Case Details
For Applicant(s):
Mr Charles KC Chan, instructed by Chin & Associates
Listing:
TIMESRUNNER INTERNATIONAL CO., LTD v. ETI TECHNOLOGY (HK) LTD AND ANOTHER
TIMESRUNNER INTERNATIONAL CO., LTD v. ETI TECHNOLOGY (HK) LTD AND ANOTHER
[2026] HKDC 2093 · DCCJ 5077/2023
District Court
DCCJ 5077/2023 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION CIVIL ACTION NO 5077 OF 2023 ------------------------- BETWEEN TimesRunner International Co., Limited (盟創國際有限公司) Plaintiff and ETI Technology (HK) Limited 1st Defendant EVGA (Hong Kong) Company 2nd Defendant Limited ------------------------- Before: Deputy District Judge Lewis Law in Court Date of Hearing: 27-28 April and 13 May 2026 Date of Judgment: 13 November 2026 ------------------------- ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES ------------------------- GENERAL BACKGROUND The Plaintiff by original action, TimesRunner International Co, Limited (“TR”), is a company engaging in the business of selling and distributing computer products including power supply units (“PSUs”) and display cards (“DCs”). Although TR was incorporated in Hong Kong, at all material times, its sales/distribution operations were primarily carried out in Mainland China. The 1st and 2nd Defendants by original action, ETI Technology (HK) Limited and EVGA (Hong Kong) Company Limited (referred to as “ETI” and “EVGA” respectively in the following), engage in the business of supplying computer products to retailers like TR. Although ETI and EVGA were both incorporated in Hong Kong, evidence shows that they are connected to a larger group of companies with commercial operation based in Taiwan. For example, if the DCs they supplied became defective, the general practice was for the goods to be shipped back to Taiwan. The interests of ETI/EVGA are the same in this action and there is no need to distinguish the two companies from each other in this decision. TR’s original action is about the “Return Merchandise Arrangement” (“RMA”) of the PSUs supplied by ETI/EVGA. For the present purpose, it is not necessary to go into the details of the original action. Suffice it to mention it is TR’s claim that: (a) ETI/EVGA had in the course of their dealings issued to TR various credit memos by reason of defective PSUs returned from end users and the standing RMA arrangement between TR and ETI/EVGA; (b) the sums under these credit memos could be used by TR to purchase extra PSUs from ETI/EVGA; (c) the unused sums of these credit memos should be paid to TR in cash. TR’s claim amounts to US$81,309.49 of unused credit balance and further damages arising from the defects found in the PSUs supplied by ETI/EVGA. ETI/EVGA contested the original action. They also counterclaimed for the delivery or the value of 114 DCs they previously supplied to TR, unpaid, as part of TR’s stock for replacing defective items returned from end users under the “agreement and practice” between the parties in relation to DCs. ETI/EVGA said TR had later failed to return these 114 DCs, which remained to be ETI/EVGA’s properties, despite various demands. ETI/EVGA’s Defence and Counterclaim was first filed on 30 January 2024. On 10 April 2024, Master Anny Chak granted leave for ETI/EVGA to amend this pleading, and the Amended Defence and Counterclaim (“AD&C”) was filed on 2 May 2024. On 27 August 2024, by reason that (a) no defence to counterclaim had been served by TR and (b) the claim for delivery of the 114 DCs had been abandoned by ETI/EVGA, an interlocutory judgment in favour of ETI/EVGA in respect of their counterclaim was granted by the Court (“the Interlocutory Judgment”), leaving damages to be assessed. Accordingly, TR’s liability for the failure to return the 114 DCs has been established, but an adjudicative process is still required to quantify the amount of compensation. Before me, no issue has been taken on the procedural regularity and the binding effect of the Interlocutory Judgment. ETI/EVGA filed a Notice of Appointment of Assessment of Damages on 28 October 2024. TR’s solicitors on record were absent from the first case management hearing to handle the Notice on 23 January 2025 before Madam Registrar Soong, at the end of which procedural directions regarding the Assessment were given. Subsequently, TR’s new solicitors appeared in a further case management hearing before Master Vienne Luk on 11 April 2025 and obtained the chance to exchange documents and witness statements on quantum with ETI/EVGA. However, no direction for pleadings on quantum has been granted (and I assume none was sought by any party at that stage). The substantive Assessment of Damages hearing was set down before me for 2 days on 27-28 April 2026. The hearing was smoothly held; evidence from two witnesses (one from ETI/EVGA and one from TR) was heard. I added an extra half-day session on 13 May 2026 to hear parties’ closing submissions. Written closing submissions from parties’ counsel were exchanged and lodged with the Court prior to that final session. This Court is grateful for counsel’s useful submissions and other assistance in this case. INCONTROVERTIBLE FACTS IN THE AD&C My task of assessment of damages stems from the Interlocutory Judgment, which was in turn based on the plea of counterclaim in the AD&C filed by ETI/EVGA and TR’s inaction to respond to it before judgment. As mentioned by Master Keith Lam in Zhang Jinsong & Anor v Zhang Jing & Ors [2026] HKCFI 676, at paragraph 9, in the process of assessing the quantum of a default judgment, the judgment should be conclusive on the issue of the defendant’s liability, and the corresponding statement of claim would in effect be a “proxy for the judgment, setting out the basis of liability”. A defendant cannot go behind any issues on liability, save that he/she can raise any issue which is not inconsistent with the judgment on liability. Accordingly, in the present exercise assessing the damages suffered by ETI/EVGA by reason of TR’s failure to return the 114 DCs, this Court should start with the relevant factual assertions in the AD&C, against which TR cannot dispute. If TR wants to dispute those assertions, it should