RE FRANCISCO CREANLYN RIVAS
[2026] HKCA 2093 · CACV 364/2026
Court of Appeal
CACV 364/2026 [2026] HKCA 2093 On appeal from [2026] HKCFI 1706 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 364 OF 2026 (ON AN APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 390 OF 2022) _____________________ _____________________ Before: Hon Chu VP and Eugene Fung J in Court Date of Judgment: 10 November 2026 ___________________ J U D G M E N T ___________________ Hon Chu VP (giving the Judgment of the Court): On 29 June 2026, this court handed down a judgment ([2026] HKCA 1087) dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge (Non-Refoulement Claims) Calvin Cheuk given on 26 March 2026 which refused her application for leave to apply for judicial review. On 30 June 2026, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal this court’s judgment to the Court of Final Appeal. The applicant has also lodged a written submission to support the application. Having considered the papers, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on paper without an oral hearing. We have therefore proceeded to determine the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents in the case. The background to this case and the applicant’s claim have been set out in our Reasons for Judgment. We will not repeat them. Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484 provides that leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision. The Notice of Motion states that (1) there are some errors in the decisions of the Director of Immigration and the Torture Claims Appeal Board as they had relied on internet news that were not officially recognized; (2) the Board’s decision was unreasonable, irrational or procedurally erroneous or unfair; and (3) the Board failed to meet the greater care and duty owed to a self-represented claimant. The written submission contends that (1) the applicant was never provided with proper legal and language assistance and the Board’s decision was not read or translated to her, as a result of which she was deprived of her right to put forward her full grounds of appeal; (2) the lack of assistance amounts to error of law, procedural unfairness and failure to adhere to the high standard of fairness because non-refoulement claims affect life and limbs and should be assessed with caution, taking also into account the applicant’s vulnerability and disadvantageous position; (3) the Court failed to appreciate the significance of the lack of assistance to the applicant; and (5) the discriminatory act of the authorities are unacceptable and contrary to the spirit of the judicial system. We are of the view that what is stated in the Notice of Motion and the written submission does not amount to viable grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. Importantly, no question of great general and public importance has been identified, as required by section 22(1) (b) of the Ordinance. Further, the complaints about lack of legal and language assistance, non-adherence to the high standard of fairness, procedural unfairness, irrationality and legal errors are unarguable for the reasons we gave in paragraphs 10 to 14 of our judgment. As to the complaint about the Board’s reliance on country-of-origin information, it is a new point that was not raised before the Judge or in the appeal before us. It is not the practice of the Court of Appeal to grant leave to appeal on new points that were not canvassed in the appeal before it. Nor is it the practice of the Court of Final Appeal to grant leave on new points, especially fact-sensitive points, that had not been argued in the Court of Appeal. The point is, in any event, a general assertion devoid of particulars. We also do not see any basis for the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b). As the statutory requirements for giving leave to appeal are not met, the Notice of Motion is dismissed. The applicant, unrepresented, acting in person.
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RE FRANCISCO CREANLYN RIVAS
CA · [2026] HKCA 2093
This judgment