林永恒 v. ALLEN OVERY律師行

HCA 1874/2019

[2021] HKCFI 1599

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

HIGH COURT ACTION NO 1874 OF 2019

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JUDGMENT

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I. INTRODUCTION

1.  The plaintiff (“P”) claimed he was (a) a shareholder and a director of Good Ascent Investment Limited (“Good Ascent”) and (b) the owner of the No 120 Stanley Main Street, Hong Kong (“120 Address”).

2.  On 11 October 2019, P commenced the present action against “Allen Overy 律師行” (“A&O”). In the Statement of Claim (“SoC”) indorsed on the Writ of Summons (“WoS”), P claimed as follows:

(a)	On 5 June 2001, Good Ascent (company number 758005) was incorporated under the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (then Companies Ordinance) Cap 32 (“CO”), and its registered office was at the 120 Address.
(b)	“翁家太公” had 2 sons, and in 1941 “翁家太公” engaged a surveyor to partition and divide the 120 Address into 2 lots, 1 of which was the Remaining Portion of Stanley Lot No 456 (“Lot 456RP”).
(c)	In 1997, P bought ½ share and interest in Lot 456RP for $250,000 from Yung Ming Kwong’s son. Later, P bought the remaining ½ share and interest in Lot 456RP from the descendent of the 2nd son of “翁家太公”, so P had both half shares and interests in Lot 456RP.
(d)	P wanted to develop and erect a building on Lot 456RP, so he engaged architect Andy Chan to submit building plans to the Buildings Department (“BD”). BD replied to the effect that the area of the lot was small, so an extra 60 sq ft of land had to be acquired from the Lands Department, and the building plans could be re-submitted upon successful acquisition of such land. Eventually, in mid-2004, the BD granted consent to commence building works.
(e)	P with the assistance of architect Andy Chan borrowed a building loan from Wing Hang Bank Limited (“WHBL”), which loan terms included (i) the 120 Address be charged to WHBL as security for the loan, (ii) the loan monies could only be used to pay for construction site foundation works, and (iii) the loan could not exceed $5,000,000. Construction site foundation works commenced in early 2005 and were completed in January 2006. There were altogether 3 building loans by WHBL in the total sum of $5,300,000, and Good Ascent made repayment to WHBL. P claimed the agreements for drawdown and repayment of such building loans were signed at the offices of WHBL’s solicitors Yu Tsang & Loong (“YT&L”).
(f)	After completion of the construction site foundation works and repayment of the building loans to WHBL, but before erection of the building structure, P with the assistance of architect Andy Chan borrowed a building loan from The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (“HSBC”), which loan terms included (i) the 120 Address be charged to HSBC as security for the loan, (ii) a bank account be opened with HSBC being account no 400-3xxxxxxx4, (iii) repayment of such loan be made by monthly payment of $72,104 at the prevailing mortgage interest rate of 2.2500% pa over 15 years to commence on 30 March 2006. After the loan terms were agreed, Wendy Shum (“Shum”) of the loans department at 3X floor of HSBC’s headquarters (“HSBC Loans Dept”) asked P and Good Ascent’s company secretary Ting Ming Kwok (“Ting”) to attend Dennis Li (“Li”) of HSBC’s solicitors [ie A&O] at 9/F, Three Exchange Square, Central the following day with the title deeds of the 120 Address.
(g)	On a day in/about mid-March 2006, P personally handed over the title deeds in respect of ½ share and interest in the 120 Address (“赤柱大街120號1/2 屋契”) to Li, and he told Li that the title deeds were in the names of P and Ting and that Good Ascent was a limited company (company number 758005); P and Ting immediately signed the loan agreement in the presence of Li.[1] Subsequently, P and Good Ascent’s solicitor “關秉基律師” spent the following year writing to Li and HSBC to obtain copy of the loan agreement, but it was in vain.
(h)	P solemnly declared he and Ting only signed a loan agreement once at A&O’s offices in mid-2006, and they did not sign any other loan agreement for the 2nd time.
(i)	A&O used fraudulent means to obtain the 6-storey commercial/ residential building at the 120 Address, which was a crime.
(j)	In HCMP2376/2010 (in which HSBC was the plaintiff sued Good Ascent was the defendant), it was alleged that on 31 March 2009 Good Ascent owed HSBC outstanding loan in the sum of $10,490,834, which was secured by a charge over the 120 Address. Master Lai granted an order in favour of HSBC, so that the 120 Address could be sold, which sale was effected by HSBC’s solicitors Johnson Stokes & Master (“JSM”) without public auction. The purchaser was Win Talent Limited (“Win Talent”), and the consideration was $27,500,000.
(k)	But the letter by Master Lai’s clerk to P on 1 November 2018 stated that according to the court’s record there was no hearing before Master Lai on 4 January 2011, so HSBC’s solicitors JSM used false court order and fraudulent means to cheat Good Ascent of its property, which was a crime.
(l)	So P claimed against A&O for loss and damages as follows: (i) 6-storeyed commercial/residential building at 120 Address (ie Stanley Inland Lot No 95, “Lot 95”) (“赤柱大街120號 (赤柱地段95號) 六層高商住樓”); (ii) value and rent from 2010 to 2019 of about $110,000,000 (“2010至2019的樓價和租金, 大約HK$110,000,000”); (iii) loss of rent from the time of issuance of the new occupation permit on 1 November 2007 until now of about $20,000,000 (“2007年11月1日發出新樓入伙紙直到現在的租金損失, 大約HK$20,000,000”); (iv) loss of land value $3,000,000 (“地價損失: HK$3,000,000”).

3.  On 18 March 2020, P filed a summons for an order that A&O’s solicitor Li do attend court to provide account and information about the loan Good Ascent (of which P was a director) borrowed from HSBC in/about March to May 2006 secured by a charge over the 120 Address, and to produce the original loan agreement (“P’s Summons”). On the same day, P filed his affirmation in support of P’s Summons.

4.  P’s Summons was scheduled to be heard on 17 April 2020, but such hearing was generally adjourned due to public health considerations. On 28 April 2020, the court notified the parties that P’s Summons would be heard on 13 May 2020.

5.  On 6 May 2020, A&O by their solicitors filed acknowledgment of service to give notice of intention to defend.

6.  On 8 May 2020, A&O filed a summons under Order 18 rule 19(1)(a) of the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”) and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the court for (a) an order to strike out P’s SoC and to dismiss P’s claim against A&O on the basis that the SoC filed on 11 October 2019 disclosed no reasonable cause of action, and (b) an order that P do pay A&O costs of the action (including costs of such application) (“Striking Out Summons”).