seek to set aside the Interlocutory Judgment but not to participate in this Assessment of Damages without first setting that aside. TR has through its litigation conduct clearly elected to abandon any right to dispute the assertions in the AD&C. I will quote the material paragraphs of the AD&C in full below. To make it easier to read, I will incorporate my defined terms in this decision and some minor textual amendments to correct obvious typos in square brackets: “29. Between March 2019 and June 2021, [TR] purchased from [ETI/EVGA] [DCs] for further distribution in Mainland China. The parties’ agreement and practice (“DC Agreement”) included inter alia the following: [ETI/EVGA] would provide to [TR] a stock of spare [DCs] (“Stock”) to be used exclusively for replacing defective items if called upon by the affected customers to do so and authorised by [ETI/EVGA]. Save the items that have been used for replacement as authorised by [ETI/EVGA], the Stock remains the property of the [ETI/EVGA]. [TR] is obliged to: Provide to [ETI/EVGA] a monthly report on the Stock; and Return the Stock (or any part thereof) to [ETI/EVGA] within a reasonable time upon [ETI/EVGA’s] request. [TR] did provide the said monthly report on the Stock to [ETI/EVGA] up to October 2023. Prior to the request for the return of the 114 DCs (as defined below), [TR] used to return any part of the Stock to [ETI/EVGA] within a reasonable time upon [ETI/EVGA’s] request. By the letter from Edmond Yeung & Co dated 4 May 2023, acting for and on behalf of [TR], [TR] admitted that: The Stock is the property of [ETI/EVGA]; [TR] is obliged to: Provide to [ETI/EVGA] a monthly report on the Stock; and Return the Stock to [ETI/EVGA] within a reasonable time upon [ETI/EVGA’s] request. As at 25 October 2022, [TR] was in possession of the Stock including [114 DCs] as particularised in Annex A hereto. Due to its wrongful refusal to return the 114 DCs to [ETI/EVGA] despite the latter’s repeated requests (as detailed further below), the 114 DCs have remained in the possession of [TR] up to the date hereof. 33. Between 25 October 2022 and February 2023, [ETI/EVGA] made various requests for [TR] to return or purchase the spare items in the Stock including the 114 DCs. 34. Pursuant to the DC Agreement: (1) [ETI/EVGA] are and were at all material times the owners of the 114 DCs. (2) [ETI/EVGA] are and were at all material times since October 2022 or at least February 2022 entitled to possession of the 114 DCs. 35. [TR] has failed to return the 114 DCs as requested. 36. It is common knowledge within the industry that [DCs] tend to depreciate quickly in value over time due to, inter alia, the rapid technological advancements in the field of computer graphics and the frequent release of newer models of [DCs], combined with the finite warranty period (which will expire over time) and the natural wear and tear of electronic components. 37. [TR] as an experienced distributor of [DCs], was at all material times aware of the matters set out in 36 above, or alternatively ought to have known such matters. 38. Given [TR’s] failure and/or refusal to return the 114 DCs, on 8 March 2023, [ETI/EVGA] requested [TR] to pay US$69,010 for the 114 DCs, being the value of the 114 DCs as at 25 October 2022, by issuing an invoice #120000185 (“Invoice”). [TR] has failed to comply with [ETI/EVGA’s] said request. 39. The total market value of the 114 DCs as at 25 October 2022 was US$69,010, as particularised in Annex A hereto. 40. By a letter dated 31 May 2023, [ETI/EVGA’s] solicitors, Messrs. LT Lawyers, wrote to [Edmond Yeung] & Co requesting [TR] to, inter alia, confirm within 14 days whether [TR] would (1) keep the 114 DCs and pay the sum of US$69,010 pursuant to the Invoice, or (2) return the 114 DCs and be responsible for their depreciation in value. 41. As pointed out by LT Lawyers in the said letter of 31 May 2023: (1) From 25 October 2022 to 8 March 2023, the value of the 114 DCs had decreased from US$69,010 to US$28,394.14, resulting in a loss of US$40,615.86 up to 8 March 2023. (2) The value of the 114 DCs continued to depreciate as time went by. 42. [TR] has failed to respond to [ETI/EVGA’s] said request within 14 days, whether through [Edmond Yeung] & Co or otherwise. Instead, by a letter to LT Lawyers dated 19 October 2023, [Edmond Yeung] & Co, acting for and on behalf of [TR], wrongfully (1) claimed that [ETI/EVGA] had no right to impose a deadline for the return of the 114 DCs and (2) sought to impose conditions for the return of the 114 DCs. 43. In the premises, [TR] is liable in detinue and/or for conversion of the 114 DCs for its refusal to return the 114 DCs upon demand. 44. By reason of the aforesaid, [ETI/EVGA] are entitled to the delivery up of the 114 DCs or payment of their value and damages consequent upon the detinue and/or conversion thereof.” Accordingly, TR cannot dispute, and I am bound to adopt in this adjudication, the positions (inter alia) that: (a) ETI/EVGA demanded return of the 114 DCs on 25 October 2022; (b) on 25 October 2022, the market value of the 114 DCs were US$69,010; (c) TR’s duty to return was “within a reasonable time” from 25 October 2022; (d) TR was in breach of this duty; (e) TR started to be in breach of this duty on a date which ceased to be “within a reasonable time” from 25 October 2022. As ETI/EVGA’s cause of action is framed as detinue/conversion (i.e., tortious in nature) in the AD&C, the date in (e) can also be treated as the starting point of TR’s tort. What was “reasonable time” is, certainly, a question of fact to be determined by me in the specific circumstances of this case: Silver Value Global Ltd v Cheung Tak Wah [2025] HKDC 473, §§43-44. Given another indisputable plea in the AD&C that the value of the 114 DCs was time-sensitive (paragraph 36 thereof), my finding on the starting point of TR’s tort will have a significant impact on the amount of compensation to which ETI/EVGA would be entitled. PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THIS ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES Counsel for the parties agreed with the general legal proposition