FAROL CRISTOPHER RAFAEL v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 2571/2018

[2022] HKCFI 1414

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 2571 of 2018

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following:

	consideration of the documents only;     or
	consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in open court;

Leave to apply for judicial review refused.

Observations for the Applicant:

1.  The Applicant is a 42-year-old national of the Philippines who last arrived in Hong Kong on 28 July 2006 as a visitor with permission to remain up to 2 August 2006 when he did not depart and instead overstayed, and was arrested by police on 18 March 2009. After he was referred to the Immigration Department for investigation, he raised a torture claim on the basis that if he returned to the Philippines he would be harmed or killed by his creditor over his outstanding debts, and after it was rejected, he then sought non-refoulement protection on the same basis. He was subsequently released on recognizance pending the determination of his claim.

2.  The Applicant was born and raised in Namitpit, Quirino, Ilocos Sur, the Philippines. After leaving school he worked in the mine and as a farmer, and later as a construction worker in Candon, Ilocos Sur.

3.  In 2004 he started to indulge in gambling by borrowing money from his employer, and with which he also used to buy illegal drugs for resale, but later when his debts were accumulated to such an amount that he was unable to make repayments. he fled to Benguet to avoid his creditor, but in May 2006 when he heard that 2 of his friends were killed by the same creditor for failure to repay their loans, the Applicant became fearful that he would also be killed by his creditor, and so he departed the Philippines on 24 June 2006 for Hong Kong where he subsequently overstayed, and later when he was arrested by the police he then raised his torture claim, and after it was rejected by the Immigration Department, he then sought non-refoulement protection, for which he completed a Supplementary Claim Form (“SCF”) on 5 January 2018 and attended screening interview before the Immigration Department with legal representation from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”).

4.  While being released on recognizance pending the determination of his claim, the Applicant was again arrested by police on 30 August 2011 for undertaking unauthorized employment, for which he was subsequently convicted and sentenced to prison for 2 months.      

5.  By a Notice of Decision dated 9 February 2018 the Director of Immigration (“Director”) rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the remaining applicable grounds other than torture risk including risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).

6.  In his decision the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from his creditor and followers upon his return to the Philippines as low due to the absence of or low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from them, that it was a private monetary dispute between them without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in the Philippines with a large population of 104 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 300,000 square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied adult with working experience to move to other part of the Philippines away from his home district in large cities such as Manila where it would be difficult if not impossible for his creditor to locate him.

7.  On 22 February 2018 the Applicant lodged an appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) against the Director’s decision, and for which he attended an oral hearing on 15 October 2018 before the Board during which he gave evidence and answered questions raised of his claim by the Adjudicator for the Board. On 2 November 2018 his appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the decision of the Director.

8.  In its decision the Board found the Applicant’s evidence vague, inconsistent and unpersuasive that it doubted the credibility of his claim of fear of harm from his creditor for overstaying in Hong Kong, and that in any event even if his claim were true that it was a private monetary dispute between him and his creditor without any official involvement that state/police protection would be available to the Applicant upon his return to the Philippines that his claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all applicable grounds.

9.  On 15 November 2018 the Applicant filed his Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, but no ground for seeking relief was given in his Form or in his supporting affidavit of the same date to which he merely attached a copy of the decision but without putting forth any proper ground for his intended challenge, nor was he able to do so at the hearing of his application. As such and in the absence of any error of law or irrationality or procedural unfairness in his process before the Board or in its decision being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, I do not find any reasonably arguable basis for his intended challenge.

10.  As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court of Appeal, judicial review does not operate as a rehearing of a non-refoulement claim when the proper occasion for the Applicant to present and articulate his claim is in the screening process and interview before the Immigration Department and in the process before the Board where the evaluation of the risk of harm is primarily a matter for the Director and the Board as they are entitled to make such evaluation based on the evidence available to them that the court will not usurp their role as primary decision makers in the absence of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality in their decisions being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, as judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment by them in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh: Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.

11.  In the Applicant’s case, the Board rejected his claim essentially on its adverse finding on his credibility for the thorough and detailed analysis and reasoning set out in paragraphs 14 – 41 of its decision with the benefit of hearing him in his oral evidence and his answers to questions raised of his claim, and in the absence of any error of law or procedural unfairness in his process before the Board or in its decision being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, I do not find any reasonably arguable basis to challenge the finding of the Board.  

12.  Furthermore, the fact is that it has also been established by the Director in his decision that the risk of harm in the Applicant’s claim if true is a localized one and that it is not unreasonable or unsafe for him to relocate to other part of the Philippines, a decision also confirmed by the Board, there is simply no justification to afford him with non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong: see TK v Jenkins & Anor [2013] 1 HKC 526.     

13.  In the premises and having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim.

14.  For these reasons I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, and I accordingly refuse his leave application.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1