SRC INTERNATIONAL (MALAYSIA) LTD (a company incorporated in accordance with the laws of the British Virgin Islands) (In Liquidation) v. BANK JULIUS BAER & CO. LTD

HCA 777/2021

[2026] HKCFI 3903

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 777 OF 2021

_______________

_______________

__________________

D E C I S I O N[1]

__________________

A.  PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION FOR EXPERT EVIDENCE

1.  The Plaintiff has applied to adduce expert evidence on banking practice in respect of 3 questions set out in Plaintiff’s summons dated 12 January 2026.[2]  The Plaintiff contends that whether the Defendant acted as a reasonable banker lies at the heart of this action. It submits that the Defendant’s conduct must be assessed against an objective benchmark to be provided by the experts on banking practice.

2.  For the reasons which I am about to give, I am not satisfied that the court will be assisted by expert evidence on banking practice to resolve the issues in this case.

3.  First, the Plaintiff has not pleaded any applicable or relevant regulatory requirements relating to the compliance and anti-money laundering responsibilities which are applicable to the Defendant. Nor has the Plaintiff pleaded any prevailing industry standard for compliance, risk management and verification of instructions from corporate clients. Further, it is not the Plaintiff’s pleaded case that any regulatory or industry standards have been breached by the Defendant. In these circumstances, the Plaintiff’s proposed questions do not arise, and the Relevance Condition cannot in my view be satisfied.

4.  Further, the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant is for breach of the Quincecare duty. Simply put, the Quincecare duty is a duty on a bank to refuse to comply with a payment instruction in circumstances where the bank is put on inquiry by having reasonable grounds for believing that the instruction was an attempt to misappropriate funds. As explained by Lord Sumption NPJ in the CFA’s decision in PT Asuransi Tugu Pratama Indonesia TBK v Citibank NA (2023) 26 HKCFAR 1 at [17], whether the bank should make inquiries would essentially depend on the facts. His Lordship at [20] further endorsed irrationality as the test to determine whether the bank can rely on ostensible authority to proceed without inquiry. That again seems to me to be a question of fact. I am unable to agree with the Plaintiff’s suggestion that the question of whether the Defendant was put on inquiry would turn on any expert evidence on banking practice.

5.  In any event, I note that the Steyn J in the Quincecare case did not appear to find it helpful to rely on expert evidence to decide the issues. Further, it appears that no expert evidence on banking practice was adduced in the Citibank case.

6.  Lastly, the Plaintiff’s proposed question 3 asks for expert opinion on whether the Defendant fell below the standard of an ordinary prudent banker. In my view, that question is improper as it is asking the experts to answer the ultimate conclusion to be decided by the court at the trial.

7.  On the basis of the materials before the court today, there is nothing to suggest that the trial judge will not be able to reach a fully informed decision to resolve the issues.

8.  For these brief reasons, I am unable to accede to the Plaintiff’s application for expert evidence. The Plaintiff’s summons on expert evidence dated 12 January 2026 is dismissed.

9.  The costs of and occasioned by the Plaintiff’s summons on expert evidence dated 12 January 2026 are to be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant, with a certificate for two counsel, to be taxed if not agreed.

B.  PLAINTIFF’S SPECIFIC DISCOVERY APPLICATION

10.  The Plaintiff has applied for specific discovery of 9 categories of documents. In its skeleton, the Plaintiff has restricted its requests for documents listed out in the Schedule of its summons (“Schedule”). Each of the categories of documents sought by the Plaintiff is dealt with in turn.

Category 1: paragraphs 1.1, 1.3, 1.4 and 1.5 of Schedule

11.  Category 1 seeks all documents relating to the Defendant’s upfront Know Your Client and client due diligence with respect to the Plaintiff’s account held with the Defendant (“Account”) including 5 sub‑categories of documents. In its skeleton, the Plaintiff only confines the request to the documents in paragraphs 1.1 and 1.5 of the Schedule. In relation to paragraphs 1.3 and 1.4, the Plaintiff only seeks an affidavit from the Defendant to state when it parted with the documents and what has become of them under RHC O.24 r.7(1) (“R.7(1) Affidavit”).

12.  As far as the documents sought under paragraphs 1.3 and 1.4 of the Schedule are concerned, I do not think the Plaintiff is entitled to get a R.7(1) Affidavit from the Defendant.

