FAHEEM CHAUDHRY MUHAMMAD v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 211/2021

[2026] HKCFI 3655

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 211 OF 2021

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  On 20 February 2025 I refused to extend time to the Applicant’s late application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) in dismissing his appeal regarding his non-refoulement claim upon finding no good reasons for his serious delay of more than 2 months for the filing of his Form 86, that none of the grounds put forward by him reasonably arguable for his intended challenge, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in the process before the Director of Immigration (“Director”) or the Board or in their decisions, and that there was no reasonable prospect of success in his intended application.

2.  The Applicant now by a summons issued on 12 March 2026 seeks leave to appeal against that decision out of time, as the 14-day period for him to file his appeal under Order 53 rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A ended on 6 March 2025, and hence he was more than 1 year late with his intended appeal.

3.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing against a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the Court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted: see Re MK HCMP 2609/2016, 10 January 2017; Chu On Fong Winter v The Appeal Panel (Housing) HCMP 982/2017, 20 July 2017; Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017, 26 June 2017; Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226; and Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346.

4.  In the Applicant’s case, a delay of more than 1 year must be considered as extremely substantial and inordinate, for which he explained in his affirmation that he was unrepresented and without access to any legal advice, and that at the material time he was trying to resolve or settle the problem that he had in his home country through his friends and family but unsuccessfully that which caused the delay with the filing of his intended appeal.

5.  The court record shows that the decision was sent on the same day of 20 February 2025 to his then reported address without being returned through undelivered post, while his bare assertion of attempts to resolve his problem in his home country even if true or genuine can never be accepted as a good or valid justification for his failure to comply with the procedural rules. As such, I am not satisfied that the Applicant has provided any good reason for his such serious delay.

6.  More importantly, nor did the Applicant put forward any proper or valid draft or proposed grounds of appeal, or any particulars of any error in the decision or why it may be reasonably arguable that the decision was unfair or unreasonable either in his summons or his affirmation in which he just repeated his complaints as before as against the decisions of the Director and the Board, and given their correct findings based on relevant Country of Information (“COI”) of the availability of both state protection and internal relocations to minimize or negate whatever risk that may arise from what was essentially a private dispute between the Applicant and his former girlfriend’s family in his home district on the basis of even his own case, and in the absence of any error in the Court’s decision being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, I do not see any prospect of success in his intended appeal either.

7.  In the premises, and for the reasons given, it would be futile to extend time for what appears to be a hopeless appeal. Accordingly, I refuse his application for leave to appeal out of time, and dismiss the Applicant’s summons.