SUPRIYANI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)

Following;

1.   The Applicant’s Form 86 be amended to name the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office as the putative respondent and the Director of Immigration as the putative interested party.

2.   The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.

Observations for the Applicant:

Introduction

1.  By a Form 86 filed on 14 April 2022 (the “Form”), the Applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (the “Leave Application”) against the Decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 17 March 2022 (the “Board’s Decision”)[1].

2.  In the Affirmation in support of the Leave Application, the Applicant exhibited a copy of the Board’s Decision[2] and raised various grounds in support of the Leave Application which I will summarise below:

a.   The Applicant is a national of Indonesia.  She fears the safety of her life in Indonesia, as she fears the loan shark and her husband;

b.   She does not understand Chinese and only speaks Bahasa Indonesia, she did not understand why the Board’s Decision was in Chinese;

c.   There was no assistance and translation provided to the Applicant in completing the Notice of Appeal, no assistance when she was asked to pick up the hearing bundle (for the hearing before the Board) and no help for her to understand the Board’s Decision;

d.   The authorities did not take her unique situation into account fairly; and

e.    She requests a hearing before a Judge so that her case can be considered again with the assistance of an interpreter.  

3.  The oral hearing of the Leave Application took place on 22 January 2026 (the “Hearing”).  At the Hearing, the Applicant was assisted by an Indonesian-English interpreter.  The Applicant informed the Court that she does not want to return to Indonesia as she is scared of her creditor Suroso, who is very powerful in Indonesia.  

Background

4.  The Applicant’s background, the basis of her claim and the arguments she advanced had been set out in detail in the Board’s Decision, and it is not necessary for me to repeat the same here.  The hyperlink to the Board’s Decision is included below[3] for reference.

Discussion

5.  The relevant legal principles are well established.  The Court’s role in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal.  The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board.  Though in non-refoulement cases, the Court will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinising the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the Court should not usurp the role of the Board.  Assessment of evidence, country of origin information (COI) materials, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board (and the Director).  The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at para. 14.  There must be a reasonably arguable case with a realistic prospect of success before leave for judicial review will be granted: see Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676. 

6.  Having considered all the relevant materials before me, I do not consider the Applicant’s intended challenge against the Board’s Decision to be reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

7.  I have reviewed the Board’s Decision in detail.  The Board had fully considered the Applicant’s evidence and his grounds for challenging the Director’s decision in refusing his claim for non-refoulment protection.  The Board found that there were various incredible and inconsistent aspects in her evidence and rejected her case that she and her son will be killed by Sutejo and Suroso if she returns to Indonesia: see the Board’s Decision paras. 14-32.  In any event, even assuming the Applicant’s factual case were to be accepted, the risk from Sutejo and Suroso arising therefrom is low: see the Board’s Decision paras.  34-42.  Further, there are internal relocation options available to the Applicant: see the Board’s Decision paras. 43-52.  On the above bases, the Board took the view that the Applicant would not face any of the relevant risks if she returns to Indonesia and rejected the Applicant’s appeal: see the Board’s Decision paras. 53-68.  I do not consider there to be any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision.

8.  With respect the Applicant’s complaints in paragraphs 2 (a) and (d) above, as explained in the preceding paragraph, the Board had fully taken the Applicant’s situation into account before reaching the Board’s Decision.

9.  With respect to paragraphs 2 (b), (c) and (e) above, at the 2 hearing before the Board, the Applicant was assisted by an Indonesian-English and an Indonesian-Chinese interpreter respectively.  At the Hearing, the Applicant was assisted by an Indonesian-English interpreter.  She has been given sufficient language assistance to present her case.  I do not consider the complaints in the above paragraphs to be valid grounds to challenge the Board’s Decision.  

10.  Leave application of this sort is meant to be a filtering process and this Court is not expected to give elaborated reasons for its decision: see Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at para. 23.  I have considered all the relevant materials in reaching the present decision.

Conclusion

11.  For the reasons stated above, I will dismiss the Leave Application.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1