(1)  For the paragraph 1.3 documents, Ms Jenny Chan in her 5^th Affirmation (“Chan 5”) said that the Defendant has disclosed all the relevant documents from January 2011 to September 2016 and confirmed that there are no others. This should be conclusive for the purpose of discovery: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026 Note 24/7/1. There is nothing to suggest that there are other written records relating to the annual review process, or other further responsive documents, which have not been disclosed.

(2)  Further, under RHC O.24 r.7(1), a deponent of an affidavit should only say when he has parted with the documents and what has become of them if he no longer has in his possession, custody or power the documents sought by his opponent. In the present case, it is not the Defendant’s case that paragraph 1.3 documents are no longer in its possession, custody or power. In these circumstances, I do not see why the Defendant should file a further affidavit to state when it parted with the documents and what has become of them.

(3)  Insofar as the Plaintiff says that Ms Chan should provide confirmation in relation to documents from September 2016 to June 2021, I am not satisfied that the Plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of such documents in the first place.

(4)  For the paragraph 1.4 documents, the Defendant has already said in Chan 5 that the Name-Check search records had already been deleted as a result of the closure of the Account, and that the other manual search records have already been produced. Such statements should be treated as conclusive for present purposes and there is nothing to suggest that there are other written records which have not been disclosed. Although Mr Manzoni in his oral reply referred to a document of the Defendant with the word “Name Check” that was recently disclosed by the Defendant, it is unclear on the face of the document whether it is a record for the account 9886652, which is the subject matter of this sub-category of documents. Insofar as the Plaintiff says it should be told when the requested records were deleted, it is apparent from Ms Chan’s Chan 5 that they were deleted when the account was closed and deactivated. For these reasons, I do not think any further affidavit is required to be provided by the Defendant.

13.  For the paragraph 1.1 documents, the Plaintiff says that in the light of the recent discovery made by the Defendant, it only seeks a R.7(1) Affidavit in relation to these documents.

(1)  I do not think the Plaintiff has justified their relevance. The Plaintiff submits that such documents are relevant to whether the Defendant had breached its own internal policies and procedures, and whether D had failed to tag a relationship manager to the Account. However, it is not the Plaintiff’s pleaded case that the Defendant’s alleged breach was caused by the non-tagging of relationship manager. In these circumstances, I do not think the requested documents are relevant.

(2)  In any event, the requested documents span from August 2011 to June 2021. I am unable to see why the Defendant’s internal policies and procedures that came into effect after the last payment from the Account in 2016 are said to be relevant.

(3)  Even if the requested documents were regarded as relevant, I think the request is defined so widely so that it may include irrelevant and unnecessary documents, such as documents which have nothing to do with tagging of relationship manager: see Molnlycke AB v Procter & Gamble Ltd (No 3) [1990] RPC 498 at 502 (Mummery J).

(4)  For these reasons, I decline to order the Defendant to make a R.7(1) Affidavit in respect of the paragraph 1.1 documents.

14.  For the paragraph 1.5 documents sought by the Plaintiff, it is said in the Plaintiff’s skeleton submission that the Defendant has not produced the documents produced in connection with Mr Harris Kuk’s review mentioned in §14.2 of his witness statement. However, the Plaintiff has not identified any basis for suggesting that there exists other underlying written records and documentation in relation to Mr Kuk’s review. In my view, the Plaintiff has not established that the requested documents exist. I decline to order the disclosure of the paragraph 1.5 documents.

Category 2

15.  Category 2 seeks all records and correspondence held by PT Julius Baer Advisory Indonesia (“JBAI”) relating to the Plaintiff, the Account, SRC International Sdn Bhd (“SRC International”), Nik Faisal Ariff Kamil (“Faisal”), Suboh Bin Md Yassin (“Suboh”) and/or 1Malaysia Development Berhad (“1MDB”) from August 2011 to June 2021.

16.  I do not think this is a proper request. My reasons are as follows.

17.  First, the request does not identify the documents by their nature and is defined so widely so as to include documents which are not relevant to the issues. It is not difficult to imagine that there would be documents held by JBAI relating to the Plaintiff or 1MDB which are not relevant to any issues in the present proceedings. I therefore disagree with the Plaintiff’s submission that all documents held by JBAI in relation to the identified individuals and/or entities are ipso facto relevant.

18.  Further, the Plaintiff has not explained why all documents held by JBAI in relation to the identified individuals and/or entities that came into existence after the last payment from the Account in 2016 are said to be relevant. The Plaintiff has also not demonstrated that there is in existence the requested documents from 2017 to June 2021. This is particularly so when Ms Chan states at Chan 5 that JBAI closed in the fourth quarter of 2016.

