YUEN OI YEE LISA v. CHAROEN SIRIVADHANABHAKDI AND OTHERS

DCCJ 1914/2015

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO 1914 OF 2015

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DECISION

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1.  This is the application of the plaintiff (“Madam Yuen”) for leave to appeal. The application is opposed.

2.  On 16 November 2015, I handed down my judgment (“the Judgment”) to strike out the claim herein and to order a restrictive proceedings order (“RPO”) against Madam Yuen.

3.  By her summons dated 23 November 2015, Madam Yuen applied for the following orders:

(a) Paragraph 1: “To listen to the tape recorder in order to confirm para 78 of ‘She admitted to have signed the certificates…’”

(b) Paragraph 2: “To pass other offence committed by Messrs Hobson & Ma, Justice Lam VP and Miss Susan Wong to the Secretary for Justice in one go together.”

(c) Paragraph 3: “To extend further time for my application for leave to appeal against His Honour Judge Ko’s Judgment delivered on 16^th November 2015 to the Court of Appeal pending an outcome from my legal aid application lodged on 22^nd October 2015.”

4.  By her written submissions dated 30 November 2015, Madam Yuen further applied to vary the costs order nisi granted in the Judgment.

5.  After hearing the parties on 2 December 2015, I allowed Madam Yuen to listen to the recording of the hearing but otherwise dismissed her summons.  I also confirmed my costs order nisi.  Full reasons for my decision have been set out in my written decision dated that date (“the Decision”).

6.  In the present summons seeking leave to appeal, Madam Yuen has stated that: “Leave to appeal against the Decisions / Judgments delivered by His Honour Judge Ko on 16^th November and 2^nd December 2015 to the Court of Appeal because his mind had already been corrupted by Justice Lam VP behind the screen to put words into my mouth by passing his allegation against me on his own motion to the Secretary for Justice while on the other hand, His Honour Judge Ko did not know the Chief Justice had refused to pass my allegations against Messrs Hobson & Ma, Justice Lam VP & Miss Susan Wong to the Secretary for Justice & Police on 27^th November 2014 before further events happened for my secret complaint to ICAC on 13^th January 2015 and absolute corruption between Messrs Hobson & Ma and Justice Lam VP on 2^nd March 2015.” (underline supplied by Madam Yuen)

7.  She has filed 2 affirmations in support of her present application.  There is a section entitled “GROUNDS FOR MY APPEAL AGAINST OTHER DECISIONS DELIVERED BY HIS HONOUR JUDGE KO ON 16^TH NOVEMBER 2015” in her second affirmation (filed today) in which Madam Yuen enumerated her grounds of appeal.

8.  Section 63 of the District Court Ordinance, Cap 336 (“the DCO”), generally mandates that an appeal to the Court of Appeal from a judgment, order or decision of a District Judge in any civil cause or matter may only be made with leave.  The test for the grant of leave to appeal is set out in section 63A which provides that leave to appeal shall not be granted unless the court is satisfied that the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or that there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.

9.  In SMSE v KL [2009] 4 HKLRD 125 at para 17, the Court of Appeal instructed (with reference to section 14AA of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4, which is equivalent to section 63A of the DCO for present purposes) that leave to appeal should not be lightly granted and may only be granted if the test has been met.  The test requires that the court be satisfied that the appeal has a reasonable prospect of success or there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard before granting leave.  Reasonable prospects of success involve the notion that the prospects of succeeding must be “reasonable” and therefore more than “fanciful”, without having to be “probable”.

10.  In my view, Madam Yuen is mostly precipitating in her smear campaign in her supporting affirmations. Her stated grounds of appeal may be analysed under the following headings:

(a) This action is not a re-litigation of LBTC 588/2011 or HCA 2045/2012. (paras 1-4 of her grounds)

(b) The High Court has already granted RPO leave for her to pursue against BM, WCL, H&M & PAY. (paras 5 & 7 of her grounds)

(c) BM, WCL, H&M & PAY did not file any affirmation in opposition. (para 6 of her grounds)

(d) I have favoured H&M and am not a fair judge. (para 8 of her grounds)

11.  First, I have set out in paras 3-12, 50-53 & 72 of the Judgment why I consider that the present action is a re-litigation of LBTC 588/2011 and HCA 2045/2012. 

12.  Secondly, I have explained in para 54(d) of the Judgment that there is no endorsement of her present action in the grant of the RPO leave by the High Court.

13.  Thirdly, I have also explained in para 54(a) of the Judgment that there was no obligation on the part of the opposing side to file affidavit evidence.  Far from conceding to Madam Yuen’s applications, the opposing side had made it clear to her that their counsel would make submissions based on the materials before the court.

14.  Lastly, I have articulated fully in paras 73-79 & 106 of the Judgment my reasons for referring the Judgment to the Secretary for Justice for consideration.  In deference to Madam Yuen’s repeated allegation that I have put words into her mouth, I have double-checked the recording of 23 October 2015 and confirmed that she did admit after my warning that: “LY個簽名喺我嘅”. 

15.  It appears from her supporting affirmations and oral submissions that Madam Yuen is still indulging in her unjustified speculation that all the judges who have ruled against her are unfair and have conspired against her.  Had I been biased against her, I would not have on my own motion raised her cause of action against the 8^th defendant for injury to feelings (if any) under s 66 of the PDPO for discussion on 23 October 2015. (see paras 56-61 & 105(e) of the Judgment).

16.  Apart from repeating herself, there is no attempt on the part of Madam Yuen to identify any shortcoming of the Judgment.  I am not satisfied that Madam Yuen’s intended appeal has reasonable prospect of success or that there is some other reason in the interests of justice why the appeal should be heard.  Her application is therefore dismissed.

17.  As Madam Yuen has lost her application, I order her to pay the costs of the opposing side.

18.  Mr Wong for the opposing side has asked for indemnity costs on the ground that Madam Yuen has made irrelevant and unjustified submissions in her leave application.  Having regard to the applicable test (see para 111 of the Judgment), I do not think it is “appropriate” to order indemnity costs against her.  Many unrepresented litigants before the court have been unable to digest an unfavourable judgment and discern therefrom any ground of appeal so much so that they repeat their early submissions (some of which are without basis) in their leave application.  In my view, Madam Yuen is no different.

19.  The costs of the opposing side are summarily assessed on the party and party basis at $2,800.