RE MD SOAVE

CACV 1190/2025, [2026] HKCA 136

On Appeal From [2025] HKCFI 5853

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 1190 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 2123 OF 2020)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Leung J (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  This is the applicant’s appeal against the order of Deputy High Court Judge Michael Wong (“the Judge”) dated 2 December 2025 ([2025] HKCFI 5853) (“the Leave Decision”). By the Leave Decision, the Judge refused to grant extension of time to the applicant to apply for leave to apply for judicial review and dismissed his application for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave Application”) against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) dated 2 September 2020 (“the Board’s Decision”). By the Board’s Decision, his appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 15 November 2018, which refused his non-refoulement claim, was dismissed.

2.  The applicant is an Indian national. His personal background, the basis of his claim and his arguments advanced before the Board as well as the Board’s reasons for rejecting his appeal were set out in the Board’s Decision: see [4] – [6] of the Leave Decision[1]. The Judge also set out the grounds advanced by the applicant in support of the Leave Application and his reasons for refusing the Leave Application: see [13] – [47] of the Leave Decision. We will not repeat the details herein.

3.  By the Notice of Appeal filed on 15 December 2025, the applicant stated:

“I have prepared this application without legal representation. I reserve the right to amend or supplement this Notice of Appeal in due course.” (sic)

4.  The appeal was listed to be heard on 2 February 2026. By the directions made by the Registrar of Civil Appeals on 15 December 2025 (“the Directions”), which were received by the applicant on the same day, he was directed to lodge two sets of skeleton argument on or before 19 January 2026, failing which, he would be deemed to have waived his right to have an oral hearing for the appeal and the hearing date would be vacated with the appeal being determined on paper.

5.  The applicant did not lodge any skeleton argument by the stipulated time. Accordingly, he was deemed to have waived his right to have an oral hearing and elected to have his appeal disposed of on paper. The hearing date was thus vacated on 20 January 2026.

6.  The relevant legal principles governing appeals in non-refoulement cases are set out in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]. In particular, in an appeal against refusal of leave to apply for judicial review in non-refoulement cases, the Court of Appeal will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed. The Court’s role is not to examine the decision maker’s decision afresh as if it were a fresh application for judicial review.

7.  No ground of appeal was stated in the Notice of Appeal. Whether or not legally represented, an appealing applicant is not in a position to reserve his position in stating his ground of appeal. Without identified and particularised ground of appeal, the appeal is liable to be dismissed for this reason alone.

8.  On 23 January 2026, the applicant lodged his skeleton submissions purporting to advance 2 grounds of appeal. The submissions were lodged in breach of the Directions and without leave. They also could not serve to advance any ground of appeal not stated in the Notice of Appeal.

9.  Even assuming that his submissions are considered, this court notes that the applicant’s two grounds of appeal respectively refer to (i) the high standard of fairness required in the determination of a refoulement claim and the alleged failure of the Board to consider the conditions of his country of origin, and (ii) the procedural fairness. In support, the applicant cites authorities including: ST v Director of Immigration [2014] 4 HKLRD 277; Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar [2005] 1 HKLRD 289; (2004) 7 HKCFAR 187; The Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for Civil Service [1985] AC 374; Pearl Securities Limited v Stock Exchange of Hong Kong [1999] 2 HKLRD 243; Michael John Treloar Rowse v Secretary for the Civil Service & Ors [2008] 5 HKLRD 217.

10.  This court has no issue with the principles pronounced and explained in the above authorities. However, the applicant’s complaint about the general practice of the Board not to question or find fault in the decision of the Director is a bare and general assertion. His complaint that the Board did not consider the conditions of his country of origin is contradicted by what is discernible from the reasons of the Board’s Decision. More relevantly for the purpose of this appeal, the applicant fails to identify and particularise how the Judge erred in applying the principles in reaching the Leave Decision which could give rise to any ground of appeal. In our judgment, the Judge was entitled to come to the Leave Decision, and we can see no basis to interfere with it.

11.  For the above reasons, the applicant’s appeal against the Leave Decision has no merit and is dismissed.