19.  I decline to order the disclosure of the Category 2 documents.

Category 3

20.  Under Category 3, the Plaintiff seeks all meeting records, meeting minutes and all other contemporaneous records pertaining to the meetings between representatives of the Plaintiff and the Defendant and/or JBAI from August 2011 to June 2021, including 4 sub-categories of documents from 4 meetings and events. In its skeleton submission, the Plaintiff confines its request only to a R.7(1) Affidavit in relation to the 4 meetings and events identified in Category 3.

21.  In Chan 5, Ms Chan confirmed that save for those that have already been disclosed in its lists of documents, the Defendant does not have in its possession, custody or power further documents falling within Category 3.

22.  The Plaintiff accepts that Ms Chan said is conclusive at the interlocutory stage but further requires the Defendant to state when it parted with the documents and what has become of them. Again, it is not the Defendant’s case that Category 3 documents are no longer in its possession, custody or power. Accordingly, I do not see why the Defendant should file a further affidavit to state when it parted with the documents and what has become of them.

Category 4

23.  Under Category 4, the Plaintiff seeks audio recordings of call backs with Faisal and/or Suboh from August 2011 to June 2021, and any recordings of communications between representatives of the Plaintiff and JBAI during the same period in connection with the Account. Ms Chan in Chan 5 has confirmed that the Defendant does not have in its possession, custody or control documents within this Category from January 2011 to September 2016. The Plaintiff now only seeks a R.7(1) Affidavit from the Defendant in relation to the documents within the period from October 2016 to June 2021.

24.  The Plaintiff has not adequately explained how the requested recording records from October 2016 to June 2021 are relevant to the issues. According to the Defendant, the call backs were conducted as additional verification of identity of the maker and contents of instruction, and there does not appear to be any issue in relation to these matters in the present proceedings. Further, the request for recording records between the Plaintiff and JBAI in connection with the Account is too broad and would invariably include records which are not relevant to the issues in this action.

25.  Accordingly, I decline to order the Defendant to file a R.7(1) Affidavit in respect of Category 4 documents within the period from October 2016 to June 2021.

Category 5

26.  Under Category 5, the Plaintiff seeks discovery of (1) all documentation, case files, internal memoranda, working papers, system reports and correspondence on the Defendant’s Compliance Team’s overall alert clearance process in connection with the payments and (2) all correspondence and supporting documentation in respect of the payments with “investment purpose” as the stated purpose of transfer.

27.  I do not believe the Plaintiff has shown a prima facie case for the existence of the two sub-categories of documents. The Plaintiff submits that there must be further documents beyond the summary comments which have been disclosed. I do not believe this necessarily follows. Similarly, the mere reference by an individual at the Defendant to the term “investment purpose” in a disclosed email does not in my view suggest that there must be in existence other documentation in support of the investment purpose.

28.  For this reason, I decline to order the disclosure of the Category 5 documents.

Category 6

29.  Under Category 6, the Plaintiff seeks discovery of 3 classes of documents relating to the Defendant’s suspicious transaction reporting and communications with regulatory authorities. For the Defendant’s internal documents to determine whether a suspicious transaction report was reported, the Plaintiff confirms that it only seeks an affidavit from the Defendant to state if it ever had such documents in its possession, and if so, what has now become of them.

30.  In Chan 5, Ms Chan has already confirmed that the Defendant does not have in its possession, custody, or power the documents sought by the Plaintiff under Category 6 paragraph 10 from 2011 to 2016. Such affidavit evidence is conclusive at this stage. Further, it is not the Defendant’s case that these documents are no longer in its possession, custody or power. In these circumstances, I do not see why the Defendant should file a further affidavit to state when it parted with the documents and what has become of them. Insofar as the Plaintiff says that Ms Chan should provide confirmation in relation to documents from September 2016 to June 2021, I am not satisfied that the Plaintiff has demonstrated their existence in the first place.

31.  As far as the Plaintiff’s request for Category 6 paragraph 11 documents is concerned, I consider that it is way too broad. It asks for all correspondence, documentation and/or records relating to communications between the Defendant’s Swiss headquarters/Zurich branch and the Hong Kong branch from 2011 to 2021 in relation to (1) regulatory enquiries made by regulatory authorities in relation to 1MDB, SRC International and other individuals and (2) the Defendant’s Swiss headquarters/Zurich branch’s review and assessment of the Defendant’s Hong Kong branch/JBAI’s compliance work on various subjects. This widely defined request is in my view bound to include irrelevant and unnecessary documents.