that, where goods are irreversibly converted and not recovered, the measure of damages should be the value of the goods at the time of the detinue/conversion. The fundamental object of an award of damages in respect of such torts, as with all wrongs, is to award just compensation for the loss suffered. Normally the measure of damages is the market value of the goods at the time the defendant expropriated them; see Maruken Kougyou Co Ltd v Hsin Chong Construction Co Ltd (unreported, HCCT 19/2013, 12.12.2016) at §87-88 per Recorder Houghton SC. Thus, both counsel agreed that this Court should first ascertain the date of detinue/conversion (i.e., the date immediately after the expiry of the “reasonable time” to return the 114 DCs), and then make finding on the value of the 114 DCs on this date in order to arrive at the appropriate quantum. During opening submissions, Mr Chan for TR once suggested that the time point relevant to the assessment of the 114 DCs’ value should be the date of the Interlocutory Judgment (27 August 2024). I have no hesitation to reject such suggestion, and consider it inconsistent with the legal position that the plea in the AD&C (which pre-dated the Interlocutory Judgment) should be treated as the “proxy for the judgment”. From whatever angle, the starting point of the tort pleaded (i.e., the moment TR “expropriated” the 114 DCs) must precede the date of the AD&C, not to mention the subsequent judgment. The suggestion of using the date of the Interlocutory Judgment for valuation must be illogical. But I should record that the suggestion was not seriously pursued by Mr Chan for the rest of the assessment hearing. It is also not disputed that the absence of expert valuation does not render the Court incapable of properly determining a fair market value. In such circumstances, the Court can undertake its own examination of the available evidence to determine damages fairly: Real Estate and Finance Fund v Sun Cheuk Pak Alan [2025] HKCFI 2478 at §527 per Recorder Maurellet SC. In the course of opening/closing submissions, Mr Chan for TR took pain to emphasize that ETI/EVGA had a “duty to mitigate”. I have found it difficult to understand why this duty is relevant as, indisputably, the 114 DCs have never been returned to ETI/EVGA. This is not a situation where the 114 DCs were returned at a point of time when they still had value, but ETI/EVGA allowed them to perish in their warehouse. I am puzzled as to what ETI/EVGA could do to mitigate when they had already, as per the plea in the AD&C, demanded TR to return the 114 DCs in the period from 25 October 2022 to 31 May 2023 repeatedly but TR simply ignored/refused the demands in this period. In fact, the documentary evidence before me is also consistent with this position. In this connection, Mr Chan cited the authority Uzinterimpex JSC v Standard Bank plc [2008] EWCA Civ 819 to establish the proposition that a duty to mitigate should still arise in a case of detinue/conversion, especially in relation to consequential loss. However, the English Court of Appeal was then dealing with a situation where the owner of the goods had rejected a reasonable offer from the party who had warehoused the goods, had refused to return the same to the owner and was ultimately found to be a tortfeasor. The offer once made was that the goods be sold in the market and the sale proceeds be held in a blocked account to await the outcome of the dispute (by reason that the goods would depreciate in value and incur storage costs over time). This context caused the Court to make the relevant remark about duty to mitigate and find that the tortfeasor should not be required to pay compensation for a loss that could not be fairly attributed to its original wrongful act of conversion. There is nothing similar to that in the present case. It is also worth mentioning that, for the present purpose, the burden is on TR to plead and prove facts relied upon by it to support a positive case contesting the amount of damages such as mitigation of damages; see Wang Ruiyun v Gem Global Yield Fund Ltd [2011] 3 HKLRD 785 at §§28-31. Order 18, rule 12(1)(c) of the Rules of the District Court (Cap. 336H) requires mitigation of damages to be specifically pleaded. Having chosen not to put forward any positive case by filing a defence to counterclaim or seeking leave to file/serve some sort of pleadings for quantum purpose, TR cannot now raise mitigation of damages during the assessment hearing. I am thus of the view that mitigation of damages is irrelevant to this assessment. I also agree with Ms Xu for ETI/EVGA that, by the same principle, it is not open to TR to run any case in this assessment that TR had somehow already paid the value of the 114 DCs under a wider commercial arrangement (and had thus become their rightful owner), a position Mr Chan once attempted to develop during his cross-examination of ETI/EVGA’s witness on the first day of hearing. By reason of such attempt, Ms Xu, at the beginning of the second day of hearing, made an application to me to limit the scope of Mr Chan’s cross-examination. I should record that Mr Chan, after hearing the exchange between me and Ms Xu, promptly confirmed that he would no longer develop that position. Ms Xu also applied to disallow two lines of Mr Chan’s questioning, viz., (a) whether the 114 DCs were already “out of market” in 2021-2022; and (b) whether the 114 DCs kept by TR were not of good quality but were of defective quality. I ruled that Mr Chan could cross-examine ETI/EVGA’s witness along those lines. As Ms Xu also acknowledged, TR may test her clients’ case on quantum, including the market value of the 114 DCs upon the expiry of the reasonable time to return (albeit the value as at 25 October 2022 is not disputable). The two areas being questioned were part and parcel of ETI/EVGA’s case that the 114 DCs were worth a specific value at that point of time, and Mr Chan’s cross-examination did not go over the content of the witness statements and available documentary evidence. Ms Xu once contemplated that she might need to seek an adjournment of the hearing for proper