RENI WIDIASTUTIK AND ANOTHER v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 1536/2020

[2026] HKCFI 2837

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 1536 OF 2020

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  On 14 April 2026 I granted leave to the 1^st Applicant to apply on behalf of her minor daughter the 2^nd Applicant for judicial review of a decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) in rejecting/dismissing their non-refoulement claims but refused her application as regard her own claim upon finding that none of the grounds put forward by her reasonably arguable for her intended challenge, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in the process before the Director of Immigration (“Director”) or the Board or in their decisions as regard her own claim, and that there was no reasonable prospect of success in her intended application for herself.

2.  The 1^st Applicant now by a summons issued on 4 May 2026 seeks leave to appeal against that decision out of time, as the 14-day period after the decision within which to file her appeal under Order 53 Rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A expired on 28 April 2026, and hence she was some 6 days late with her intended appeal.

3.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing against a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the Court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if extension of time were granted: see Re MK HCMP 2609/2016, 10 January 2017; Chu On Fong Winter v The Appeal Panel (Housing) HCMP 982/2017, 20 July 2017; Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017, 26 June 2017; Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226; and Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346.

4.  In the 1^st Applicant’s case, a delay of 6 days may not be considered as significant, for which she explained in her affirmation that she never received the decision in the mail, and that it was only sometime later when she was so informed by her immigration officer, but by then she was already out of time with her intended appeal.

5.  The court record shows that the decision was sent on the same day of 14 April 2026 to the 1^st Applicant’s reported address which is the same as stated in her present application without being returned through undelivered post, and in the absence of any evidence to substantiate her bare assertions, I am not satisfied that the 1^st Applicant has provided any good or valid reason for her delay, but given the relative insignificance thereof, I propose to focus on the prospect of success of her intended appeal.

6.  However, the 1^st Applicant has failed to put forth any proper or valid draft or proposed grounds of appeal, or any particulars of any error in the decision or why it may reasonably be argued that the decision was unfair or unreasonable either in her summons or in her affirmation. As such, and in the absence of any error in the decision being clearly and properly identified by the 1^st Applicant, I do not see any prospect of success in her intended appeal.

7.  In the premises, and for the reasons given, it would be futile to extend time for what appears to be a hopeless appeal. Accordingly, I refuse the 1^st Applicant’s application for leave to appeal out of time, and dismiss her summons.