7.  On 11 May 2020, P filed an affirmation to confirm that “[P]已將更新日期的「傳票」派給[A&O] (證物: LWH-A1), 有印章在其中” (“P’s Aff”). Exhibit LWH-A1 of P’s Aff appeared to be a copy summons dated 1 March 2020 (but such purported summons was not filed with court, “P’s Purported Summons”) in which P purported to apply for an order that A&O’s legal executive Victor CS Chan (“Chan”) do attend court to provide account and information about the loan Good Ascent (of which P was a director) borrowed from HSBC in/about March to May 2006 secured by a charge over the 120 Address, and to produce a certified copy of the loan agreement. A receipt chop by A&O on 11 May 2020 appeared on the face of such copy P’s Purported Summons in exhibit LWH-A1 of P’s Aff.

8.  On 13 May 2020, P’s Summons came before Master Dick Ho for hearing. After hearing P and A&O’s solicitor, Master Dick Ho adjourned P’s Summons sine die with liberty to restore. The learned master made clear that P’s Purported Summons had not been filed, and hence was not then before the court. Since then, P had not restored P’s Summons for hearing.

9.  On 20 May 2020, A&O filed a summons under Order 3 rule 5 of the RHC and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the court for (a) extension of time until 28 days after the Striking Out Summons was finally determined for A&O to file/serve their Defence, and (b) an order that costs of the application be costs in the cause of the Striking Out Summons (“Time Extension Summons”).

10.  On 15 June 2020, Master Kot, after hearing P and A&O’s solicitor in respect of the Striking Out Summons, granted the following order: (a) unless P took out application to amend his pleadings on or before 29 June 2020, it shall be deemed that P would not take out such application, (b) the Striking Out Summons be adjourned for argument at a hearing before a master with 2 hours reserved, (c) neither party shall file affidavit without leave of the court, and (d) costs be in the cause of the Striking Out Summons.

11.  P did not file any application by summons for leave to amend his pleadings within the time prescribed in the order of Master Kot dated 15 June 2020 or at all, hence it was deemed that P would not take out such application.

12.  On 15 June 2020, Master Kot, after hearing P and A&O’s solicitor in respect of the Time Extension Summons, granted extension of time until 28 days after the Striking Out Summons was determined by a master for A&O to file/serve their Defence, and ordered that costs of such application be costs in the cause of the Striking Out Summons.

13.  On 16 July 2020, the Listing Office of the High Court Registry fixed the adjourned hearing for argument in respect of the Striking Out Summons before Master J Wong on 6 November 2020.

14.  On 6 November 2020, Master J Wong, upon hearing P and A&O’s solicitor, (a) struck out P’s SoC indorsed on the WoS filed on 11 October 2019 and dismissed P’s claim against A&O in the present action, and (b) ordered P to pay A&O costs of the present action including costs of the Striking Out Summons (and all costs reserved) summarily assessed at $64,770 (“Wong Order”).

15.  There was no appeal against the Wong Order, which was therefore final and binding on P. In the circumstances, P’s claim against A&O in the present action was at an end, and there was no further possibility of any amendment of P’s pleadings.

16.  But on 2 November 2020, P unilaterally submitted to (but not filed with) the court a copy first page of the WoS with words/characters marked in red as purported amendments. By reason of the matters in paragraphs 10-11 and 14-15 above, such purported amendments were not permitted and were ineffective, and in any event P was no longer able to propose any amendment to the WoS as his claim in the present action had been dismissed.

17.  On 3 November 2020, A&O filed a summons pursuant to Practice Direction 11.3 and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the court to seek the following reliefs: (a) P be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process in the High Court or the District Court concerning any matter involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the present action, HCA1361/2018 (“2018 Action”) and HCA1253/2020 (“2020 Action”) without leave of the Court of First Instance being first obtained, and (b) costs be in the cause of such application (“RPO Summons”). On the same day, A&O filed the affirmation of their solicitor Wan Chung Man (“Ms Wan”) in support of the RPO Summons (“Wan Aff”).

18.  The RPO Summons was returnable before this court on 4 December 2020. But it transpired that since the RPO Summons was filed on 3 November 2020 until such hearing on 4 December 2020 (ie within the space of a month), P without leave of the court persistently and unilaterally submitted to court various original/copy documents, letters, incomplete authorities, handwritten submissions, drawings etc (“P’s Documents”), which documents were received by the court inter alia on 4, 5, 6, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25 and 26 November 2020.

19.  On 27 November 2020, this court granted written directions to P and A&O’s solicitors as follows:

“1. 於2019年10月11日, 原告人存檔本訟案的傳訊令狀(下稱「該傳訊令狀」), 向被告人提出是次訴訟。該傳訊令狀附載原告人的申索陳述書 (下稱「該申索陳述書」)。

2. 於2020年5月8日, 被告人代表律師存檔傳票 (下稱「8/5/20傳票」), 申請 (包括) 剔除該申索陳述書及駁回原告人針對被告人在本訟案的訴訟。

3. 於2020年11月6日, 8/5/20傳票在黃健棠聆案官席前進行聆訊, 經聆聽原告人及被告人代表律師的陳述後, 黃聆案官剔除該申索陳述書及駁回原告人針對被告人在本訟案的訴訟, 並頒下訟費命令, 原告人須支付給被告人評定訟費港幣64,770元 (下稱「6/11/20命令」)。

4. 基於對原告人具約束力的6/11/20命令, 原告人在本訟案針對被告人的申索及訴訟已經完結。

5. 另外, 於2020年6月15日, 葛倩兒聆案官頒下命令, 除非原告人於2020年6月29日或之前提出修改狀書的申請, 否則視作原告人不打算提出此申請 (下稱「15/6/20命令」)。

6. 原告人並沒有在2020年6月29日或之前存檔傳票, 提出修訂該傳訊令狀及/或該申索陳述書的申請。基於對原告人具約束力的15/6/20命令, 原告人不得在2020年6月30日或以後提出修訂該傳訊令狀及 / 或該申索陳述書的申請。

7. 再者, 基於6/11/20命令, 原告人在本訟案針對被告人的申索及訴訟已經完結, 原告人現在已再沒有任何有效基礎可提出申請，要求修訂該傳訊令狀及 / 或該申索陳述書。

8. 於2020年11月3日, 被告人經由代表律師存檔傳票提出以下的申請 (下稱「3/11/20傳票」), 並存檔 Wan Ching Man 的非宗教式誓詞, 用以支持3/11/20傳票:

「1. the Plaintiff be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process in the High Court or District Court concerning any matter involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the present action, HCA1361/2018 and/or HCA1253/2020 without leave of the Court of First Instance being first obtained; and

2.  costs in the cause of this application.」

9.  3/11/20傳票將於2020年12月4日上午9時30分在本席席前提訊, 預留聆訊時間為3分鐘 (下稱「該聆訊」)。

10.  於2020年11月2日, 原告人單方面送交 (並非正式存檔) 法庭1份以紅色字體作修訂的該傳訊令狀首頁, 但基於上述第5-6段的理由, 這是不許可及無效的申請。再者, 基於上述第7段的理由, 原告人現在已不可以提出修訂該傳訊令狀的申請。

