AMANDEEP KAUR v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5403 · HCAL 1115/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1115/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5403
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1115 OF 2023
BETWEEN
| |Amandeep Kaur |Applicant |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name of the
putative interested party be amended to “Director of Immigration”.
2. The applicant’s application to withdraw the application for leave
to apply for judicial review be refused.
3. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 7 July 2023, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 29 June 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”).
2. The Board found that the applicant’s appeal/petition against the
decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 8
September 2021 (“the Director’s Decision”) failed on all the
applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism. Hence, the
Board confirmed the Director’s Decision, which rejected the
applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
Amendments
3. The applicant named “Ian WINGFIELD Member of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board” as the putative respondent and the Board the putative
interested party in Form 86, when the Board should be the putative
respondent, and the Director should be the putative interested party.
4. Thus, on this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent
is amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name of the
putative interested party is amended to “Director of Immigration”.
The applicant’s case
5. The applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because as a
member of the Akali Dal Party (Shiromoni Akali Dal “SAD”), if she
returned to India she would be harmed or killed by a local politician
from the Congress Party (Indian National Congress “INC”), Jagroop
Singh, who had tried to persuade her to leave SAD and join INC.
Oral hearing and Withdrawal of the Leave Application
6. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application,
and her case was heard on 17 September 2026.
7. At the hearing, the applicant told this court that she wanted to
withdraw the Leave Application. The applicant confirmed with this
court that her problem in her country had been resolved as the regime
had changed and it was safe for her to return to her country.
8. There is no evidence to show that the applicant made the withdrawal
application other than out of her own volition. With this withdrawal
application, it is clear that the applicant no longer wishes to
proceed with the Leave Application.
9. However, the Court of Appeal had held in Re Manik Md Mahamudun
Nabi [2022] HKCA 471 that:-
“The applicant on his own motion applied to the Court to withdraw his
application for leave to apply for judicial review. The Judge acceded
to his application, whereupon there was nothing outstanding in the
action. The Judge was correct to conclude the action by ordering a
dismissal of the application instead of leaving the action at large.”
10. Thus, it is not right to leave the action at large. The applicant’s
application to withdraw the Leave Application is therefore refused and
this court will proceed to deal with the Leave Application.
Discussion
11. It is not necessary for this court to discuss the merits of the
intended judicial review any more, as the applicant had confirmed that
her problem had been resolved and it was safe for her to return to her
country. In other words, the basis of her non-refoulement claim no
longer exists.
12. It is clear that the applicant no longer needs non-refoulement
protection and the intended judicial review serves no practical
purpose.
13. It is well established that the court may exercise discretion not to
grant a remedy on judicial review if it would serve no practical
purpose, where it may have become otiose or pointless to grant a
remedy because the relevant detriment to the applicant has been
removed (see AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam, CACV 63 of
2015).
14. Even assuming that there were errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality in the Board’s Decision and the case were remitted to
the Board for reconsideration, there would simply be no more basis for
the applicant to claim non-refoulement protection as it was no longer
unsafe for her to return to her own country. The Board should assess
the risk of the applicant at the time of the proceedings, taking
account of information that has come to light to ensure that it is
able to make a “full and up-to-date assessment” of the current
situation (see Ubamaka Edward Wilson v Secretary for Security and
Another (2012) 15 HKCFAR 743).
15. It is therefore otiose and pointless to grant leave to the applicant
to proceed with the intended judicial review even if there were merits
in it. Thus, the Leave Application ought to be dismissed.
Conclusion
16. For reasons aforesaid, the application to withdraw the Leave
Application is refused and the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 23rd day of September 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant | | |
|or his solicitors must:| | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s solicitors|the putative |
|may be directed by the |on: 23/09/2026 |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order | |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any | |interested parties as |
|directions given within| |may be directed by the |
|14 days after the leave|Applicant’s ref. no: |Court / the putative |
|was granted (Order 53, |Nil |interested parties’ |
|rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |23/09/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and | |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance | |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | |ref. no.: USM 18806 |
|and | | |
| | |Director of Immigration |
|c) supply to every | |Putative interested |
|other party copies of | |party’s ref. no.: |
|every affidavit which | |QA T/C 1496/21 |
|the Applicant proposes | |(formerly RBCZ 11363/21)|
|to use at the hearing, | | |
|including the affidavit| |Department of Justice, |
|in support of the | |Senior Assistant Law |
|application for leave | |Officer |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1