been legally trained. Moreover, he made oral submissions to me (which I have set out below) with the assistance of an interpreter. See Re Kartini [2025] HKCA 699 at §16(5)-(6).

(4)   Complaint 6 is misconceived, as the role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal, and as judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh even in the absence of any legal error (Lakhwinder Singh, supra). Moreover, and indeed, I do not see how the matters in Complaint 6, the allegation in the Affirmation that “in due time circumstances change and now I need some more time to sort out my problems”, or similar claims made at the hearing before me, are relevant to or assist the Applicant’s application:

i.   At the resumed hearing, the Applicant initially suggested that he wanted to submit police complaints from India which “those people” had filed against him, which he said were dated before he came to Hong Kong, and which he claimed he had only learnt about after he had come to Hong Kong “later in 2015”. However, he then said he was not applying to submit such documents, that they were not relevant to his application for judicial review, and that whatever related to his case had already been mentioned in writing (both in the 2018 Leave Application and in the present leave application), which was what he wanted me to take into account rather than his oral submissions. I note that in any event, it is clear that the Director’s Decision and the TCAB Decision refer to the fact that police complaints had allegedly been made against the Applicant;

ii.   During the resumed hearing, the Applicant also said that at the time of the January 2020 Withdrawal Affirmation he said that he wanted to go back because he “could see that [the problem] was ending”, but that afterward (without any proof) that “those people who had the problem started creating some trouble again”, and he had felt unwell, so he had changed his mind, and hence had filed the present application. I do not see or accept that such bare allegations are relevant to the leave application given the analysis and findings in the TCAB Decision and the nature of judicial review. If he intends to claim that there has in fact been a significant change of circumstances or new information relevant to his non-refoulement claim, that may be relevant to the procedure in ss. 37ZO and 37ZP Immigration Ordinance (Cap 115). But it is not relevant to the present application (Amandeep Kumar v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2019] HKCA 1369 at §13; Poinem v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2020] HKCA 911 at §15).

21.  In the circumstances, there is hence no basis for the court to intervene by way of judicial review, and I am not satisfied that there are any reasonably arguable grounds for judicial review which enjoy a realistic prospect of success. Indeed, given the lack of any reasonably arguable grounds for judicial review, I would still dismiss the application for leave, even if I have somehow erred in relation to question of delay.

22.  Moving on from the question of merits, there is no request for an extension of time to make the application in the Form 86. However, as the 2018 Leave Application was filed less than 2 weeks after the TCAB Decision, I am prepared to approach the matter of delay by considering whether the Applicant has provided an acceptable explanation as to why more than 3 months elapsed after the March 2020 Order before he filed the present application.

23.  I do not consider that the Applicant has done so, given that he only made bare allegations before me that his situation changed and “those problem who had the problem started creating some trouble again” at some unidentified point after the January 2020 Withdrawal Affirmation, and that at some unidentified point between March and July 2020 he had been allegedly arrested by the Police and hospitalised for 2 days due to his health condition. There has hence been an undue delay of 28 days (or taking his bare allegations at their highest, 26 days) which has not been acceptably explained.

24.  Thirdly, I do not see any question of general public importance raised by the application which is likely to be resolved by the courts in any event.  Given the lack of any reasonably arguable grounds, I also see no prejudice to the Applicant if the application were not allowed to proceed, whereas allowing it to proceed would clearly be to the detriment of public administration and would needlessly prejudice the putative Respondent.

Conclusion

25.  In the circumstances, I have made the orders above, including that the application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1