11.  於2011年11月4日、5日、6日、17日、18日、19日、20日、23日、24日、25日及26日, 原告人在未得到法庭許可下單方面送交 (並非正式存檔) 法庭多份文件、信函、非完整案例、手書陳述等的正本或副本 (下稱「該等文件」)。

12.  3/11/20傳票作為關涉與訟雙方的傳票申請是正式存檔法庭的法律程序, 任何與訟一方也不得將文件、信函、非完整案例、陳述等單方面送交法庭 (不論有沒有抄送其他與訟方) 作為正式法律程序的證據, 該些文件並非誓詞, 亦非可以正式呈交法庭的證據。因此, 法庭無需亦不會參閱及/或考慮該些與訟一方在未經法庭批准 / 指示下送交法庭的文件、信函、非完整案例、陳述等。

13.  本席不會就3/11/20傳票及該聆訊的法律程序參閱原告人的該等文件。本席現頒下指示, 原告人不得以該等文件代替誓詞證據。如果原告人欲存檔及送達反對3/11/20傳票的誓詞, 原告人可以在該聆訊提出此要求, 以便被告人代表律師就該要求回應及本席考慮, 但本席現階段就該要求不作出任何結論。

14.  本席現再提醒原告人,他已多次單方面將該等文件送交法庭 (不論他有否抄送被告人代表律師), 在未得到法庭許可前, 他不得再將文件、信函、陳述等送交法庭 (不論有沒有抄送被告人代表律師) (下稱「該進一步文件」)。如果原告人仍續繼將該進一步文件送交法庭, 該進一步文件將被擱置而不被法庭參閱, 法庭亦無需就該進一步文件作出任何書面及 / 或其他回應。”

20.  By such written directions dated 27 November 2020, this court explained to P inter alia that (a) it was inappropriate for him to unilaterally submit P’s Documents to the court (whether copied to A&O’s solicitors or otherwise) when the RPO Summons was an inter partes summons, and (b) since P’s Documents were not affidavit evidence they were not admissible evidence before the court, so the court would not read/consider P’s Documents submitted without leave/directions by the court. This court also directed that (i) the court would not read P’s Documents for the purpose of the RPO Summons and/or for the proceedings at the hearing on 4 December 2020, (ii) P could not substitute P’s Documents in place and stead of affidavit evidence, and (iii) P should not further submit to the court documents, letters, incomplete authorities, handwritten submissions, drawings etc (whether copied to A&O’s solicitors or otherwise) (“P’s Further Documents”), but should P continue to submit P’s Further Documents to the court, such documents would be left unread and/or would not be responded to in writing or otherwise by the court.

21.  At the hearing of the RPO Summons on 4 December 2020, this court, after hearing P and A&O’s solicitor, granted the following order (“4/12/20 Order”):

“1. 許可原告人於2020年12月28日前存檔及送達誓詞以反對被告人於2020年11月3日存檔的傳票申請；

2. 許可被告人於隨後的21天之內存檔及送達誓詞以回應原告人存檔及送達的反對誓詞 (如有的話)；

3. 任何與訟方在未得到法庭命令許可前，不得在上述第1及2段的指定時間後存檔及 / 或送達有關被告人於2020年11月3日存檔的傳票申請的進一步誓詞，但純粹確認送達文件給對方的送達誓詞除外；

4. 如任何與訟者違反上述第3段的規限而在未得到法庭命令許可下存檔誓詞，該等誓詞將會在本訟案的法庭文檔中刪除 (expunge) 而不會被法庭參閱或作為呈堂證據；

5. 被告人於2020年11月3日存檔的傳票將押後至另定日期在高等法院法官吳美玲席前進行爭辯聆訊，預計聆訊時間為1小時，而爭辯聆訊的日期不得在本命令起計的63天之前進行；

6. 被告人須於爭辯聆訊前14天前呈交法庭及送達原告人：(1) 聆訊文件冊、(2) 書面陳詞大綱及法律典據，而書面陳詞大綱不得超過5頁單面A4紙張；

7. 許可原告人在爭辯聆訊前7天存檔法庭及送達被告人書面陳詞大綱及法律典據，而書面陳訶大綱不得超過5頁單面A4紙張；

8. 除了上述第7段指示以外，原告人不得單方面呈交未經存檔的文件、典據、信函、圖片及 / 或其他給法庭 (不論該等文件有否抄送被告人)；

9. 如原告人違反上述第8段的規限而單方面呈交未經存檔的訟案文件 (不論原告人有否抄送被告人)，法庭不會參閱原告人所呈交的該等文件，而原告人亦不可在被告人於2020年11月3日存檔的傳票的爭辯聆訊使用該等文件，或在該爭辯聆訊時才呈交使用其他文件；及

10.  今天聆訊的訟費用保留待決。”

22.  Notwithstanding the court’s leave granted under the 4/12/20 Order, P did not file any affidavit to oppose the RPO Summons within the prescribed time (ie on/before 28 December 2020) and/or did not seek leave under the 4/12/20 Order to file affidavit in opposition out of time.

23.  On 18 December 2020, the Listing Office of the High Court Registry fixed the adjourned hearing for argument in respect of the RPO Summons before this court on 31 May 2021 at 10:00am with 1 hour reserved (“Hearing”). P was notified of the Hearing by the court. As evident from his letter dated 9 May 2021 referred to in paragraph 26 below, P was well aware of the date and time of the Hearing.

24.  By paragraphs 7-9 of the 4/12/20 Order, (a) leave was granted for P to lodge with court and serve on A&O written submissions (not exceeding 5 A4 pages) and list of authorities within 7 days before the adjourned hearing for argument, but (b) save as provided for in (a) above, P shall not submit P’s Further Documents to the court (whether copied to A&O or otherwise), and (c) if P in breach of (b) above submitted P’s Further Documents to the court (whether copied to A&O or otherwise), P’s Further Documents would be left unread, and P would be debarred from relying on P’s Further Documents at the Hearing in respect of the RPO Summons and/or from submitting other documents to the court at the Hearing.

25.  In breach of the orders/directions in paragraphs 19, 21 and 24 above, P continued to submit P’s Further Documents to the court, which documents were received by the court inter alia on 27 and 30 November 2020, 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 10, 17, 18 and 28 December 2020, 7, 20, 22 and 29 January 2021, 1, 2, 5, 9, 11 and 22 February 2021, 7, 26 and 31 May, and 7 June 2021. However, by reason of paragraphs 7-9 of the 4/12/20 Order, P was not entitled to adduce and/or rely on P’s Documents and P’s Further Documents at the Hearing and/or for opposing the RPO Summons.

26.  On 9 May 2020, P sent a handwritten document to “inform” the court that he intended to “discontinue” the Hearing (“兹通知: 本人擬中止31-5-2021上午10時的聆訊”). Such document was not filed with the court, and it did not appear on the face of such document that it was copied to A&O’s solicitors.

