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NGUYEN THI DUYEN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
NGUYEN THI DUYEN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5432 · HCAL 690/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 690/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5432
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 690 of 2023
BETWEEN
| |Nguyen Thi Duyen |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |Applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
1. The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Introduction
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in
the prescribed Form 86 filed on 11 May 2023, the applicant applied for
leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The
intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture
Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office
(“Board”) dated 8 May 2023 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the
applicant's appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration
(“Director”) dated 17 August 2021 rejecting the applicant's subsequent
non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds[1]. The Board’s
Decision can be viewed at the following hyperlink: -
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL000690_
2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. In his Form 86, the applicant named the Board as well as the Director
as the proposed respondents and did not name any proposed interested
party. As the Board should have been the proper putative respondent
and the Director the proper putative interested party, the Form 86
shall be amended accordingly on the court’s own motion.
3. The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Vietnam,
she would be harmed or killed by the moneylender for an unpaid loan.
The Board’s reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the
Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them.
Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s
abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision.
4. At the applicant’s request for a hearing of the Leave Application,
this court scheduled a hearing on 8 September 2026. The applicant
attended the hearing in person and submitted that she still owed money
in Vietnam and could not return.
Discussion
5. The leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence, there
is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my
decision.[2] It is therefore sufficient to state my observations
after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials
adduced.
6. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds
of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full
and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an
affidavit. In her Form 86, the applicant averred that the Board’s
Decision was unreasonable and unfair, and that the Board had placed
too much reliance on the COI without having taken her personal
background and experience into account. She further averred that the
Board was procedurally improper and unfair by requiring her to respond
to questions that she was not in a position to offer any response. In
the supporting affirmation, no such grounds were provided.
7. As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively
within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will
not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality.[4] In the present case, the
Board found that the applicant kept changing her evidence and found
that she was not a witness of truth. It did not accept her claim to
have borrowed a loan from a moneylender for the purpose of her trade
or had been assaulted by the moneylender. In conclusion, the Board
found that the applicant would not face any risk of harm if refouled.
The Board also found that state protection and internal relocation
were both reasonably available. These are findings of fact, which the
court in a judicial review will not interfere with, subject to there
being any public law errors.
8. Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in
scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the
Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and
observed a high standard of fairness. The averments in the applicant’s
Form 86 were general and vague. The applicant has not shown any errors
of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s
Decision. The applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision
is not reasonably arguable with realistic prospects of success such
that would enable this court to grant leave[5].
Order
9. The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.
10. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be
dismissed.
Dated the 29th day of September 2026.
| |(Alfred Chan) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal
advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of
their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the Applicant:| | |
| | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the |Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such |Applicant |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 29/9/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the | |solicitors / such |
|Court the order granting|Nguyen Thi Duyen |Putative Interested |
|leave and any directions| |Parties as may be |
|given within 14 days |Applicant’s ref. no:|directed by the Court / |
|after the leave was |Nil. |the Putative Interested |
|granted (Order 53, rule | |Parties’ solicitors on |
|4A); | |29/9/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the originating| |Torture Claims Appeal |
|summons within 14 days | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|after the grant of leave| |Claims Petition Office |
|and serve it in | |Putative Respondent’s |
|accordance with Order | |ref. no.: |
|53, rule 5; and | |USM 18555 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every other| |Director of Immigration |
|party copies of every | |Putative Interested |
|affidavit which the | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|Applicant proposes to | |1049/21 (Formerly RBCZ |
|use at the hearing, | |323/20) |
|including the affidavit | | |
|in support of | |Department of Justice, |
|the application for | |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the
Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the
risk of violation of the right to life under Art 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong
Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to
the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of
persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33
of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified
Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process
claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the
USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015]
3 HKC 293.
[2] Re Zunartyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23].
[3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL
21/2015, 22 December 2016 at [142].
[4] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328;
Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and
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Ühþ,ñPJaJmH nHNupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
[5] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676