HUSSAIN ZAHEER v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD/ NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE
[2026] HKCA 1794 · CACV 391/2025
Court of Appeal
CACV 391/2025, [2026] HKCA 1794 On Appeal From [2025] HKCFI 2120 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 391 OF 2025 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 139 OF 2020) ____________________ BETWEEN ____________________ Before: Hon Anthony Chan JA and Ng J in Court Date of Written Submissions: 9 June 2026 Date of Judgment: 3 November 2026 ________________ JUDGMENT ________________ Hon Anthony Chan JA (giving the Judgment of the Court) : INTRODUCTION On 11 May 2026, this Court handed down a Judgment ([2026] HKCA 639) (“Judgment”) dismissing the Applicant’s appeal against the order of Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Martin Wong (“Judge”) dated 3 June 2025 (“Order”) refusing to grant leave to the Applicant to apply for judicial review. The Applicant had sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 3 January 2020 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing his appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration rejecting his non-refoulement claim. The facts and issues in the Applicant’s appeal, as well as the reasons for dismissing it, were set out in the Judgment. We will not repeat them here. NOTICE OF MOTION The Applicant now applies, by a Notice of Motion filed on 26 May 2026, for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal (“CFA”). In the Notice of Motion, the Applicant raises four questions which he claims to be of great general or public importance (“GGPI”) under s.22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484 (“Ordinance”) : “Where a decision maker in a non-refoulement case accepts that an applicant received repeated and credible death threats from a non-state actor, is it a legal error to infer the absence of real future lethal intent from the fact that those threats were not physically carried out in the past?” (“Question 1”); “Does the minimum severity threshold under [Ubamaka FACV 15/2011] require the decision-maker to assess the severity of harm the applicant has already sustained, or the severity of harm he would prospectively face if refouled?” (“Question 2”); “In the internal relocation analysis from [Januzi] [2006] UKHL 5, does the decision-maker consider whether the applicant received specific death threats in his home area? Even if the decision-maker decides those threats don’t pose a real risk, does the analysis still include that information?” (“Question 3”); and “In [Horvath and Bagdanavicius], does a state protection finding that relies mainly on general information about a country’s institutional reforms really meet the standard of individualized protection? This is especially when the same person who made the decision has already acknowledged that the police force in that country is corrupt, not enough to do its job, and not very effective.” (“Question 4”). Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Practice Direction 2.1 (“PD 2.1”), the Notice of Motion should set out the grounds of appeal concisely and succinctly and should not contain arguments or factual allegations. However, apart from Questions 1 to 4, the Notice of Motion comprised of almost seven pages of arguments in breach of PD 2.1. These arguments consisted of the Applicant’s legal and factual submissions in which he alleged various errors of the Board, which were not previously raised before this Court or the Judge, and errors of this Court. None of the cases relied upon by the Applicant in the Notice of Motion (except Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 which was cited by this Court in the Judgment) were referred to by him in the appeal before this Court or in the leave application before the Judge. Written Submissions The Applicant lodged written submissions on 9 June 2026 (“Written Submissions”) in which he reiterated the arguments made in the Notice of Motion and argued why the four questions raised are questions of GGPI. The Applicant also reformulated Question 1 into the following question : “whether a non-refoulement decision-maker commits an error of law by using the absence of past physical harm as the primary basis for finding that a person who has received accepted death threats does not face a real risk upon return.” (“New Question 1”) Question 1 focuses on the decision-maker’s inference of the “absence of real future lethal intent” whereas New Question 1 is concerned with the decision-maker’s finding of “real risk upon return”. However, the two questions are based on the same or substantially the same submissions. They will both be considered below. In the Written Submissions, the Applicant now argues that, in the alternative, leave ought to be granted for him to appeal to the CFA on the “otherwise” limb under s.22(1)(b) of the Ordinance on the grounds that the alleged “errors in the decisions below, taken together, give rise to a substantial and grave injustice in a case where the consequences of an incorrect outcome are irreversible and potentially fatal” and that he faces a real risk of death if he returns to Pakistan. Having considered the Notice of Motion and the Written Submissions, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining an application of this type on paper. DISCUSSION As an overview of this application, the Applicant is seeking to overturn various findings of the Board. He should have raised the complaints which