27.  On 13 May 2020, this court granted the following written directions to P and A&O’s solicitors:

“1. 本席現指示書記將原告人於2021年5月10日呈交法庭 (並非存檔法庭) 的日期為2021年5月9日文件 (下稱「該文件」) 的副本抄送被告人代表律師。

2. 該文件指稱「[原告人]擬中止31-5-2021上午10時的聆訊」。

3. 被告人於2020年11月3日存檔傳票(下稱「該傳票」)。本席於2020年12月4日頒下命令 (下稱「該命令」)，而該命令第5段指示如下:

「被告人於2020月11月3日存檔的傳票[即該傳票]將押後至另定日期在高等法院法官吳美玲席前進行爭辯聆訊，預計聆訊時間為1小時，而爭辯聆訊的日期不得在本命令起計的63天之前進行」

4. 依據該命令第5段，被告人所存檔的該傳票於2020年12月18日訂定於2021年5月31日上午10時在本席席前進行爭辯聆訊，預計聆訊時間為1小時 (下稱「該聆訊」)。

5.  因此，將於2021年5月31日上午10時在本席席前進行的該聆訊是審理被告人 (而非原告人) 所存檔該傳票的關涉雙方爭辯聆訊。故此，原告人無權單方面申請中止被告人所存檔的該傳票的關涉雙方爭辯聆訊。該聆訊將會在2021年5月31日上午10時如期進行。”

28.  Since (a) the RPO Summons was filed by A&O and not by P, and (b) the RPO Summons was an inter partes summons, P could not “discontinue” the Hearing by unilateral letter application to the court. Thus, this court directed that the Hearing on 31 May 2021 would proceed.

29.  On 15 May 2021, P wrote to the court (with copy to A&O’s solicitors) as follows:

“本人收到閣下13-5-2021的回覆。

本人詢問根據何例，原告人無權申請中止這聆訊。

本申請既已通知被告人，亦請被告人示意及原因。

祈請法官再考慮及批准。”

30.  On 17 May 2021, A&O’s solicitors lodged hearing bundle, written submissions and list of authorities pursuant to paragraph 6 of the 4/12/20 Order. Such written submissions clearly showed that A&O intended to proceed with the RPO Summons and the Hearing, which reinforced and confirmed this court’s written directions on 13 May 2020 that P could not unilaterally “discontinue” the Hearing (see paragraphs 27-28 above).

31.  On 25 May 2021, this court granted the following directions to P and A&O’s solicitors:

“1. 原告人的日期為2021年5月15日來函收悉。

2. 本席已於2021年5月13日的書面指示第3-5段述明2021年5月31日上午10時的聆訊(下稱「該聆訊」)如期進行的原因。

3. 再者，被告人代表律師已於2021年5月17日呈交將於該聆訊使用的聆訊文件冊，書面陳詞及典據。從被告人代表律師的書面陳詞可見，被告人已示意依然申索其於2020年11月3日存檔的傳票之濟助。

4. 本席拒絕及不批准原告人以書面形式提出中止該聆訊的申請，因此該聆訊將會於2021年5月31日上午10時如期進行。”

32.  P, who was self-represented, attended the Hearing, and Ms Wan appeared on behalf of A&O.

II. WAN AFF

33.  Ms Wan stated that A&O’s solicitors were instructed by A&O and its former employees Li and Chan, and they were defendants in 2 other actions commenced by P that involved or related to or touched upon or leading to the subject matter of the present action.

(a)  2018 Action

34.  In respect of the 2018 Action, P styled as “林永恒 (銳升投資有限公司首任董事和赤柱大街120號業主)” (plaintiff) commenced such action against A&O named as “Allen Overy 律師行” (defendant) by filing a writ of summons on 13 June 2018.

35.  In the Statement of Claim endorsed on the Writ of Summons in the 2018 Action, P claimed as follows:

(a)	In 2004, Good Ascent originally had a 2-storey stone house at the 120 Address. As Good Ascent wanted to develop the property, it engaged an architect and an engineer surnamed Wong to submit building plans to the BD, and as a result the BD granted consent to commence building works.
(b)	At the end of 2004, Good Ascent with the assistance of such architect borrowed a building loan from WHBL, but WHBL required Good Ascent to charge its property to secure such loan, which loan was to pay for the construction site foundation works and was not to exceed $5,000,000. The building loan was secured, and the building works commenced.
(c)	By about November 2005 when the construction site foundation works were completed, WHBL demanded Good Ascent to repay the building loan. Between 2005 and January 2006, altogether 3 building loans were borrowed from WHBL in the total sum of $5,331,174.
(d)	After the construction site foundation works were completed, with the assistance of such architect, a building loan was borrowed from HSBC in favour of Good Ascent. HSBC asked Good Ascent’s shareholders P and Ting to attend HSBC’s solicitors A&O at 9/F Three Exchange Square, where Li met and explained to P the terms of the loan, including (i) opening a bank account no 400-3xxxxxxx4 with HSBC, (ii) repaying the loan of $11,000,000 with interest at 2.2500% pa by monthly instalments of $72,104 each over 15 years, and (iii) charging Good Ascent’s property rights to HSBC (since Good Ascent had only completed the foundation works).
(e)	After the loan agreement was signed, HSBC transferred some loan monies to WHBL to pay off WHBL’s loan. On 12 March 2006, WHBL’s solicitors YT&L asked Good Ascent’s shareholders P and Ting to attend their offices to sign document to confirm HSBC’s payment of the construction charges of $5,331,174 was repayment made on their behalf.
(f)	After a week, Li asked P to attend A&O’s offices with the title deeds of the 120 Address. Upon arrival P asked for the whereabouts of the drawdown balance of about $5,000,000 in respect of the loan by HSBC after paying off WHBL, and was told that it was deposited in Good Ascent’s bank account. P said when he signed the loan agreement, he gave Li a title document no 8451823 in respect of a sale from P to Good Ascent, and both P’s and Ting’s names were on such title document. About a month later, P and Ting went to A&O to obtain the loan agreement, but Li only gave P a provisional agreement and told him A&O had to prepare some document for registration at the Land Registry before the agreement could be given to him. P claimed by now he had lost the provisional agreement.
(g)	P claimed that about a year later he went to A&O to look for Li, and was informed by Li’s colleagues that Li no longer worked there. In the past few years, P complained to the Monetary Authority, Securities and Futures Commission, and Shum of HSBC’s Loan Dept, but there was no reply.
(h)	P claimed it was strange for the court order in HCMP2376/2010 (in which HSBC sued Good Ascent, which company was then represented by Charles Yeung Clement Lam Liu & Yip) to provide that on 31 March 2018 Good Ascent signed an agreement, and that Good Ascent owed HSBC $10,490,834, when P’s and Ting’s then solicitors did not know about those proceedings on 5 January 2011, and P only got the relevant court order from the Official Receiver (“OR”) in 2017.

