A SOLICITOR v. THE LAW SOCIETY OF HONG KONG

CACV 188/2012

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 188OF 2012

(ON APPEAL FROM THE FINDINGS AND ORDER OF

THE SOLICITORS DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL

DATED 5TH MARCH 2012 AND 8TH AUGUST 2012)

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BETWEEN

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Stock VP (giving the judgment of the Court):

1.  By a judgment handed down on 28 February 2014, this Court dismissed an appeal from a finding of a Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal in relation to the non-payment by a solicitor of a barrister’s fees.

2.  By notice of motion dated 28 March 2014, the solicitor seeks leave to appeal that decision to the Court of Final Appeal pursuant to the provisions of section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484.

3.  The parties have agreed that the application for leave be dealt with on the papers.

4.  The application for leave is based on the suggestion that there are a number of questions involved in the appeal which by reason of their great general public importance ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal.  The questions are included in six separate paragraphs but each such paragraph in itself contains several questions; and the whole of the suggested questions run to almost four closely typed pages.  The questions are not easy to follow and although the applicant is not legally represented, he is a trained lawyer and one might have hoped for something more precise.

5.  Be that as it may, the case essentially turned on the factual history, as to which the evidence told strongly against the appellant.  By his application the solicitor seeks, in effect, to re-run the factual issues.  The factual issues do not raise questions of public importance.

6.  We held also that even if, contrary to the weight of the evidence, there had been an arrangement between solicitor and barrister of the kind asserted by the solicitor, that in itself would constitute a breach of the solicitor’s duty to his client and to the court; in so far as that is a matter of law, we are of the view that the contrary is not reasonably arguable.

7.  The applicant seems then to rely on the “or otherwise” limb of section 22(1)(b) in that he asserts that the case should be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision, “having regard to the substantial amount of money or value at stake.”  It is difficult to discern the basis of this contention save for the point made by the applicant that as a result of the intervention of the Law Society upon his bankruptcy, which he says was a wrongful intervention, he has suffered heavy financial losses.  In our judgment of 28 February 2014, we explained why that intervention did not constitute a reasonable excuse for the failure to pay the barrister’s fees.  This is not a suitable case for leave to be granted on the “or otherwise” limb.

8.  The application for leave to appeal is dismissed; and we make a costs order nisi that the costs of the application be to the respondent.