directions of pleadings and further evidence to be given. However, having heard my oral remark that my permission of the aforesaid two lines of questioning did not mean TR would have a free hand to introduce new evidence in those two areas (by further documents or top-up questions of its witness during examination-in-chief), Ms Xu no longer pursued an adjournment application. At the end of the day, I also saw no attempt from TR to introduce new evidence in those two areas. Shortly put, the issues in the present assessment are simply when the reasonable time to return the 114 DCs expired and what was their value at that point of time. I will deal with these issues in turn. EVIDENCE ETI/EVGA’s witness is Ms陳昭文 (“Ms Chen”); her witness statement dated 18 June 2025 (“Chen WS”) was adduced as her evidence in chief. Ms Chen was employed by ETI/EVGA and based in Taiwan at the material times of this dispute. Her responsibilities included the sales operation of DCs and liaison with TR. TR’s witness is Mr LI, Li Yang (“Mr Li”); his witness statement adduced was dated 27 May 2025 (“Li WS”). He was a director of TR and, in counsel Mr Chan’s words, akin to a “CEO” of the company. Both witnesses gave evidence in Putonghua with English translation; they were subject to detailed cross-examination with reference to their statements and other available documentary evidence. Documentary evidence of this case includes, inter alia, correspondence between TR and ETI/EVGA (emails between different individuals of the companies and letters between their respective lawyers), certain trading/delivery of goods records and certain market information of the DCs from different websites. In my view, there is no stark factual discrepancy between Ms Chen and Mr Li. The Court can accept their respective evidence at the same time without becoming logically inconsistent. This case does not turn on which side’s factual evidence is to be preferred, but how the law should be applied to a set of rather incontrovertible facts to arrive at a proper decision. The summaries of these witnesses’ evidence will be given in the sections below addressing each of the two specific issues of this assessment. ISSUE 1 - EXPIRY DATE OF REASONABLE TIME In oral opening submissions, Mr Chan for TR said the 114 DCs were not requested to be returned as at 4 May 2023 despite paragraph 31 of the AD&C because no specification of model, actual quantity and return destination had been provided by ETI/EVGA up to that point. Such a position is plainly inconsistent with other factual assertions in the AD&C (especially when paragraph 35 thereof is read together with its paragraphs 31-33). It must be rejected. Another position put forward by Mr Chan on reasonable time should also be rejected. He made reference to LT Lawyers’ letter dated 31 May 2023 issued on behalf of ETI/EVGA (pleaded at paragraphs 40-41 of the AD&C), and said as TR was still given the choice between paying for the 114 DCs or returning them and be responsible for their depreciation in value, the reasonable time to return must be after 31 May 2023. This position stems from a misunderstanding of what reasonable time means in this context. Reasonable time, in this context, means the period within which TR could return the 114 DCs without legal consequence – without being found to be in breach of its duty under tort law. It was a period within which no compensatory liability shall arise from not being able to return the DCs earlier. As at 31 May 2023, ETI/EVGA was already demanding (a) a payment of full invoiced amount of US$69,010 or (b) a return of the 114 DCs plus compensation for depreciation in value. ETI/EVGA’s conduct as at 31 May 2023 was consistent with their position that TR had already failed its duty to return, hence a demand for payment under both choices. The two choices were just between a pure/bigger monetary amount of compensation and a smaller monetary compensation if the actual products were really returned. The letter dated 31 May 2023 did not mean TR could still return the 114 DCs without having to pay any compensation. In my judgment, clearly, TR must have been in breach of its duty to return the 114 DCs before 31 May 2023. ETI/EVGA was not offering any free option at that time. None of the possible dates of expiry of reasonable time put forward by Mr Chan is arguable. Ms Xu submitted that the reasonable time for return of the 114 DCs expired 2 weeks after the first request for return, i.e., on or around 8 November 2022. First, Ms Xu referred to Ms Chen’s oral evidence that TR knew ETI/EVGA’s Taiwan address for the return of the 114 DCs, because it had returned products there before and the return address had been the same. There was therefore no practical uncertainty as to the destination for return, and this substantially undermines any suggestion that a prolonged period was needed before return. No contrary evidence has been adduced from TR’s side to rebut its knowledge about ETI/EVGA’s address. Mr Li’s evidence even gives me an impression that he knew clearly what TR had to do if TR made up the mind to send back the goods to ETI/EVGA. Secondly, Ms Xu referred to Ms Chen’s evidence that it took about 3 days to send the DCs back to Taiwan by air, and about 1 week by sea. It would therefore at most take about 2 weeks to complete the return process from ETI’s request. Thirdly, Ms Xu commented that Mr Li was evasive when questions about transportation time for the 114 DCs were put to him. Mr Li initially refused to commit to a particular position under cross-examination and diverted his answer to the quality of those DCs, which is a separate issue from transportation time. When he was warned by this Court of the duty to answer relevant questions, he said the transportation time should be around “2 to 3 weeks”. But he also qualified that answer with provisos such as the prevailing relationship between Mainland China and Taiwan, COVID-19 (which was still affecting global economy/logistics in late 2022 and early 2023) and the need for testing the DCs before transportation. Later, during re-examination, Mr Li said 45 to 60 days would be required