36.  In short, P in the 2018 Action alleged (a) it was Good Ascent that obtained a loan from HSBC in relation to the 120 Address, which loan was also the subject matter of the present action, (b) he had lost the provisional agreement, and (c) he had made enquiries about Li. No prayer for relief was set out in the Statement of Claim in the 2018 Action.

37.  On 28 August 2018, A&O filed a summons under Order 18 rule 19(1)(a) of the RHC and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the court for (a) an order to strike out P’s Statement of Claim filed on 13 June 2018 and to dismiss P’s claim against A&O in the 2018 Action on the basis that such Statement of Claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action, and (b) an order that P do pay A&O costs of the action (including costs of such application).

38.  On 30 October 2019, Master Chow struck out P’s Statement of Claim and dismissed the 2018 Action pursuant to Order 18 rule 19(1)(a) of the RHC and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the court on the ground that P’s Statement of Claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action, and P was ordered to pay A&O’s costs of the action (including such application) summarily assessed at $28,000.

(b)  2020 Action

39.  On 11 October 2019, P commenced the present action. Then on 28 July 2020, P commenced the 2020 Action against A&O’s 2 former employees being “Allen & Overy 律師行前職員 Dennis Li” (ie Li) and “Allen & Overy 律師行前職員 Victor C S Chan” (ie Chan) by issuing a Writ of Summons.

40.  Ms Wan stated A&O’s solicitors were instructed by A&O that such Writ of Summons was served to A&O’s address, which was not valid service on Li and Chan as they had left A&O and no longer worked at A&O’s offices. Later, A&O’s solicitors received instructions to also act for Li and Chan in relation to the 2020 Action.

41.  In the Indorsement of Claim endorsed on the Writ of Summons in the 2020 Action, P claimed as follows:

“原告人就下述各項提出申索

1. 本人是銳升投資有限公司 (簡稱:銳升) 的股東，佔股51%首任董事

銳升有兩名董事，是丁明幗和本人。

2. 在2008年3月31日，丁明幗單獨代表銳升與滙豐銀行簽訂貸款合約。

3. 借取HK$11,000,000，是在Allen & Overy律師事務所的辦公室進行的。

4. 律師行負責這交易的職員是Legal Executive, Victor C S CHAN及Solicitor, Dennis LI。他們有在貸款契約上簽名。

5. 銳升的公司章程是列明公司的事宜是須全部董事簽署的。

6. 本人從事沒有簽授權書或董事協議書，許可丁明幗一人獨簽這貸款合約。

7.  本人追究Victor C S CHAN及Dennis LI疏忽，要求賠償HK$454,640,000HK$11,000,000。”

42.  By such Indorsement of Claim in the 2020 Action, P raised issues in relation to the loan by HSBC to Good Ascent, and alleged Li and Chan were in charge of the matter in relation to such loan, and that they were negligent in handling such matter.

43.  On 17 September 2020, Registrar S Kwang granted written directions inter alia as follows:

(a)	In breach of paragraph 4 of my order dated 4 December 2019 (“RAO/RPO Order”) in HCA889/2019 (“2019 Action”) (see paragraph 48 below), P failed to seek leave of this court as designated judge before he commenced of the 2020 Action.
(b)	Pursuant to paragraph 15 of the RAO/RPO Order, the 2020 Action was stayed for referral to this court as the designated judge for consideration or directions.
(c)	Pending any directions by this court, all further proceedings in the 2020 Action be stayed.

44.  By my order dated 22 September 2020, the Indorsement of Claim endorsed on the Writ of Summons in the 2020 Action was struck out, and P’s claim against Li and Chan in the 2020 Action was dismissed. On the same day, this court granted written directions to P and to Li and Chan in the 2020 Action as follows:

“1. The Writ of Summons issued on 28/7/20 in [the 2020 Action] (‘Writ of Summons’) refers.

2. Para.4 of [the RAO/RPO Order] dated 4/12/19 in [the 2019 Action] …… provides that [P] is prohibited from commencing any further fresh new legal proceedings by whatever originating process in inter alia the High Court concerning, ‘any matters involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings in HCA1180/2018 and the [2019 Action] without the leave of the designated judge being first obtained’.

3. Para.15 of the [RAO/RPO Order] provides that if [P] should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of para.4 of the [RAO/RPO Order] above without first seeking the court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of inter alia the Registrar of the High Court, such fresh proceedings shall be referred to the designated judge for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed.

4. The [RAO/RPO Order] is binding on the plaintiff (whether styled in his own name or as ‘林永恒是STANLEY LOT 456RP業主’).

5. [P] has failed to apply to this court as the designated judge for leave to commence the present action (ie [the 2020 Action]) before issuing the Writ of Summons.

6. Since the subject matter of [P’s] claim shown in the Indorsement of Claim endorsed on the Writ of Summons (‘Indorsement of Claim’) involves or relates to or touches upon or leads to the proceedings in HCA1180/2018 and [2019 Action], the [2020 Action] is plainly a claim that seeks to re-open matters already considered and determined in HCA1180/2018 and [2019 Action], and/or is a collateral attack on the dismissal of the actions in HCA1180/2018 and [2019 Action] (including [P’s] lack of locus standi to maintain the claim in [2019 Action]). In such circumstances, no leave is granted for [P] to commence [the 2020 Action] and/or to issue and serve the Writ of Summons.

7. The Indorsement of Claim endorsed on the Writ of Summons in [the 2020 Action] is struck out, and [P’s] claim against [Li and Chan] in [the 2020 Action] is dismissed.

8. A sealed copy of the order in para.7 above is enclosed for each of [P] and for [Chan and Li].”

(c)  2019 Action and RAO/RPO Order

45.  The 2019 Action was another set of proceedings commenced by P under the style “林永恒是STANLEY LOT 456RP業主” against Win Talent as defendant by issuing a Writ of Summons on 22 May 2018. On 4 December 2019, I handed down reasoned judgment in HCA889/2019 (“Judgment”) in respect of Win Talent’s summons filed on 31 May 2019 inter alia to strike out P’s Statement of Claim and to dismiss his claim against Win Talent, and to seek an order inter alia to prohibit P from commencing fresh proceedings by whatever originating process in the High Court or the District Court concerning any matter involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the 2019 Action without leave of the Court of First Instance.

46.  In a nutshell, P in the 2019 Action alleged that in September 1997 he purchased 1/3 share of and in Lot 456RP from Yung Jim Mei Jimmy, and remained as owner of 1/3 share of and in Lot 456RP, so Win Talent wrongfully acquired Lot 456RP and as a result P suffered loss for which Win Talent was liable.

