RE FAYAZ MUHAMMAD

CACV 1211/2025, [2026] HKCA 237

On appeal from [2025] HKCFI 6209

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 1211 OF 2025

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 1253/2025)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  This is an appeal against the decision of DHCJ To (“the Judge”) given on 12 December 2025[1] (“the Leave Decision”) refusing to grant leave for the applicant to apply for judicial review. The intended judicial review was against the decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 23 May 2025 (“the Director’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant’s request to make a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection.

2.  The applicant previously lodged a non-refoulement claim on 28 February 2014 (based on the BOR 3 risk^[2], the persecution risk^[3] and the torture risk^[4]), which has been finally determined on 2 September 2024 (see Leave Decision, [2] and [4]).  Separately, the applicant’s non-refoulement claim based on the BOR 2 risk^[5] was also finally determined on 13 December 2022 (see Leave Decision, [3]).

3.  The applicant’s background, the basis of his previous non‑refoulement claim, the basis of his application in making a subsequent claim and the Director’s reasons in reaching the Director’s Decision have been set out by the Judge in the Leave Decision at [7]-[17], which will not be repeated.

4.  After considering the documents filed by the applicant as well as oral submissions made by him at the hearing of the leave application, the Judge dismissed the application for the reasons stated at [18]-[27] of the Leave Decision.  

Appeal to this court

5.  By a Notice of Appeal dated 18 December 2025, the applicant stated: 

“The High Court did not consider my JR. Adjudicator did not give me correct decision. His decision is full of wrong. Please grant my leave.”

6.  By written submissions dated 22 January 2026, the applicant repeated the hardships he allegedly faced should he be refouled, and contended (without providing any particulars or basis to such contentions) inter alia that (i) the Judge was wrong as a matter of law for not having applied “the principle of procedural unfairness” in his consideration of the Director’s Decision; (ii) the Judge did not have due regard to the requirements of procedural fairness; (iii) the Judge “reviewed the matter lightly” and did not accord to “high standards of fairness”; and (iv) the Adjudicator failed to give sufficient chances to the applicant to “arrange relevant evidence” in respect of his claim. 

7.  We heard the appeal on 10 February 2026, at which the applicant appeared in person.  At the hearing, the applicant submitted that the situation in his country was still dangerous, as “party leaders are still missing” and that if he were to return, he would be arrested.

Discussion

8.  As this court has often stated, an appeal to the Court of Appeal is not a fresh application for judicial review.  It is necessary to identify some error on the part of the judge that would justify this court in intervening: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14].  The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.  An appeal is not the occasion for regurgitating arguments advanced and rejected by the judge or for running arguments which could and should have been raised but were not raised before the judge.  In the determination of an appeal, the Court of Appeal focuses on the decision of the judge and the court will only reverse that decision if an appellant could demonstrate that the judge made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before the court or was otherwise plainly wrong.

9.  The applicant has failed to identify any error on the part of the Judge and thus failed to raise any viable ground of appeal. The points advanced by the applicant were bare assertions unsupported by particulars or evidence.  General assertions of fear if refouled do not constitute proper grounds of appeal: Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627 at [6].

10.  In the present case, the Director considered the matters submitted by the applicant in his first letter dated 12 September 2024, which contained his substantive request for the making of a subsequent non-refoulment claim[6].  The Director also considered further evidence submitted by the applicant on 24 April 2025 in support of his request.  Finally, the applicant also attended an interview with the Director on 7 May 2025, at which he provided further evidence and elaboration in respect of his request. 

11.  In essence, the applicant’s alleged fear of harm in his previous claim was said to arise by reason of his membership in the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) political party and the Pakistan Sunni Tehreek religious group.  In his subsequent claim, he submitted to the Director that he had, since or around the determination of his previous claim, joined the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (a popular political party in Pakistan; “TLP”), which attracted oppression from other political parties such as the Pakistan Peoples Party and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf.  The applicant, separately, also contended that he wished to remain in Hong Kong as he was suffering from medical conditions such as breathing problems and walking difficulties (see Leave Decision, [7]-[12]). 

12.  The Director noted that the applicant claimed to have joined TLP in Hong Kong, since the determination of his previous claim, via social media.  The Director found the applicant’s evidence on his joining of TLP (including his knowledge and understanding of the party, and his alleged support for such party) to be incredible.  The Director concluded that the current situation of TLP in Pakistan has no relevance to the applicant personally, and nor was he of any official capacity in TLP.  The Director was also unconvinced that the applicant’s medical condition “would surmount to the extent that [the applicant] should not be refouled to [his] home country”, and such would not in any event amount to a significant change of circumstances which would permit his making of a subsequent claim (see Director’s Decision, [11]-[24]).  

13.  These were factual findings open to the Director on the evidence, and were sufficiently canvassed and considered by the Judge in the Leave Decision at [13]-[27].  We see no basis to interfere.

14.  The applicant has failed to demonstrate how the Director had acted unlawfully or procedurally unfairly in reaching its Decision, or how such Decision could be said to be Wednesbury unreasonable.

15.  As we have noted, the applicant advanced no viable grounds of appeal against the Judge’s decision.  There is therefore no merit in the appeal and we dismiss the appeal accordingly.