JUMYATI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5428 · HCAL 1912/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1912/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5428
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1912 OF 2023
BETWEEN
| |Jumyati |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
|Π|consideration of the documents only; or |
| |consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant or |
| |counsel in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name of the
putative interested party be amended to “Director of Immigration”.
2. The applicant’s application to withdraw the application for leave
to apply for judicial review be refused.
3. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 24 October 2023, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 26 June 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”).
2. The Board found that the applicant was not entitled to non-refoulement
protection in Hong Kong on any of the applicable grounds under the
Unified Screening Mechanism. Hence, the Board refused the applicant’s
appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of Immigration
(“the Director”) dated 29 September 2022, which rejected the
applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
Amendments
3. The applicant named the Board and “non-refoulement Claims Petition
Office” as both the putative respondents and the putative interested
parties in Form 86, when only the Board should be the putative
respondent and the Director should be the putative interested party.
4. The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing
administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the
Board and should not be named as a putative party at all.
5. Thus, on this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent
is amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name of the
putative interested party is amended to “Director of Immigration”.
Late application
6. By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap
4A, the applicant had to make the Leave Application within 3 months
when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the
Board’s Decision was made.
7. However, the applicant filed Form 86 on 24 October 2023, which was 3
months and 28 days after the Board’s Decision (made on 26 June 2023).
The applicant was hence late for 28 days in making the Leave
Application, and this court has to consider whether there is any good
reason to extend the time for the applicant to make the Leave
Application.
8. As held in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393, the criteria
for granting an extension of time are:
(i) the length of the delay;
(ii) the reason for the delay;
(iii) the merits of the intended application; and
(iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public
administration.
9. The applicant did not make any application for extension of time and
provided no explanation for the delay when she filed the Leave
Application.
10. A delay of 28 days is not insubstantial, and there is simply no reason
for this court to extend the time for the applicant to make the Leave
Application when no explanation was given for the delay at all.
Moreover, as the Leave Application ought to be dismissed as discussed
below, there is simply no reason for this court to extend the time.
11. Having considered the above criteria, this court is not prepared to
grant any extension of time to the applicant to file the Leave
Application. The Leave Application can therefore be dismissed on the
ground of being made out of time alone.
12. However, for the sake of completeness, this court will still deal with
the Leave Application as discussed below.
The applicant’s case
13. The applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because if
refouled to Indonesia, she would be harmed or killed by her husband
and a loan shark.
Withdrawal of the Leave Application
14. Before the Leave Application was dealt with, the Director informed
this court on 3 September 2026 that the applicant wrote a letter dated
27 August 2026 to state that she wanted to return to her country. In
her said letter, the applicant stated that she wanted to return to her
country, Indonesia, as her problems had been solved, and she wanted to
withdraw the Leave Application.
15. The applicant also wrote another letter dated 4 September 2026 to this
court to close her case.
16. There is no evidence to show that the applicant made the withdrawal
application other than out of her own volition. With this withdrawal
application, it is clear that the applicant no longer wishes to
proceed with the Leave Application or any oral hearing of the Leave
Application even though she had previously requested one.
17. However, the Court of Appeal had held in Re Manik Md Mahamudun
Nabi [2022] HKCA 471 that:-
“The applicant on his own motion applied to the Court to withdraw his
application for leave to apply for judicial review. The Judge acceded
to his application, whereupon there was nothing outstanding in the
action. The Judge was correct to conclude the action by ordering a
dismissal of the application instead of leaving the action at large.”
18. Thus, it is not right to leave the action at large. The applicant’s
application to withdraw the Leave Application is therefore refused and
this court will proceed to deal with the Leave Application.
Discussion
19. It is not necessary for this court to discuss the merits of the
intended judicial review any more, as the applicant had confirmed that
she wanted to return to her country, Indonesia, as her problems had
been solved. In other words, it was safe for her to return to
Indonesia, and the basis of her non-refoulement claim no longer
exists.
20. It is clear that the applicant no longer needs non-refoulement
protection and the intended judicial review serves no practical
purpose.
21. It is well established that the court may exercise discretion not to
grant a remedy on judicial review if it would serve no practical
purpose, where it may have become otiose or pointless to grant a
remedy because the relevant detriment to the applicant has been
removed (see AW v Director of Immigration and William Lam, CACV 63 of
2015).
22. Even assuming that there were errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality in the Board’s Decision and the case were remitted to
the Board for reconsideration, there would simply be no more basis for
the applicant to claim non-refoulement protection as it was no longer
unsafe for her to return to her own country. The Board should assess
the risk of the applicant at the time of the proceedings, taking
account of information that has come to light to ensure that it is
able to make a “full and up-to-date assessment” of the current
situation (see Ubamaka Edward Wilson v Secretary for Security and
Another (2012) 15 HKCFAR 743).
23. It is therefore otiose and pointless to grant leave to the applicant
to proceed with the intended judicial review even if there were merits
in it. Thus, the Leave Application ought to be dismissed.
Conclusion
24. For reasons aforesaid, the application to withdraw the Leave
Application is refused and the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 23rd day of September 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant | | |
|or his solicitors must:| | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s solicitors|the putative |
|may be directed by the |on: 23/09/2026 |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order | |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any | |interested parties as |
|directions given within| |may be directed by the |
|14 days after the leave|Applicant’s ref. no: |Court / the putative |
|was granted (Order 53, |Nil |interested parties’ |
|rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |23/09/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | | |
|within 14 days after | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|the grant of leave and | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|serve it in accordance | |Claims Petition Office |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | |Putative respondent’s |
|and | |ref. no.: |
| | |USM 21048 |
|c) supply to every | | |
|other party copies of | |Director of Immigration |
|every affidavit which | |Putative interested |
|the Applicant proposes | |party’s ref. no.: |
|to use at the hearing, | |QA T/C 896/22 (formerly |
|including the affidavit| |RBCZ 5000751/22) |
|in support of the | | |
|application for leave | |Department of Justice, |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | |Senior Assistant Law |
| | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1