47.  But as seen from the Judgment, the 2019 Action also concerned matters in relation to the assignment of Lot 456RP and the house at the 120 Address from P to Good Ascent as well as the loan by HSBC. The house at the 120 Address was the subject matter of the 2018 and 2020 Actions. P’s assertion in relation to HSBC’s loan in the 2019 Action were set out in paragraphs 50-51 of the Judgment, and it was said in paragraph 54 of the Judgment that this court found P’s complaints in relation to such loan to be without merits. This court (a) struck out P’s claim in the 2019 Action on the ground that P had no locus standi and that his Statement of Claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action, or was scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or was an abuse of process of the court, and (b) dismissed P’s claim in the 2019 Action.

48.  By the Judgment, this court also granted the RAO/RPO Order which by its nature was inter alia a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) (see Schedule to the Judgment) that prohibited P from commencing any further fresh new legal proceedings by whatever originating process in the High Court, the District Court and/or the Lands Tribunal concerning any matters involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings in HCA1180/2018 and the 2019 Action without the leave of the designated judge being first obtained.

(d)  P’s bankruptcy

49.  Ms Wan stated that according to a bankruptcy search record dated 29 October 2020 in respect of P obtained from the Official Receiver’s Office (“ORO”), a bankruptcy order was made against P on 25 April 2007, which bankruptcy order was discharged on 25 October 2011. After such discharge, a 2^nd bankruptcy order was made against P in HCB1052/2015 on 11 May 2015. While pursuant to section 30A of the Bankruptcy Ordinance Cap 6 P might have been discharged from bankruptcy upon expiration of 5 years from 11 May 2015, the present action was commenced when P was still an undischarged bankrupt.

50.  In the 2018 Action, A&O wrote to the ORO on 13 December 2018 to enquire inter alia whether the 2018 Action was commenced with the approval/knowledge of the OR. On 30 May 2019, the ORO replied to confirm the OR as the trustee-in-bankruptcy of P’s property had not given consent for P to commence the 2018 Action against A&O, and the OR would not have given such consent/approval to P unless P could demonstrate to the OR’s satisfaction that his claim was meritorious and there was sufficient funding to pay the legal costs of the proceedings including any adverse costs that might be ordered against the OR in the proceedings. Further, the OR would not adopt or take over any such legal proceedings commenced by P. “According to [the OR’s] record, [P] has commenced some legal proceedings without [the OR’s] consent and most of them have been struck out or dismissed by the Court upon application by the Defendants. [P] has been in communications with [the ORO]. Further, the [OR] had no objection to the summons application dated 28 August 2018 to strike out [P’s] claim under the [2018 Action]”.

(e)  A&O’s application for RPO

51.  The Wan Aff claimed that the present action and the 2020 Action were clearly attempts to re-litigate the same or similar subject matter in respect of which P had failed to show any reasonable cause of action, and which in any event had no merit, was scandalous, frivolous or vexatious and/or was otherwise an abuse of process of the court. The fact P was an undischarged bankrupt had not deterred him from pursuing unmeritorious claims against A&O. A&O was concerned that unless restrained by the court, P would continue to pursue unmeritorious litigation against A&O and/or its former employees and/or any related parties who would have to incur substantial legal costs.

52.  A&O understood P is now restricted by the RAO/RPO Order under the 2019 Action in that P was prohibited inter alia from commencing any further fresh new legal proceedings by whatever originating process in the High Court, the District Court or the Lands Tribunal concerning any matters involving or relating to or touching upon or leading to the proceedings in HCA1180/2018 and the 2019 Action without the leave of the designated judge being first obtained. But considering HCA1180/2019 and the 2019 Action did not entirely overlap with P’s alleged claims in the 2018 Action, the present action and the 2020 Action, the RAO/RPO Order might not sufficiently address the allegations in these 3 actions that included but not limited to alleged negligence of A&O’s former employees Li and Chan, and alleged fraudulent action by A&O. Thus, Ms Wan urged the court to grant a RPO in terms of the RPO Summons.

53.  Also, on 21 October 2020, A&O’s solicitors wrote to invite this court to dismiss the present action upon considering the 2020 Action that concerned matters relating to the present action and the order/ directions granted in relation to the 2020 Action. But on 22 October 2020, this court granted written directions inter alia that the commencement of the present action (ie on 11 October 2019) pre-dated the RAO/RPO Order that was granted on 4 December 2019, so no order was made on A&O’s request by letter dated 21 October 2020.

III.  DISCUSSION

54.  At the outset, I note there was no appeal against the RAO/RPO Order, which therefore was still valid and binding on P. In the circumstances, the findings and determination in the Judgment were still effective on P. For convenience, unless otherwise expressly defined in this judgment, I shall adopt the abbreviations in the Judgment. I shall also refer to the Judgment as appropriate without repeating their contents herein.

55.  P’s claim in the present action against A&O had been struck out and dismissed. In any event, the subject matter of P’s claim had been canvassed in the 2018, 2019 and 2020 Actions, and also touched upon in other related legal proceedings referred to in the Judgment. But there was no merit to any and all of P’s such claims and legal proceedings.

56.  Turning first to P’s SoC in the present action, the alleged facts and matters had been canvassed in other related litigation and subject to findings and conclusions by the court against P on those matters, especially by my findings and conclusion in the Judgment based inter alia on objective documents and P’s own information:

