CHU VAN THAO v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5819 · HCAL 1033/2024
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1033/2024
[2026] HKCFI 5819
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1033 OF 2024
BETWEEN
| |Chu Van Thao |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
|Π|consideration of the documents only; or |
| |consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the applicant or |
| |counsel in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated 2 June 2024 and filed on 2 July 2024, the
applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 17 May 2024 (“the Board’s Decision”). The
Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2024/HCAL00
1033_2024_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant’s appeal/petition against the
decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 21
November 2023 (“the Director’s Decision”) failed on all the applicable
grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the
Board confirmed the Director’s Decision, which rejected the
applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
Amendment
3. In Form 86, the applicant named the Board / Non-refoulement Claims
Petition Office as the putative respondent, when only the Board should
be so named.
4. The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office which
provides administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of
the Board and should not be named as a putative respondent at all.
5. Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of
the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”.
The applicant’s case
6. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
7. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Vietnam, he would be harmed or killed by a moneylender
named THUC due to his failure to repay the loan he borrowed from THUC
to finance the expansion of his wooden furniture making business.
Disposal on paper
8. The applicant did not request for an oral hearing of the Leave
Application. This court is also satisfied that the Leave Application
can be disposed of based on the written materials before this court.
Hence, the Leave Application is dealt with on paper.
Grounds for judicial review
9. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
10. The applicant did not advance any ground for his intended judicial
review in Form 86. In his supporting affirmation dated 2 July 2023,
the applicant mentioned a few matters, which are summarised as
follows:-
1) He had no knowledge of English or Chinese so he did not know how to
proceed with his application for judicial review;
2) He did not have the financial means to obtain concrete legal advice
regarding the procedure of appeal;
3) His life would be in danger because his creditor and his creditor’s
subordinates could have inflicted more serious harm had they intended
to do so; and
4) He did not have any source [sic] to rely on since his family was very
poor and they were unable to help him to solve his problem.
Discussion
11. First of all, it is trite that the high standards of fairness required
by law would not entail interpretation service being made available at
any time the applicant desires (see Re Gurnishan Singh [2018] HKCA 704
and Re Gurung Sagar [2019] HKCA 658).
12. In fact, all the documents filed by the applicant in relation to the
Leave Application were written in English. This indicates clearly
that the applicant is either familiar with the English language or he
has access to such language assistance if needed. The applicant
cannot claim that he has been prejudiced at all.
13. In respect of the applicant’s allegation that there was a lack of
legal assistance, the applicant was actually provided with legal
assistance during the first-tier screening of his non-refoulement
claim. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly emphasized that, as a
matter of law, a non-refoulement claimant is not entitled to free
legal representation at all stages of the process (see Re
Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14; Re Zahid Abbas [2018] HKCA 15; Re Tariq
Farhan [2018] HKCA 17; and Re Lopchan Subash [2018] HKCA 37). Thus,
there is no substance in this allegation.
14. Finally, the applicant’s alleged risk from his creditor had been duly
assessed but rejected by the Board. If he intends to challenge the
Board’s finding of facts, it is not permissible in an application for
judicial review unless there were errors of law, procedural
unfairness, or irrationality in the Board’s Decision.
15. Thus, none of the matters raised in the applicant’s supporting
affirmation constitutes any valid ground to challenge the Board’s
Decision.
16. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
17. Thus, despite the fact that the applicant did not advance any valid
ground for the intended judicial review, this court will scrutinize
the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural unfairness, or
irrationality as aforesaid.
18. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 12 March 2024. The applicant was present and was thus
given the chance to present his case to the Board in person.
19. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board gave full and
detailed reasoning in rejecting the applicant’s claims. Its analysis
and findings in relation to the applicant’s claims were laid out in
paragraphs 59 to 63 and 64 to 67 of the Board’s Decision respectively,
and it is not necessary to repeat the same here.
20. In gist, the Board found significant inconsistencies in the
applicant’s evidence. The Board found that the applicant was not a
witness of truth and his evidence could not be relied upon to prove
any of the matters that he asserted. The Board found no evidence to
support that the applicant borrowed money from a loan shark to fund
the expansion of a furniture business.
21. The Board considered that the existence of a loan that the applicant
failed to repay was fundamental to his case. In the absence of a
loan, the question of repayment would not arise and the pursuit of the
applicant by a moneylender would fall away. The Board found no
credible evidence that the applicant was assaulted as he claimed or
that he would be at risk from a loan shark if he returned to Vietnam.
22. Thus, on the whole of the evidence, the Board found that the applicant
would not face a real risk of harm if he returned to his country, and
concluded that the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection
failed on all the applicable grounds under the USM.
23. The Board did not consider availability of state protection and
viability of internal relocation. However, as the Board found that
the applicant did not face a real risk of torture, ill-treatment,
arbitrary deprivation of life or persecution in his country at all, it
is not necessary for the Board to consider the availability of state
protection.
24. As to internal relocation, it is a well-recognised principle that the
decision-maker only needs to consider internal relocation if the
applicant has established that he qualifies as a refugee pursuant to
Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention (see Robinson v SSHD & Anor
[1997] EWCA Civ 3090, dated 11.7.1997). In other words, internal
relocation only arises if the applicant has established a real risk of
persecution in his home area (see Gardi v SSHD [2002] 1 WLR 2755).
25. As it is the Board’s finding that the applicant had no real risk of
any of the proscribed forms of harm whatsoever, it is not necessary
for the Board to further consider internal relocation.
26. The finding of facts relating to a non-refoulement claim, including
the assessment of evidence and risk of harm, was solely within the
ambit of the Board in dealing with the applicant’s appeal/petition.
This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way the Board
reached its decision.
27. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
28. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
29. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 21st day of October 2026
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or his solicitors | | |
|must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / the|
|interested parties as |applicant’s |putative respondent’s |
|may be directed by the|solicitors |solicitors / such |
|Court the order |on: 21/10/2026 |putative interested |
|granting leave and any| |parties as may be |
|directions given |Applicant’s ref. no: |directed by the Court / |
|within 14 days after |Nil |the putative interested |
|the leave was granted | |parties’ solicitors on: |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |21/10/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and| |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance| |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 22525 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the Applicant proposes| |QA T/C 1153/23 (formerly |
|to use at the hearing,| |RBCZ 5001190/23) |
|including the | | |
|affidavit in support | |Department of Justice, |
|of the application for| |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit 2)|
Form CALL-1