if the time required for paperwork (i.e., custom clearance) was included, and his previous answer of “2 to 3 weeks” was only a reference to pure transportation time. Mr Li then further said the return of the “last batch” (which should be a reference to part of the 114 DCs) would take around 3 months because (a) the warranty of relevant products would expire in July 2023 and (b) TR would need to inform their customers (second-layer retailers or end users) of a final opportunity to obtain after-sale service. Ms Xu submitted that such evidence about after-sale service given during re-examination was irrelevant, incredible and impermissible by reason of the following: There is no evidence to suggest that the “last batch” return had anything to do with the return of the 114 DCs, which was indisputably requested by ETI/EVGA on 25 October 2022. That was long before the expiry of warranty; Between October 2022 and February 2023, when ETI/EVGA made various requests for the return of the 114 DCs, TR never suggested that they wished to retain any of the 114 DCs for the so-called final after-sale service. Even in the 4 May 2023 letter from Edmond Yeung & Co, acting for TR, there was no suggestion that TR needed to retain the 114 DCs for any alleged after-sale service; The incontrovertible fact is that TR was obliged to return the 114 DCs upon request within a reasonable time. There is no provision that TR could refuse to return and retain the 114 DCs for any alleged final after-sale service. Mr Li’s belated evidence in this regard was therefore inconsistent with the terms of the DC Agreement pleaded in the AD&C, which TR is deemed to have admitted. I accept Ms Xu’s various submissions on the issue of reasonable time, except that I would give weight to Mr Li’s evidence that the time required for paperwork etc. should be added to the “pure” shipping/transportation time. First, there is no significant difference between the parties as to the time required for “shipping” the 114 DCs back from Mainland China to Taiwan; it is not ETI/EVGA’s pleaded case or evidential position that the 114 DCs must be transported to Taiwan by air. Shipping time alone would take 1-3 weeks. Reasonable time has never been literally defined between the parties before this assessment of damages and certain flexibility must be given. In fact, judging from the contents of Chen WS and other documentary evidence, ETI/EVGA did not represent to TR that the 114 DCs must arrive at their Taiwan address by a defined deadline as matters stood in November 2022, December 2022 and/or January 2023. Secondly, I accept all the points made by Ms Xu as to why TR cannot add to the reasonable time the alleged time required for informing TR’s customers of the last chance of after-sale service. Thirdly, Mr Li’s evidence about paperwork/custom clearance, and probable lead time arising from COVID-19, Government factor and testing need, does not appear to me to be unreasonable. After all, the 114 DCs are computer-related products involving the use of chips. This Court can take judicial notice that the logistics of this type of goods must be more complicated than that of other types of goods such as clothing or furniture. I also take note of Mr Li’s further evidence that TR distributed the goods supplied by ETI/EVGA at many different places within Mainland China (a fact apparently known to ETI/EVGA’s side). When goods had to be returned, TR needed to transfer them from various places to Shenzhen first, and then caused the same to leave the border of Mainland China from Shenzhen. This appeared to me to be a reasonable/realistic arrangement, and the relevant time would have added to the reasonable time required. Overall speaking, I find that the reasonable time to achieve the return of the 114 DCs back to ETI/EVGA’s Taiwan address expired on or around 9 December 2022 (i.e., around 45 days from 25 October 2022, the lower end mentioned by Mr Li excluding the after-sale factor). My next task would be to arrive at a fair market value of the 114 DCs on around 9 December 2022, which represents ETI/EVGA’s actual loss caused by the tort of detinue/conversion and the damages which TR should pay them. ISSUE 2 - MARKET VALUE OF 114 DCs UPON EXPIRY OF REASONABLE TIME The starting points of the valuation process is that the 114 DCs were valued at US$69,010 as at 25 October 2022 but they depreciated quickly after that date because of rapid technological advancement in the field of computer graphics. In closing submissions, Mr Chan still commented the pricing of US$69,010 as at 25 October 2022 to be “affronting logic and common sense”. He cannot make that comment when TR has never sought to set aside the Interlocutory Judgment. Sub-issue 2.1 – Relevance of MSRP In Annex A to the AD&C (mentioned in paragraph 32 of the AD&C), ETI/EVGA drew reference to a concept called “Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price” (“MSRP” in abbreviation) in describing the value of the different models of the 114 DCs. There were 40 different models within these 114 pieces of goods. The MSRP of each model was not the same as the corresponding “invoiced price” (i.e., the price adopted in the Invoice issued by ETI/EVGA to TR on 8 March 2023 – see paragraph 38 of the AD&C). For some items, their MSRP was higher than the “invoiced price”; for others, their “invoiced price” was higher. The figure US$69,010 was arrived at by adding up the “invoiced price” of all 114 DCs. In Ms Chen’s evidence, she said these 40 models were first launched to the market in 2018/2019, and the MSRP of the respective models in Annex A to the AD&C were based on Nvidia’s then recommendations. Nvidia is a multinational technology company known for designing/ manufacturing graphics processing units and other hardware of computing systems. Certainly, Nvidia played an important part in the technology involved in these DCs. Under cross-examination, Ms Chen accepted that (a) MSRP was a suggestion to retailers as to how much they should charge the end users for the DCs; (b) it was not applicable to the sales of such products from wholesalers to retailers or in the second-hand