(a)	In respect of P’s allegations in paragraph 2(b) above, this court made the findings in paragraph 38 of the Judgment that since 5 June 2001 (i) P was a director, first subscriber and shareholder (5,100 shares) of Good Ascent, and (ii) the other shareholder (4,900 shares), director, subscriber and company secretary was Ting.
(b)	In respect of P’s allegations in paragraph 2(b) above, this court made the findings in paragraphs 26-28 of the Judgment that as reflected in the 456RP Records, (i) Lot 456 (which comprised the subsequent subdivided Lot 456A and Lot 456RP) was initially owned by Yung Shau Nin, Yung Hok Ming and Yung Kwai Shang as tenants-in-common in equal shares, (ii) Kwok Mui acquired Yung Shau Nin’s ⅓ share of and in Lot 456 (which comprised the subsequent subdivided Lot 456A and Lot 456RP), (iii) Lot 456RP came into existence pursuant to the Partition Deed dated 18 November 1941, and (iv) pursuant to such Partition Deed Kwok Mui ceased to have any share/interest in Lot 456RP which became owned by Yung Hok Ming and Yung Kwai Shang as tenants-in-common in equal shares.
(c)	In respect of P’s allegations in paragraph 2(c) above, this court made the findings in paragraphs 29-36 of the Judgment that (i) after Yung Kwai Shang passed away on 2 April 1942, Yung Ming Kwong became the administrator of his estate on 6 May 1976 and the owner of ½ share of and in Lot 456RP on 18 March 1980 as tenant-in-common with Yung Hok Ming, who assigned his ½ share of and in Lot 456RP to Litmond, (ii) after Yung Ming Kwong passed away, Yung Jim Mei Jimmy on 8 November 1994 became the administrator of his estate, and on 8 July 1995 assigned to P ½ share of and in Lot 456RP and the 120 Address for a consideration of $250,000, (iii) on 7 November 1996 P re-assigned to Yung Jim Mei Jimmy his ½ share of and in Lot 456RP and the 120 Address for $250,000, and on 8 July 1997 Yung Jim Mei Jimmy re-assigned to P his ½ share of and in Lot 456RP and the 120 Address for $250,000, and (iv) on 31 May 2000 Litmond assigned to P its 1/2 share of and in Lot 456RP for a consideration of $2,000,000; thus, in 2000 P became the sole owner of Lot 456RP and the stone house at the 120 Address.
(d)	In respect of P’s allegations in paragraph 2(d) above that he wanted develop Lot 456RP and that he engaged an architect to submit building plans to the BD, this court made the findings in paragraphs 37-38 of the Judgment that P no longer had any title, share or interest in Lot 456RP upon sale of the same to Good Ascent in 2001: (i) by the P / Good Ascent 2001 Assignment dated 13 July 2001, Good Ascent acquired from P (and hence became the owner of) Lot 456RP and the stone house at the 120 Address for a consideration of $3,000,000,[2] (ii) at that time P and Ting were directors and shareholders of Good Ascent, but (iii) on 22 April 2002 P ceased to be a shareholder (by transfer of his shares to Ting/So) and/or director of Good Ascent (and he was replaced by So as director), and he left Good Ascent (whether as director or shareholder). Quite simply, P ceased to have any title, share or interest in Lot 456RP upon sale of the same to Good Ascent in 2001 (see paragraphs 82 and 89(a)-(d) of the Judgment). P could not have been unaware of the P/Good Ascent 2001 Assignment as (1) P was the vendor and Good Ascent was the purchaser, (2) P signed such assignment as vendor and/or as director of the purchaser, (3) P as vendor also signed such assignment to acknowledge receipt of the consideration of $3,000,000 (see paragraphs 84-85 of the Judgment).
(e)	In respect of P’s allegations in paragraph 2(d) above about the acquisition of further land (see also P’s Claim Document in paragraph 93(a) of the Judgment), this court made the findings in paragraphs 39-42, 82 and 89(e)-(f) of the Judgment that Lot 95 was acquired by Good Ascent and not by P: (i) Good Ascent surrendered Lot 456RP to the government under the Surrender Deed dated 20 October 2004 in exchange for the grant of Lot 95 by the government to Good Ascent under the Exchange Conditions dated 20 October 2004, (ii) so Lot 456RP’s legal existence came to an end, the Block Lease insofar as concerned Lot 456RP was discharged, and any interest Good Ascent had (or P previously might allegedly have had) over Lot 456RP was extinguished,[3] (iii) so even though Lot 95 retained the same street number of 120 Stanley Main Street, Stanley, Hong Kong as that for Lot 456RP, there was no overlap as the 120 Address was either previously that of Lot 456RP and now that of Lot 95, (iv) Good Ascent and Win Talent were the 1st and 2nd owners of Lot 95, and P (whose name never appeared in the 95 Records) never had any title, share or interest in Lot 95 or any part thereof.[4] In the circumstances, it was Good Ascent and not P who developed Lot 95, and by 2004 P had left and was no longer a director and/or shareholder of Good Ascent (see paragraph 90 of the Judgment).
(f)	In respect of P’s allegations in paragraph 2(e) above about the buildings loans by WHBL, this court made the findings in paragraphs 43-45 of the Judgment that the borrower/mortgagor was Good Ascent and not P as P had left Good Ascent and had no share/interest in Lot 95 by that time: (i) the 95 Records showed Good Ascent (not P) as borrower/mortgagor entered into the 1st Building Legal Charge on 7 December 2004 with WHBL to secure a building loan of $5,000,000 from WHBL to construct the building foundation, (ii) in/ about November 2005 WHBL demanded repayment of the building loan, and the 95 Records showed Good Ascent (not P) as borrower/ mortgagor entered into the 2nd/3rd Building Legal Charges on 28 December 2005 to borrow a total sum of $5,331,174 to repay the original building loan,[5] and (iii) Good Ascent (not P) gave Letters of Undertaking to the BD on 13 October 2006 and 13 July 2007.
(g)	In respect of P’s allegations in paragraph 2(f)-(i) above about the loan by HSBC and the involvement of A&O (which were akin to P’s allegations in the Claim Document and the Chronology in paragraphs 50-51 of the Judgment), this court made the findings in paragraphs 46-53 of the Judgment: (1) by the Mortgage dated 31 March 2008, in consideration of HSBC granting general banking facilities to Good Ascent (not P) pursuant to a facility letter dated 1 March 2008 signed by Good Ascent (not P),[6] Good Ascent as beneficial owner charged and assigned Lot 95 and the building thereon known as the 120 Address to HSBC subject to the proviso for redemption, and (2) the 95 Records showed the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Building Legal Charges were discharged on the same day (ie 31 March 2008), thus part of the banking facilities from HSBC were used to discharge the indebtedness due to WHBL in 2008. Apart from the findings in (1)-(2) above, this court by paragraph 53 of the Judgment rejected P’s other allegations in his Claim Document and Chronology (and likewise in paragraphs 2(f)-(i) above) for reasons as analysed and explained in paragraph 53(a)-(1) of the Judgment, which I highlight below:
	(i)	P was no longer shareholder and/or director of Good Ascent in 2006 and/or 2008 (see paragraph 53(a) of the Judgment);
	(ii)	As regards P’s allegations in paragraph 2(f) and (h) above, I have found in paragraph 53(b)-(d) of the Judgment that (a) Good Ascent made full drawdown of the term loan of $11,000,000 granted by HSBC to Good Ascent (not P) in 2006 that was repayable with interest at 2.2500% pa by monthly instalments of $72,104 each, butthe loan monies were not kept in Good Ascent’s bank account no 400-3xxxxxxx4 with HSBC, and Good Ascent did not pay the monthly instalment on 30 May 2006 when due, (b) HSBC’s term loan granted to Good Ascent (not P) in 2006 was not secured by any mortgage in favour of HSBC over Lot 95,[7] and (c) Good Ascent signed a new facility letter by HSBC on 31 March 2008 for banking facilities secured by the Mortgage of the same date,[8] whereupon the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Building Legal Charges were discharged, which suggested that the building loans due to WHBL were repaid in 2008 and not 2006.[9] Whilst Good Ascent did sign the facility letters by HSBC, P was not the borrower and would not have signed such facility letters. P’s claim that no facility letter was signed in 2008 flied against his own Chronology that admitted Good Ascent signed a new facility letter by HSBC on 31 March 2008 (see paragraph 53(c) of the Judgment).
	(iii)	As regards P’s allegation in paragraph 2(g) above in relation to the alleged meeting with Li in March 2006 and the hand-over of the title deeds of his alleged ½ share and interest in the 120 Address, this court made the findings in paragraph 53(f)-(l) of the Judgment that: (a) the entire term loan granted to Good Ascent by HSBC in 2006 was drawdown by Good Ascent, so any query over the whereabouts of such loan monies should have been directed to Good Ascent and not to Li, (b) it was inexplicable why Li would have asked for and P would have produced to him the P / Good Ascent 2001 Assignment (memorial no 8451832) which P signed as vendor to sell and P / Ting signed on behalf of Good Ascent as purchaser to purchase all of P’s shares and interests in Lot 456RP, so Good Ascent was the sole owner Lot 456RP until it was surrendered to the government in 2004 and thereby ceased to have legal existence (as evident from publicly available Land Registry records), (c) P ceased to be director/shareholder of Good Ascent shortly thereafter in 2002, and (d) Good Ascent was the owner of Lot 95 since 2004 (and was still such owner in 2006 and/or 2008), and P’s name never appeared in the title documents of Lot 95. In short, P’s allegations that in mid-March 2006 he still had ½ share or interest in the 120 Address (ie Lot 95) and/or that the then title deeds of the 120 Address showed his name as a part owner were plainly wrong. There was simply no basis to say A&O used fraudulent means to obtain the 120 Address.
(h)	As regards P’s allegations in paragraph 2(l) above, this court made the findings in paragraphs 55-57 of the Judgment that (i) on 11 January 2010 Good Ascent was wound up by the court, which was an event of default under the Mortgage, (ii) with leave of the court HSBC commenced HCMP2376/2010 for money and possession order against Good Ascent to recover the indebtedness due to HSBC ($10,171,546.74 with interest) and for vacant possession of Lot 95, and (iii) according to the 95 Records, Win Talent eventually acquired Lot 95 pursuant to mortgagee sale by HSBC as mortgagee under the Mortgage by way of private treaty for the consideration of $27,500,000.
(i)	In respect of P’s allegations in paragraph 2(k) above about Master Lai’s order of 4 January 2011 in HCMP2736/2020 (see also P’s Claim Document in paragraph 60 of the Judgment), this court made the findings in paragraph 59 of the Judgment: (i) the letter dated 6 November 2018 from Master Lai’s clerk stating that “根據法庭記錄, 2011年1月5日並沒有聆訊於黎達祥聆案官前審理。再者, [P]和[林雪梅女士]並非本案的與訟方。如有任何查訊, 應向案件的與訟方提出” merely confirmed there was no court hearing on 5 January 2011, but (ii) such letter did not alter the fact that the aforesaid order was granted at the hearing on 4 January 2011 by Master Lai after hearing submissions from solicitors for HSBC and Good Ascent. There was no basis to say HSBC’s solicitors used false court order and/or fraudulent means to cheat Good ascent of its property. In any event, P in 2011 did not have any share or interest in Lot 95 and/or the 120 Address, and was no longer a director and/or shareholder of Good Ascent.