32.  As to the Category 6 paragraph 9 documents, the Plaintiff seeks discovery of all correspondence, documentation and/or records of communications and calls between 2011 and 2021 concerning the Account or the Payments as between the Defendant (including the Defendant’s Swiss Headquarters/Zurich branch) and the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (“FINMA”), the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (“HKMA”) and/or any other regulators.

33.  As far as the communications with FINMA are concerned, the Defendant has put in evidence to suggest that FINMA corresponded with the Defendant via the Defendant’s Swiss headquarters and not with the Hong Kong branch. The Plaintiff has not put into issue that the knowledge of any staff members of the Defendant’s Swiss headquarters is relevant to any issues in these proceedings. Further, it does not appear to be the Plaintiff’s case that the knowledge of any staff members of the Defendant’s Swiss headquarters is attributable to the Defendant. In these circumstances, I do not see the relevance or necessity of the Category 6 paragraph 9.1 documents.

34.  As far as the Category 6 paragraph 9.2 documents are concerned, the Plaintiff seeks records between the Defendant and HKMA concerning the Account or the relevant payments.

(1)  To justify their existence, the Plaintiff refers to paragraph 64 of Ms Barkhouse’s 1^st affidavit, where she said that the Defendant’s disclosure and factual evidence reveals communications between the Defendant and regulatory authorities with respect to the Account as identified in her Appendix 6. In Appendix 6 of her 1^st affidavit, Ms Barkhouse only identifies one email from Ms Margaret Lau to the HKMA dated 23 July 2015. I am not persuaded this single email can be used to justify that there was in existence correspondence, documentation and/or records of communications and calls from 2011 to 2021 between the Defendant and HKMA.

(2)  In any event, it is not clear to me that the requested documents are necessary for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs. Documents of which discovery is necessary for the fair disposal of a matter in issue must at least have a demonstrable evidential materiality: O Company v M Company [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 347 at 352 (Colman J). It has not been sufficiently demonstrated by the Plaintiff that this class of documents sought is expected to yield information of evidential materiality to the pleaded claim or the pleaded defence in the broad sense.

35.  As to the Category 6 paragraph 9.3 documents, the Plaintiff asks for communication records between the Defendant and “any other regulator” concerning the Account or the relevant payments. The Plaintiff has not identified who the “other regulators” are intended to refer to or why such documents are relevant to any issues in this case. Therefore, I am also unable to see the relevance or necessity of the Category 6 paragraph 9.3 documents.

36.  For these reasons, I decline to order the disclosure of the Category 6 paragraphs 9 and 11 documents.

Category 7

37.  Under Category 7, the Plaintiff seeks discovery of unredacted copies of all documents previously produced in redacted form in their unredacted entirety. The Plaintiff submits that the Defendant has made no attempt to explain the nature of the redacted materials, or why it says the redacted materials is not relevant to the issues in dispute. On the other hand, Ms Chan in Chan 5 says that the redactions were principally made in relation to the identity of the senders or recipients of the emails on the ground of irrelevance.

38.  It is well-established that an oath of the party giving discovery that the parts redacted in a document do not relate to the matters in question is ordinarily conclusive: GE Capital Corporate Finance Group Ltd v Bankers Trust Co [1995] 1 WLR 172 at 174D-E (Hoffmann LJ); 176H‑177B (Leggatt LJ); 177F-H (Dillon LJ). A heavy burden lies on a party who seeks to challenge the veracity of the other party’s oath regarding redaction: Wong Kar Gee Mimi v Severn Villa Ltd [2012] 1 HKLRD 887 at [52] (Kwan JA).

39.  The Plaintiff refers to an unredacted email dated 2 July 2015 and submits that the Defendant should provide explanation for redacting the email chain prior to this date because of the significance of the timing to the issues in dispute. I do not believe this is sufficient to discharge the heavy burden. Indeed, it appears to me that the Plaintiff’s submission that the redactions are unexplained is an attempt to reverse the heavy burden.

40.  As Kwan JA said in Wong Kar Gee Mimi (above) at [51], the test is not whether the redacted parts are potentially relevant. According to her Ladyship, the test is whether it is not unreasonable to suppose that the parts redacted do contain information which may, either directly or indirectly, enable the Plaintiff to advance its own case or to damage the Defendant’s case. I do not believe the Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated how the information from the unredacted parts may advance its own case or to damage the Defendant’s case.