market; (c) it was only applicable to brand new products which are usually sold to end users with warranty periods. That said, Ms Chen emphasized that Nvidia did not fix the MSRP of a product to whether a full 3-year warranty period for the product was offered by the relevant wholesalers/retailers to their customers. This was because the lengths of warranty periods offered to customers differed across different companies; it was a matter determined by their own commercial practices. By reason of my findings below in respect of the product cycle of the 114 DCs, I hold that the MSRP suggested by Nvidia back in 2018/2019 has no bearing on the fair market value of the 114 DCs as at 9 December 2022. Sub-issue 2.2 – Condition of the 114 DCs Mr Chan submitted that the conditions of the 114 DCs could be inferred from certain records about the RMA for DCs in the hearing bundle. In particular, it was said Ms Chen admitted, during cross-examination, the existence of a “RMA practice”. The practice was that when DCs were returned from end users to TR because of inferior quality, those DCs would be transferred by TR to ETI/EVGA for testing/repairing, and such repaired DCs would be sent back to TR as part of “the Stock” (paragraph 29(1) of the AD&C), which ultimately constituted the 114 DCs. As such, Mr Chan invited the Court to deduce that the 114 DCs could not have been brand new and they probably had gone through the said “return and repair” procedures. Ms Xu submitted that there is no proper evidential basis for this allegation. First, she referred to Mr Li’s initial and spontaneous answer during cross-examination that the 114 DCs were all “good products” (“良品” in his original words), even though they were not brand-new. It was only when he was warned by the Court that he had to answer a question on the time required for their return (under Issue 1 above) that he changed his evidence to say not all of them were “good products” (some could be “inferior products”). Secondly, Mr Li accepted that TR was required by distributors such as Jin Dong (京東) to process replacement requests within 7 days (with reference to B/16/75 of the hearing bundle). He also accepted that, upon receiving a replacement request from an end user, TR would provide a good product of the same series or, if unavailable, a similar or higher-level product (“如果有一模一樣的,替換一模一樣的良品;如果沒有一模一樣的,替換相似的;如果兩者都沒有,替換更高級別的” in his original words). Mr Li further accepted that TR would conduct quality checks upon receipt of DCs from ETI/EVGA and there had been previous occasions where TR refused to take delivery of DCs (as shown in B/2/14). Ms Xu hence submitted that when TR took delivery of any DCs which would be kept by it to entertain end users’ requests for replacement (i.e., the Stock), it needed to be sure that the DCs were of good quality because replacement for the end users had to be arranged within a short timeframe. A better inference is that the goods supplied were at least regarded by TR to be suitable replacement stock. This is also consistent with Mr Li’s initial and spontaneous answer of “good products”. Thirdly, Ms Xu said Ms Chen’s evidence does not assist TR. As a salesperson not directly involved in the product replacement and RMA processes, Ms Chen’s understanding was that spare DCs for replacement would have to be brand-new. When asked specifically whether any of the 114 DCs were defective, she fairly accepted that she did not know/was not sure about their condition. That is not positive evidence that any of the 114 DCs were defective. When these puzzles are put together, Ms Xu submitted that there is no credible evidential basis for the suggestion that any of the 114 DCs were not good products or were of inferior quality. In any event, the assertion is inconsistent with and cannot alter the starting point that the market value of the 114 DCs as at 25 October 2022 was US$69,010. I accept Ms Xu’s submissions on the conditions of the 114 DCs. In fact, Mr Chan could at most point to the existence of a practice of ETI/EVGA supplying refurbished DCs to TR for the purpose of the Stock. However, there is zero evidence on (a) whether any of the 114 DCs fell within this category of refurbished products; and (b) even if any DCs were refurbished, whether refurbished products were necessarily inferior. At most, one can say the Stock was not brand new. But even though Ms Chen did use the term “brand new” in her oral evidence, I do not think it has been ETI/EVGA’s position that, at the expiry of the reasonable time to return, the 114 DCs were still “brand new” as such. After all, it has been admitted that the models of the 114 DCs were first launched in 2018/2019; even if all these DCs had never been actually used by any end users up to December 2022, it is hard to describe these legacy products as “brand new” at that point of time. From my understanding of the submissions made by Ms Xu, ETI/EVGA’s position is just that the 114 DCs remained to be of value and marketable in the period from October 2022 to March 2023. She only needed to establish that they were of merchantable quality. By reason of TR’s lack of specific evidence to prove the actual quality of the 114 DCs as at December 2022, as well as Mr Li’s admission under cross-examination and other points made by Ms Xu outlined above, I rule that the 114 DCs were of merchantable quality as matters stood on around 9 December 2022. TR cannot persuade this Court to come to a lower figure of fair market value by reason of any specific quality/condition issue of any specific item within these 114 DCs. The above said, I also need to emphasize that from a broader reading of Li WS, Mr Li did flag up the condition of the 114 DCs (for example, at paragraph 11 thereof) as an issue. Mr Chan/Mr Li had not taken ETI/EVGA by surprise for making a new evidential point on this matter. Li WS and the documentary evidence were not concrete enough to establish a reduction of value based on quality/condition, but this is not a situation of TR raising new evidential issue for the first time during the assessment hearing. Sub-issue 2.3 – Product Life Cycle, Warranty and Other