|
CACV 1207/2025, [2026] HKCA 1331
On Appeal From [2026] HKCA 135
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL APPEAL NO 1207 OF 2025
(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1089 OF 2025)
_______________
_______________
| Before: |
Hon Au JA and Leung J in Court |
| Date of Judgment: |
31 July 2026 |
_______________
J U D G M E N T
_______________
Hon Au JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):
1. On 4 March 2026, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to
apply for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against this court’s judgment of 23 February 2026
(“the Judgment”) ([2026] HKCA 135). In the Judgment, we dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the
decision of Deputy High Court Judge KW Lung (“the Judge”) dated 8 December 2025, by which the Judge
dismissed his application for leave to apply for judicial review ([2025] HKCFI 5764).
2. By a Request for Dismissal of
Appeal filed on 22 April 2026[1], the
applicant requested for dismissal of the intended appeal.
3. On the basis of his said request to dismiss his application
for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal, we dismiss the Notice of Motion. In any event, his
intended application also fails for lack of merit, which we will explain further below.
4. The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as this court’s
reasons for dismissing it, are set out in the Judgment. We will not repeat them here. After
reviewing the Notice of Motion, we see no reason to deviate from the usual practice to consider this application
on paper pursuant to paragraph 3 of Practice Direction 2.1.
5. Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal
Ordinance (Cap 484) (“the HKCFAO”) provides that an appeal shall lie to the Court of Final Appeal at the
discretion of this court or the Court of Final Appeal if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by
reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final
Appeal for decision.
6. In his Notice of Motion, the
applicant alleged that his life would be in danger if he returned to Vietnam and that creditors and gangsters in
Vietnam are cruel and violent and are willing to kill people to satisfy their anger and ferocity. He also
alleged that internal relocation would not be feasible because there would be many difficulties and obstacles
that he would have to face in the new location. He further contended that the nationwide social network of
gangsters and clandestine connections with corrupt people in the government and
police apparatus make it quite possible for those creditors and gangsters to find out his new address. He
also alleged that the Immigration Department did not consider his human rights under various legislations but
failed to particularise his complaint.
7. The applicant lodged written submissions on 9 March 2026.
In those submissions, he reiterated the factual and procedural background of his non-refoulement claim and
cited various general propositions and legal authorities on the requirement of high standards of fairness and
Wednesbury unreasonableness, but failed to show how they are relevant to his case.
8. This application is plainly devoid of merit. The
applicant’s assertions are all vague, bare and unsupported by any particulars or evidence. General
assertions of his fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy
Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6]. His allegations are just a mere
regurgitation of those submissions he had previously made before this court in his appeal, which we had
already considered and rejected in full: see [3] ‑ [11] of the Judgment. He did not identify any
specific error in the Judgment. It is well established that the Court of Appeal will not allow an
application of this nature to be deployed as an occasion for re-running the arguments which had already been
canvassed at the appeal: Ho Sin Ying v Chan Yui Ling & Another (unreported, CACV 221/2013, 14
November 2014) at [2] and [3]. Clearly, his assertions do not constitute proper grounds of appeal.
9. Further and in any event, even taking them at their highest,
his allegations remain fact-specific and do not relate to any question of great general or public importance.
10. Accordingly, the applicant has failed to identify any
question of great general or public importance, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO. We also do
not see any basis for granting leave on the “or otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b) of the HKCFAO.
11. For these reasons, the applicant’s intended appeal has no
merit, and we dismiss the Notice of Motion.
(Thomas Au) Justice of Appeal |
(Simon Leung) Judge of the Court of First Instance |
The applicant acting in person
[1] The Request was wrongly dated 22
April 2025.
|