41.  Accordingly, I decline to order the disclosure of the Category 7 documents.

Category 8

42.  Under Category 8, the Plaintiff seeks discovery of records and correspondence held by the Defendant in Switzerland and Singapore relating to the Plaintiff, the Account, Faisal, Suboh, SRC International and/or 1MDB from 2011 to 2021.

43.  In my view, this request is formulated much too widely. It will inevitably include documents made by the staff of the Defendant’s Swiss headquarters and Singapore branch. However, the Plaintiff has not established whether the makers of such documents had any role to play, or were involved, in relation to the relevant payments made by the Defendant at the material times. This would mean that the documents sought by the Plaintiff may well be completely irrelevant to the issues in the present proceedings.

44.  The Plaintiff submits that the Defendant is seeking to introduce a geographic limit to its discovery obligations. However, it seems to me that the burden is on the Plaintiff to demonstrate that the documents sought under this very wide class of documents are all relevant documents. I do not believe the burden has been discharged.

45.  Further, the Plaintiff has not demonstrated why the requested documents are necessary either for disposing of the matter or for saving costs.

46.  For these reasons, I decline to order the disclosure of the Category 8 documents.

47.  For the sake of completeness, I should mention that the Defendant also submits that ordering this request would subject the Defendant’s Swiss staff to a real risk of prosecution under Swiss law. Given that the conclusion I have reached for not acceding to this request, it is unnecessary for me to express any view on the risk of prosecution issue.

Category 9

48.  Under Category 9, the Plaintiff seeks discovery of native copies of all relevant emails disclosed by the Defendant, including native format copies of each email including any attachments from the inbox of each staff member copied of the Defendant on the relevant email, to be produced electronically in a manner that preserves metadata.

49.  The Plaintiff acknowledges that its request is framed by reference to Practice Direction SL 1.2, which it accepts does not apply to this action. However, it submits that given the scale of the present litigation, production of native files on discovery is a reasonable expectation.

50.  Irrespective of the amount at stake or the complexity of the case, I am unable to agree that a party in litigation can reasonably expect that his opponent will produce documents in discovery in native format. In the absence of any overriding practice direction, the default discovery rules for actions commenced by writ must be those set out in RHC O.24.  

51.  In the present case, the Plaintiff has not demonstrated the necessity for the Defendant to disclose native format copies of all the relevant emails. No reason has been proffered by the Plaintiff as to why there is a need for the Defendant to re-produce all the previously disclosed emails in native form. The suggested exercise is in my view the antithesis of saving costs.

52.  For these reasons, I decline to order the disclosure of the Category 9 documents.

53.  The Plaintiff’s summons dated 12 January 2026 for specific discovery is dismissed. The costs of and occasioned by that summons are to be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant, with a certificate for two counsel, to be taxed if not agreed.

C.  DEFENDANT’S APPLICATION FOR FURTHER AND BETTER PARTICULARS

54.  The Defendant has applied for the Plaintiff to be ordered to provide answers to the requests for further and better particulars of the Re‑Amended Statement of Claim. The requests that the court needs to determine may be grouped into 3 groups. I will deal with them in turn.

Requests 1.3, 1.5, 1.7 to 1.10

55.  The first group comprises Requests 1.3, 1.5, 1.7 to 1.10. These requests are said to arise out of paragraphs 23 and 27 of the Re‑Amended Statement of Claim where the Plaintiff pleaded the fraud on the Plaintiff and the fact that the Plaintiff was used as a vehicle by the conspirators for the misappropriation of funds to individuals/entities connected to them. Under these requests, the Defendant asks the Plaintiff to provide further and better particulars on the alleged conspiracy, the alleged connection between the conspirators and the other individuals, and how the funds were allegedly diverted and distributed by them.

56.  The Defendant says that the answers are necessary for the fair disposal of the action and that there is a genuine need for clarification.

57.  I disagree. It is right to bear in mind that the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant is based on a breach of the Quincecare duty. In particular, the Plaintiff has not alleged that the Defendant was involved in, or had knowledge of, the fraud perpetrated by the conspirators identified by the Plaintiff. Paragraphs 23 and 27 of the Re-Amended Statement of Claim are part of the Plaintiff’s pleas on the background of the fraud, which led to the Plaintiff’s claim in respect of the 16 payments out of the bank account maintained with the Defendant. The Defendant’s responses to the Plaintiff’s background pleas consist of non-admissions, and the Defendant has not pleaded any positive case in relation to the fraud. In these circumstances, I do not see the necessity for the Defendant to seek the requested particulars from the Plaintiff.

