RE ALAM KHORSED

CACV 119/2019

[2019] HKCA 1099

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 119 OF 2019

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 759 of 2018)

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JUDGMENT

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Hon Andrew Chan J (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  By a judgment on 19 July 2019, the Court (Lam (Ag) CJHC and Andrew Chan J) dismissed the applicant’s appeal from the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Josiah Lam dated 7 March 2019 refusing leave to apply for judicial review.

2.  On 2 August 2019, the applicant filed a motion seeking leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  The ground relied on by the applicant was that he was not satisfied with the Court’s judgment.

3.  In his written submission lodged on 15 August 2019, the applicant asserted that: 

(1) The Director of Immigration and the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) would not reject his claim for non-refoulement protection if they had “practical investigation system”;

(2) He only met his legal representative from the Duty Lawyer Service on the date of the screening interview, and that his legal representative failed to give any advice;

(3) There was no legal representation for him in his appeal before the Board and in the High Court.  As such, he was unable to identify any legal errors;

(4) His basic right was violated because of the lack of legal representation;

(5) He had no friend in his own country and could not obtain any documentation to substantiate his claim; and

(6) The police in his own country would invariably help his enemy.

4.  At [15] – [19] of the judgment, the Court explained that the appeal was dismissed because the applicant did not put forth any viable ground to reverse the judge’s decision.

5.  The matters raised by the applicant in the written submissions were not canvassed in the appeal before the Court.  It is also not the practice of the Court of Appeal to grant leave to appeal on new points that were not canvassed in the hearing before it; nor generally is it the practice of the Court of Final Appeal to grant leave on new fact-sensitive points not argued in the Court of Appeal.

6.  In any event, the complaints either lacked particulars (see [3(1)], [3(5)], and [3(6)]), or were not reasonably arguable (see [3(2)], [3(3)], and [3(4)]).  They cannot constitute valid grounds of appeal.

7.  More importantly, the matters as stated do not involve any question of great general or public importance.  Nor do we see any reason to grant leave on the “or otherwise” limb.  The statutory criterion for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal is therefore not met: section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance (Cap 484).

8.  For these reasons, we dismiss the application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.