Factors There is no dispute that the models of the 114 DCs were first launched in 2018/2019 and a typical “Product Life Cycle” for this type of goods is 18-24 months. Coupled with the plea at paragraph 36 of the AD&C, it ought to be the common ground between the parties that from 25 October 2022 to 9 December 2022, the value of the 114 DCs must have dropped significantly. Their Product Life Cycle had already ended during that period. Ms Chen said under cross-examination that, after the end of their Product Life Cycle, such type of goods could no longer be sold on “usual sales channel” such as physical chain stores or famous online platforms. It was the reason why she had to look up second-hand market information in auctioning website like eBay when she tried to ascertain the remaining scrap value (殘值) of the 114 DCs in 2024. Pausing here, I should add that such scrap value in 2024 does not assist my task in assessing the value of the 114 DCs as at 9 December 2022. Ms Chen did mention that these products could still be circulated to, for example, end users situated in the United States if they had been timely returned. However, the timeframe she was referring to when giving this answer was year 2021, which was much earlier than the assessment date of 9 December 2022 this Court has come up with. She also referred to the factor that, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the price of the goods did not drop too much because of lack of new supplies, but this Court is not going to give weight to that assertion (even if it might be partially true) because this assertion is inconsistent with ETI/EVGA’s own plea at paragraph 36 of the AD&C that depreciation would occur after the request for the return of the 114 DCs was made. Other than Product Life Cycle, the Court should also consider the factor of warranty period (which was specifically pleaded in paragraph 36). However, it seems to this Court the way this factor affected the market value of the 114 DCs has been initially misplaced. In both Chen WS and her oral evidence, Ms Chen said the warranty period for the “last batch” within the 114 DCs expired in July 2023, and the availability of warranty would indeed affect the market value of this type of goods. Such evidence initially gave the Court an impression that, even if the 114 DCs were timely returned to ETI/EVGA and timely resold to other retailers or even directly sold by ETI/EVGA to any end users, the applicable warranty periods that ETI/EVGA (or other retailers) could give the end users would still expire in July 2023, i.e., replacement of defective goods could only be entertained for a brief period of 7-8 months. But upon a closer understanding of Ms Chen’s evidence, this Court found that the initial impression was wrong. In fact, the “July 2023 expiry date” was only a reference to the expiry date of the warranty period of those goods which were in the “same batches” of the 114 DCs but were sold to other overseas markets. In order to clarify Ms Chen’s evidence, I specifically asked if TR had returned the 114 DCs in January 2023 and they had been resold to other customers immediately, what would have been the length of the warranty period offered. To my question, Ms Chen answered affirmatively that the period awarded to the DCs’ end users would still be a full three-year period from the date of the sale. I note this oral evidence is not quite the same as the literal expressions used in Chen WS, and in fact Ms Chen also once testified that she had difficulty working out the expiry dates of the warranty periods of the different “batches” of goods within the 114 DCs. However, Ms Chen did not impress this Court as shifting her evidence to make it more advantageous to ETI/EVGA’s position. Overall speaking, I have found Ms Chen to be forthcoming and her demeanour to be consistent with an honest and reliable witness. I hold that she adopted the expressions in Chen WS regarding warranty periods because, from her perspective, the 114 DCs had not been actually returned for ETI/EVGA to resell them to others. Thus, in her then view, the applicable warranty periods should be counted by reference to when ETI/EVGA previously supplied these batches of goods to retailers like TR and those in other overseas markets. When Chen WS was being prepared, it just did not occur to her and those assisting her in making the statement that, if the goods were actually returned in 2022/2023, her companies could still offer three-year warranty periods to enhance their value. I therefore hold that, while the emergence of new products and the end of the 114 DCs’ Product Life Cycle in around 2020/2021 would cause the value of the 114 DCs to depreciate from 25 October 2022 to 9 December 2022, the factor of warranty period would not further reduce their value. I should also add that I placed no weight on a few emails in September 2021 crossed between the two sides’ representatives (not Ms Chen or Mr Li) at B/13/66-67. The Court is unable to ascertain the context of the figures put forward by TR’s side, i.e., US$1-2 for certain types of models in second-hand market. It is obscure whether they were related to the 114 DCs at all. Moreover, ETI/EVGA’s side did not admit such figures and positively commented that they were too low. It sheds no light on the value of the 114 DCs. Mr Chan for TR also said ETI/EVGA did not tell TR what use they would put to the 114 DCs upon their return to Taiwan and dismissed TR’s choice of returning them in September/November 2023. These factors are completely irrelevant. The factual foundation of this assessment remains to be TR’s failure to return the DCs upon the expiry of reasonable time (which was long before September/November 2023) and the non-existence of any proposal from TR to protect ETI/EVGA against the loss arising from TR’s failure to return those DCs. Sub-issue 2.4 – Arriving at the Fair Market Value as at 9 December 2022 The Court knows for sure the value of the 114 DCs could not stand at the same value of US$69,010 as at 9 December 2022 because of the end of their relevant Product Life Cycle. In fact, ETI/EVGA just benefits from