57.  As explained in paragraph 91 of the Judgment, “since 2001/2002 or at the latest since 2004, P had no title, share or interest in Lot 456RP. Indeed, P could not have any present title, share or interest in Lot 456RP which had no present legal existence. There was no arguably credible basis for P to assert …… he was still owner or part owner of Lot 456RP ……” Likewise, P never had any interest in Lot 95 as he had ceased to be the owner of Lot 456RP in 2001 and he had left Good Ascent by 2002 before Lot 95 came into existence in 2004 by land exchange. In my view, P had no reasonable cause of action herein to sue for the reliefs in paragraph 2(l)(i)-(iv) above. Further, by virtue of the mortgagee sale of Lot 95 by HSBC as mortgagee to Win Talent as purchaser, any title or interest P might have had in Lot 95 (which I disagree) would have been extinguished under sections 52 and 53(1)(a) of the CPO (see paragraphs 95-97 of the Judgment). Master J Wong rightly struck out P’s claim against A&O.

58.  At the Hearing, P reiterated the allegations in paragraph 2(f)-(h) above. I have dealt with such allegations in paragraph 56(g) above. P had not filed any affidavit to oppose the RPO Summons despite the 4/12/20 Order. P’s suggestion of submitting P’s Further Documents in relation to his allegations after the Hearing was refused by this court at the Hearing. In any event, P’s SoC had been struck out and his claim herein had been dismissed under the Wong Order.

59.  It was evident from the above analysis that the subject matter of P’s claim against A&O in the present action had been previously raised by him in earlier litigation, including the 2019 Action and other actions referred therein. Plainly, P intended to pursue the present action as well as the 2018 and 2020 Actions covering the same or similar subject matters, which were directed at A&O and their former employees Li and Chan as defendants. I refer to paragraphs 54-58 above. In my view, none of the matters raised by P had any merit. But such multifarious and unmeritorious complaints and litigation by P, and such repeated legal actions against A&O and/or their former employees served to add weight to the concern that unless restrained P would continue to vex others (including A&O, Li and Chan) with his unmeritorious complaints and claims.

60.  It was also plain that P’s bankruptcy was insufficient protection against P from vexing A&O and pursuing unmeritorious claims. P commenced the present action when he was an undischarged bankrupt without permission by the OR or leave of the court. This was of particular concern because, apart from the fact that his claim herein had no merits, he had no locus standi to commence the present action at all for (a) a right to sue is a chose in action within the meaning of “property” under the BO, (b) P was adjudicated bankrupt in 2015, (c) his rights of action being choses in action and therefore his “property” within his bankruptcy estate had become vested in the OR as trustee-in-bankruptcy, and (d) such rights of action being choses in action and P’s “property” would not revert to him even upon his discharge from bankruptcy (see Parts III-IV and paragraph 87 of the Judgment).

61.  As seen from the 2020 Action, the RAO/RPO Order also had not deterred P from attempting to re-litigate unmeritorious claims. It is an abuse of process to re-litigate claims that had been dismissed and subject to the doctrine of res judicata. I reiterate the principles that have fallen from the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Ltd & anor,[10] which I have set out in paragraph 124 of the Judgment.

62.  I accept that unless P is restrained by a RPO, it would be likely that he would continue to commence unfounded actions and applications against A&O, Li, Chan and/or related party(ies) on the same and similar subject matter. It would be a waste of court time and resources to allow such claims to proceed, and a RPO would prevent further abuse of the court process.[11]

IV.  CONCLUSION

63.  I therefore grant the RPO order against P on the terms set out in the schedule to this judgment. There is no reason why costs should not follow event. I therefore grant a costs order nisi that P do pay costs of the RPO Summons (including all costs reserved if any) to A&O on indemnity basis to be taxed if not agreed.

64.  Should P require translation of this judgment into punti language, he can contact my clerk to arrange an appointment for a court interpreter to verbally translate this judgment to him at the High Court Building at a mutually convenient time. Further, D must serve on P Chinese translation together with the sealed copy the order made herein.

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