58.  The Defendant has cited numerous authorities to contend that matters which are essential in a plea of conspiracy must be pleaded with sufficient particulars. In my view, these cases are not on point. As mentioned earlier, the Plaintiff has not advanced a claim of conspiracy against the Defendant. The particulars concerning the fraud are therefore not the material facts to the pleaded claim as against the Defendant.

59.  For these reasons, I decline to order the Plaintiff to give further and better particulars to Requests 1.3, 1.5, 1.7 to 1.10.

Requests 2.1, 2.4 and 2.5

60.  The second group comprises Requests 2.1, 2.4 and 2.5, which are said to arise out of paragraphs 18, 21.1 23, 27, 30Q and 72 of the Re‑Amended Statement of Claim. The Requests ask for particulars of (1) matters as to why each of the 16 payments is said to be a fraudulent misappropriation of the Plaintiff’s properties, (2) the entities and individuals involved in effecting each payment and those who ultimately received it and (3) details of the ultimate recipient of each payment.

61.  As to Request 2.1, it seems to me the Defendant is effectively asking the Plaintiff to give reason to explain why the relevant payments were described as fraudulent misappropriation of the Plaintiff’s properties. It seems to me that the reason can be found from paragraph 72.2 of the Re-Re‑Amended Statement of Claim, which pleads that “[each] of the Payments was made on the instructions of Faisal and/or Suboh who acted without authority of the Plaintiff”. The Plaintiff further pleads the circumstances under which each of the 16 payments were made in the remaining parts of Section F of its Re-Amended Statement of Claim. These are essentially what the Plaintiff has said in its voluntary particulars. In these circumstances, I disagree with the Defendant that the Plaintiff’s pleas of fraudulent misappropriation of properties have not been sufficiently particularised. For the reason given earlier, there is again no merit in the Defendant’s complaint that the Plaintiff has not pleaded the essential elements of a claim in conspiracy.

62.  As to Requests 2.4 and 2.5, the Defendant seeks information concerning the entities or individuals who effected and received each payment. I am unable to see how such information are facts which are material to the Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant. Insofar as these two requests are said to arise out of paragraph 23 of the Re-Amended Statement of Claim, I repeat what I said earlier about paragraph 23 being a background plea. I agree with the Plaintiff’s submission that the information sought by the Defendant is essentially evidence, and cannot be obtained in the guise of requests for further and better particulars.

63.  For these reasons, it is my view that Requests 2.1, 2.4 and 2.5 are not necessary either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter, or for saving costs. I decline to order the Plaintiff to provide further and better particulars to them.

Requests 3.1 and 3.2

64.  The third and last group comprises Requests 3.1 and 3.2. These requests arise out of paragraph 28 of the Re-Amended Statement of Claim, which pleads that “… [no] red flags appeared on the account following the 1MDB scandal being widely reported, and despite Faisal and Suboh … being named as involved in the 1MDB/SRC International Fraud”. The requests seek particulars of the articles reporting the “1MDB/SRC International Fraud”.

65.  In its voluntary particulars, the Plaintiff referred to the articles pleaded in Section E of the Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim as examples of the articles in which the 1MDB scandal being widely reported and which named Faisal and Suboh as involved in the 1MDB/SRC International Fraud. In paragraphs 44 to 71 and 71A of the Re‑Re‑Amended Statement of Claim, I note that the Plaintiff has pleaded extensive references to articles and media coverage on the fraud. In its Re‑Amended Defence, the Defendant made no admission as to whether the fraud was reported in the media articles as pleaded by the Plaintiff. I further note that the issue of media reports has been dealt with in Ms Barkhouse’s witness statement for the Plaintiff at Section D1, and in Ms Lau’s witness statement for the Defendant at Section C2.

66.  In these circumstances, contrary to the Defendant’s submission, I do not believe it is necessary for the Plaintiff to “commit its case on the precise articles it intends to rely”. Insofar as the Defendant complains that the articles pleaded by the Plaintiff do not support the plea in paragraph 23 of the Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim, that issue can be further pursued at the trial. The function of a request for further and better particulars is not to enable the maker to test the veracity of his opponent’s pleas in a pleading.

67.  For these reasons, I decline to order the Plaintiff to provide further and better particulars to Requests 3.1 and 3.2.

68.  The Defendant’s summons dated 20 February 2026 on requests for further and better particulars is dismissed. The costs of and occasioned by that summons are to be paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff to be taxed if not agreed.