YASIR MUHAMMAD v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 1461/2020

[2026] HKCFI 256

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 1461 OF 2020

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  By a summons issued on 5 January 2026 (“Summons”) supported by an affirmation of the same date (“Affirmation”) the Applicant sought an extension of time to appeal my order dated 11 December 2025 (“Order”) wherein I had, for reasons set out in [2025] HKCFI 5637 (“Leave Decision”), refused his application for leave to apply for judicial review of a decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”)/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“NRCPO”) dated 5 June 2020 (“TCAB Decision”).

2.  The relevant considerations in relation to such an application are the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the prospects of the intended appeal, and the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time is granted (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226; Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346; Nupur Mst [2018] HKCA 524; Nguyen Van Quyen [2025] HKCA 510). The prospect of success is important as the court will not grant an extension of time to pursue a hopeless appeal (Tran Van Anh [2025] HKCA 408).

3.  The Summons and Affirmation did not explicitly identify any ground of appeal. Rather, taken together and at their highest, they claimed that the Applicant only received the Leave Decision on 30 December 2025 by which time he was out of time to appeal, says that he does not agree with the Leave Decision because his problem still exists in his home country, and that his appeal is very important for his case.

4.  As the 14-day period for the Applicant to appeal against the Order expired on 29 December 2025 (RHC O. 53 r. 3(4)), there is a delay of 7 days. I shall hence focus on the merits of the appeal.

5.  In that regard I see no basis (in the nature of an error of law, a failure to take account of relevant matters already placed before the court, or that I was plainly wrong) on which the Court of Appeal would reverse my decision (Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524). I had in the Leave Decision mentioned that the role of the Court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal, further to which I had reviewed the TCAB Decision with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, applying the enhanced Wednesbury standard, and saw no reasonably arguable public law grounds to vitiate such or that would justify the grant of leave. The Applicant has not identified any ground of appeal in relation to such, let alone one which is sufficiently particularised.

6.  Given the above, an extension of time for the Applicant to advance a hopeless appeal would substantially and needlessly prejudice the respondent.

7.  In the circumstances, I refuse the application and dismiss the Summons.