a technical approach of litigation to tie down the value of the 114 DCs to US$69,010 as at 25 October 2022. While this Court will observe that starting point by reason of the applicable legal principles, the Court’s hands are not so tied when the assessment is about the value of the DCs as at 9 December 2022. Unfortunately, there appears to be no compelling evidence as to the market value of the 114 DCs on or around that specific date. Although many of Mr Chan’s submissions are rejected by this Court, one submission he made is in my view correct: as long as the claimant is not making a windfall from the Court’s award of damages, the law takes a flexible approach on the amount of damages, and the overall purpose is just to ensure a fair and just compensation. In closing submissions, Ms Xu drew my attention to the plea at paragraph 41 of the AD&C and the relevant letter issued by solicitors for ETI/EVGA on 31 May 2023 (a copy of which is also in the hearing bundle at C/2/14-17). In that letter, ETI/EVGA’s solicitors said the value of the 114 DCs were US$28,394.14 as at 8 March 2023. TR’s side did not specifically respond to this valuation in its contemporaneous correspondence (it did not do so even during this Assessment of Damages process). Although the origin of this valuation of US$28,394.14 (as at 8 March 2023) is not covered by other evidence, it seems to be consistent with the pleaded factual foundation of “quick depreciation” and the evidence that the Product Life Cycle of these products had ended. TR has had more than enough opportunities to respond to that valuation, but has never targeted at that amount to make a specific rebuttal (e.g., the 114 DCs were not worth that amount but a different amount as at 8 March 2023). TR’s failure to address that can be treated as an implicit admission. The plea at paragraph 41 of the AD&C was, in substance, a repetition of the content of a demand letter. It was unlike a factual plea in itself (such as the valuation of US$69,010 as at 25 October 2022 in paragraph 39). Therefore, I cannot say the valuation of US$28,394.14 is legally binding by reason of the lack of reply to counterclaim. Yet, the content of that letter and TR’s failure to express a contrary view is something the Court can have regard to evidentially. Applying the flexible principle Mr Chan urged me to apply to the facts of this case, I adopt the values of US$69,010 as at 25 October 2022 and US$28,394.14 as at 8 March 2023. There were 134 days between the two dates. In other words, the daily depreciation of the 114 DCs was (US$69,010 – US$28,394.14)/134 = US$303.10. The valuation date I adopt, 9 December 2022, was 45 days from 25 October 2022. I therefore deduce that the value of the 114 DCs, as at 9 December 2022, to be US$69,010 – (US$303.10 x 45) = US$55,370.50. I appreciate that depreciation is not always linear. However, there can be no absolutely correct or scientific approach in deducing the amount of depreciation of a particular asset over time; even market or expert evidence can at best be inferential or projectory. The Court needs to live with the realities of this case and find a value which is supported by some evidence and closest to the actual loss suffered by ETI/EVGA. As the Court accepts that ETI/EVGA would have been able to find sources to resell the DCs if they had been promptly returned on or before 9 December 2022 and provide full three-year warranty periods, I conclude that the amount of US$55,370.50 is reasonable, and TR ought to compensate ETI/EVGA for this sum. ETI/EVGA’s case has always been framed as detinue/conversion, and thus a tortious basis of assessment of damages should be adopted (see the general principle cited in paragraph 14 above). The Invoice issued by ETI/EVGA has never been framed as the basis of any sale and purchase agreement (in fact it was only unilaterally issued by ETI/EVGA), and thus this has never been an action to sue for the price of goods. Neither has any contractual basis of damages been put forward. It is therefore never appropriate to simply adopt the invoiced amount on 25 October 2022 (or that amount minus the scrap value of the DCs if they were indeed returned) as ETI/EVGA’s compensation, when that was at most the value of the 114 DCs on 25 October 2022 but that date, on ETI/EVGA’s own case, could not have been the date of tort (detinue/conversion). In my view, at the earlier stage of these proceedings, the distinction between the applicable tortious basis of assessment and an action to sue for the price of the goods might not have been fully appreciated. If that was appreciated earlier, I believe parties would have adduced more evidence showing the market value of the 114 DCs from November 2022 to some appropriate points of time in 2023. This case shows that, even when liability is not contested and has been established, pleadings may very often be required in order to guide the parties as to what are the real issues and evidence required for the assessment of quantum (especially unliquidated damages). One example is the Statement of Damages and the Answer to it, which are generally adopted in personal injuries (“PI”) actions. I think similar consideration should apply to non-PI tort cases, or even contract/equity cases, involving assessment of damages or other forms of unliquidated monetary compensation. DISPOSITION I thus order TR to pay ETI/EVGA the sum of US$55,370.50. Pre-judgment interest on this sum is awarded at the rate of 1% above the prevailing HSBC best lending rates from 9 December 2022 (i.e., when the cause of action based on the tort of detinue/conversion first arose) to the date of this judgment. Interest accrued after this judgment is certainly on judgment rate. I also grant a costs order nisi that TR shall pay ETI/EVGA the costs of the counterclaim, including the costs of this Assessment of Damages, with Certificate for Counsel. Such costs are to be taxed if not agreed on party-and-party basis. ( Lewis Law ) Deputy District Judge Mr Charles KC Chan, instructed by Chin & Associates, for the Plaintiff Ms Cherry Xu, instructed by LT Lawyers, for the 1st and 2nd Defendants