underpin Questions 1 to 4 in the leave application before the Judge, but he failed to do so. This application, if allowed, would have the effect of bypassing the leave application as well the appeal to this Court. In the premises, this application should be declined as a matter of principle. However, it will be seen below that this application has no merit in any event. Question 1 Although Question 1 is formulated in general terms, it is premised on the facts of the Applicant’s own non-refoulement claim and Board’s findings of fact in relation to the death threats. The question cannot be determined in the abstract. In the Applicant’s case, the Board found that Uncle (whom the Applicant alleged had made death threats against him due to a land dispute) had never harmed or injured the Applicant or his family, nor had he any real intention to do so. Fact-sensitive complaints relating to the specific circumstances of the case, or questions which cannot be answered in the abstract without relying on the facts, are not questions of GGPI: see Re Li Xiaoming [2022] HKCA 142, [17]. Thus, Question 1 cannot be a question of GGPI. For the same reason, we would reject New Question 1 as a question of GGPI. Both questions are fact-sensitive to the Applicant’s case and cannot be determined in the abstract. Question 2 On its face, this is a question on a point of law. It was not argued in the appeal before us or at the leave application before the Judge. It is not the practice of this Court to grant leave to appeal on new points that were not canvassed previously before it: see Ageas Insurance Company (Asia) Ltd v Lam Hau Wah Inneo, CACV 65/2014, 19 May 2015, [7] to [9] and The Law Society of Hong Kong v A Solicitor, CACV 78/2014, 10 July 2015, [4] to [7]. On this ground alone, we would not grant leave on Question 2. Two further points should be made. First, the minimum severity threshold issue was dealt with in some detail by the Board. There is no excuse, and none has been offered, for not raising it before the Judge or this Court if the Applicant is dissatisfied with the Board’s findings. Second, in our view, Question 2 is a thinly veiled challenge to the Board’s findings of fact that: “Uncle did not [have] a real intention to severely harm or kill the [Applicant] and his mother. … I find that the prime objective of Uncle’s visits and various verbal threats were to put pressure on the [Applicant] and his family so that Uncle may obtain interest of the Land (or part of it) under duress”. The Applicant’s submission that under Ubamaka, [172], the Board was required to conduct a “prospective analysis” to see if he would face ill-treatment if expelled is without substance. The assessment of risk of ill-treatment upon expulsion must be based on all the relevant evidence at the time of assessment. The Board had done precisely that. Questions 3 and 4 On their face, these are also questions on points of law. However, they were not argued, and the cases relied upon on these questions were not cited, in the appeal before us or the leave application before the Judge. For the reason stated at paragraph 18 above, we would also not grant leave on Questions 3 and 4. In any event, the underlying point of Question 3 is ill-conceived. The Board clearly found that the death threats made by Uncle were not intended to be carried out. It cannot be said that such threats constituted real risk of harm to the Applicant which called for his internal relocation. Question 4 is also a fact-sensitive question requiring consideration of the specific facts of the Applicant’s non-refoulement claim and the findings of the Board in relation to, inter alia, the Police Force in Pakistan. For the reason stated at paragraph 15 above, Question 4 cannot be a question of GGPI. Further, Question 4 is premised on a blinkered view of the assessment of the Board on state protection, which was fully set out in paragraphs 40 to 48 of its Decision. It is trite that matters of state protection is within the province of the Board. Other alleged errors In this application, the Applicant makes various allegations of errors of the Board which were not advanced in the appeal before this Court or in the leave application before the Judge. There are also errors allegedly made by this Court. An application for leave to appeal to the CFA is not a platform for a litigant to conduct the application as if it is a fresh application for judicial review, raising new grounds for the first time: see Re Malugu Johani Emmanuel [2021] HKCA 1064, [7]. In the present application, it is incumbent on the Applicant to identify a question of GGPI which may justify the granting of leave. General allegations of errors do not advance this application, and it is unnecessary to deal with each such allegations. The “otherwise” limb For the reasons stated above, the matters raised by the Applicant do not constitute proper grounds for granting leave to appeal to the CFA, nor do they have any merit. The Applicant has not raised any real question of GGPI for the CFA to consider as required under s.22(1)(b) of the Ordinance. We do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under s.22(1)(b) of the Ordinance. DISPOSITION Accordingly, the Notice of Motion is dismissed with no order as to costs. The Applicant acting in person
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HUSSAIN ZAHEER v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD/ NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE
CA · [2026] HKCA 1794
This judgment